interests from year to year, directing the operation of departments and creating irresponsible commissions to usurp the powers of city officers, will in the end nullify every effort to establish intelligent and economical municipal government.

Many grave problems are involved in the proper management of the affairs of great cities, and in recent years there has been much study of the general subject. The intelligent development of the resources and utilities that are the common property of the people is now recognized as a matter of more importance than changes in the routine of taxation and expenditure. Municipal ownership of public utilities has been accepted as a correct principle; but the possibilities of the system cannot be realized without charter powers that conform to modern conditions. The old plan of incorporating in every city charter certain arbitrary financial restrictions, which are in most cases supplemented by constitutional safeguards, was an error on the side of caution to begin with, and to-day the system is as much out of date as the stage coach and the horse car.

Legislatures have too often attempted to make one general plan of municipal government fit every city in a State, without regard to the geographical or industrial conditions of the cities. A charter that might be well nigh perfect for an interior town of limited population might, on the other hand, prove to be a crushing legal incubus upon a seaboard city or a great metropolis. With few exceptions, State constitutions limit the borrowing capacity of cities to a fixed proportion of the assessed value of taxable property, and no classification or exception of obligations is made. Under this system the public property, no matter how valuable, is not available as an asset, nor is it negotiable as security for a loan. The property owned by the city of New York is worth, roughly estimated, $500,000,000; yet, under constitutional and charter provisions, the municipality cannot borrow a cent upon this security, the limit of indebtedness being fixed at ten per cent. of the assessed value of taxable real estate. The city cannot tax its own property, and it is therefore forced into the unbusinesslike and apparently contradictory position of growing richer and poorer at the same time. Every time the municipality acquires real estate for any purpose, its borrowing capacity is reduced by an amount equal to ten per cent. of the assessed value of the land acquired, its income from taxation is reduced, and the property,

no matter how valuable it may be, at once becomes worthless as an available asset. No private business could long exist under such a system of restriction.

To continue with New York as an illustration of the charter needs of great cities, nearly one-fourth of the gross funded debt of the city was incurred for the development of two great public utilities, water works and docks, both of which are profitable investments. The revenue derived from the water-front property that has been improved by the city is large enough to meet the interest on the bonds issued to pay for the work, and to provide a sinking fund that will retire the securities as they fall due. This will leave the city in possession of a most valuable property free of debt and yielding a large net revenue that may then be applied to the reduction of taxation. But, under existing constitutional and charter restrictions, every dollar of debt incurred to develop this paying property is a charge against the borrowing capacity of the city and, therefore, a check upon other public improvements. Substantially the same condition of facts exists in the Department of Water Supply, the receipts from the sale of water being more than enough to pay interest on the bonds issued to build the plant. The financial ability of the city to carry on general public work is restricted by the issue of bonds for the purpose of developing into paying properties two public utilities. In the case of these two properties, the taxpayers are merely sureties for the payment of the bonds. They pay neither principal nor interest, because the property improved earns both; but for twenty years the borrowing capacity of the city is restricted by obligations that are mere formalities.

For the building of the underground rapid-transit railroad the city is amply secured against interest and principal of the bonds issued, and at the end of fifty years it will own the property free of cost to the taxpayers; but for all that period the sum of $35,000,000 must stand charged against the borrowing capacity, or the available assets of the corporation. When the bonds have been retired and the road is the unencumbered property of the city, its only available value as an asset will be the net revenue that may be earned. If the property should possess the market value of $100,000,000, under existing restrictions the municipality could not in any way utilize it as a pledge for loans to develop other public utilities.

The original purpose of these extraordinary safeguards was, doubtless, a wise and necessary one, because they would unquestionably prevent a city from rushing into bankruptcy; but, for a great and progressive municipality that would conduct its affairs according to tried methods of business, the system is a huge . stumbling block in the path of material progress. If the people of the city of New York should vote unanimously to extend municipal ownership to all public or semi-public utilities, a new system of finance would have to be devised before the mandate could be obeyed. Should the municipality acquire by purchase street railroads and lighting plants to the value of $300,000,000, that amount of property would be withdrawn from taxation and the borrowing capacity of the city would be reduced by $30,000,000. If bonds could be legally issued for the amount of property mentioned, it is doubtful if the investment would ever earn enough to pay interest on the loan and replace the loss in taxes.

