millet they roasted. But this supply of grain was soon exhausted, or, at least, became so scarce, that none of the common soldiers had any of it: they lived on horned eattle, dried grapes, and other fruit. Flesh, for want of any thing farinaceous, they ate immoderately; and, what was a very distressing privation, they had no salt. Few cattle remained at the end of October; insomuch, that French soldiers began in November to eat the flesh of horses and mules. Although there was still some wheat at head-quarters, there was none at Aleutqueer, where the prisoners were kept. The soldiers drove cattle, horses, and mules pell-mell into fields of green millet.* They were not only in extreme distress for want of provisions. They were in great want of shoes: some of them were barefooted. The following placard was stuck up in a conspicuous place by a French soldier:-"A French soldier should have the heart of a lion, the stomach of a mouse, and the humanity of a brute." This account of the hardships and difficulties that were to be encountered by the French in Portugal, is not on the whole incongruous with the statements of be Moniteur of the 29th and 30th of November, under the title of Reflections on the official dispatches of Lord Wellington of the 14th of November; though the drift of those papers was to make Et appear that the French could not be said to have suffered any serious hardships. "From Almeida to Alentqueer the army did

not meet with 2000 Portuguese. The towns and villages were deserted. Lord Wellington had ordered, on pain of death, the inhabitants of all places near which our army passed, to carry along with them what they could, and to burn' what they could not, or throw it into the rivers or tanks. We found the mills destroyed, the wine running in the streets, the grain burnt, the furniture of the houses broken in pieces; not a horse, mule, ass, cow, or goat, to be seen. The army subsisted on biscuit and the herds of cattle in our train. The soldiers, in addition, supplied themselves with maize, cabbages, French beans, and raisins. Rice, maize, French beans, and oil with fish, forming the basis of the food of the Portuguese, we found every where. Beasts were brought from the plains of Thomar, and the isles of the Tagus. Towards the 20th of October, hand-mills were distributed among the regiments, and the soldiers received their daily rations of bread. Magazines of grain were formed, and biscuit baked at Santarem." But we are not told how long this competency lasted. Not a fortnight, according to the report of the Portuguese prisoners, which was confirmed by the French prisoners, and the deserters that came over to the allies almost every day.

When the French approached to Coimbra, some unfortunate families, who had not time or the resolution to take the road to Lisbon with the army, fled to the nearest woods; whither they were

traced

traced by the French, pillaged, and insulted. Some persons, reputed to be rich, they attempted by the most brutal usage to torment into a disclosure of secreted treasure. When they evacuated Coimbra, the furious soldiers burnt what they could not carry away with them, in the streets. Not a little of what they did attempt to carry off, they threw away on their march to Leyria. This booty falling into the hands of the peasants, was sometimes more than a compensation to individuals who had been plundered of what belonged to them.

A considerable force of the French made some resistance to Colonel Trent's troops at the bridge of Mondego; but they sur rendered at discretion, on the promise of protection from the insults of the peasants. Of 5000 prisoners that fell into the hands of the Portuguese, 4000 were sent to Oporto. 3500 muskets were found, all of them charged; which may convey an idea of the effective strength of the French left at Coimbra. It is precisely the number that we have seen stated by Massena. The arms were distributed among the peasants. A great number of cattle was found that had been collected for the subsistence of the French troops. It was extremely difficult to keep the Portuguese, especially the Ordinanza, or armed peasants, from plundering their prisoners. Six or eight of those poor men fell victims to the rage of the peasants. Colonel Trent did every thing in his power to protect the French prisoners. Leaving one of his brigades at Coimbra, he went himself with the prisoners to

Oporto; for this was absolutely' necessary, so much enraged were the Portuguese against the French army, particularly those in the districts between the Mondego and the Vouga.

The longer that the French general lay inactive in the front of the British lines, the more his difficulties increased. The heavy rains falling at that season of the year, rendered it impossible for him to bring up his heavy artillery. From the same cause the Mondego had overflown its banks. He was hemmed in on every side. To at tack the allies, posted as they were, would have been madness; to retreat northwards, extremely hazardous, if not altogether impos sible. The hardships and sufferings of the army for want of provisions, and the danger of absolute famine, have already been described. In these circumstances he had only a choice of difficulties. To endeavour, by enlarging his quarters, to maintain himself on the right bank of the Tagus, until he should receive both a reinforcement of men, together with a supply of stores and provisions, or to make a desperate attempt to cross the Tagus, and support himself in the Alentejo; which, however, he could not have done for any great length of time, as that province is but a poor country. He made a shew, however, for occupying the attention of the allies by the construction of boats, pontoons, and flying bridges, of intending this; while, at the same time, he moved farther up the river, exchanged Alentqueer for Santarem, which he strengthened by adding art to the advantages which it enjoyed by nature, and

