selves in his countenance. He is a dissimulator to the roots of his being. But he employs the most varied means for succeeding. Women show themselves particularly apt in a thousand methods of sly dissimulation. (2) The servile simulator is a variety of the crafty one, with the peculiarity that his tendency is to subordinate his attitude, facial expression, and words to the requirements or desires or unspoken wishes of those who are his masters and whose good will or indulgence he hopes for. He may be either ambitious or shrewd, or lazy, apathetic, timid, or weak. (3) The practical joker turns simulation into an amusement. He enjoys mystifying his fellows without personal profit to himself. . . . This class may also be made to include the simulator who feigns the possession of exceptional talents or virtues and takes pleasure in duping the public at large or a select circle with his deceptive assertions and inventions. . . . (4) The "dissidents" are those who feign sentiments which they do not possess, in order to produce a reaction against current tendencies which they deplore and wish to improve. (5) The neuropathic simulator is well known. These border on the hysterical, the alcoholist, and the degenerate. . . . (6) The simulator by suggestion is rather a victim than a culprit. But here must be included those persons who receive suggestion from the environment, i.e. are subjected to a vague influence which gives vent to their morbid tendency to deceptions and more or less skillful lies.

...

Ingegnieros' classification may seem not systematic enough. It rests on the distinction between normal and pathologic persons, and utilitarian and disinterested ends. It would seem that there may well be as many secondary types of simulators as there are distinct human traits, viz.: (1) amorphous, and polymorphous or unstable; (2) unbalanced, and balanced; (3) impulsive, and obsessed; (4) emotional, and apathetic; (5) intuitive, or imaginative, and ratiocinative; (6) strong-willed and weak-willed. Thus they fall into groups (of contrasted traits), each presenting different aspects of simulation.

(1) The amorphous are susceptible of simulation under the influence of all sorts of suggestions. They have no more a fixed trait in their simulation than in the rest of their mental and social activity. They may exhibit trickery in any fashion required by their interests or desires or caprices, as circumstances vary. They are usually weak of will, and may thus yield to the exigencies of their environment, becoming, if need be, servile in their lies. The polymorphous are often degenerates or hystericals, — liars and simulators to the degree that they change easily in personality. They do not long persist in any one species of simulation; e.g. they may in succession simulate piety and atheism, simple-mindedness and skepticism, cautiousness and imprudence, timidity and courage, lying according to the rôle they are playing, often without interest to serve, and sometimes unconsciously. (2) The unbalanced are simulators only intermittently; they have accesses of candor which make them abandon for a period their system of feints and lies. They mislead by the uncertainty which they thus produce in the mind of the observer. (3) Next to them may be classed the impulsives. These yield, but only intermittently, to their need for lying and for simulating the sentiments calculated to induce confidence in their veracity. This need is most often explainable by sudden cravings or repulsions, unforeseeable even by the subjects themselves. Such a person,

without knowing why, will suddenly experience an irresistible desire to deceive in some way his wife or his friend, and will therefore simulate anger or grief or astonishment. - The obsessed are dominated by a fixed idea, an exclusive aim, an emotion, and sometimes are driven to simulation by the exigencies of a purposeful mind; success in their enterprises (sometimes such as do not merit approval) depends often on their aptness in feigning, in the expression of ideas which they know to be false. The pretenders who obtain a public following are of this type at bottom. (4) The emotionals have little aptness for simulation; they are not able to control themselves well enough. The apathetics will not take the trouble to do so. Nevertheless, some emotionals do become simulators, usually through fear, love, hatred, pride, or vanity; e.g. they will feign altruistic sentiments, for fear of seeing their egoism unmasked; or affect a deep sensitiveness in matters of æsthetics, religion, or morality; or carry on a mendacious discourse (often lacking coherence) while under the emotion's influence. The apathetics (or indifferent), being little inclined to altruism, simulate mostly a sympathy or a pity or even a burst of feeling, when circumstances and the environment constrain them; their discourse is then particularly deceptive. (5) The ratiocinatives are those who use dialectics (sometimes keen), captious argument, long series of propositions, so as to simulate depth of thought. How many such disputers — metaphysicians, theologians, and others have abused the confidence of their hearers or readers by a sterile logomachy, of which they themselves have not always been the dupes! Must we not admit that there are many men, clever, educated, masters of thought and language, who are so devoted to empty disputatiousness that they overstep (in one or another way) the boundary between honesty and simulation? Starting with little real earnestness, they do not hesitate to make assertions of whose slender objective soundness they are well aware; but their logic draws them on; they must be consistent with themselves and their earlier professions of good faith; they are driven to simulate beliefs which they no longer entertain, and to defend dogmas and principles which they have ceased sincerely to approve. The fear of being a renegade or a heretic makes them persevere in their attitude, and lies and simulation form a larger and larger part of it.-The intuitives, while less the slaves of a purposeful mind, are often lacking in that check which logic puts upon excessive license in one's interpretations of experience; they are too ready to think that they can depart, without harmful consequences, from a strict veracity.—In contrast with persons of scientific mind, who are scrupulous in the observation of facts and the verification of hypotheses, are the imaginatives. Contradiction does not in the least alarm them; whether through dilettantism or through self-interest, they put forth at every turn their romances (sometimes very ingenious). These are the typical simulators, especially when their imagination is at the service of a will strong enough to persevere in important schemes. In this class belong notably those who simulate illness to obtain help, reward, or favor, or exoneration from military service, taxes, or other social burden.

