The dialogue commenced by the exchanging of these two notes continued until November 5. On October 12, Dr. Solf, the Foreign Minister, replied that his government accepted Wilson's conditions; that he assumed that the Entente governments also accepted them; that the German government was now a government of the German people; that this government agreed to evacuate the territories it held, and requested Wilson to appoint a mixed commission to take charge of the evacuation. On October 14, Wilson replied to the effect that the terms of the armistice and the conditions of evacuation were matters for the military chiefs to settle; that under all circumstances the armistice must assure the maintenance of the military advantages obtained by the Entente armies; that no dealings with Germany were possible until that country renounced its barbaric methods of warfare; finally, that before negotiations began, the associated governments wished to know with whom they were dealing. They wished to know whether they were still negotiating with the arbitrary Prussian government, which it was one of their first war aims to render powerless, or to destroy.

This brought them to the Hohenzollern question. On October 20, Solf, after admitting that the German armies had committed the atrocities denounced by Wilson, asserted that the government of Germany had been radically reformed; that the Chancellor was now responsible solely to Parliament; that the offer of peace submitted to the Allies therefore came from the German people.

On October 23, Lansing wrote that the President consented to discuss with the governments associated with the United States the question of an armistice; but he repeated, that such an armistice must assure the military

superiority of the Entente, and that no arrangement would be agreed to which did not make it impossible for Germany to resume hostilities. On October 27, Solf wrote that Gerwas awaiting the armistice

Finally, on November 5, 1918, Lansing officially informed the Swiss Minister at Washington, who was acting as intermediary between the United States and Germany, that Marshall Foch had been authorized by the Allies to communicate the terms of an armistice to Germany.

This fourth and last note of Wilson's quoted a memorandum which the Entente Powers had handed him, defining and qualifying their endorsement of his Points. These Powers stated that they reserved complete liberty of action regarding freedom of the seas, which was open to many interpreta tions; they declared that they under stood by the restoration of evacuated territories, compensation for all injury done to the civilian population of the Allied nations by the Germans. By accepting this second reservation, which Wilson fully approved - (he did not approve the first) - Germany agreed to pay not only for the physical property it destroyed, but also the cost of pensions to the families of our soldiers who fell in battle, to our wounded soldiers, and to all similar victims of the war.

While they were soliciting Wilson to mediate between themselves and h associates, the men in control at Berlin and at the German army headquarter were still catching at straws in the hope of making a last successful re sistance. Ludendorff discloses this On October 17, at a Council of Wa which he attended, together with Ma of Baden, von Payer, Scheidemann Solf, Goerber, the new Minister of War and Hausmann, a general rising of the

nation was discussed. But Scheidemann, while agreeing that they might still mobilize hundreds of thousands of men, pointed out the danger of this step, saying: 'Such recruits would not raise the morale of the army. Our working-men would say to themselves: "Better a terrible end than terror N without end." The new Minister of War offered in default of these hundreds of thousands of new combatants, a modest sixty thousand men, which were still in barracks in the interior. Ludendorff replied with surprising op1timism: 'I welcome these reënforcements. I regard the future with confidence.'

Then, as though the reënforcements were already in his hands, this man, who for weeks had been pleading for an armistice and a speedy peace, set about opposing the conditions which Wilson made in his second note of October 14; 1 conditions which were intended to guarantee let us bear in mind the absolute maintenance of the present military superiority of the Entente on the field of battle. Ludendorff said, addressing the Council of War:

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. . . I havealways been of the opinion that we should start negotiations for an armistice, if they are possible. But we should accept no conditions which will not permit us to evacuate the enemy's country in good order. To obtain these conditions we must delay two or three months. We must not accept any terms which render a resumption of hostilities impossible. Now that is precisely what the enemy demands. We must recognize that, after this note. The terms are intended to put us hors E de combat. Before we go farther, the enemy ought to lay down his precise peace conditions. We do not want to break off utterly with Wilson. We ought to say to him rather: "Tell us exactly what you ask us to do. But if

your demands are incompatible with our national honor, then the answer will be, No!"'

