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it must exist soon. He who shall create it will descend to posterity with a glory in nowise inferior to that of Bacon or of Newton. He who would complete such a work must be acquainted with the whole circle of the sciences, and be familiar with their history; he must examine and analyze all the circumstances of every important discovery, and, from the facts thus developed, point out the laws by which is governed the yet unexplained process of original investigation. When God shall have sent that genius upon earth who was born to accomplish this mighty labor, then one of the greatest obstacles will have been removed to our acquiring an unlimited control over all the agents of nature.

But, passing this first part of the subject, I remark that, whenever the laws of such a science shall have been discovered, I think that they will be found to rest upon the following self-evident principles:

First- A part of any system which is the work of an intelligent agent is similar, so far as the principles which it involves are concerned, to the whole of that system.

And, secondly · The work of an intelligent and moral being must bear, in all its lineaments, the traces of the character of its author. And, hence, he will use analogy the most skilfully who is most thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the system, and at the same time most deeply penetrated with a conviction of the attributes of the First Cause of all things.

To illustrate this by a single remark: Suppose I should present before you one of the paintings of Raphael, and covering by far the greater part of it with a screen, ask you to proceed with the work and designate where the next lines should be drawn. It is evident that no one but a painter need even make the attempt; and of painters he would be the most likely to succeed who had become best acquainted with the genius of Raphael, and had most thoroughly meditated upon the manner in which that genius had displayed itself in the work before him. So, of the system of the universe we see but a part. All the rest is hidden from our view. He will, however, most readily discover where the next lines are drawn who is most thoroughly acquaint

ed with the character of the author, and who has observed, with the greatest accuracy, the manner in which that character is displayed, in that portion of the system which he has condescended to reveal to us.

All this is confirmed by the successive efforts of mind which resulted in the greatest of Sir Isaac Newton's discoveries. . . . I think it self-evident that this first germ of the system of the universe would never have been suggested to any man whose mind had not been filled with exalted views of the greatness of the Creator, and who had not diligently contemplated the mode in which those attributes were displayed in that part of his works which science had already discovered to us.

And if this distinction be just, it will lead us to divide philosophers into those who have been eminent in attainment in those sciences which are instruments of investigation; and those who, to these acquisitions, have added unusual skill in foretelling where these instruments could, with the greatest success, be applied. Among the ancients, probably, Aristotle belonged to the former, and Pythagoras and Archimedes to the latter class. Among the moderns I think the infidel philosophers generally will be found to have distinguished themselves by the accurate use of the sciences, and Christian philosophers by the additional glory of foretelling when and how the sciences may be used. I am not aware that infidelity has presented to the world any discoveries to be compared with those of Boyle and Pascal, and Bacon and Newton, or of Locke, and Milton, and Butler.

And I here may be allowed to suggest that, often as the character of Newton has been the theme of admiration, it has seemed to me that the most distinctive element of his greatness has commonly escaped the notice of his eulogists. It was neither in mathematical skill nor in mathematical invention that he so far surpassed his contemporaries; for in both these respects, he divided the palm with Huygens, and Kepler, and Leibnitz. It is in the wide sweep of his far-reaching analogy, distinguished alike by its humility and its boldness, that he has left the philosophers of all previous and all subse

quent ages so immeasurably behind him. Delighted with his modesty and reciprocating his confidence, nature held communion with him as with a favorite son; to him she unveiled her most recondite mysteries; to him she revealed the secret of her most subtle transformations, and then, taking him by the hand, she walked with him abroad over the wide expanse of universal being. — Occasional Discourses.

DUTY OF CITIZENS.