The time is not far distant when the charters of all the larger cities of the United States will be amended or entirely reconstructed, to accord with advanced knowledge of municipal government. This work provides a broad field for the exercise of political wisdom. The new charters must be adapted to the special needs of cities, and not constructed on a general plan in which unnecessary financial restrictions will hamper development. Limitations of borrowing capacity must be retained and the credit of every municipality amply safeguarded in the fundamental law; but a plan must be devised to separate, in the debt account, profitable investments from obligations incurred for current expenses and miscellaneous improvements. Municipal ownership of public utilities must remain a mere academic principle or sound political theory, if cities are not permitted to develop public property in a businesslike way. A debt incurred to convert public property into a paying investment is never a burden upon taxpayers, and that fact must be recognized in the making of new charters.

Base a city charter upon a sound financial system, and the work of providing for good government is half done. The feature next in importance is proper recognition of the fact that, in the conduct of municipal business, there must be organization and discipline, and that full responsibility must be the penalty of power. There is no reason to fear centralization in city government; and, without a responsible head to plan and direct, the

public business will fall into confusion and neglect. A Mayor should have enough power over subordinates to justify the city in holding him to full responsibility for their acts. A better method of compelling the appointment of good men has not been devised.

The chief officers of a city, those in control of large departments, ought to be elected by the people for short terms with the privilege of re-election. The appropriation of money for current expenses, the authorization of bonds and the approval of plans and contracts for large expenditures should never rest in a Board, Commission or Committee controlled by appointed officers. The chief financial officer, if responsible for payments and expenditures, should have veto power over them, and there should be no board or divided authority at the head of any department.

The complete realization of home rule for cities is supposed to include a legislative branch of government, and Aldermen and Councilmen have existed long enough to become a popular tradition. That a nominal legislative body can serve any useful purpose in a correct system of municipal administration is an open question, with good argument on either side; but it is, unfortunately, a matter of history that the record of such bodies in recent years has done more than anything else to discredit their official existence. With few exceptions, the system of government that has prevailed in American cities has relegated the law-making or ordinance-making branch to a position of minor importance. As a rule, such bodies have had no control of expenditures; and where they have had authority over public property and franchises they have too often made the rights of the people a means to corrupt personal gain, thereby discrediting the system which is responsible for their existence. There have been various experiments with so-called Municipal Assemblies, and the results have in no case been satisfactory. To abolish the representative branch of city government outright would involve a general re-distribution of duties, powers and responsibilities among other departments; but the result of the present system is, in nearly every case, the only plausible excuse for constant State interference in local affairs.

Municipal Legislatures do not legislate, and the statement of that fact briefly sums up the story of their failures. One corrupt Board of Aldermen will discredit the system for a generation, but there are many minor details in the management of business

affairs of a municipality that may be entrusted to an elective Assembly, under proper charter provisions and restrictions. Such bodies must have more power or less, and the results of recent experiments indicate that in future they should be restricted to routine matters and details that cannot affect the general system of administration. If their powers are increased, the change should carry with it pay and the possibility of civic distinction that would induce the best citizens to seek the office of Alderman or Councilman. In any event, the charters of cities should so clearly define the powers and duties of the legislative branch of government that corruption and obstruction would be rendered impossible.

Other imperative charter needs of great cities are improved systems of taxation and the elimination of complicated laws and ordinances in other words, brevity and simplicity. To-day, every head of a department in New York, and possibly in other large cities, violates the law and commits a misdemeanor at least once a week, not because such officers are ignorant or corrupt, but for the reason that charter provisions are incompatible with practical business methods of administration. There are too many laws; and far too often the laws are not understood until interpreted by the highest court of a State after vexatious and expensive litigation.

A charter that will admit of honest, intelligent and progressive city government must decree, clearly and positively, the duties and powers of every officer to be elected or appointed. Then it should prohibit, absolutely, interference with purely local affairs by a State Legislature. It should not admit the possibility of a private or corporate interest going beyond the local authorities for special privileges or exemptions. BIRD S. COLER.