breath, air or the atmosphere, or wind; 2nd, a state of mind or feeling, such as a "proud" or "haughty" spirit; 3rd, an influence proceeding from a being; 4th, a being possessing conscious mind, and personality, and power, whose substance is non-material, such as God, the angels, and, I presume, possibly man soon after death, if there is any distinction between that state and the "spiritual body" of the resurrection, which is a point left doubtful.

Scripture gives no countenance to the figurative sense that is so commonly put upon the expression, "breath of life," viz., that it denotes a spiritual essence, infused into man and animals by the Creator, and the cause of their life. It always means, simply and literally, the air for respiration, which, being a necessary of life, is often, by a figure of speech, put for the whole life itself, just as bread, blood, and other things are.

The word Pneuma is never rendered "soul" in the New Testament. There is a distinct difference between the words soul and spirit, although they are often taken to mean the same things. The soul is always applied to something belonging to man, the body and conscious mind together, while the word spirit must be admitted to denote the existence of independent non-material beings, possessing a conscious mind, whether such an essence be the cause of man's mind in this life or not. But in none of the examples of the use of the word spirit in the Bible, does it convey distinctly the doctrine that the mind and life of man and animals consists in a spirit separable from the organism, capable of living without it, and leaving the body dead when it departs.*

* I have submitted these conclusions on the interpretation of the words nephesh, ruach, psuche, and preuma, in Scripture, to a profound scholar, who, as an orthodox divine, is a member of the Old Testament Revision Committee. I allude to the Rev. J. D. Geden. He kindly permits me to say that these words, strictly construed, bear no other meaning than that given above. In particular, the word

In the immense variety of the uses of the words nephesh, psuche, ruach, and pneuma, or soul, spirit, breath, and ghost, we must remember that the inspired writers were not blank sheets of paper, but men who were allowed to express themselves in the language of the generation in which they lived, and whose minds were moulded in the knowledge of the time, and that this extended over a long period of years. Hence we must expect much variety in the popular and philosophical mode of thought and expression on the part of the writers. Therefore, in psychology, we cannot, any more than in geology, chemistry and other departments of science, expect precision in knowledge beyond that of the age in which the writer lived. If, therefore, the inspired writers, influenced by the prevailing Egyptian and Greek philosophies, confounding life and mind in one immaterial, though substantial but not immortal, entity, use the common language of the day in describing death,--for example, as giving up the ghost, or the departure of a spiritual principle from the body,—that is not to be taken as the revelation of a scientific fact. On the contrary, I think we may safely conclude that here, as elsewhere, we can expect no revelation in Scripture on what properly belongs to science, viz., the nature of life and mind, so far as it is discernible by observation and experiment. To reconcile science and religion, it is sufficient for the whole scope of Christian Dogmatics, that the man of science may accept, on supernatural authority, the knowledge of the existence of personal

nephesh has no other meaning than the self, or the conscious personality of the individual. So far on Dr. Geden's authority; but I may add, that it is not a new doctrine that the literal construction of the Bible does not bear out the natural

immortality of the human mind. It seems to have been held by the early Christians generally; was revived by Luther; and it has been maintained in this country by a party, since the latter part of the seventeenth century, when the works of William Coward, Dodwell, and others attracted much attention, and gave rise to long controversy. Milton, also, held that the body and soul were inseparable, and one individual.

conscious thinking beings other than human, and whose substance is non-material, and that man, in a personal, conscious, and responsible state, shall live again for ever. As to how this last is to be brought about, science can tell us nothing whatever, and Scripture gives extremely little that is distinct and positive, while, probably, it gives all that our faculties are able to comprehend. If these points can be received, as I maintain they can be, by one holding the doctrines of Evolution, and the merely functional nature of life and mind, then is Scientific Materialism compatible with Dogmatic Theology.*

