year 1844, and to follow this with testimony that defendant wanted to borrow money both before and after the date of this single bill. The counsel for defendant objected to the evidence offered. The Court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence, and sealed a bill for defendant. The witness then went on to state that he had loaned defendant money; that he loaned him $40, and took his note when he was in Philadelphia, in June, 1844. The verdict was for the plaintiff. The error assigned in this court was, the admission of the evidence of Cook. Watson & Maynard, for plaintiff in error. Armstrong, contra. The opinion of this court was delivered by BELL, J. It is, undoubtedly, a rule governing the production and admission of evidence, that the evidence offered must correspond with the allegations and be confined to the point in issue. The effect is to exclude merely collateral facts, having no connection with the subject litigated, and, therefore, incapable of shedding light upon the inquiry, or affording ground for reasonable presumption or inference. . . . But it by no means follows that all collateral facts, presenting at first view no direct connection with the principal fact, are irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible. On the contrary, great latitude is allowed to the reception of indirect, or, as it is sometimes called, circumstantial evidence, the aid of which is constantly required, and, therefore, where direct evidence of the fact is wanting, the more the jury can see of the surrounding facts and circumstances, the more correct their judgment is likely to be. . . . In the case at bar, the question is of the alleged forgery of the defendant's signature to a promissory note, averred to have been given for money loaned. Such investiga tions, founded in imputed fraud, naturally take a wide range. Among the most common topics of inquiry is the pecuniary capacity of the supposed lender, and the necessitous condition of the alleged borrower. And these inquiries are legitimate. It is surely competent for the defendant to show that the plaintiff was, at the time of the alleged lending, a poor man, and probably unable to loan the sum in question; or that the defendant was himself possessed of money, and therefore not driven to the necessity of using his credit. If so, why should not the plaintiff be at liberty to prove, that about the critical time the defendant was seeking to borrow? Standing unsupported, neither line of evidence would be sufficient to rebut the adverse allegation. But yet all must feel, that, in a doubtful case, the facts I have supposed to be made out by the defendant, would go far to determine in his favor. On the other hand, where the proofs were otherwise in equilibrio, the fact I have thought the plaintiff might show, would, questionless, furnish an argument of some weight in his scale. Had the defendant's effort been to borrow from another the sum for which the note was subsequently given, the inference deducible from the fact would, doubtless, be more stringent than where, as here, the sum first sought for is much smaller than the amount called for by the note. But the convincing power of the inference is for the jury, when weighing the value of the fact proved; not for the judge, in determining the bare question of its relevancy. It is sufficient for the purposes of his inquiry, that it has some affinity with the principal inquiry, though this may be weak or remote. Such we think was the condition of the evidence received here; wherefore, judgment affirmed. ບ. JEFFRIES. (1863. SUPREME should make the entry $3.00 less per cent.' The buyer claims that if we save brokerage, he is to have the per cent though not as brokerage. The linseed was to be sound. That is always understood, unless something else is expressed. In the course of business, linseed is used by the crushers to extract the oil by crushing. I knew all the crushers in New York, I think, and have made myself acquainted with their standing and business credit. After making the entry in the memorandum book, I gave him an order on the warehouse man as follows, to wit: 'Boston, August 19, 1863. Please deliver to the order of Messrs. E. P. Jeffries & Co. two thousand bags linseed, per ship Resolute from Calcutta. (BR) George M. Barnard.' 'B. H. R.' means, Barnard & Hunnewells, per Resolute." 113. COMMONWEALTH JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. Indictment for obtaining goods by false pretenses. . . . At the trial in the Superior Court, before RUSSELL, J., George M. Barnard was called as a witness, and the material portions of his testimony were as follows: "I knew and had dealt largely with the defendant as a broker in linseed, and only as a broker, except in one instance in 1861. He came to my counting room on the 19th of August last, and asked whether I was disposed to sell linseed? I said I would not sell at the price quoted, $2.90. I said, 'I suppose they will give only $2.90 and I am not willing to sell.' He said he had an order from parties in New York for two thousand bags of linseed; and after some conversation he said, 'At what price will you sell it?' I said, at $3.00 a bushel. I think I said, 'Can you buy at $3.00?' He said, 'Yes; that he could buy of the Tudor Company and William Perkins at that price.' I said, 'I will sell at $3.00, but I want the money immediately.' He said vessels were scarce, and that there might be some delay in getting vessels to haul to East Boston and take the seed, but that he would send to New York and get the notes of the parties discounted, and so get the money certainly within a week. He said the parties did not wish their names disclosed, as they were constantly using large quantities of seed, and did not wish to be known in the market as buyers. I then made an entry in my memorandum book, in his presence, as follows, to wit: '19th August. Sold to E. P. Jeffries & Co. 2000 bags linseed at $3.00. Cash within ten days. E. P. J.Secret.' The word secret refers to the price. The meaning of ‘E. P. J.' is, that he was