age 21: "Words seemed colored. My name is red, my sister's is yellow. I often remember by color." Male, age 18: "I remember figures by color." Association helps; a college student writes: "I associate figures with what is familiar. If I hear that Mr. A. receives $5000 salary, I say to myself that is five times as much as my old school teacher got. After this the salary is easily recalled." Place-localization, and association, are chiefly relied upon. Some have a kind of mnemonic system, and group or reverse the numbers. One associates the figure 8 with a doughnut. Faces are recalled by types. After fixing the type to which it belongs, the eyes, hair, nose, cheek bones, complexion, and scars are noted. A college student writes: "I try to trace a resemblance between a strange face and one I know." A middle-aged woman takes careful notice of the hand; she has a poor memory for faces, but can often locate the person by the hand. A normal student writes the initial of the person or place on the left hand; after it has been erased, she still visualizes it there. One analyzes the features; "if any feature resembles a well-known face, it is easily recalled."... Phrases in music are recalled by playing, or by attempting to play, or by humming the tune. College student, m., age 22: "I recall the time intervals and note the first part of the theme; I recall the rest by association." Female, age 17, normal student: "I remember phrases in music by thinking if they are similar to phrases in any selections that I have heard.” . . . It is worthy of note that some excellent musicians recall music better after an interval. They cannot immediately reproduce it, if they have enjoyed it intensely. Sometimes an interval of a day or two is necessary in order to recall it well. It is quite possible that there is a modification of the basilar membrane which serves as a basis for subsequent recall.

Furthermore, it is true that many people find that a time interval is necessary to recall well any experience. E. C., f., age 17, recalls better now what happened in all school grades than when she was younger. Male, age 20: "I can define and locate my former experiences better now than I could a year or so after they happened." Female, age 19: "I can recall now things that happened 8 or 10 years ago, which I could not recall 4 years ago." Apart from a maturer mind, perspective seems to be necessary to many in order that they may have a good memory.

Passages of prose and declamations are memorized by paying attention to the thought. After the thought is fixed, it easily clothes itself in language. Not a few, however, memorize mechanically, attention being paid especially to the beginnings and endings of sentences. Repetition and reading aloud are frequently mentioned. Clear mental representation and a purely local memory are of service. Male, 17: "I usually memorize by imprinting the object and its surroundings on my mind like a negative. In memorizing Lew Wallace's 'Chariot Race,' comprising 16 pages, I read it through twelve times. I imprinted the photograph of the page on my mind, and then read what I saw."

A large number of devices are given for keeping appointments. Females change rings, insert paper under a ring, pin paper on dress, etc. There are other favorite mechanical devices. Chairs are turned over, and other furniture disarranged. A middle-aged man hid his hat to remind him of an appointment. Next morning he hunted up another hat, but did not recall

why the one usually worn was gone. One associates appointments with the hands of the clock at the hour fixed. Not a few find it necessary to repeat the appointment again and again. Others are aided by a memorandum. As a rule those who say their memories are utterly untrustworthy do not use notes. Yet W., m., age 26, writes that the only appointment he has missed for years is one which he noted down. Female, age 16, writes: "To keep an appointment I write the first letter of the person or place connected with the appointment on my left hand. Even if it be erased, I still imagine it there." Clear mental representation is the great help in such cases.

There is a wide diversity of opinion as to how full notes a student should take, and almost all degrees of copiousness are indicated. Female, age 37, believes her memory was injured by taking full notes at the normal school. Again, "too many notes make the general idea of the lecture indistinct." One writes that the state of his health determines how full notes he takes; if the physical tone is low, he is obliged to take more copious notes. Some are best aided by jotting down the headings and by giving attention unreservedly to the lecture. A normal student writes out very full notes, and never thinks of the contents of the lecture until she leaves the lecture room. Some take "key" words with which the rest is associated. Concentration of attention and "hand and arm" memory are acquired as a rule by taking quite copious notes. To take few notes is a work of art, and the essentials must be seized upon. The consensus of opinions received would seem to favor few notes.

viewed. . . .

