C. P.] TROTTER V. TREVOR-HANKS v. JONES-BISHOP v. Jones. barrister duly appointed to revise the lists of voters for the said borough, the name of William Anderson was duly objected to being retained on the register of voters for the said borough under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act 1867. The facts of the case were as follows: The said William Anderson was, on the last day of July 1868, and during the whole of the preceding twelve months, an inhabitant occupier as tenant of a dwelling-house in the township of Brompton within the said borough of Northallerton of a net yearly rateable value of less than 10% The Small Tenements Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 99) had been duly adopted in the township of Brompton, and was in force in that township at the time of the passing of the Representation of the People Act 1867, and the owner of the premises occupied by the said W. Anderson was assessed to the rates for the relief of the poor and to all other rates and assessments in respect of which the owner of such premises was rateable pursuant to the provisions of that Act and sect. 3 of the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 39. It was customary in the township of Brompton to make all poor rates prospectively to meet the future expenditure. The first rate for the relief of the poor within the township of Brompton, made after the passing of the Representation of the People Act 1867, was made and allowed by two justices on the 4th Sept. 1867, and in that rate the said Wm. Anderson's name was inserted in the column, headed "Name of Occupier," and the owner's name was inserted in the column headed, "Name of Owner," and the owner was assessed as he previously had been, in pursuance of the Small Tenements Act, at threefourths of the amount at which the said Wm. Ander son would have been rateable had the Small Tenements Act not been adopted within the township of Brompton. The amount so assessed was paid by the owner. The owner of the premises occupied by the said Wm. Anderson had not at any time availed himself of the provisions contained in the latter part of sect. 4 of the Small Tenements Act. The said 'Wm. Anderson had not claimed to be rated instead of the owner in respect of the rate of the 4th Sept. 1867. No other rate for the relief of the poor was made for the said township before the 5th Jan. 1868. The next subsequent poor-rates made in the year ending 31st July 1868 were respectively made on the 14th Feb. and the 21st May, and in both those rates the said Wm. Anderson was rated as an ordinary occupier, and paid an equal amount in the pound to that payable by other ordinary occupiers. It was contended on behalf of the objector, 1. The said Wm. Anderson had not during the whole of twelve calendar months preceding the last day of July 1868 been rated as an ordinary occupier in respect of the premises occupied by him to all rates made for the relief of the poor in respect of such premises, and had not on or before the 20th July 1868 paid an equal amount in the pound to that payable by other ordinary occupiers in respect of the same premises up to the preceding 5th Jan., according to the provisions of the 3rd section of the Representation of the People Act 1867. 2. That the liability of the owner to be rated or assessed to any subsequent rate for the relief of the poor ceased on the passing of the Representation of the People Act 1867, under the provisions of sect. 7 of that Act. 3. That this liability was in no wise affected by the first proviso to the last-mentioned section, as the word "composition" in such proviso related only to cases where the owners had under the provisions of the latter part of the 4th section of the Small Tenements Act compounded for the rates for [C. P. a year in respect of all his tenements occupied or unoccupied within the township of a rateable value of not more than 67., and to special local Acts. It was contended on the part of the said Wm. Anderson, 1. That the rate made on the 4th Sept. 1867 was not payable by him in respect of the premises then occupied by him, but by the owner thereof, and that therefore the 4th paragraph of sect. 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1867 was not applicable. 2. That a composition, within the meaning of that word in the first proviso to sect. 7 of the Act existed in the township at the time of the passing of the Act, and that as the rate was made before the 29th Sept. 1867, and as the said William Anderson had actually been rated as an ordinary occupier in all subsequent rates, he must be taken to have been sufficiently rated, under the 7th and 8th sections of the Act, for the purposes of being placed on the register. Upon the above facts the barrister decided that the said William Anderson was entitled to have his name retained on the register. If the court should be of opinion that his decision was wrong, the register was to be amended by expunging the voter's name from the register. But if the court should be of opinion that this decision was right, the list of voters for the borough was to stand as settled. BOVILL, C. J.