Suppose twenty men and women, with their families, to be thrown together upon an uninhabited island. They would soon begin, from necessity, to build themselves houses, and cultivate the soil, and catch for their use whatever animals might be found. Whatever each family thus builded, or raised, or caught, it would, of course, hold as its own. And, if any one exchanged with another whatever he had secured by exchange would also be his own. In other words, each one would work for himself, and claim as his own whatever he had produced. They might thus live very happily for a long time; at least, so long as every one acted in this manner, and they would need neither laws nor government. But suppose that any one should begin to act differently. Suppose any one should undertake to drive his neighbor's family out of their house; or, after they had raised a crop of corn, should come and carry it into his own barn, and leave them to starve. And suppose another, seeing this was so easy a way of support, should undertake to do the same thing to another neighbor. The result would be, that, if no one could enjoy the fruit of his labor, no one would work, and they would either starve, or else they would go away and live alone; and thus be exposed to the inconveniences of always living in the wilderness.

Or, suppose another case. Suppose that the man who was turned out of his house, determined upon having his revenge, and therefore set fire to the house of his oppressor. Here would be two families turned out of their houses, and left destitute. These two families might, on VOL. XXIV.-6

the same principles, go on to turn of their possessions two others, who might avenge themselves by two more fires, and thus it would go on, until all the houses and property were destroyed, and the whole settlement would very soon perish.

Now it is clear that this would never do. There must be a stop put to such proceedings, and the only way would be, to stop it at the beginning. The whole community would have to unite against the first robber, and oblige him to return the property which he had stolen, and to agree together, that they would always do so, to any one who should steal again. And, if this did not stop it, they would have to agree to punish the robber, in some such way as would oblige him to let alone everything that was his neighbor's. This would be the first law of this little community.

And now having made this law, and thus having undertaken to see that no one interfered with his neighbor's property or rights, it is evident that no one need undertake to avenge himself, or to reclaim by force anything that had been taken from him. This community. would, therefore, agree together, that, if any one was injured, he must apply to them for redress, instead of redressing himself. The reason of this is evident, for they would be better judges how much he was injured, and what redress should be made, than he would be himself; because, it is a bad rule, to allow any man to be the judge in his own case. This would be the second law of this community.

These two laws then would be, first, that no one should interfere with his neighbor's rights, in any manner whatever; and, secondly, if any one did thus interfere, that the injured person should not attempt to redress himself, but, should leave the subject to be decided upon by the whole community.

In process of time, these laws would have to be subdivided, as there would be various forms of injury. A man might encroach upon his neighbor's land. This would require one form of redress. One might steal by day, and another by night; one might break open a house, another might steal a horse; each one requiring

a separate form of punishment. And so, of redress of grievances; one might strike another, and a second might burn his house; these would have to be distinguished, and all these forms of crime be defined, so that the innocent might be distinguished from the guilty, and the guilty punished according to their deserts.

As this community increased in number, and it became necessary to make a great many laws, it would be impossible for them all to meet, on every occasion that presented itself. They would therefore be obliged to appoint a few persons, in their place, to meet for this purpose. Eight or ten would unite together and select a prudent and wise man, and agree to be bound by what he should consent to. These delegates would be legislators, and such an assembly would be a legislature.

But after the laws were made, when cases of injury became frequent, all the community could not meet together, to decide between two men, who had a difficulty with each other. They would, therefore, be obliged to appoint some persons, who should make it their business to hear causes, and decide, according to law. This would save a great deal of time, and would also insure a much better administration of justice. Such men would be judges, and when they were assembled, they would be I called a court.

And, besides, after they had decided what was right, and how a bad man should be punished, it would be necessary that some one should carry their sentence into effect. Such persons are called executive officers. Governors, sheriffs, and constables, belong to this class.

Now, all these officers taken together, legislators, judges, governors, sheriffs, etc., are called the government of a country. They are persons appointed by the people, in some mode or other, to make laws and to carry them into execution, so that no man shall interfere with his neighbor's rights; and, so that if he does, he shall be obliged to make redress, and shall be punished for his crime.

Hence, the duties of man, as a citizen, are, in general, these.

1. As he agrees that no one shall interfere with the

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