paper." Though no one had approached the teacher, 7 of the 22 pupils gave a man's name. The experimenter then continued the test by saying: "Was it not Mr. M-?" to which 17 pupils now answered "Yes." Before a number of lawyers, individual pupils were then subjected to oral examination and gave complete descriptions of the "man's" dress and personal dress and personal appearance.

It is not surprising that this experimental demonstration of the complete failure of children to withstand the lure of suggestive questions produced a profound effect upon the jury. It is perhaps as little surprising that the legal authorities did not take kindly to the testimony of the psychologists. There is, however, the satisfaction that the study of the psychology of testimony has saved a man from the gallows.

273. G. F. ARNOLD. Psychology applied to Legal Evidence. (1906. p. 344.) There is nothing really wonderful in hypnotism: the hypnotic subject is not governed by special psychological laws, but the germs of all his symptoms can be traced in the normal state: the physical disturbance also caused by suggestion has many characters in common with the spontaneous disturbance found in an insane person, and the hallucination of hypnotism does not essentially differ from the ordinary forms of hallucination. The phenomena are only an exaggeration and pathological deviation. The fact that hypnotic patients have displayed extraordinary powers of memory, sensation, and discrimination has tended to give hypnotism an air of the marvelous which has led some people to discredit what they hear of it. Those, however, who have studied the subject explain this by a simple hypothesis which is known as "the principle of compensation of functions," according to which the inhibition of the activity of one region is always connected with an increase in the activity of the other interrelated areas.

This interrelation may be either direct (neurodynamic), or indirect. (vasomotoric). The first is probably due to the fact that energy which accumulates in one region, as the result of inhibition, is discharged through the connecting fibers into other central regions. The second is due to contraction of the capillaries as a result of inhibition, and a compensating dilation of the blood vessels in other regions. The increased blood supply due to this dilation is in turn attended by an increase in the activity of the region in question. . . . In hypnosis it is possible for different regions within the apperception center itself to be so related that while certain of these regions are partially inhibited, others are correspondingly more open to excitation. . . . In such states of partial hypnosis the subject may carry out in an automatic way complicated acts, all his other functions seeming to be in a waking state. Or he may show certain psychological activities of clearer discrimination, or strikingly exact recognition, or reproduction of certain particular sensations and feelings to the exclusion of all other forms of activity.

...

The method of producing the hypnotic state is either by fatiguing the senses or by acting on the imagination. . . . It is not necessary that suggestion should always be present: "a whole series of purely physical agents exist, which prove that sleep can be induced without the aid of the subject's imagination, against his will and without his knowledge." At the

same time these cases are rare, and as it is suggestion that is usually employed, it will be well to explain what is meant by this term :

Suggestion uses ideas and the subject's intelligence: it consists in introducing, cultivating, and confirming, an idea in the mind of the subject of the experiment. The states it produces are the results of that mental susceptibility, which we all to some degree possess, of yielding assent to outward suggestion, of affirming what we strongly conceive, and of acting in accordance with what we are made to expect.1 There are as many forms of suggestion as there are modes of entering into relations with another person. Spoken or written suggestion is the simplest. But gestures can be employed, and, though less precise in meaning, suggestion by their means. is more intense. Several ways can also be combined. In what is known as autosuggestion, the suggestion has its origin in the subject's intelligence: instead of being the result of an external impression, as in the case of verbal suggestion, it results from an internal impression, such as a fixed idea or delirious conception; these are often derived from hallucinations. Again, suggestion may produce either an active or impulsive phenomenon, such as a sensation of pain, an act, etc., or a phenomenon of paralysis, e.g. loss of memory, anææsthesia: there are different psychological explanations of these two states; in the former association of ideas is used, in the latter it is supposed that the experimenter produces a mental impression which has an inhibitory effect on one of the sensorial or motor functions. . .

A further question is how much spontaneity exists in the hypnotic state. The subject is capable of reflecting and reasoning and under the influence of suggestion will himself invent expedients which were not suggested to him, to carry out the order; also on awaking he imagines his acts were spontaneous and invents reasons of his own for doing them. "Subjects in this condition," says Professor James, "will receive and execute suggestions of crime, and act out a theft, forgery, arson, or murder. A girl will believe that she is married to her hypnotizer, etc. It is unfair, however, to say that, in these cases, the subject is a pure puppet with no spontaneity. His spontaneity is certainly not in abeyance so far as things go which are harmoniously associated with the suggestion given him. He takes the text from his operator; but he may amplify and develop it enormously as he acts it out. His spontaneity is lost only for those systems of ideas which conflict with the suggested delusion. The latter is thus 'systematized': the rest of consciousness is shut off, excluded, dissociated from it. In extreme cases the rest of the mind would seem to be actually abolished and the hypnotic subject to be literally a changed personality."