-The case which was argued yesterday, and the two cases which have been brought before the court this morning, depend exactly upon the same point, and I am very glad that the discussion has been continued so as to place the court in possession of all the arguments that could be adduced on either side. The question depends, as Mr. Mellish has said, entirely upon the construction to be placed upon the first proviso of sect. 7 of the Act of 1867, which enacts that nothing in this Act contained shall affect any composition existing at the time of the passing of this Act, so nevertheless that no such composition shall remain in force beyond the 29th day of September next." The question is, as has been stated, what is the meaning of "composition existing at the time of the passing of this Act?" If this proviso had included every case that came within the principal enactment in the 7th section, it would have been very difficult for us, or for anyone, to answer the argument of Mr. Mellish, that the Act ought not to receive such a construction as would make the proviso negative the enactment, and therefore stultify the Legislature; and for a long time the difficulty was, in considering only the effect of the Small Tenements Act, to see what other case there could be that would come within the enactment and would not come within the proviso; and I, for one, certainly felt great difficulty in construing the proviso so as to avoid negativing the enactment. But in the course of the discussion and towards the close of it, by a reference Mr. Mellish was good enough to make, and Mr. Macnamara also, to other Acts of Parliament of a local nature, which had been passed before the Small Tenements Act, it seems the system was, at all events in some cases, probably in many, in the particular towns where the owner was assessed instead of the occupier, that there was no diminution in the amount of the rate, and in those Acts of Parliament there was a power given to the landlord to compound for a less sum in respect of property whether occupied or not. That was the state of things existing at the time under various local Acts when the Small Tenements Acts passed, and then it seems that Act authorised vestries to order tenements under 67. a-year to be rated to the owners instead of the occupiers. By the 2nd C. P.] TROTTER V. TREVOR-HANKS v. JONES-BISHOP v. JONES. section, a vestry by a majority of two-thirds might | rescind that order after it had been in force for three years. In the present case no difficulty arises in that respect, because the order was here made many years ago, and although the vestry were at liberty to rescind it, that order has never been rescinded. By the 4th section, while the first-mentioned order was in force, the owner was to be rated at three-fourths of the amount at which the tenement was rated to the occupier; and further, if the owner desired to be rated for a tenement whether occupied or not, he might be so rated at an amount to be agreed upon, not less than one-half that at which the occupier was previously rated; this latter arrangement was to exist upon notice in writing within fourteen days after the 25th March of any year till the following 25th March. Then there are some cases brought before us, cases where under the local Acts the owner was rated instead of the occupier at the full amount of the rate and cases where they may be rated at less than the full amount, one without agreement and the other by agreement, in matters of occupied houses as well as those which are unoccupied. We then come to the Registration Act (14 & 15 Vict. c. 14), and, as was pointed out in the course of the argument, that being a Registration Act, and not a rating Act, would seem to have no operation with reference to the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 99 (The Small Tenements Act), which related only to tenements under the value of 64, because at the time the 14 & 15 Vict. was passed, the occupation franchise was a 101. franchise. Nor has that Act anything to do with Sturges Bourne's Act, the 23rd section of which excepts from all effect of the enactment the places where the right of voting for members to serve in Parliament depends on the rating. Then it would seem that this statute, the 14 & 15 Vict., must apply to cases under local Acts, and those local Acts, or some of them at all events, that have been brought to our attention, or cases where the owner may be rated instead of the occupier to the full amount, and cases where he may be rated at less than the full amount. Then by the 3rd section of this Act (14 & 15 Vict. c. 14), in cases where by any composition with the landlord, a less sum shall be payable than the full amount of rate, which, except for such composition, would be due in respect of the same premises, the occupier claiming to be rated shall not be bound to pay or tender more than the amount then payable under such composition." That seems to refer to cases in which the full amount of the rate might be payable. The distinction is drawn as to the full amount, and that would seem to apply to those cases where under local Acts of Parliament the owner was rated to the full amount instead of the occupier. It may well be, therefore, that the composition by the landlord spoken of in the 3rd section refers to that species of composition which is mentioned in the Acts of Parliament which have been brought to our attention. It may be it applies to those cases where there may be an agreement with the landlord. It is not necessary to consider the case under other Acts of Parliament that have been brought to our attention, where there was less than the full amount payable. Looking at he object of these sections, and that they will *pply to where the full amount was paid, it is not ampossible to come to that conclusion. It is not Inecessary to consider further that question. I only point to it to show that in the Act of Parliament the distinction appears to have been drawn between the cases where the full amount was payable, and where less than the full amount was payable-the distinction that Mr. Mellish drew between the words of the two sections, the third expressly saying where a less sum should be payable than the full amount of the rate, and that is coupled with 66 [C. P. First, the words "composition with the landlord." We then come to the language of the present Act; and by the 7th section it is enacted that "Where the owner is rated at the time of the passing of this