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nesses, at the time of his arrest, that he left Chicago on the evening of September 18th to go to Harvey about 7 o'clock, he testified on the trial, and one or two other witnesses also testified, that he did not leave the downtown part of the city until after 10 o'clock on Sunday evening, September 18th. He stated once or twice after his arrest that he went to Harvey to visit acquaintances named Robinson, and gave the officers to understand that after visiting with them he missed the street car and walked back. The state proved by the Robinsons that he did not call on them on the night in question, and later Jennings testified in his own behalf that he knocked at the Robinsons' door and no one responded, so he went to a place called Phoenix, a short distance from Harvey, where he visited a saloon. No other witness corroborated him as to his presence in Harvey, Phoenix, or at any other point south of the Halsted residence on the night in question. He denied being at the Halsted house, the McNabb house, or the Hiller house, or having anything to do with the shooting. When arrested he denied that he had ever been arrested before, giving his name as Will Jones.

Mrs. Hiller testified that their house had but recently been painted, the back porch, which was the last part done, being completed on the Saturday preceding the shooting. Entrance to the house had been gained by the murderer through a rear window of the kitchen, from which he had first removed the window screen. Near the window was a porch, on the railing of which a person entering the window could support himself. On the railing in the fresh paint was the imprint of four fingers of some one's left hand. This railing was removed in the early morning after the murder by officers from the identification bureau of the Chicago police force and enlarged photographs were made

of the prints. Jennings, when returned to the penitentiary for the violation of his parole, in March, 1910, had a print of his fingers taken and another print was taken after this arrest. These impressions were likewise enlarged for the purpose of comparison with the enlarged photographs of the prints on the railing. Four witnesses, over the objection and exception of counsel, testified that in their opinion the prints on the railing and the prints taken from Jennings' fingers by the identification bureau were made by the same person. . : :

It is contended that the evidence as to the comparison of photographs of the finger marks on the railing with the enlarged finger prints of plaintiff in error was improperly admitted. While the courts of this country do not appear to have had occasion to pass on the question, standard authorities on scientific subjects discuss the use of finger prints as a system of identification, concluding that experience has shown it to be reliable. 10 Ency. Britannica (11th Ed.), 376; 5 Nelson's Ency. 28. See, also, Gross' Crim. Investigation (Adams' Transl.), 277; Fuld's Police Administration, 342; Osborn's Questioned Documents, 479. These authorities state that this system of identification is of very ancient origin, having been used in Egypt when the impression of the monarch's thumb was used as his sign manual, that it has been used in the courts of India for many years and more recently in the courts of several European countries; that in recent years its use has become very general by the police departments of the large cities of this country and Europe; that the great success of the system in England, where it has been used since 1891 in thousands of cases without error, caused the sending of an investigating commission from the United States, on whose favorable report a bureau was established by

the United States government in the war and other departments.

Four witnesses testified for the state as to the finger prints. William M. Evans stated that he began the study of the subject in 1904; that he had been connected with the bureau of identification of the Chicago police department in work of this character for about a year; that he had personally studied between 4000 and 5000 finger prints and had himself made about 2000; that the bureau of identification had some 25,000 different impressions classified; that he had examined the exhibits in question, and on the forefinger he found 14 points of identity, and on the second finger 11 points; that in his judgment the finger prints on the railing were made by the same person as those taken from the plaintiff in error's fingers by the identification bureau.

Edward Foster testified that he was inspector of dominion police at Ottawa, Canada, connected with the bureau of identification; that he had a good deal to do with finger prints for six years or more; that he had special work along that line in Vancouver and elsewhere in Canada; that he had studied the subject at Scotland Yard; that he began the study in St. Louis in 1904 under a Scotland Yard man and had taken about 2500 finger prints; that he had studied the exhibits in question and found 14 points of resemblance on the forefinger; that the two sets of prints were made by the fingers of the same person.

Mary E. Holland testified that she resided in Chicago; that she began investigation of finger-print impressions in 1904, studied at Scotland Yard in 1908, passed an examination on the subject, and started the first bureau of identification in this country for the United States government at Washington; that they have over 100,000 prints at Scotland Yard; that she also had studied the two sets of prints and believed them to have been

made by the fingers of the same

person.

Michael P. Evans testified that he had been in the bureau of identification of the Chicago police department for 27 years; that the bureau had been using the system of fingerprint impressions since January 1, 1905, and that they also used the Bertillon system; that he had studied the question since 1905 or 1906 and had made between 6000 and 7000 finger prints; that he had charge of the making of the photographs of the prints on the railing; that in his judgment the various impressions were made by the fingers of the same person.

All of these witnesses testified at more or less length as to the basis of the system and the various markings found on the human hand, stating that they were classified from the various forms of markings, including those known as "arches," "loops," "whorls," and "whorls," and "deltas." It was further insisted on oral argument and in the briefs of the plaintiff in error that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict.