even by laying its environs under water. The French position formed a triangle, of which Santarem and the Tagus were the base; the Zezere one of the legs, and a chain of mountains the other. Bridges were thrown across the Zezere, and a body of troops was stationed at Punbete, which was fortified. In November and December, the cavalry, 9 or 10,000, were dispersed in cantonments along the right of the Tagns, so far as the borders of Upper Beira. Redoubts were constructed at different points on the same side of the river. Thus the circle Massena had to depend on for subsistence was somewhat widened, and he looked forward to the reinforcements and supplies which he expected from Drouet and Gordonne on the one hand, and from Mortier on the other. Drouet's corps, 12,000 strong, with a large convoy, arrived early in December, and, some weeks thereafter, that under Gordonne, nearly equal in number. Towards the end of that month, detachments from the army of Mortier, and that of Soult, to the number of 12 or 14,000, having quitted Andalusia, were on their march on the left of the Tagus, through Estremadura. When Drouet was advancing through the valley of Mondego, Col. Wilson, to avoid an unequal contest, abandoned Coimbra, and retired on Espinhal.

There was now some appearances that seemed to menace a turn of fortune in favour of the French. But Lord Wellington was firm in adhering to his plan, nor ever for a moment doubted of ultimate success. He considered that if the reinforcements sent, or

yet to be sent, should be unable to protect his convoys against the attacks of those numerous bodies of troops that harassed him in flank and rear, and to cover the forma tion of magazines, they would ag gravate the distress arrising from the want of necessaries, instead of alleviating it. The ardour and activity of Lord Wellington were suitable to the importance of the crisis. He was very sparing in his diet, and slept in his clothes. He was up every morning at four o'clock, and at fire he rode out and visited his advanced posts. The noble enthusiasm with which he was actuated was infused by sympathy. The whole country was under arms. Every thing at Lisbon was military. The city was garrisoned by marines from the English fleet The garrison of Lisbon was sent to reinforce the army, which was also augmented by the arrival of 10 or 12,000 men, under the Marquis of Romana. The greater part of the British troops had arrived from Cadiz, and other regiments were arriving from time to time from the Mediterranean, Lisbon, and Gibraltar. The seamen and marines were also landed from the fleet, to assist in working the guns in the batteries. The banks of the Tagus on the right were flanked by our armed boats, and seven sloops were sent up the river. Great fortifications were raised on the south of the Tagus, to cover the river and protect the shipping. The peninsula, formed by a creek or small bay at Moita, near Aldea Gallega, on the Tagus, and the bay of St. Ubes, at Settuval, was cut off from the French by a double line of fortifications, mounted

mounted with heavy artillery, and manned, partly, by a body of 3000 seamen. So that the enemy could not advance to Almeida opposite to Lisbon; which it was apprehended might be his intention. The corps of General Hill and General Beresford were posted on the south bank of the river; while in front of the grand line of Torres Vedras, Lord Wellington lay with the main body of the British army at Cartaxo. The British fleet lay between, and on whichsoever side an attack might be made, was ready to bring over re

inforcements from the other. The number of troops that could be brought into action, within not many hours, has been variously stated. They seem, as far as we have been able to judge, in point of numbers, to have been pretty nearly equal; that is, on each side from 80 to 90,000. What advantage of numbers there was, probably lay on the side of the allies. Such nearly were the relative positions and force of the French and the allied army of Portugal at the close of 1810.

CHAP

Mortier, alias the Duke of Treviso, was sent about the beginning, or near the middle of March, against Badajoz. A fruitless attack having been made on that city, the French established themselves in Merida, Zafra, and Santa Maria. The siege of Badajoz was abandoned for a time, from the necessity of forwarding the siege of Cadiz by suppressing the insurrections in Grenada and Murcia: yet still demonstrations were made on Badajoz. There was a good deal of skirmishing. The reconnoitring parties of the French sometimes advanced almost to the glacis of Badajoz. This was in the nature of a false attack, intended no doubt to occupy the army of Estramadura, while the real invasion of Portugal was to be carried on by the route of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. When the troops under Romana were drawn from Badajoz and Campo Major, and some other points in Estramadora, to join Lord WelVOL. LII.

Portuguese, united with some English; of whom a great proportion was officers. The siege of Cadiz, in like manner, as above observed, went on but slowly. The main efforts of the French were naturally pointed against the allied army under Lord Wellington. If Marshal Massena should be able to drive the English into the. sea, he would be enabled to send out such detachments as could easily reduce Badajoz, perhaps Cadiz.

After the sad reverses of fortune suffered by the Spaniards towards the close of 1809, when they were convinced, by multiplied experience, that their armies were altogether unfit to contend with the French in pitched battles, they had again recourse to that desultory warfare, which had been so wisely recommended by the Junta of Seville at the beginning of the revolution, and which had been carried on for some time with so much success. The Junta of Badajoz