again, it is conceded, even by members of the 'anti-mastodon' school, that the great armored ship may still prove valuable, if not indispensable, when war has to be conducted in so vast an arena as the Pacific, however much her value for operations in the restricted waters of the North Sea or the Mediterranean has been depreciated by the evolution of submarines and aircraft. Consequently no excuse is needed for basing an estimate of naval power in the Pacific on the dimensions of the respective battle-fleets.

At the same time, it would be a great mistake to ignore the many other types of ships represented in every modern and well-balanced fleet. Light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries are essential components, and the absence of any one of these types would mean a corresponding reduction in the efficiency of the fleet as a whole.

Japan, it must be confessed, has shown a keener sense of proportion than the United States in developing her ship-building policy. She has never committed the error of putting all her money into battleships, and neglecting to provide the satellites without which the big ship is a more or less blind, groping, and vulnerable Goliath. Since the year 1904 the United States has authorized only 13 fast light cruisers, whereas Japan, in the same period, has provided 27. The disparity becomes still more pronounced when it is remembered that throughout this period the United States has possessed more than twice as many battleships as her rival.

This omission to build an adequate number of fast scouting vessels imposes a severe handicap on the American fleet even in time of peace, and would undoubtedly be a matter of grave concern in the event of war. As the three scouts of the Birmingham class, completed in 1908, are now obsolete, and as the first of the ten new scouts building

under the 1916 programme is still uncompleted, the fleet at this moment does not dispose of a single fast cruising ship, and is therefore dependent for reconnaissance duties on its destroyers, which have neither the fuel-endurance nor the seaworthiness to perform such work efficiently.

Japan, on the other hand, is reaping the fruits of a wiser policy. Irrespective of certain older ships, which are too slow to work with a modern fleet at sea, she has 10 fast cruisers completed, 4 building, and 12 about to be laid down under the eight-eight scheme. From these figures it may be inferred that she attributes to the fast scouting cruiser an importance secondary only to that of the capital ship, and the experience of the World War suggests that she is right. That conflict had not been in progress a month before the principal naval belligerents discovered the urgent need of fast cruisers, and forthwith proceeded to build them in large numbers. Between the outbreak of war and the Armistice Great Britain had laid down no less than 40; and Germany's effort in the same direction was limited only by the exigencies of her huge submarine programme. It was one more case of history repeating itself; for Nelson a century earlier was always calling out for 'more frigates,' and finding himself hampered at every turn by the lack of speedy scouts to keep in touch with, and bring intelligence of, the enemy. Under modern conditions the functions of the light cruiser have expanded, and although certain of her duties may in future devolve upon aircraft, she is, and will remain for many years to come, a most necessary adjunct to the battle-fleet.

III

After their wonderful records of service accomplished during the World

War, it would be superfluous to emphasize the unique value, in their different spheres, of the destroyer and the submarine. There are some critics who hold that neither type would find in a Pacific campaign so many opportunities for useful work as they found in the late struggle, which was fought, for the most part, in narrow seas and within easy reach of fuel stations. This holds good so far as the destroyer is concerned. For the rough-and-tumble work of patrol, submarine-hunting, and convoy escort, the medium-type destroyer of 1000 tons or thereabouts proved adequate for all practical purposes, and was therefore rapidly multiplied by nearly all the belligerents. America, in particular, created a record in massproduction by building 270 destroyers to a standard design; and thanks to this sudden spurt, is now amply provided with destroyers of a staunch, fast, and well-armed type. She can muster, in round numbers, 300 boats, all of modern design. The Japanese total is barely one third of this at present, but it will rise to 150 when the eight-eight programme is complete, not counting half a hundred older boats that are still good for many years of subsidiary service. Japan, however, has not adopted the system of standardization in building up her destroyer flotilla. Her method is to build boats in groups of 10 to 20, each group an improvement on its predecessor, with the result that her latest classes are larger, more heavily armed, and have a wider range of action than the American 'flush-deckers.' In effect they are small but very fast cruisers, of 2000 tons or more, steaming 36 knots at full speed, and mounting a battery of five 4.7-inch guns. Twenty boats of this design are known to be under construction, and in all probability a certain number of the 40 new destroyers for which funds have been voted will prove to be even larger and

more heavily armed. On the whole, therefore, the American margin of superiority in destroyers is less than the bare figures seem to indicate.