As regards the testimony of hypnotized persons as to what happened to them in the hypnotic state, it must first be remarked that, after waking, the subject is still liable to suggestions, which will last if he has been told that he will still see the object, etc., when awake. Though he remains influenced by the hypnotic suggestion, it appears to him to be spontaneous, and he does not remember how the hallucination was produced, nor who gave him the order, nor even that it was given at all; he will proceed to carry out an act,

1 Professor James notes that the power of suggestion is insignificant unless the subject is first thrown into the trance-like state, but after that there are no limits to its power: this state has no particular outward symptoms, as the bodily phenomena which are called such are really the products of suggestion, but these suggestions could not have been made successfully without the trance state.

which he has been told to do, and if asked why he does so, will reply that he does not know or will invent some reason. A subject's statement as to the time he has been in the hypnotic sleep can rarely be accepted; he cannot measure the time, as he has no landmark. Nor do the subjects know how often they have been hypnotized, though they sometimes have a general impression about it caused by an impression of cold and shivering. This, however, is not always present and it can be destroyed by suggestion. Sometimes oblivion as to what occurred during the sleeping state is complete, sometimes partial, sometimes the events which occurred during hypnosis recur to the mind with great force, when they are recalled by some external circumstance. No rule can be laid down, as there is every variety of case from the most profound oblivion to the most lucid recollection. If the hypnotizer tells the patient that he will remember nothing on awaking, the suggestion will destroy the subject's recollection of all that has occurred; he may even undergo all sorts of violence and have no remembrance of it. The subject who says he remembers everything cannot be trusted; if he find, e.g., that he has a wound, he is apt to invent an explanation or accept one given him, but in all cases he ends by suggesting to himself that he saw things as he explained them. Or, again, he may err because of the suggestion of the experimenter who has impressed upon him a recollection which is false. If, however, the subject is hypnotized anew, the recollection of all which occurred during the former hypnosis is then revived, if he has received no special suggestion of oblivion; it has been shown, however, that subjects while in a hypnotic state are capable of simulation and of suppressing the truth.

Topic 3. Narration as affected by Typical Temperaments

275. Wм. C. ROBINSON. (1893. p. 126.)

Forensic Oratory; a Manual for Advocates.

Intelligible Evidence: how Rendered Unintelligible. The Rambling Witness; his Treatment. Testimony in itself intelligible is often rendered difficult of comprehension by the incompleteness, or the want of continuity, with which it is presented. These evils are due either to the defective mental constitution of the witness, or to his moral weakness, or to his personal hostility, or to the improper conduct of the advocate. A defective mental constitution manifests itself in rambling, or in dull and stupid witnesses. In many individuals there apparently exists no power of fixing the attention on a single object and persistently pursuing its consideration, and from such an individual it is useless to expect any exhaustive and coherent statement of the facts within his knowledge. Any idea which suddenly arises in his mind, during the course of his narration, diverts his thought into another channel; he loses sight of many details which he should remember, and continues his relation without consciousness of the omission. If he endeavors to express this new idea, his effort to explain it leads him still further from his proper subject, and when he returns to it, if ever, it is at a point different from that at which it was abandoned, while the intermediate ideas, however necessary to the comprehension of the whole, are left unuttered. The examination of a witness of this defective mental character should be close and catechetical.. The questions of the advocate should

lead him step by step through the entire subject of his testimony, in logical order and without omissions. If he persists in rambling and irrelevant. replies, he should not be rudely interrupted, for any mental shock or moral perturbation will increase his difficulties, but when he has finished what he wishes to relate, the question from whose true reply he has departed should be patiently repeated, and the examination pass from this point to the next only when the proper answer is obtained.

