End of Mukden campaign. tain extent, but a thick dust-storm raged all day and made accurate laying a matter of impossibility. At 20 o'clock Oku and Nodzu joined hands in rear of the enemy and the Mukden campaign had come to an end. At 18 o'clock Kuropatkin had wired to St. Petersburg: "Our retreat has been most dangerous, but, thanks to extraordinary efforts, our armies are now out of danger." Oyama wired to Tokio: "To respect sanctity of place where Imperial dynasty of China arose, and to preserve peace and tranquillity among Chinese inhabitants of Mukden, in issuing orders for pursuit, I have strictly prohibited troops from taking up quarters within walls of the city." On the 11th the Russians continued their retreat north, hungry, exhausted, and demoralized, and the Japanese followed closely on their heels, constantly harassing both flanks. In the eastern zone, the Japanese drove the enemy out of Yingpau, eighteen miles east of Fushun. In the mountainous district east of the Imperial Chinese road, a large number of Russian officers and men surrendered. In the western zone, the Japanese continued. to drive the beaten Russians north. The Russians' retreat was most arduous, the country being intersected by nullahs with steep banks, where wagons could only cross singly. Fif teen miles north of Mukden they had to abandon a train of carts twelve miles long. It was necessary now for Kuropatkin to make a stand to check pursuit to enable him to restore order amongst his retreating troops. He accordingly drew up two divisions and fifty-six guns on the hills south of Tieling, carefully entrenched. The Japanese attacked in centre and both flanks with two brigades on the 12th, but were repulsed with 750 casualties. The following day they pressed forward again, and succeeded in driving back the Russians, who lost 1,000 men before they retired. On the same day, the 13th, Kawamura's centre column occupied Hsingchingting. At midnight on the 15-16th, the Japanese occupied Tieling, after a hard fight. On the 17th it was officially announced at St. Petersburg that Kuropatkin had been relieved of the Commander-in-Chiefship of the Russian Forces in the Far East and Linevitch appointed in his stead. losses. The Russian losses were great. Forty Russian thousand were taken prisoners, including General Nakhimoff, 26,500 killed, and 90,000 wounded, or 156,500 casualties in all; while 2,000 horses, 60 guns, 60,000 rifles, 200,000 rounds gun ammunition, 25,000,000 rounds S. A. A., 150 ammunition wagons, 1,000 transport wagons, 3 Chinese cartloads of maps of the country, 45 miles of material for light rail General Linevitch way and 350 wagons for same fell into the victors' hand. The Japanese casualties were 73,235. [General Kuropatkin superseded by Gen supersedes eral Linevitch as Commander-in-Chief of the General Kuro patkin. Russian army in Manchuria. Manuel Garcia, the great singing-teacher, celebrated his hundredth birthday. New island appeared in Rui Kui Archipelago. Disastrous earthquake in India. Demonstration of the unemployed in Trafalgar Square, London. Ports of Formosa closed to foreign ships. Czar issued orders granting freedom of worship in Russia. Massacres in Warsaw. Earthquake shocks in Vesuvius. Admiral Togo annihilated the Russian Baltic fleet in the Sea of Japan.] BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN (A.D. 1905) ARCHIBALD S. HURD A DMIRAL TOGO handled his ships in the Sea of Japan with such complete success that what the best opinion thought would be a hard-fought battle resolved itself into a battue. In the long story of sea warfare there is no parallel to the series of events which culminated in this fight. With a fleet far inferior in battleships, but with a superiority in armored cruisers and torpedo craft, the Japanese swept practically out of existence, in a period of about forty hours, the forces under the control of the Russian Commander-in-Chief. In thirty-seven min- A thirty: utes, Admiral Togo tells us, the issue was de- ute victory. cided, and the remainder of the time was devoted to "rounding off" the victory. If any importance could be attached to those elaborate "paper comparisons" which are used to indicate the standard of strength of the great naval Powers, the result of the action of May 27-28 should have been a draw, with the advantage slightly in favor of Admiral Togo. The history of the naval struggle since the dramatic opening of February 28, 1904, has seven min Japan's small fleet. served to completely unmask the virtue of those mechanical comparisons between the strength of rival fleets, which it is so easy to make and which events are so swift to expose. Russia began the war with a fleet thrice as strong as that of Japan, but it was widely distributed, while Japan's forces were concentrated. Sea power is a delicate combination of forces which cannot be purchased with money alone; it consists in the provision of the besttried weapons, and the patient training in their efficient use of officers and men who have the three essential characteristics-the fighting edge, an aptitude for technique, and the sea habit. Japan entered upon this war with one of the smallest fleets in the world. With six battleships and eight armored cruisers the officers and men of the Japanese Fleet, supported by torpedo craft and scouts, have swept from off the Far Eastern seas every single vessel flying the Russian ensign. It was Nelson's dictum that "numbers only can annihilate." These words were written in the old sailing days, when ships fought side by side, and the crews engaged in hand-to-hand contests; and if there is one moral more than another to be drawn from the great victories won by the Japanese, it is that this saying of the great British seacaptain is no longer applicable to modern conditions. If numbers could have annihilated, |