action without previous inquiry, there may be good precedents for action with previous inquiry. But in order to make a correct application of these precedents respectively, it is necessary to examine the circumstances of each, and to apply them to the cases exhibiting similar circumstances. For example, it would be irrational to apply a precedent of legislative inquiry where the subject was complex, the facts imperfectly known, and many discordant opinions prevailed, and where, moreover, there was no pressing need of action, to the case of a general who was called upon for a decision in the midst of a campaign. In cases so manifestly dissimilar as those just suggested, nobody would perhaps think of employing one as a precedent for the other, or, if any such argument were used, its inapplicability would be easily exposed; but where the degrees of dissimilitude are less, the application of irrelevant precedents is often made, and, if the difference should be small, it becomes a hard matter for a perfectly competent judge-a person unbiassed, experienced, and well informed of the facts of each case-to form a confident opinion as to the applicability or non-applicability of the alleged precedent.

It happens not unfrequently, in the discussion of practical affairs, that rival precedents or real examples are cited, and that those who have to decide the question are called upon to judge as to the greater applicability of the one or the other to the case in hand. Inasmuch as no two cases are ever identical in all their circumstances, the comparison is instituted by omitting some of the circumstances of each, and by pointing out the resemblance between their residuary circumstances. Hence, if different portions of the case under consideration are selected for comparison, different precedents may be found, leading to different, or even to opposite conclusions. Thus, let us suppose that the case which stands for decision is composed of the circumstances 4+A'+A”+B+B+B", and that one party in the debate adduce a precedent consisting of circumstances a+a+a"+c+c+c"; while the other party adduce a different precedent consisting of circumstances b+b'+b"+d+d'+d′′ The former party treat the circumstances A, A', A" in the case for decision as material, and reject the others as immaterial.

They likewise treat the circumstances a, a, a" in the precedent as material, and reject the others as immaterial. The other party deal in a corresponding manner with B, B', B" and b, b', b". The two parties then severally compare A, A', A" with a, a', a", and B, B', B' with b, b′, b', and allege that the parallelism of each precedent with the case in hand is established. In order to impugn the applicability of his antagonist's precedent, the former party may then argue that B, B′, B", the circumstances, in the proposed case, treated by the other side as material, are in fact immaterial, and that therefore the precedent has no weight; or, secondly, they may argue that d, d', d', the circumstances in the precedent treated by the other side as immaterial, are in fact material, and therefore that the precedent is inapplicable. Corresponding objections may be made by the latter party to the other precedent. Thus, if one nation receives an affront from another nation, a question may arise, in political debate, as to the policy of resenting the affront, or of leaving it unnoticed. Precedents in favour of each of the two opposite courses may be alleged by the contending parties. There may be valid precedents for resenting a national affront, and valid precedents for acquiescence without retaliation. Each of these may present certain points of resemblance with the particular case of affront under consideration. It will be for those who argue and decide the question to judge which of the rival analogies is the strongest. In like manner, if there be a question whether a certain expense shall be defrayed by a local tax, or out of the taxes of the general government, rival precedents may be adduced in favour of both courses. Each of the precedents cited on both sides may have a certain affinity with the case under discussion. There may be some circumstances, in the particular expense to be incurred, which resemble circumstances in some expenses defrayed by local taxation-there may be other circumstances in it which resemble circumstances in some expenses defrayed by national taxation. The nicety of the practical judgment consists in determining which of these two sets of circumstances preponderate. Thus Machiavel, in examining the question, whether a nation which expects to be invaded should await the attack at

home, or should anticipate the enemy by an aggressive movement, adduces opposite examples of the success both of defensive and offensive tactics under the supposed circumstances-as the successful attack of Scipio upon Carthage on the one hand, and the unsuccessful attack of the Neapolitans upon Charles VIII., in Romagna, on the other.(1)

The scrutiny of the different items of fact upon which the applicability of the rival precedents, and the balancing of the opposite considerations with one another, singly and in the aggregate, depend, is often a delicate and difficult process, requiring rare mental qualifications for its proper performance. In the comparison of the several analogies-in the dissection, illustration, and rejection of the various attempted parallels-all the resources of an acute, dexterous, experienced, and well-informed reasoner-of a mind equally prompt in discerning resemblances and differences -may be tasked to the utmost, even if there is perfect freedom from bias, and a strong desire to decide rightly. On the other hand, it is the business of the advocate, and of the sophistical partizan, to advert merely to those precedents which support his own view of the case, and to withdraw attention from the precedents on the other side; and moreover, to insist merely on the points of resemblance in his own precedents, and to be silent as to the points of difference. In this way he contributes, so far as he is able, to the practical error which consists in the misapplication of a good precedent.

Another variety of the same form of practical error is when a good model is injudiciously copied when an institution, desirable under the circumstances in which it exists, is assumed to be desirable under a different set of circumstances, and is therefore propagated by imitation. The most frequent example of this error is to be found in the government of dependencies, whether they be newly-established colonies, politically dependent upon the mother-country, or newly-conquered provinces. In either case, the imperial government is apt to introduce its own institutions into the dependency, simply because they are its

(14) Disc. ii. 12.

institutions, and with little or no reference to the different medium in which they will, when so introduced, have to act. It may be led into this error sometimes by a belief, that the propagation of its laws and institutions will increase its power-sometimes by the facility of the operation, and an ignorance of the circumstances which cause the institution to be unsuited to the dependent community.(15) Thus, when Athens introduced democracy, Sparta oligarchy, into its dependent states, each believed that, in multiplying copies of its own constitution, it was taking a step which tended to consolidate its own power. (1) On the other hand, the permanent settlement in Bengal was made by Lord Cornwallis with excellent intentions to the province, but with an imperfect knowledge of the probable consequences of his own measure.

own.

The desire of multiplying copies of an admired real model is, further, the source of the system of political propagandism in independent states. Sometimes this desire is interested, as in the case of Athens and Sparta, just mentioned: a nation seeks to impose its own form of government upon other nations for the purpose of increasing its own political influence, through the sympathy and support of governments similarly constituted to its At other times, the desire is disinterested-it is the fruit of a political fanaticism, which strives to force upon reluctant nations an institution which the propagandist considers beneficial, and to make them prosperous and happy in spite of their own prejudices. The struggles of the revolutionary government of France to diffuse its principles over Europe, and to introduce republican governments in foreign countries, were owing to a mixture of these motives. Disinterested political propagandism has not only borrowed its name, but has taken its rise, in great measure, from the system of religious propagandism established by the church of Rome, and partially adopted by the protestant churches. The principles of unity of faith and of unity of church government were easily transferred to politics. Looking to this

(15) See Bentham, Traités sur la Législation, tom. iii. p. 329; ed. 1802. (16) οἱ μὲν ̓Αθηναῖοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δήμους KATEλVOV.-Aristot. Pol. v. 7.