to have per cent brokerage. I do not know that the defendant saw this entry made. If I sold to a broker for himself, I R. The government proved that upon the foregoing order and the order hereinafter referred to relating to the second purchase, the defendant caused the seed to be removed from the warehouse and shipped to New York, to Messrs. T. & G. Rowe and to Messrs. Campbell & Thayer, and introduced evidence tending to show that he afterwards sold the seed to them at a less price than the same were sold by Barnard, on the same days on which he bought of Barnard. The District Attorney then offered in evidence the defendant's petition in insolvency, with his schedule of creditors and of assets, signed and sworn to by him; the petition on the 14th of September, and the schedule on the 21st of September, 1863; and offered to prove that his indebtedness was not materially different on the 19th and 21st of August, when the transactions with Barnard took place, and that on the 19th and 21st of August, the defendant was in fact deeply insolvent. The Judge admitted this evidence, against the defendant's objection, solely as tending to prove the intent of the defendant at the time of making the representations alleged. At a subsequent stage of the trail, the said Barnard explained that he was induced to part with the thirteen hundred and seventy bags on the expectation of receiving $3.00 per bushel from the purchaser in New York, founded upon the representations of the defendant already herein before testified to by him. The case was submitted to the jury under instructions to which no special exception was taken, and a verdict was returned of guilty upon the first and second counts, and not guilty on the third. The defendant alleged exceptions, and moved in arrest of judgment. Yet B. F. Thomas & E. D. Sohier, for the defendant. The evidence of the defendant's insolvency was incompetent. . . . It had no tendency to show a fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant. this is the precise point in reference to which it was admitted. There is no authority in support of the ruling. Poverty cannot be shown for the purpose of proving crime. It is impracticable to administer justice on such a principle. Before the law, the rich and poor stand on an equality. Foster, A. G., for the Commonwealth. . BIGELOW, C. J. . . . The indictment is for obtaining goods by false pretenses. At the trial in the Superior Court, the evidence offered in support of the prosecution tended to show that the defendant, being by occupation a merchandise broker, falsely pretended and represented to the prosecutors that he was authorized as the agent and broker of certain persons in New York, whose names he did not disclose, to purchase a large amount of linseed at the price of three dollars per bushel; that the prosecutors, believing these pretenses and representations to be true and relying upon them, did agree to sell to said persons in New York for whom the defendant purported to act, several thousand bags of linseed at the price named by the defendant; and that in pursuance of such agreement, they did deliver the same to the defendant, who by means of said false representations and pretenses received and obtained said merchandise with intent to cheat and defraud the prosecutors thereof. . . . We next come to the consideration of an exception on which great stress has been laid by the learned counsel for the defendant. It is founded on the admission of evidence to prove that at the time of making the alleged false representations the defendant was deeply insolvent. This fact was offered in proof by the government as tending to show the fraudulent intent of the defendant in making such false statements, and was held by the court to be competent for that purpose. It is doubtless true that in a large class of cases the poverty or pecuniary embarrassments of a party accused of crime cannot be shown as substantive evidence of his guilt. The reason of the exclusion of such evidence is, that in those cases there is no certain or known connection between the facts offered to be proved and the conclusion which is sought to be established by it. To render evidence of collateral facts competent, there must be some natural, necessary, or logical connection between them and the inference or result which they are designed to establish. It does not follow because a man is destitute that he will steal, or that when embarrassed with debt and incapable of meeting his engagements he will commit forgery. The conclusion in such cases is too remote and uncertain a deduction to be legitimately drawn from the premises. But as a safe practical rule it may be laid down that in no case is evidence to be excluded of any fact or circumstance connected with the principal transaction, from which an inference as to the truth of a disputed fact can reasonably be made. This rule is especially applicable when it becomes necessary to show a particular intent in a party as an essential ingredient in the crime with which he is charged. Limited strictly to this purpose, other criminal acts have a direct relation to the particular accusation under investigation, and tend to prove the substance of the issue, because they show the state of the mind of the accused in committing the act with which he is charged. If these views are correct, and we cannot doubt that they are, there is no room for question as to the correctness of the ruling of the court in admitting evidence of the defendant's insolvency. . . . The inability of the person making the false pretense to pay for the goods which he has received becomes a significant circumstance bearing on his intent, and tends to show that the pretense, which otherwise would be innocent or harmless, was made for the purpose of accomplishing a fraud. The insolvency of the party has a direct tendency to show the intent with which the false pretense was used. . . . If at the time of the transaction he was deeply insolvent, and was cognizant of his condition, the necessary consequence of the act was to deprive the