The Dull and Stupid Witness: his Treatment. The same obstacles are encountered in eliciting the evidence of a dull and stupid witness. His perceptions are cloudy and indefinite. His processes of recollection and reflection are slow and disconnected. . . . The patience of the advocate in this examination must be inexhaustible. To take the witness again and again over his story in order to recall to him some event or fact which seems to elude every effort of his memory, to construct questions which contain some word or phrase suggestive of the missing thought, to contrive methods of explanation or illustration which enable him to make himself clearly understood by the jury, to afford him opportunities for reconciling inconsistencies into which his misapprehension of the questions or the inaccuracy of his replies has led him, taxes the ingenuity and perseverance of the most adroit and indefatigable lawyers. The task imposed upon them is nothing less than the creation of the testimony, save that the facts, as crude and indefinite ideas, lie dormant in the recollection of the witness. It is the advocate who gives to these ideas vitality and form, who clothes them in suitable expressions, who arranges, produces, and communicates them to the jury. The Timid and Self-conscious Witness: his Treatment. The testimony of a witness whose moral weakness manifests itself in an undue timidity and self-consciousness is subject to the same defects. His attention is divided between the ideas which he is requested to present, and the effect that he supposes is to be produced by their disclosure on himself or on the cause. His apprehensions and conjectures often work through his imagination on his memory, until without intending falsehood he omits or colors facts to a degree irreconcilable with truth. No sooner are his ideas uttered, however, than he becomes conscious of their error. If he now attempts an explanation, it usually results in his entire discomfiture. If he persists in the misrepresentation or concealment, a new cause of embarrassment arises in the fear of subsequent exposure, and leads to still more harmful falsehoods and suppressions. Thus, with the best intentions at the outset, and knowing matters of importance to the cause, a nervous, apprehensive witness may finally retire suspected of the grossest perjury, and without having related a single matter as it actually occurred. No witness who is liable to this infirmity should be permitted to narrate material facts until his embarrassment and fear are overcome. By simple questions in reference to his occupation, residence, or relation to the parties of the cause, eliciting replies in which mistake will be impossible, he should be gradually assured that he is capable of understanding, and of properly responding to, the inquiries which are to be proposed to him, and his entire attention fixed on the proceeding in which he is now engaged. When at last fully at his ease, the more material portions of his evidence should be approached, the questions made, if possible, even more simple and direct, and limiting the answer to the point. required.

The Bold and Zealous Witness: his Treatment. The moral weakness of a bold and zealous witness creates almost equal difficulties. He also is self-conscious, but in him self-consciousness is manifested by a high opinion of his discernment of the real requirements of the cause, and of the importance and conclusiveness of his own evidence concerning it. He feels that, if permitted to state fully, in his own way, what he thinks as well as what he knows, the jury must decide at once in favor of the party in whose interest he is called. He rebels at interference, even of his own counsel, is jealous of the questions in reply to which his testimony is delivered, and avails himself of every opportunity to assert his own opinions and escape the limits within which the interrogatories are intended to confine him. He is a dangerous witness, rarely adhering strictly to the truth, easily led astray by flattery, and liable to betray the cause whenever he suspects that his services are unappreciated. This witness requires the most prudent and at the same time the most inflexible control. While he should not be irritated by sensible restrictions, he must still be kept within the narrowest limits, and his evidence confined in matter and expression to the precise truth which it is necessary for him to disclose. . The entire examination of this witness should be conducted with a view to the dangers which will attend his crossexamination. Exaggerations in his evidence, which are likely then to be exposed, should be corrected as soon as made, by questions bringing him to some known standard and furnishing a measure of his actual meaning. If he endeavors to conceal unfavorable facts which are certain sometime to appear, such inquiries should be propounded as will now elicit them in the least unfavorable form.

The Hostile Witness: his Treatment. Incompleteness or obscurity in the testimony of a hostile witness is caused by difficulties of an entirely different character. The obstacles encountered in the examination of the rambling, the self-conscious, or the stupid witness arise from intellectual or emotional defects, and can be overcome by enlightening the mind of the witness, or by assisting him to bring his impulses under control. The obstacle encountered in an adverse witness, however, is an antagonistic will. He labors usually under no mental or emotional embarrassments. He knows clearly and precisely the facts which ought to form his evidence. He is able to narrate them positively and coherently, if he so chooses. But, actuated by interest, or partiality, or more secret impulses, he is determined to withhold the knowledge he possesses, or, if compelled to yield it, to communicate it in language which will make it as valueless as possible. Where such a witness is the sole repository of ideas which are essential to the cause, the advocate has no other course than to produce him, and render him as useful as he may. Otherwise, he should avoid him altogether. For it is seldom that the benefit to be derived from such a witness is equal to the injury which his reluctance to assist and his perversion of the facts inflict. When, however, it becomes necessary to improve him, the advocate must first discover the cause and character of his hostility. If it be partial only, manifesting itself toward a single person or a single feature of the cause, it may be possible during the whole examination to ignore the objectionable individuals or issues, and to approach the witness solely upon matter concerning which he will freely testify. If his antagonism extend to the entire cause, or to all the parties by whom he is called, there is little hope of rendering him useful