Act (which is the 15th Aug. 1867), to the poor-rate in respect of a dwelling-house or other tenements situate in a parish wholly or partly in a borough, instead of the occupier, his liability to be rated in any future poor-rate shall cease." And that, I quite agree, if it stopped there, would apply to every case where the owner was rated instead of the occupier under the local Acts, or the Small Tenements Acts, whether rated to the full amount or less. It is general in its application, and the intention was that from and after the passing of the Act all those rates should cease. Then it proceeds, "And the following enactments shall take effect with respect to rating in all boroughs: after the passing of this Act no owner of any dwelling-house or other tenement situate in a parish either wholly or partly within a borough, shall be rated to the poor-rate instead of the occupier except as hereinafter mentioned." But for the exception which follows, those words are equally general with the enactment itself; the sub-section is equally applicable, and would apply to all cases to which the principal enactment applies, and would exclude the power of rating any owner instead of the occupier after the passing of the Act. But then come the concluding words of the section: "Except as hereinafter mentioned." That does not refer to the exception of a house wholly let out in apartments, as in the case of Stamper v. The Overseers of Sunderland, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 682, and has no bearing upon this question. Then we come to the first proviso, "Provided that nothing in this Act contained shall affect any composition existing at the time of the passing of this Act, so nevertheless that no such composition shall remain in force beyond the 29th day of Sept. next." Now, if composition is there used for the purpose of designating only an arrangement by which less than the full amount is paid, there is no difficulty in the construction of the Act, and though, in the course of the discussion, I pointed out to Mr. Macnamara a number of instances where the full amount of the rate differed in circumstances from the rate made by an order on the owner instead of the occupier; and though there are a number of instances of that description, one being rated at the full amount, the other less, one for one period of time, and another for another, and a variety of other cases, yet notwithstanding all those cases, I have been unable to discover any cogent reason why the Legislature should make one system of rating conclude upon the 15th Aug. and the other the 29th Sept. But it is said that the 29th Sept. is the quarter-day, or the half-yearly day, to which I entirely accede. There is equal reason it seems to me with reference to the arrangements between landlord and tenant, for making the rating of the owner cease on that day in one case as in the other. I do not see any substantial difference between the two. If the proviso applied to all cases included in the enactment, it would not be for us to enter into the reasons of the Legislature in making the distinction which they have made, though it is difficult to see why they should make a distinction in the day, and fix the 15th Aug. in one case and the 29th Sept. in the other. Again, in the particular case it is true that the parish might have put an end to the order for rating if they pleased, because the three years had elapsed. Then, in other cases there might have been, if the order was recent, an order continuing for more than a year; and there might have been cases where the order was in force, and would continue for two or three years, whilst an occupation by agreement was in force only for nine months. I C. P.] THE WARRINGTON PETITION. fail to discover any reason why in one case, which was for a longer period, in which the order might be in force, it should be determined on the 15th Aug., and in the other on the 29th Sept. If there were any cogent reasons, they would be a ground for us to consider what ought to be the proper construction to be placed upon the word composition. Looking at the language of the 14 & 15 Vict., and the distinction there made between full amount of the rate and less than the full amount, I come to the conclusion that the Legislature, in speaking of "composition" in the first proviso, did mean where less than the full amount was paid, and that is the proper construction to be placed upon the proviso. We held the other day, that where the composition is by agreement it came clearly within this, in the Whitehaven case Mason (app.) v. Bennett (resp.); and there seems to me to be no reason why it should not include all cases where a less sum is paid by the owner than would be payable by the occupier, whether by agreement or under Act of Parliament. This will best carry out the intention of the Legislature, and the consequence will be this, that the whole of these clauses will be consistent. No rate can be made after the passing of this Act upon the owner instead of the occupier, except in cases where less than the full amount is paid which would be in the nature of a composition; and that word is generally considered as referring to a case of this sort, that a composition is something less than the whole. Dealing with it in that way, which is the ordinary position, it seems that in all cases when less than the whole was payable, the owner cannot be rated after the 29th Sept. but by force of the proviso that the liability would continue to be rated up to that time. Then the 8th section seems to me to be entirely consistent with that view; and, at first, it struck me, if the provision was inconsistent with the enactment that then the provision of the first condition in the 8th section would assist the construction, because that seems to contemplate