vendor of his property without recompense or the chance of payment, and leads to the just and almost unavoidable inference that it was done with an intent to defraud. Evidence of the pecuniary condition of the accused in such a case is not offered to show that he was under a peculiar temptation to commit the offense, or was more likely to cheat and defraud because he was in embarrassed circumstances, but for the purpose of showing the natural and necessary consequence of his act, which the law presumes he intended. The distinction between the motives which impel a man to commit an act and the effect which he intends his act shall produce on a third party is clear and obvious. Poverty or pecuniary embarrassment may be incompetent to prove the former, but direct and forcible evidence of the latter. . . . For this reason, without enlarging further on the point, it seems to us that the evidence objected to was clearly competent, and had a direct tendency to prove a material issue in the case. 114. BRADBURY v. DWIGHT. (1841. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 3 Metc. 31.) Assumpsit to recover back money alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, upon a consideration which had in part failed. At the trial, in the court of common pleas, before STRONG, J., the plaintiff introduced evidence. tending to prove that in December, 1839, he contracted with the defendant for $300 worth of wood, at $1.25 per cord, to be cut on the defendant's land, for which the plaintiff gave his promissory note to the defendant, payable in sixty days, and paid the note soon after it fell due. The plaintiff gave evidence of a negotiation between him and the defendant respecting the purchase of the wood, and introduced a witness, who testified that he (the witness) called upon the defendant, by direction of the plaintiff, and gave to the defendant the above-mentioned note, signed by the plaintiff and by the witness and another person; that the witness took from the defendant a bill of sale of the wood, and carried and delivered it to the plaintiff. Evidence being given that the bill of sale had been lost since the commencement of this action, the witness was permitted to testify as to its contents; and he stated that it purported to be a bill of sale of $300 worth of wood, to be cut and taken from a certain lot belonging to the defendant, by the 1st of June, 1840. The defendant contended, and offered evidence tending to show, that the contract between him and the plaintiff was for all the wood standing on the said lot, whether more or less, without any agreement as to the quantity for which the sum of $300 was to be paid. The plaintiff gave evidence, that there was not on said lot wood enough to amount to $300, at $1.25 per cord; and that he, on the 15th of June, 1840, demanded of the defendant a return of part of the money he had paid, or that the defendant should show him where he could procure more wood. In the course of the defense, the defendant offered evidence to prove that the wood, on the lot upon which the plaintiff cut, "was of far greater value than $1.25 per cord, for the purpose of showing the probability that the contract was such as he alleged it to be, and that it was not according to the claim of the plantiff." This evidence was rejected by the Judge, and the plaintiff obtained a verdict. The case was brought into this court on exceptions to the rejection of this evidence. C. Allen, for the defendant. Merrick, for the plaintiff. PUTNAM, J.-This controversy has grown out of a contract between the parties concerning a sale of wood standing on the defendant's land, and to be cut down by the plaintiff. A bill of sale was given by the defendant to the plaintiff, which expressed the terms of the agreement. But the paper has been lost, and the parties are at issue on its contents; the plaintiff insisting that it was for $300 worth of wood, at $1.25 per cord, and the defendant maintaining, on the contrary, that it was for all the wood on a certain lot, for which the plaintiff was to pay, and has paid, $300. It now appears that there was not wood enough on the lot to amount to the sum of $300, paid at the rate of $1.25 per cord, and that the plaintiff gave notice of that fact to the defendant, fifteen days after the expiration of the time within which the wood was to be cut and taken away, and requested the defendant to show to him and permit him to cut wood on another lot sufficient to make up the deficit, or to return it in money. The witness, who undertook to testify as to the contents of the bill of sale, said that it purported to be a sale of $300 worth of wood, to be taken from a certain lot of the defendant by the 1st of June next after the time of the sale, which was in December, 1839. Now, if that was the contract, it would be satisfied by the plaintiff's taking all the wood which was on the lot, although it might be of less value than $300. That witness did not state that the wood was to be at a certain rate per cord. He stated that the plaintiff paid $300 for the wood; and if the case rested there, the plaintiff would have no just claim against the defendant. But if the contract was for $300 worth of wood, on a certain lot, at a certain rate per cord, and there was a deficiency, it would be clear that the plaintiff, upon reasonable notice and request, would be entitled to recover the amount of that deficiency, as for money paid upon a consideration that had failed to that extent. The question at the trial was, What were the terms of the agreement? The defendant offered to prove that the wood, which the plaintiff cut down in his lot, was of far greater value than $1.25 per cord, as it stood, for the purpose of proving his own statement of the agreement, and disproving the claim of the plaintiff. But the Court rejected that evidence. And the question now is, whether it should have been admitted. If the inference properly to be drawn from the fact tended to prove the agreement to be such as the defendant contended that it was, then it should have been admitted; other |