* Locke states the question thus:-"Judgments transcending reason are those whose truth or probability we cannot discover by the investigation and development of conceptions which arise from sensation and reflection, as, for example, that the dead are raised." At the same time, he maintained there was no inherent impossibility that matter should be endowed with the power of thinking. Thus, we perceive, he would allow that mind or thought might be within the limits of natural science, contrary to Descartes's dictum, that thought is spiritual; while, in any case, life after death belonged to the things transcending reason. This is contrary, also, to the classification of Thomas Aquinas of the things pertaining to faith and reason. Those belonging to revelation alone, the knowledge of which cannot be arrived at by reason, are, the Trinity, the creation of the world in time, original sin, the incarnation of the Logos, the sacraments, purgatory, the resurrection of the flesh, the judgment of the world, and eternal salvation and damnation. The natural immortality of the soul is, we see, not mentioned among these doctrines, which he thinks above, but not contrary to, reason. In fact, he held, as a philosophical doctrine, that immateriality must be ascribed to the human intellect from its very nature, and that the immortality of the soul follows from its immateriality. He accepts the Aristotlian idea of the soul, but he "ascribes to the same soul, which, as vous, or rational soul, has individual and yet immaterial existence, and is separate from the body, the animal and vegetable functions; so that, for him, the formproducing principle of the body, the anima sensitiva, appetitiva, and motiva, and, finally, the anima rationalis, are all one and the same substance" (Ueberweg, I., p. 449). Most unfortunately, this merely human speculation-derived, indeed, from heathen sources-was erected into a dogma by the Catholic Church, at the Council of Vienne, in 1311, a body of men, doubtless, quite as ignorant of physiology as Thomas, and intellectually far his inferior. So they could add nothing to the probability of the truth, while they added infinitely to the authority of the doctrine; and this is, no doubt, the chief source of the popular notions still prevalent, which, contrary to sound physiology, jumble up the life common to plants and animals, the sensation and thought of animals and man, and the immortal life of the last, all into one substantial principle.

The dogma negatively asserted by Thomas was reaffirmed positively by Leo X., who decreed that all should be punished as heretics who denied the natural immor

There remains only a few words to be said on the bearing of the belief in the supernatural on our own minds. Formerly, all freedom of thought was under great difficulties and even danger. But, now-a-days, the tables seem to be turned in so far as that any one expressing his belief in Supernatural Revelation is looked upon in certain circles as a poor contemptible creature, and intellectually little better than a fool! This is strongly shewn in the controversy which has sprung up upon Häckel's Natural History of Creation in Germany. Professor Michelis, one of the most notable writers on the theological side, is in his turn attacked by the disciples of Häckel in an unmeasured style of language surpassing, as usual, the master, and shewing an actual fanaticism in infidelity. For example, Posner (in Im neuen Reich) declares that Science can pay no attention to the attack of Michelis upon Häckel, because the former, 1st, being a theologian and a Christian, is a believer in a God and Creator; 2nd, the ideal conception aimed at by him is essentiaily a Non-ens, a something á priori, unthinkable, and, therefore, with no sense or meaning in the eyes of a man of science. And he adds, you must deny God and trample the Cross under foot before you can become even a scholar, far less a master in Natural Science.* What tality of the soul. This was met by a counterblast from Luther, who classed this theory with "those monstrous opinions to be found in the Roman dunghill of decretals." Notwithstanding, it is still held, not only by Roman Catholics of necessity, and by Deists who of course can have no other hope of immortality, but also by the great majority of Evangelical Christians who follow Luther in other respects.

Perhaps I may be permitted in this place, where we are precluded from entering on theological discussions, to say that the doctrine, "that the soul is not naturally immortal, but that its future existence is simply a gift of God, which is both imparted and announced by supernatural agencies and instruments," does not necessarily bear out the theories of "conditional immortality," etc., which have been put forward along with it, but is equally compatible with the more orthodox tenets. Nor are the difficulties in any way greater than those inseparable from the infusion of an immortal soul into a body torn naturally, and which has been the subject of such interminable and fruitless speculation.

#66 "Häkelogonie. Ein akademischer Protest gegen," Häckel's Anthropogenie, von Professor Fr. Michelis. Bonn, Neusser, 1876. 2nd Edit.

modicum of truth really underlies this extravagant and repulsive statement? It must be admitted that the methods of scientific investigation, directed as they are to the tracing all phenomena to antecedent causes which are themselves phenomena, is essentially sceptical, and excludes thoughts of First Causes. The latter, also, are of no use for the purpose in hand, and must prove distracting; the foregone conclusion of a Creator received by faith is also apt to fill the mind with teleological ideas, which tend to check the progress of investigation at numerous points, which are afterwards passed by an unembarrassed thinker. The thought of the continual presence of God is also, as in the small affairs of life, too heavy for man to bear, and troubles his intellect, even in special scientific investigations. Consequently, as our whole powers, at the very best, are never more than enough to cope with the difficulties of two men of science of medium capacity and equal opportunities, the infidel will have a certain advantage, which, however, will hardly tell with great and exceptional geniuses, while, with most, the counterbalancing good will more than turn the scale. There is no gainsaying the fact that the majority of scientific men are not religious (in the restricted sense in which the term is commonly used), but this really adds little strength to the fanatical-infidel positions above given, for the intellectual requirements of a votary of natural science are very different from those of men whose natural bent of mind leads them to literature, theology, and art; we would, therefore, not expect a man to excel in both fields. Besides, the field of science is now so enormous that a man must not only give himself up wholly to it, but even to a very small part of it, in order to make a new conquest for the domain of knowledge. Hence even an incapacity to judge of religious truths. It is related that the astronomer Halley, desirous of combating Newton's orthodox views on the Christian evidences, received this reply from the