This rally by an army commander, who had been under such pressure for three months, brought him many compliments, and may have inspired Max of Baden to adopt the challenging attitude which he displayed in the Reichstag on October 22.

"Those who loyally propose to submit to a peace of justice do not thereby agree to submit without resistance to a peace of violence. A government which had so lost its sense of honor as to accept the latter would merit only the contempt and repudiation of a valiant and industrious nation.'

Vain words! Ludendorff says:

'... Part of the promised reënforcements refused to go to the front,' adding, gloomily: 'If the people had risen en masse, our situation might have been better. A great nation cannot be crushed if it has the will power to resist. The Frenchmen in 1870 and 1871, and the Boers in their fight against England, made a far better showing!'

Ludendorff did not make this admission, that the German people lacked that sacred fire which stakes everything on honor and thereby assures a nation's future, until later, when he wrote his memoirs, in Sweden, during the winter of 1918-19. On October 24, 1918, believing that Max of Baden had asserted an honest resolve in his speech of October 22, which we just quoted, and misled, as he says, by the tone of an official statement in the Berlin press of the government's attitude toward Wilson's third note; Ludendorff and Hindenburg issued this order to the army:

...

'Wilson says in his reply that he will recommend to his Allies to open negotiations for an armistice; but only for an armistice which makes Germany powerless from a military standpoint; and which prevents the possibility of our appealing again to arms. .. WilWilson's reply is, therefore, a demand for unconditional surrender. Soldiers, we cannot accept that. Soldiers, such a reply is to us merely a command to continue our resistance to the utmost limit of our strength. When our enemies realize that by no sacrifices will they be able to break our front, they will be ready to conclude a peace which assures Germany the future which the welfare of the masses of its people demands.'

However, this order calling for the resistance to the last was not issued to the armies on the 25th of October, because Hindenburg and Ludendorff left that day for Berlin. Ludendorff says he did not want to publish it until after the conference called to consider Wilson's third note. But his subordinates had telegraphed or telephoned the text to all army commanders, so that the latter might issue it to their troops without delay, when so ordered. Meantime, a soldier's council had been formed at Kovno. One of its members belonged to the telephone corps. He at once communicated this pronunciamento of the commander-in-chief to the Independent Socialists.

A violent storm was raised in the Reichstag against the 'man who wants to prolong the war.' That accusation

was directed against Ludendorff alone. Hindenburg, although he also had signed the order, was still so popular on account of his victory over the Russians in 1914 and 1915, that he was not included in the condemnation heaped upon his subordinate. According to the rumor of the lobbies, Ludendorff alone was the man responsible. He was charged with trying to exalt the authority of army headquarters above the authority of the Chancellor and of Parliament. Thereupon, he was disavowed by the Cabinet and abandoned by Wilhelm II. On October 26, he and Hindenburg were summoned to an audience with the Kaiser. 'Addressing me alone, His Majesty mentioned the general order of the evening of October 24. I begged him, very humbly, to relieve me of my command. He granted my request.'

So the man who after his defeat on August 8 was the first to demand peace, left the stage of public affairs the last man who still dreamed of Germany's fighting on. The afternoon of October 27, the day when Ludendorff was relieved of duty, Solf telegraphed to Wilson: 'The German government awaits the terms of an armistice, which is to be the first step toward a peace such as the President has outlined in his proclamations.'

The same day, the terms under which Foch consented to cease his pursuit of the retreating foe were submitted to Clemenceau. Ludendorff's disgrace saved him the humiliation of personally receiving the conditions of surrender.

