highest authorities, like Lord Wolseley and Lord Roberts, have joined in sounding a note of alarm and in reasoning with the too numerous class of stubborn Englishmen who, in the blindness of their pride and ignorance, are confident that Great Britain will, somehow, always rise superior to the occasion, as she has so far done, and who will not admit the necessity for any change in her institutions and methods. The cause of this disturbance among thinking and observant Englishmen is the enormous place Russia has occupied, within the space of a hundred years, as a political factor in the world. No event in modern history is comparable in importance to the internal and external development of Russia and its expansion in every direction. No other country, not even Germany, has more reason than Great Britain to view with apprehension this mighty phenomenon. The direct contact which the Muscovite advance in Asia has established between AngloSaxon dominion and the great Slav Empire must deeply influence the destiny of the British people and the fate of the world.

The prediction of Napoleon, "L'Europe sera républicaine ou Cosaque," seems to be gaining plausibility, even in an extended sense, for the march of modern events may very well be interpreted to mean that the political problem of the world is getting gradually reduced to three or four, or at the outside five, factors— Great Britain, Russia, the United States, possibly Germany, and, if the yellow race awakens from its torpor in time, China. The force which would bring about this situation is that of the numerical strength of States. In this direction the possibilities of the three first named Powers are infinite, but those of Germany, although good as far as actual increase of population is concerned, are threatened by emigration and denationalization. The advantages of civilization cannot fail to acquire uniformity and international balance through a continuous process of endosmosis and exosmosis and owing to the universal character of science and arts. It does not seem unreasonable to say, then, that numbers will govern the world and determine the future grouping of humanity. The principle of nationalities, which is the only obstacle in the way of a simplification of the present political divisions of the world, is one whose career, although successful in the southeast of Europe, does not warrant the expectation of a failure of the policy of expansion through the absorption of inferior or weak races which suggests itself to-day to the great Powers.

Who is the optimistic politician who can predict anything but extinction to Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway and Sweden? And having foreseen this reduction of European factors, why should he stop at that point and go no further? Supposing, then, that the rollers of American, British, German, Russian and Chinese supremacy have crushed political and ethnical distinctions into five uniform masses, there are but two alternatives left: eternal peace on the basis of a federation of these five masses, or, what seems less probable, a further process of simplification, and again eternal peace on the basis of a fusion of the five into one government-Muscovite, in all likelihood, for her youth and strong rule are chances in favor of the survival of Russia? Universal federation will mean universal brotherhood in a restricted sense; universal fusion will mean universal brotherhood in an absolute sense; and what is considered as the highest dream of humanity will have been realized at the expense of principles which, with more than usual inconsistency, we cherish to-day to the point of staking our lives for them, although they mean, in the form of patriotism and national competitions, the prolongation of universal strife and hatred.

But, abandoning the deceptive mirages of speculation and going back to sober realities, I repeat that the meeting in Asia of Great Britain and Russia is fraught with tremendous consequences. It is the clashing of two great dreams, two plans for what is Cæsarism on a gigantic scale. What are the conditions of the struggle?

After centuries of insular isolation, determining a peculiar orientation of ideas and a special cast of institutions, England has suddenly dropped into the condition of a continental Power. In running up against Russia in the neighborhood of India, practically on the frontier of India, in colliding with Russia in China and Persia, she does not come into contact with a detached portion of the Russian Power, represented by a colony or an isolated group of interests, but with the whole mass of the Russian Empire, which, having enjoyed the privilege of expanding continuously, forms one uninterrupted stretch of territory. Thus, England's superiority as a naval power, so decisive in her relations to Germany and France, who are both vulnerable to her attacks on their colonies, is of no avail against Russia, who, on the contrary, confronts her British rival with overwhelming military re

sources and superior facilities of communication. In this way Russia is the mistress of the situation in the East. To this cause is principally due the eclipse of British influence in Turkey, China and Persia. In the great crisis which the new conditions of international life have created for England, she has been at a material disadvantage, which she is loath to meet with any change in her institutions; and yet she has lamentably failed in diplomacy, the only weapon left to her for securing compensation and balancing the chances of the struggle. It is a fact that, on every occasion, British statesmanship and diplomacy have been outwitted by Slav astuteness, which has secured a further advantage to Russia in the East.

It will be interesting to compare Russian with British diplomacy, to bring to light their respective methods, their merits and modes of action.