Where full notes are taken, they are not often re

The request made under heading 13 of the syllabus called forth a wealth of material. “13. Describe cases of exceptional forgetfulness in old and young, stating whether it was due to distraction, abstraction, loss of mental power, or heredity. As a rule, does defect in memory in children appear in the field of things done, known, or felt?" Certain cases due to abstraction are as follows: A young lady went to telegraph for an umbrella left on a car; she had been holding it over her head for thirty minutes. A lady walked into the parlor with a $10 bill in one hand, a match in the other; she put the bill in the stove and saved the match. A college professor forgets to eat his meals. A boy broke his ribs, and forgot all about it in two days. A man picked up a pebble and put it in his pocket; took out his watch and threw it into the ocean. A lady tried to tie her horse with the blanket and cover him with the line. A boy returned from the store three times to find out what his mother wanted. A lady who was called away by an important message, before, breakfast, forgot until late in the day that she had eaten neither breakfast nor dinner. A gentleman, age 50, came down from his study and asked his wife if she knew where his pen was; he thought the children had mislaid it; she told him if he would take it out of his mouth, he would talk more plainly. A boy, age 9, sent to store for extract of peppermint, brought paregoric; sent back with a bottle labeled peppermint, brought vanilla; third time sent he brought the peppermint. A college professor, expert in numbers, is frequently seen with one black and one tan shoe on. A minister became absorbed in a book and forgot that it was Sunday. A man walked home and left his horse in the village all night. The same man drove home from church and left his wife.

A great share of cases of lack of memory are due to abstraction, or to absent-mindedness, which Mach terms "present-mindedness." It often characterizes people of great ability along narrow lines of thought. The following is an instance of lack of memory due to fatigue: Female, age 22: "At the age of 16 I had been traveling all day; I went to the ticket office at the last change of cars, but could not think where I was going; yet I had lived in the town sixteen years." There are a few instances given in which loss of memory is due to distraction. A middle-aged woman heard of her son's death by drowning; she could not remember her husband's address in order to telegraph him, although she had written there hundreds of times. "Aunt recalls nothing that happens since her husband's death." Defective memory in children is ascribed to things known. There are many instances reported in which forgetting occurred in the field of things done; many of these cases, however, are evidently cases of temporary forgetfulness due to abstraction. All of the Indians, with a single exception, state that things known are most easily forgotten. As to abstraction, no period of life is free from its influence. Not a few draw comfort from the facts, frequently cited, that Samuel Johnson when he had stepped from the sidewalk would continue for a long distance with one foot in the gutter and one on the walk; that Pestalozzi did not know enough to put up his umbrella when it rained; that Sir Isaac Newton supposed he had eaten when he saw the chicken bones on his plate; and that Edison forgot his wedding day. The fact is that no period of life is free from noticeable abstraction. The boy with book in hand forgets to go to dinner after he has rung the bell; the young woman goes to different parts of the house, she knows not why; middle age hunts for the thimble on its finger, or the pen in its mouth; while old age is troubled that it cannot find the glasses on its nose.

242. Wм. C. ROBINSON. Forensic Oratory; a Manual for Advocates. (1893. p. 193.) . . . It is not easy to define in what a faithful memory consists. Some persons are endowed with excellent general memories, recalling the minutest details of events or conversations after the lapse of many years. Others remember with precision and completeness only certain classes of facts, localities, dates, faces, names, or abstract processes of thought. Still others are without distinct recollections of any kind, their memories apparently preserving some faint, uncertain traces of almost every incident of their whole lives, but with no clear and definite impression in regard to any. In persons of the first description, the memory may always be considered good. In persons of the second, it is good whenever the thing remembered is of that class which their memories are accustomed to preserve, and bad, at least for all the purposes of evidence, when the fact belongs to that class which their memories do not retain. In persons of the third description, the memory is always bad, and on their uncorroborated evidence no question of importance ought to be decided. Were these distinctions generally understood, or if understood, were they remembered and considered by the jury, the cross-examination as a test of memory should properly be limited to the power of the witness to retain impressions concerning the class of objects to which the evidence relates. When the inquiry is as to the identity of persons, the ability of the witness to distinguish and remember faces, forms, and voices is the only faculty in question, and

whether or not localities and dates are easily recollected by him is of no consequence whatever. In actual practice, however, the law permits the jury to infer a general want of recollection from a special one, and the cross-examiner to expose defects in memory by testing it with facts of any class that he desires.