The relative position in submarines is less easy to define, owing to the intense secrecy in which the Japanese naval authorities have always shrouded this branch of their service. It is doubtful whether anyone outside the Tokyo Navy Department knows either the exact number of underwater craft that Japan has available at the present moment or how many she has on the building slips. All that can be said with certainty is that most of the statistics and other data relating to the Japanese submarine flotilla which appear in foreign naval textbooks are unreliable, notwithstanding the fact that they are derived in some cases from official sources in Japan. The eight-eight scheme provides for an establishment of 80 submarines, all of which are to be ready for service by the end of 1927; but this total includes only ‘first-line' boats of the latest design and largest dimensions. By the date in question Japan will probably have an additional 50 or 60 boats of older and smaller types, which would, however, be quite effective for short-range operations and coast defense. A careful analysis of information that has reached the writer from a well-informed quarter shows Japan to have ordered from 90 to 100 submarines of all types since the year 1903. At least 45 of these boats have been completed, leaving about the same number still under construction or contracted for. To these must be added an unknown number of new boats to be built under the eight-eight programme. By far the major proportion of the boats built or ordered in the past five years are of the ocean-going type, planned with a view to long-distance cruising.

In deciding the characteristics of

their latest submarines the Japanese naval constructors have been influenced by the design of the surrendered German U-boats, particularly those of the submersible cruiser class. Of the 10 boats begun in 1919 (numbers 27 to 36), each displaces 1100 tons, and will have a surface speed of 17 knots. Cruising at economical speed, they will be able to cover a distance of 11,000 knots without replenishing their oil-tanks. A larger type, of 1250 tons, armed with one 5.5-inch rapid-fire gun and four torpedo tubes, was begun last year; but even this will be eclipsed by the huge submersibles reported to have been ordered during the current year- with displacement of over 2000 tons, a speed of 18 knots, and a battery of two 5.5inch guns and six torpedo tubes. The Minister of Marine is anxious to increase the submarine programme to 150 boats, all to be in service by 1926; but apparently he has not yet gained parliamentary sanction for this scheme. Nor is it likely that the Japanese industry would be capable of producing so many large submarines by the date in question. Even as it is, the Government has been compelled to place contracts for many sets of submarine engines with European firms.

The American submarine flotilla now consists of 154 vessels, only 63 of which are officially classed as ocean-going, the remainder being 'coastal' boats, with a nominal cruising endurance up to 5000 knots, though many of them could not traverse half that distance on one load of fuel. Hitherto American naval policy has differed from the Japanese in assigning to submarines a rôle that is mainly defensive, underwater craft having been regarded more as instruments for coast-defense than as vessels competent to operate on the high seas, either independently or in coöperation with the battle-fleet. There is, however, reason to believe that this view has

lately been modified, and that most, if not all, of the new American submarines will be found equal to foreign contemporaries in cruising range, seaworthiness, and other essential qualities. Their studies of the strategic problems of the Pacific have apparently convinced American naval officers that a very extensive cruising radius is absolutely indispensable in the case of every type of vessel liable to be employed on war service in that ocean. Acceptance of this proposition naturally involves a substantial increase in size, which applies as much to the submarine as to the battleship. While, therefore, the coastal boats that constitute so large a percentage of the American submarine flotilla might prove valuable enough for the defense of. continental and oversea harbors, they would count for little in an offensive campaign, which is generally admitted to be the only form of strategy open to the United States in the event of war with Japan.

No one can predict the part that airpower is destined to play in future naval wars, and least of all in a war waged in the Pacific, where so much would depend upon circumstances impossible to foresee with any clearness. If, for instance, the Philippines and her other insular possessions in the Western Pacific remained in America's hands, she could employ her air-power against Japan with possibly decisive results. It is, however, a somewhat formidable 'if,' as will become manifest when we turn to the strategical outlook. So far as matériel is concerned, American resources for the conduct of aerial warfare at sea are far superior to those of Japan. Without entering into detailed comparisons, it is enough to say that the United States has more than twice as many efficient naval aircraft as Japan; and, if military machines are included, the American preponderance becomes as three to one.

Japan has not yet succeeded in producing a counterpart of the remarkable NC flying boats of the United States navy; and, in fact, there is positive evidence that her aviation services, both naval and military, are in a backward state. The 1918 programme made provision for 140 new naval airplanes, all of which were to be ready for use in five years' time. Since, in their present stage of development, even the largest airplanes have a relatively limited radius of action, it is clear that they could not participate to any marked extent in a Pacific campaign unless supported by aircraft-carriers. This, however, is a type of vessel in which both navies are sadly deficient. The United States will shortly have two such ships, the Langley and the Wright; but as their speed is not more than 15 knots, they would be too slow to accompany the battle-fleet, and might prove more of a hindrance. than a help if attached to it. Japan is even worse off, possessing as she does only one old and slow ship of limited carrying capacity; but the Hosho, a new aircraft-carrier of high speed, is under construction and will join the fleet next year.