All the above described temperaments lend themselves more or less to effectuate some form of simulation. Some persons seem to be innately disposed to this mode of life. Certain children at an early age exhibit as their peculiar trait a mendacity accompanied by simulation; experience

and habit, necessary for its development, increasingly betray it as they become older; and one may meet with adults and old persons whose every attitude, gesture, and discourse is directed to the deception of others. Success has made them persevere in this marked aptitude. One is almost tempted to believe that (in primitive as well as in civilized communities) supremacy is assured, in the struggle for existence, not to those who employ honest methods and conscientious assertions, but to the astute and shrewd simulators who employ their skill, when needed, 'to the detriment of the simple, ending in the discomfiture or the elimination of the latter..

Conclusion. The foregoing study has now shown us that the lie is a phenomenon common to all civilizations, all classes of society, all ages, and both sexes. It is at one and the same time a psycho-physiologic and a psycho-sociologic phenomenon. . . . It originates spontaneously, apart from imitation or faulty education, and merely by the combined operation of imagination and the personal tendencies or aims unsatisfied by the natural course of events. Nevertheless, education, imitation, fashion, manners and morals, all strengthen the mendacious tendency; while weakness, illness, mental and physiological incapacity, lack of the higher sentiments (united sometimes with arrest of intellectual development), degeneracy, all favor the hatching of the lie-tendency; and, finally, social causes, such as war, persecution, popular emotions, mob frenzy,repression by violence or coercion, combine to make mendacity almost inevitable.

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We have thus shunned (it will be noted) all those shallow explanations of mendacity which merely use a form of words, such epithets, for example, as "innateness," "the inventive faculty," etc., and such supposed laws as that "the lie tends to develop in a social medium in proportion as that medium becomes complex," and the like. . .

And in showing that the lie is due to specific tendencies which are themselves closely bound up with individual character, temperament, physiological constitution, and neuro-muscular activity, we have also shown the emptiness of the unconscionable claims of those moralists and pedagogues for whom our warfare against the lie has its basis in a commandment inscribed in golden letters for centuries past on the walls of churches and schools. In sober fact, the warfare is against rooted human desires or antipathies, often concealed from our view, and no less difficult to overcome than they are to discover. And our means of overcoming is to awaken contrary tendencies, not artificial ones, but those tendencies and desires which are normally implanted in human nature and go to make up the noblest traits that mark humankind.

And so the warfare against the lie is simply a part of the great struggle for the moral life as a whole.

SUBTITLE F: FEELING, EMOTION, BIAS

203. G. F. ARNOLD. Psychology applied to Legal Evidence. (1906. pp. 236, 260.) . . . The effect of desire on belief cannot be omitted from consideration in such cases if we are to come to a correct conclusion. "If a certain objective combination," says Professor Stout, "presents itself as the only condition, or the most favorable condition, of obtaining a certain end, the active tendency towards this end is of itself a tendency to believe in the objective combination." As to the way in which Desire acts, the following is the same writer's account: "This influence of Desire on Belief often operates by simply diverting the attention from counter evidence. ... The mind is so absolutely preoccupied by certain tendencies, that whatever crosses them either never comes before consciousness at all, or, if it does, is immediately dismissed. . . . It also directly intensifies the resistance offered by a mental combination to conditions which might otherwise dissolve it. . . . But the more often they (i.e. such beliefs) are acted upon, the more completely, they become incorporated with the original conation so as to become an integral part of it; hence the support they receive from it is increased." With this may be compared the manner in which Feeling in general influences Belief: "This action of feeling on belief is in every case mediate; that is to say, it works by modifying the processes of ideation themselves. It is by giving preternatural vividness and stability to certain members of the ideational train called up at the time, e.g. ideas of occurrences which we intensely long for, or especially dread, and by determining the order of ideation to follow, not that of experience, but that which answers to and tends to sustain and prolong the feeling, that its force serves to warp belief, causing it to deviate from the intellectual or reasonable type."