That part of statesmanship called diplomacy is the art employed by governments in their dealings with one another, or against one another, to obtain the most for the least, to secure, over and above such conditions as are guaranteed by natural law or by treaties or by the possession of superior power, advantages which may be won by resourcefulness in bargaining and skill in finesse, reinforced by unscrupulousness when necessary. This is not the official definition, I know, but the sole or even principal object of diplomacy is not, as some maintain, the defense of the members of a State in their rights and interests. This task is the routine and drudgery of diplomacy. It is performed mechanically, as it were, and without serious hitches, under the tutelar wing of international law-unless, indeed, one party is very inferior to the other in civilization, in which case the restraints of right and law are conveniently ignored. In its vital and essential aspects, what I must be pardoned for calling its higher flights, diplomacy is still to-day, as it has been from the time of its origin during the struggle of the Italian republics with the transalpine Powers down to Talleyrand and Bismarck, the art of deceiving and overreaching. If, as has been asserted, the American Commonwealth enjoys the privilege of possessing a diplomacy which has never stooped to the tortuous ways employed by others, it is not, as is implied, because the exercise of the craft can be, if its adepts be so minded or educated, directed solely by principles of directness, frankness and tact. It is because, until lately,

the United States has not been implicated in international politics, and its action abroad has been limited to the consideration of its commercial or social interests, whose defense is a task which can be performed in the light of day. By inaugurating an imperial policy and annexing the Philippines, the United States has plunged into the field of international rivalry and will soon feel the necessity of adopting the occult weapons of other Powers.

Diplomacy may achieve its ends, if they are frank and honest, through the instrumentality of a man like Franklin, who was guided throughout his foreign career by truth and common sense. Many a diplomatist reaches a venerable age in his profession without having practised it otherwise than in the form of learned discussions with Secretaries of State and references to texts and jurisprudence or appearances at stately balls and dinners. But even these must admit that, at least potentially, every diplomatist contains an agent committed to cunning and unscrupulousness, whose calling must find him ready to accomplish, when national interest claims it from him, acts which in private life would be considered immoral or criminal. If it were necessary to adduce proofs in support of the view given here of diplomacy, the disposal of secret funds, sometimes enormous, by most diplomatic agents, and the scandals connected with the activity of military attachés in different capitals, could be quoted as conclusive ones. Politics are governed by a special code of ethics-that which is contained in the maxim, "the end justifies the means;" and, although nations keep up the comedy of virtuous pretenses, they subscribe to acts of injustice or fraud performed in their behalf and secretly condone them. It is quite as much as humanity can do to create in its midst a sincere feeling of reprobation against private villainy. This is not stated as an apology for vice, but to show that the ethics of humanity, like everything else in the world, are a relative and conventional quantity, and that we will always find our infirm nature ready to seek relief from the restraints of conscience in the reservation of spheres of action where our primitive instincts can have full play. With nations it is the field of politics; with individuals it is the field of love. If, for instance, the strewing of a battlefield with thousands of human corpses in the name of national interest is a meritorious and even glorious action, while, on the contrary, the wilful destruction of one man by another in the name of private interest is condemned and

punished as a crime, why should the practices of diplomacy entail reprobation and odium, though the same practices in private life be destructive of reputation?

Diplomacy is essentially a game of observation and cleverness; one in which patience and caution alternate with boldness and promptness of action; in which intelligent management neutralizes the disadvantages of a naturally unfavorable situation, or even snatches victory out of the conditions of defeat; in other words, it is a game of poker, but poker in which peeping and other questionable devices are liberally practised. It follows that success in diplomatic enterprises depends mainly on agility and suppleness of thought, on elasticity of political conscience, on the powers of adaptability and assimilation, and not on any of the transcendent qualities of mind and character, which are too unwieldy and heavy to be of much use on the quicksands of international politics, where, indeed, they are likely to do more harm than good unless allied with great address. They will provoke admiration and esteem, but they will seldom lead to practical success.

Among the qualities indispensable to a good diplomatist, the most important are knowledge of human nature and skill in putting that knowledge to account. Psychology is the source of inspiration of diplomacy. An intelligent and, when occasion demands, unscrupulous use of the insight psychology gives into the workings of the brain and soul, is the triumph of diplomacy. Personal attractions and social accomplishments are among its most powerful adjuncts.

The golden age of diplomacy was in the time of absolute monarchs or ministers, when the action of States depended not on definitely fixed conceptions of national interest, but on the ideas and passions of one man; when kings were governed by fair favorites, and these in turn by lieutenants of the body guard; when a witty word or timely compliment turned the political scales, and when golden weights restored them to their former balance. To-day, the opportunities of diplomacy have considerably decreased. Scientific conceptions of the nature of the State have, in most cases, transferred its centre of gravity from the sovereign to the nation. Closely defined and rationally elaborated commercial and politcal ideals have taken the place of the fumbling, empirical and dishonest methods of the past. The mutual relations of most of the modern States are governed by fixed