that there were two different periods at which the liability of an owner to be rated would cease. But then, when we come to the conclusion which I have stated, that the rating of the owner, where he is rated to the full amount, is to cease at the passing of the Act, and the rating of the owner, when he pays less, is to cease on the 29th September, then that the words of the condition to the 8th section are properly used, and are applicable to those cases; and, as put by Mr. Manisty, the 8th section does not seem to assist the arguments upon either one or other of them. On the whole, I am of opinion that in the case of rating an owner, although there is no agreement but by virtue of an order under the Act, where a smaller sum less than the full amount is payable, that is a composition within the meaning of the proviso. And in these cases the result will be, in one case affirming the decision of the revising barrister, and in the others reversing it. BYLES, J.--I am of the same opinion. I place my judgment entirely upon the word composition. I think that it means every rate which is abated, but it must be under the sanction of an Act of Parliament. Now there are two modes of making rates the first, where there is an order in vestry, and the second, where there is an agreement as to the mode of making it; in both of those cases there must be a rate made according to the prescribed form. I can see no reason for any distinction between the two cases. I must confess that the attempt to construe and reconcile all the different clauses and provisions of this Act of Parliament and to draw a conclusive argument from them is past the limits of my understanding. | [JUDGES' CH. reference to the meaning of the word "composition' here, inasmuch as at the passing of the Act there were two classes of cases in which an owner had been rated and paid, in one case by agreement and the other without agreement, by an order of vestry, less than the amount ordinarily paid :--there being those two classes of cases, as they are popularly and ordinarily compositions, I see no reasons why they should not both be termed compositions. It is quite clear that that would be the popular signification. There is no satisfactory reason, though some ingenious reasons have been suggested, why this difference should be made between the two cases, and if the Legislature had really intended to exclude one class, which I should suppose would be the more numerous class, one would have expected to find some language to declare such an intention. I quite agree in the meaning of the word composition. Therefore the result stated by the Lord Chief Justice follows. BRETT, J.-I am of the same opinion. BOVILL, C.J.-There will be no costs in either of these cases. Judgment for respondent in Trotter (app.) v. Trevor (resp.); for appellants in the other two cases. JUDGES' CHAMBERS. Reported by F. O. CRUMP, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Friday, Jan. 8, 1869. (Before WILLES, J. and MARTIN, B.) CROZIER v. RYLANDS AND NEILD (Returning Officer). Returning officer-Alleged misconduct of by deputy- A petition alleged misconduct against a returning officer, Held, also, that if such allegations were withdrawn, The petition in this case was presented against the sitting member and the returning officer, and was what one of the learned counsel called a blended petition, there being some paragraphs which related to the sitting member, and others which related to the returning officer, and this was a summons taken out on the part of the returning officer, for the purpose of obtaining particulars of the misconduct alleged against him. The miscon duct was alleged to have been committed by the returning officer by one of his deputies, and also by himself personally in not duly and indifferently making a return. The summons asked for an order for particulars of such misconduct to be given forthwith. Wheeler in support of the summons. WILLES, J. expressed a wish to hear counsel fully upon the question, a similar point having arisen in KEATING, J.-I am of the same opinion. With the Southampton petition. JUDGES' CH.] STALEYBRIDGE ELECTION PETITION. [JUDGES' CH. WILLES, J. said that as Martin, B. would try the petition he should consult him upon the point, although he was prepared to make an order at once for particulars within, say, six days. Agents for the respondent, Hoskins and Wyatt. Agents for the petitioners, Baxter, Rose, and Norton. STALEYBRIDGE ELECTION PETITION. (Before WILLES, J.) Petition-Irrelevant clause-Application to strike out. Paying for the conveyance of voters to the poll is an illegal act, for which an indictment may lie, but is not an offence which can be alleged in a petition against a candidate's return. Wheeler thereupon referred to the Act 31 & 32 | alternative of the petitioners refusing to pledge Vict. c. 125, sect. 48 of which says that, "If any themselves not to charge him with personal default. returning officer wilfully delays, neglects, or refuses duly to return any person who ought to be returned to serve in Parliament, for any county or borough, such person may, in case it has been determined on the hearing of an election petition under this Act that such person was entitled to have been returned, sue the officer having so wilfully delayed, neglected, MARTIN, B. shortly after arrived at chambers, and or refused duly to make such return at his election concurred in the view taken by Willes, J. He accordin any of Her Majesty's courts of record at West-ingly made an order for stringent particulars within minster, and shall recover double the damages he six days, such order only to be carried out in the event has sustained by reason thereof, together with full of the petitioners continuing the proceedings as comcosts of suit; provided such action be