AMERICA has become England's most powerful rival, as a result of the World War, and accommodates its policies to that fact. Americans who fancy that rivalry will not impair the friendship of the two nations and have faith that 'blood is thicker than water,' should remember that this famous sentence was first spoken by an American, and not by an Englishman. Conflicts of interests will multiply and America's memory will revert rather to the days when England armed the Alabama. As the manufacturing industries of the United States expand, the demand for an independent merchant marine will grow stronger, because the two are inseparably connected. Germany's merchant marine grew rapidly, before the war, in response to that very condition. Practical minded Americans will never be deluded into fancying that the existence and prosperity of their commerce and manufacturing can be left to the mercy of English good will. The crop of greenhorns will not be as thrifty in their country as it was among us German half-cousins of the AngloSaxons. The brotherhood of nations is a grand ideal, toward which we ought to strive. But up to to-day, Divine Providence has made inter

in

national competition the mainspring of progress and civilization. At least that is the lesson of several thousand years of human history. Men with the gift of seeing things as they are, hardly fancy that this situation will change completely within a single generation.

Granting these facts, the United States, whether it wishes it or not, will be obliged to protect its commerce by real defenses. It may depend entirely upon its own resources for the latter, or it may seek them in friendship with other nations. Since Germany has been crushed, the United States is thrown more than ever on itself. So far as England is concerned, rivalry with the United States may be limited for an indefinite time to come to commercial competition. But irresistible historical forces are pushing America into unavoidable military and political, as well as economic, conflict with Japan.

France, which still remains an important factor in world policy, although one of second rank, has become so completely dependent on England, that it will never be a political plus for the United States. In Washington's day, France was truly such a plus, because it stood on its own feet

and was a rival of England upon the sea. Americans have yet to learn by experience whether Wilson, a century later, acted with political farsightedness, when he helped to crush the only independent maritime state in Europe; a state which under the stress of existing conditions neither could come into conflict with the United States, nor desired to do so.

It is impossible to predict at this moment just when and in what way the inevitable conflict between the United States and Japan will reach a crisis. In the interest of the whole world, I hope it will be possible to avoid a war. But in the background of this conflict will always lurk the growing rivalry between England and America. The statement of an American officer, that England would in time become a star on the StarSpangled Banner, was possible before the World War; but now, it is very unlikely, notwithstanding all the pleasant things which England and Englishmen are saying about their transAtlantic cousins. The United States, in the self-confidence of its strength and youth, utterly underestimates the power of England. It is not America but England, with its countless strongholds and naval bases acquired in the course of centuries, with its bridgeheads, not only against other countries but also against the United States, which commands the sea and controls the globe. That will continue to be the case, although to a somewhat lessened degree, if America builds a powerful navy. In a certain sense, and under somewhat different conditions, America now occupies the position which Germany occupied before the World War. England, however, has to-day obtained unconditional mastery over Continental Europe, has extended its rule in Africa, Mesopotamia, and India, and has

as at

seized the keys of the Mediterranean at Constantinople, as well Gibraltar. By controlling all these territories it has secured itself an overwhelming counterpoise to the compact territory of the United States.

Many people believe that Englishmen and Americans will always remain friends, because they speak the same language and have the same customs and traditionsand traditions-powerful aids to mutual understanding. We must not underestimate the importance of such ties of sympathy. Wilson was able, by their aid, to persuade his people to participate in the World War. On the other hand, however, the history of the last century which is the significant century in this matter- proves that the United States has become a nation with its own psyche, already either fully matured, or reaching maturity. The mental and moral evolution of the United States has now reached a stage far enough advanced to make the country less dependent on England, even in its forms of speech and art. There will come a time when their common language will no longer outweigh the conflict in their material interests; and the extraordinary speed with which political events march in our day may make this date nearer than men fancy.

However that may be, a survey of England's policy for centuries shows that it is the national character of its people to shape their course in accordance with practical rather than sentimental interests. That country will be very prudent in handling its conflicts with America. It will cover its designs with fair humanitarian phases, and bluff John Bull cordiality. To-day, England is the ally of Japan, and is on the best of terms with America. It will pose as a friendly mediator, honorably intent on peace and compromise, whenever controversies arise be