Defective Memory: how Detected. The direct examination of the witness in most instances informs the advocate as to the true condition of his memory. If he speaks positively and exhaustively concerning one class of facts, and hesitatingly or inaccurately concerning others, it may well be concluded where his weakness lies, and with what questions it may best be tested and exposed. If it be generally deficient, the whole field of the past is open to the advocate, and the more varied and disassociated are the topics it embraces, the more thoroughly are his defects revealed. On the other hand, if his memory appears generally perfect, and able to recall events of every kind with equal ease, the cross-examiner must discover a deficiency in reference to some class of facts as yet unnoticed, or his attempt will but corroborate the credibility it was intended to destroy. The tests applied to the memory of a witness by the cross-examiner must be fully and immediately apparent, as such, to the jury. If the subject he employs is not one which the jury realize that they themselves would easily remember, the failure of the witness to recall it will create no surprise. If it is so far outside of their sphere of information that, when he misremembers, or, not remembering at all, invents, they do not instantly detect him, they can draw no conclusion as to the strength or weakness of his memory. These tests must, therefore, be such as the jury are conscious that they could endure, and also such as they can see that the witness does not successfully sustain. Questions relating to important epochs in the life of the witness, to such facts in the cause as, if he tells the truth in reference to his knowledge of them, must have impressed him deeply, to those public events of which no man can be ignorant, to any striking occurrences in the court room during the trial of the cause, to matters fully demonstrated in his presence by the testimony of preceding witnesses, or to objects to which the attention of the witness is directed and which after a few moments he may be requested to describe, answer these two requisites. With an honest witness this method of examination is short and easy; with a cunning and dishonest witness its success depends mainly on the judgment with which the subject for these tests has been selected.

243. ARTHUR C. TRAIN. The Prisoner at the Bar. (2d ed. 1908. p. 228.) Almost all cases are stronger in court than they give the impression of being when the witnesses are first examined in the private office.

The reason is not far to seek. Witnesses to the events leading up to a crime are acquainted with a thousand details which are as vivid, and probably more vivid, to them than the occurrence in regard to which their testimony is actually desired. It may well be that the immaterial facts are the only ones which have interested them at all, while their knowledge of the criminal act is relatively slight. For example, they know, of course, that they were in the saloon; are positive that the complainant and defendant were playing cards, even remembering some of the hands dealt; are sure that the complainant arose and walked away; have a very vivid

recollection that in a few moments the defendant got up and followed him across the room; are pretty clear, although their attention was still upon the game, that the two men had an argument; and have a strong impression that the defendant hit the complainant. In point of fact, their evidence is really of far less value, if of any at all, in regard to the actual striking than in regard to the events leading up to it, for at the time of the blow their attention was being given less to the participants in the quarrel than to something else. Their ideas are in truth very hazy as to the latter part of the transaction. However, they become witnesses, pronouncing themselves ready to swear that they saw the blow struck, which is perhaps the fact. Their evidence is practically of no value on the question of justification or selfdefense. But finding, on being examined, that their testimony is wanted principally on that aspect of the case, they naturally tell their entire story as if they were as clear in their own minds upon one part of it as another. Being able to give details as to the earlier aspect of the quarrel, they feel obliged to be equally definite as to all of it. If they have an idea that the striking was without excuse, they gradually imagine details to fit their point of view. This is done quite unconsciously. Before long they are as glib with their description of the assault as they are about the game of cards. They get hazy on what occurred before, and overwhelmingly positive as to what occurred towards and at the last, and on the witness stand swear convincingly that they saw the defendant strike the complainant, exactly how he did it, the words he said, and that the complainant made no offer of any sort to strike the defendant. From allowing their minds to dwell on their own conception of what must have occurred, they are soon convinced that it did occur in that way, and their account flows forth with a circumstantiality that carries with it an irresistible impression of veracity.

The witness remembers in a large proportion of cases what he wants to remember, or believes occurred. The liar with his prepared lie is far less dangerous than the honest, but mistaken witness, or the witness who draws inadvertently upon his imagination. Most juries instinctively know a liar when they see and hear one, but few of them can determine in the case of an honestly intentioned witness how much of his evidence should be discarded as unreliable, and how much accepted as true.

The greatest difficulty in the trial of jury cases so far as the evidence is concerned lies in the fallibility of the human mind, and not in the inventive genius of the devil. An old man who combines a venerable appearance with a failing memory is the witness most to be feared by either side.

Both men and women habitually testify to facts as actually occurring on a specific occasion because they occurred on most occasions: Q. "Did your husband lock the door?" A. "Of course he did." Q. "How do you know?" A. "He always locks the door."

Witness after witness will take the stand and testify positively that certain events took place, or certain acts were done, when in point of fact all they can really swear to is that they usually took place or usually were done: Q. "Did he put on his hat?" A. "Certainly he did." Q. "Did you see him?" A. "No, but he must have put on his hat if he went out."

And the probability is that the whole question to be determined was whether or not "he" did go out or stay in.

The layman chancing to listen to a criminal trial finds himself gasping with