commenced menced against the returning officer, and not to be within one year after the commission of the act on acted upon if they withdrew the personal charges. which it it is grounded, or within six months after Costs to be paid up to the moment of such withthe conclusion of the trial relating to such elec- drawal. He declined to express any opinion as to tion." By virtue of this section the remedy against the liability of a returning officer for the misconduct the returning officer was by action for recovery of of his deputy. the damages. Within the meaning of the Act no case was made out which could form matter for a petition against the returning officer, it was charged that he had committed the misconduct by his deputy, and he was in a position analogous to that of a captain of a man-of-war and not responsible for his deputy. This was not a case similar to that of principal and agent. [WILLES, J. thought that in accordance with the decision of Lord Holt in the Post-office case, a returning officer would not be considered liable for the misconduct of his subordinates.] He referred also to sections 51 & 52, the former stating that, "Where an election petition under this Act complains of the conduct of a returning officer, such returning officer shall, for all the purposes of this Act, except the admission of respondents in his place, be deemed to be a respondent;" and the latter (sect. 52), enacting that "A petition under this Act complaining of no return may be presented to the court, and shall be deemed to be an election petition within the meaning of this Act, and the court may make such order thereon as they think expedient for compelling a return to be made, or may allow such petition to be heard by the judge in manner hereinbefore provided with respect to ordinary election petitions." On the latter section he contended that the only petition within the scope and purview of the Act which could be presented against the returning officer was in cases where he made no return whatever, and if he was liable in any other respect it must be for wilful neglect under sect. 48. There was only one paragraph in the petition charging him personally that he had not duly and indifferently made a return. That was not a matter for petition, and he asked to be allowed to demur. It appeared to him (Wheeler) that in a case of this kind, as the proceedings under this statute were analogous to proceedings at law, that the petition, so far as it related to the returning officer, was open to demurrer. [WILLES, J. expressed his concurrence in this, and also in the construction placed upon the Act.] But an application to strike out the clause alleging the payment was refused, the petitioner being left to pay the costs in respect of it at the trial should he per severe. In this case the petition, besides charging bribery, reating, and undue influence in the usual form, contained a clause which alleged that the respondent by himself, and others on his behalf, had hired carriages for the conveyance of voters on pollingday. This clause it was sought to strike out. Jeune argued that the clause was wholly irrelevant to the prayer of the petition. By the Representation of the People Act 1867, s. 36, the payment of money on account of he conveyance of any voter to the poll, except in ertain boroughs, was to be deemed an illegal payment within the meaning of the Corrupt Practices Act 1854. Sect. 18 of the Corrupt Practices Act 1854, which inflicted a specific penalty on illegal payments, was repealed by 26 Vict. c. 29. The act of paying money for conveyance of voters was now simply illegal, and might perhaps be the subject for an indictment, but it did not void a seat. The case of Cooper v. Slade did not touch the point. That referred only to a conditional payment for travelling expenses. The prayer of the petition could not be amended, so that the clause might become applicable to it, as under the Parliamentary Elections Act 1868, s. 5, it was clear a petition could complain of nothing except an undue election or an undue return. Chitty appeared for the petitioners. ¦ Jeune. The object of the clauses in the petition which allege irregularity and negligence in the conduct of the election is to put certain votes in the poll books, which were improperly omitted. The particulars therefore required by the respondents are, in fact, particulars of votes sought to be put on by their opponents. To such particulars WILLES, J. said he fully agreed in the view of the the respondents are not entitled. Reg. Gen. 7, which law which had been stated. He thought the offence provides for full information being given as to votes charged was only a subject for indictment. The which it is sought to strike off, makes no provision only conceivable case of conveyance of voters voidfor votes which it is sought to put on. If the return-ing a seat was if a man could be supposed to be ing officer is not liable for the misconduct of his subordinates, clearly he is not entitled to particulars of their alleged misconduct. The utmost that should be allowed to the respondents should be particulars of alleged misconduct of the returning officer in the bribed by a ride to the poll. In the present case, however, he should not order the clause to be struck out. If the petitioner persevered with it in all probability he would have to pay the costs of it on the trial, whatever the issue might be. He should Witness ill-Commission to examine-31 § 32 Vict. c. 125, s. 2. [JUDGES' CH. Held, that if the facts could be agreed upon and a special case stated the matter of law might be severed; but that otherwise it must be dealt with at the trial in the same way as the other allegations. Summons adjourned to give counsel an opportunity of preparing a special case for the approval of the judge. This