Feeling, then, acts in part by warping the intellectual element in Belief. Emotion is a great source of illusion, because it disturbs intellectual operations. It gives a preternatural vividness and persistence to the ideas answering to it, i.e. the ideas which are its excitants or which are otherwise associated with it; hence when the mind is under the temporary sway of any feelings as, e.g. fear, there will be a readiness to interpret objects by help of images congruent with the emotion. A man under the control of fear will be apt to see any kind of fear-inspiring object whenever there is any resemblance to such in the things actually present to his vision. The state of emotion (apart from its promotion of the flow of ideas if it be not too strong) is antagonistic to thinking, which implies at the moment a certain subsidence of the feelings and a considerable suppression of outward action or movement, but to paralyze the intellectual activity it must be very strong. . . . Professor James explains our tendency to believe in emotionally-exciting objects (objects of fear, desire, etc.), as due to the bodily sensations which emotions involve, for the more a conceived object excites us, the more reality it has; and he considers the greatest proof that a man is sui compos to be his ability to suspend belief in presence of an emotionally-exciting idea. Now, this power is the result of education, and does not exist in untutored minds, for which every exciting thought carries credence. . . .

If imagination is the most important quality [for correct thinking], prejudice is perhaps the worst impediment. Psychologically speaking, it is a case of mental preadaptation which may be voluntary or involuntary, and is a source of active illusions. . . . For good observation what is chiefly needed is self-restraint, in order to limit the attention to what is actually presented and exclude all irrelevant imaginative activity. The common faults of the bad observer are the impulse to go beyond the facts observed and stray into inference and to look out beforehand for a particular thing and so create a prepossession. The undisciplined mind is apt to see what it expects, wishes, or, may be, fears to see, and to overlook that which it is disinclined to believe. It often happens in consequence that a witness states things which appear to the more educated mind of the magistrate to be manifestly false or absurd and who is therefore inclined to reject the whole. But such an attitude is more frequently than not a wrong one. An effort should be made to arrive at what the witness actually saw, apart from the explanations he gives of them, for it is usually the tacit explanations which are wrong.

204. HANS GROSs. Criminal Psychology. (transl. Kallen, 1907, § 83, p. 375); and Criminal Investigation. (transl. Adam, 1907, p. 78.) Intellectual Attitude as affecting Testimony. It would be foolish to assert that we have the right to demand only facts from witnesses. Setting aside the presence of inferences in most sense perceptions, every exposition contains, without exception, the judgment of its subject matter, though only, perhaps, in a few dry words. It may lie in some choice expression, in the tone, in the gesture, but it is there, open to careful observation. Consider any simple. event, e.g. two drunkards quarreling in the street. And suppose we instruct any one of many witnesses to tell us only the facts. He will do so, but with the introductory words, "It was a very ordinary event," "altogether a joke," "completely harmless," "quite disgusting," "very funny," "a disgusting piece of the history of morals," "too sad," "unworthy of humanity," "frightfully dangerous," "very interesting," "a real study for hell," "just a picture of the future," etc. Now, is it possible to think that people who have so variously characterized the same event will give an identical description of the mere fact? They have seen the event in accordance with their attitude toward life. One has seen nothing; another this; another that; and, although the thing might have lasted only a very short time, it made such an impression that each has in mind, a completely different picture which he now reproduces. .. Voltaire says, "If you ask the devil what beauty is, he will tell you that beauty is a pair of horns, four hoofs, and a tail." Yet, when we ask a witness what is beautiful, we think that we are asking for a brute fact, and expect as reliable an answer as from a mathematician. We might as well ask for cleanliness from a person who thinks he has set his house in order by having swept the dirt from one corner to another.

To compare the varieties of intellectual attitude among men generally, we must start with sense perception, which, combined with mental perception, makes a not insignificant difference in each individual. Astronomers first discovered the existence of this difference, in that they showed that various observers of contemporaneous events do not observe at the