We deem it not improper to say that all the incriminating proof points to the accused. There is absolutely nothing in the record tending to show that the crime was committed by any one else. Among the many circumstances which must have convinced the court and jury that the plaintiff in error was the criminal agent were his statements, so inconsistent with the testimony of many other witnesses, in explaining his whereabouts on the night in question; also his statements as to how the blood came to be on his clothing, how he received the wound on his arm, and the tearing of his coat pocket. Then, too, they must have considered his lack of motive in going to Harvey and almost immediately turning around and coming back; the improbability, when he had sufficient money to pay his car fare, that he should walk that

distance at that time of the night when the cars were running each hour and one left within an hour after he claims he started; the condition of his clothing when arrested; the sand in his shoes and on the young girl's bed; the evidence that his revolver had recently been discharged; the testimony of three witnesses that he was seen in the neighborhood of the crime just before its commission; the fact that

the bullets which had inflicted the mortal wounds were of the same size and kind as those in his revolver. No one of these circumstances, considered alone, would be conclusive of his guilt, but when all the facts and circumstances introduced in evidence are considered together, the jury were justified in believing that a verdict of guilty should follow as a logical sequence.

TITLE III:

EVIDENCE TO PROVE A HUMAN TRAIT,
QUALITY, OR CONDITION

27. JOHN H. WIGMORE. Principles of Judicial Proof. (1913.)1 The reasons for dividing into four groups the whole subject of Circumstantial Evidence have been already stated (ante, No. 3). The groups being distinguished according to the probanda to be proved, the third group is now to be considered, namely, Evidence to prove a Human Quality, Condition, or other attribute. This group of Probanda separates itself from the fourth (Human Acts) with fair distinctness, because the circumstances available as evidence are usually distinct for the two groups. Though the distinction between the two groups is only a rough and practical one, nevertheless, it is in essence a real and unavoidable one, and by no means artificial.

The chief kinds of human qualities or conditions to be proved may be reduced to the following sorts: Moral Character or Disposition; Physical and Mental Capacity; Design or Plan, and Intent; Knowledge, Belief, or Consciousness; Motive or Emotion; Habit or Custom.

It will be understood that we are here not concerned how the above human qualities come to be probanda. We are concerned only to learn what facts will be evidential to prove the quality proposed for proof. For instance, character may be in issue through the pleadings in a suit for slander on a plea of justification, or in an action for personal injury as an element of the defendant's liability for an incompetent servant; or it may be used, not as in issue through the pleadings, but as evidential to prove a human act, for example, the good character of a defendant in a criminal case or his bad character in rebuttal. So, also, knowledge may be in issue in a suit to set aside a purchase in fraud of creditors, or it may be evidential only, as when it is offered to prove the doing of a past act as a mark of identity. In all these instances the quality which is termed character, knowledge, or the like, has somehow come into the case as a proposition to be proved; and the question how to evidence it presents itself equally whether the probandum, when once proved, is going in turn to be used itself evidentially to show some other fact, or is one of the very ultimate propositions made material by the pleadings.

Three species of evidential facts are available to show a human quality or condition: (1) Conduct; this is the expression, in outward behavior or acts, of the quality or condition operating to produce effects. These results are the traces by which we may infer the moving cause. In point of time, conduct is closely associated with the internal condition giving rise to it; nevertheless, the indication is strictly not a concomitant, but a retrospectant one (ante, No. 3), because the argument is backwards in time from effect (conduct) to cause (internal condition). (2) External facts pointing for

1 Adapted from the same author's Treatise on Evidence. (1905. Vol. I, § 190.)

ward to the probable coming into existence of the quality; for example, the victim's gold, as pointing forward to the defendant's probable desire to rob him, or the reputation of A's insolvency, as pointing forward to B's probable receipt of knowledge of it. In using this evidence, we take our stand beforehand and argue that the evidential fact probably gave rise to the emotion, knowledge, or intent to be proved. The indication is thus prospectant; while that of conduct is retrospectant. (3) There is also a third sort of fact, having either a prospectant or a retrospectant indication, and not exactly corresponding to either of the preceding sorts, namely, prior or subsequent condition, as showing condition at a given time.

Thus, to prove insanity, we may offer (1) conduct as the effect illustrating its cause, mental aberration, (2) circumstances of unsuccessful business, domestic troubles, and the like, tending to bring on insanity; and (3) prior or subsequent insanity, pointing forwards or backwards to insanity at the time in question. So also, to show a husband's desire or motive to get rid of his wife, we may offer (1) his conduct exhibiting such a desire, (2) the existence of a paramour, tending to create such a desire, and (3) a prior desire, as pointing forward to its continued existence at the time in question.

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