was an application to sever a certain allegation in the petition, and for an order that the matter so severed might be tried in London. Order made for commission to examine witness alleged the petition alleged bribery, treating, and intimidato be dangerously ill. In the matter of this petition Chitty asked for an order to examine by commission a witness alleged in an affidavit, by his medical attendant, to be in danger of immediate death. Another affidavit by the petitioner alleged that he was advised and believed that the witness was material. Jeune, for the respondent, contended that the judge had no authority to grant such a commission in the matter of an election petition. The election committees had never had power to examine witnesses in the case of English petitions otherwise than viva voce.. This appeared from the Ipswich case, B. & Aust. 261. The Parliamentary Elections Act 1868, while it contained elaborate enactments with regard to witnesses, made no provision with respect to the issue of a commission. This showed that the Legislature did not intend witnesses at election petitions to be examined by commission, because the old Acts which allowed the issue of commissions to Ireland provided in great detail for their composition and procedure. The section of the Parliamentary Elections Act (sect. 2) which invested the judges with the same authority over the proceedings on election petitions, as over ordinary civil cases did not authorise a commission to take evidence. That was not a proceeding in an election petition, but something collateral to it. In any case, the section did not render it compulsory on the judges to direct the taking of evidence in a way which, however suitable in the case of private civil suits, was not appropriate to the public and, in some degree, criminal character of election petitions. The 2nd section of the Act is in these words: "The expression, 'the court' shall, for the purposes of this Act, in its application to England, mean the Court of Common Pleas at Westminster, and in its application to Ireland the Court of Common Pleas at Dublin, and such court shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have the same powers, jurisdiction, and authority, with reference to an election petition and the proceedings thereon, as it would have if such petition were an ordinary cause within their jurisdiction." HANNEN, J. thought that under this section he had power to issue a commission. The taking evidence was a proceeding on the petition. As the case appeared urgent, he should make the order. The point was new, and his decision might be reviewed by the court. HEREFORD ELECTION PETITION. (Before BLACKBURN, J.) Election petition-Law and fact-Severance of Allegations Special case- -Office of profit under the Crown. In a petition against the return of two respondents there were allegations of bribery, treating, and intimidation, and also an allegation that one of the respondents was disqualified by reason that he held an office of profit ander the Crown: H. James, in support of the application, said that tion, and that one of the respondents held an office of profit under the Crown. These were entirely distinct allegations, which ought to constitute distinct petitions. The respondent for whom he appeared, Mr. Wylie, had been a servant of the East India Company, and, as his Lordship was aware, by a statute passed in the year 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106) all the rights and powers of that com. pany were transferred to the Crown. He should contend, on the part of the petitioner, that Mr. Wylie was thereby a holder of an office of profit created subsequently to 1705. The determination of that question must depend upon documents in the possession of the East India Company, which would show whether this was a new office or whether the company made the same appointment before 1705. It was evidently a pure question of law, but the basis of the decision must be rested upon evidence to be produced by witnesses living in London. This being so, it would be inconvenient to take the matter to Hereford for trial. [BLACKBURN, J.-How can the facts be ascertained?] Mr. Archibald concurred with me in the New Sarum case, 19 L. T. Rep. N. S.528, that he and I should agree upon the facts, but the learned judge must to some extent bear the respon sibility. If the two issues went down together there might be a difficulty as to costs. [BLACKBURN, J.— There is small doubt that the bulk of the costs would be determined as a general rule to go according to the event.] G. Browne for the respondents, said the great difficulty was in determining the facts. [BLACKBURN, J.-What are the facts?] That I understand is not agreed upon. I am told there will be some attempt to rely upon a resignation. The facts of that resignation I believe are in dispute. James. It is quite true a communication was made on the Saturday before the election, to the East India Board, and it is partly as to that we shall require members of the board. It is clearly more convenient that the trial of this should take place in London. Browne. We might go down and try the corrupt practices, and adjourn to London for the hearing of the other allegation. BLACKBURN, J.-It would be more convenient if the allegations were severed. Would it not be better to adjourn the matter for a time. If you find no difficulty in agreeing on a special case, then of course it would be simple and straightforward work. If you find a difficulty I do not know whether it would be desirable to let it go on for trial, or settle it here. If it is not made a special case, I shall have to inquire into it. If it were made a special case it would be just as if it were out of the petition. Adjourned for a week for counsel to settle special case, if possible. |