IV

The personnel factor, it need hardly be said, is of supreme importance in relation to naval efficiency. Only the test of war could determine which navy has the most highly trained and efficient officers and men; but there is no reason to suppose that any marked difference exists between American and Japanese seamen in respect of morale and professional keenness. Both services have an unbroken record of victorious warfare, and both are imbued with the glorious traditions that inspire men with an iron will to win.' Japan is in a particularly advantageous position by virtue of her large establishment of

trained personnel. She has sufficient officers and men to provide a full complement for every vessel that would be mobilized in case of war, and, in addition, a reserve force numerous enough to man every new warship and auxiliary that could be placed in commission. This means that the whole of the effective strength of the Japanese navy could be mobilized swiftly and secretly, and dispatched to the war zone without a week's delay.

The American navy, on the other hand, is hampered by the chronic shortage of personnel. Judging from recent experience, the first hint of war would flood the recruiting bureaus and fill the training camps to overflowing; but the fact remains that competent naval officers and bluejackets cannot be improvised. Two years is a very narrow estimate of the time required to convert a civilian into a useful rating on board a modern man-of-war. What proportion of the United States active fleet could put to sea on the outbreak of war, fully manned with trained officers and men, is a secret known only to the Navy Department; but external evidence suggests that the figure would be considerably below the total paper strength of the United States navy.

In the Pacific, as in other possible theatres of war, strategy is merely the handmaid of policy. Previous to the war with Spain the United States had no commitments in the Pacific beyond her own territorial waters, and was consequently under no necessity to maintain a powerful naval force in that ocean; for geography had imposed insuperable barriers between her Western littoral and a would-be invader from the East. But with the acquisition of the Philippines and other Pacific islands formerly held by Spain, the position underwent a fundamental change. The frontiers of America were thrust forward many thousands of miles, and

the task of defending them by sea-power, hitherto so very simple, developed into a problem the complexity of which does not even yet seem to have been completely visualized. If it were possible to rule out these islands, the American people might feel supremely confident as to their naval position. But no one familiar with the American temper ever supposes that the Philippines would be tamely surrendered to the Japanese or to any other invader. Their retention would therefore compel America to concentrate her naval effort in the Western Pacific, where she does not as yet possess a single first-class naval base, and possibly to fight a decisive action at a distance of nearly 7000 miles from her home coast. She has one asset of great value in the Isthmian Canal, which would enable her to transfer naval force from the Atlantic to the Pacific with the minimum of delay; but against this must be set a host of disadvantageous conditions, which cannot be fully realized unless the student has before him a large-scale map of the Pacific.

Assuming war with Japan to be a possibility of the future, three propositions may be advanced without much fear of contradiction. (1) The Western seaboard of the United States is absolutely safe from serious hostile attack, and a military invasion would be a sheer impossibility. (2) In the event of war, the Philippines are practically certain to be seized by Japan unless a powerful American fleet arrives in the Western Pacific within a fortnight after the declaration of war. (3) No such fleet could be sent unless it was sure of finding a secure base, with a submarine-proof anchorage, abundant stocks of fuel and other requisite supplies, and facilities for carrying out repairs, including those necessitated by heavy damage sustained in action. If these propositions are examined with the aid of a good

map, they will be found to contain in a nutshell the strategical problems which the American naval command would be called upon to solve in case of war in the Pacific.

Distance and base-power are the dominant factors in the situation. It is nearly 7000 miles from the American coast to the Philippines, and no fleet dare venture so far in war-time without being assured of finding ample supplies of fuel when it reaches its destination. A few years hence, provided that the plans of the Navy Department are allowed to mature, a well-defended base will have been established at Guam. It will then be feasible for the American battle-fleet to steam across the Pacific and undertake warlike operations against an Asiatic power, using Guam as its advanced base. There is some talk, also, of extending the dockyard at Cavite; but professional opinion is rather averse to this plan, holding, as it does, that the Philippines, exposed as they are to successful invasion by the Japanese, should not be reckoned among the assets upon which the American navy could rely in the event of war. The development of Guam, though apparently now determined upon after many years of hesitation, will be a task of several years' duration, and until it is completed, the American fleet will be practically debarred from waging warfare in the Western Pacific.

Unless they are far less intelligent than we have any right to suppose, Japanese naval officers must clearly perceive the immense strategic importance of Guam; and, this being so, it is reasonable to assume that they would make strenuous attempts to seize the island in the very first stage of a conflict with America. With Guam in their hands, they would have the Philippines at their mercy. Whether under these circumstances the American battlefleet would advance into the Western