further than to say: "The Navy would undertake a ruthless submarine campaign with ardent enthusiasm. There is no doubt that it would inflict very heavy loss upon England. But I do not believe it would force England to its knees, and I do not believe that we could thus get peace.' Neither Bethmann nor Capelle changed their minds up to the time that the submarine campaign began. The fact that they later bowed to the will of others, merely proves that the control of the government rested elsewhere, and that that control had resolved upon a 'desperado policy,' as Bethmann himself subsequently called it.

Noske demanded, in the session of March 29, that we should make peace at once in order to relieve the people of their extreme distress. Bethmann rejected this policy, but without dissenting from it in principle. He evaded the question. He could not show his cards without harming Germany. We had never sought to injure or to destroy other nations. Our

war aim was to protect Germany's future, while Asquith was determined to destroy Germany. Westarp then put the leading question: 'How will the Imperial Chancellor get an acceptable peace without a ruthless submarine campaign?' Bethmann repudiated the suggestion vigorously: 'I will not let myself be persuaded to play vabanque.'

The sinking of the Sussex in April, produced a new crisis. But in spite of the raging opposition Bethmann clung obstinately to his first position. During the summer, however, the number of U-boat champions multiplied, especially in Southern Germany, and at the session of September 29, Bassermann, who again had charge of the debate, after recounting the

enemies' superiority in wealth, men, munitions and food supplies, asked the Chancellor to define his attitude toward a submarine campaign. He was supported in this by the Liberal representative, Heckscher. Bethmann again declared that a submarine war meant war with America. The mo ment that one could state with assurance that the ruthless employment of submarines would hasten a victorious peace we would use our submarines. Capelle, who now for the first time felt in a position to guarantee monthly sinkings of six hundred thousand tons, added to this statement: 'I am not able to say yet what effect the destruction of this quantity of tonnage will have upon England.'

David accepted these figures of probable sinkings, which would not accomplish cutting off England entirely from supplies. The Channel was wholly under the control of England's high sea fleet. The effect would be to involve us in war with America, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and Spain, and to isolate us absolutely when the war was over. 'A ruthless submarine campaign will be the first step to ruin; therefore it is simply a crime to start it.' Keil whispered to Hanssen: 'No responsible statesman could say anything different. A ruthless submarine campaign will but hurl us into the abyss.'

In spite of that, Westarp remained unteachable. He exclaimed in the session of September 30: 'We supposed the Chancellor would reverse the policy he has been following, and start an unlimited U-boat war. The people will be profoundly disappointed if this is not done. We regard such a measure as not only a means, but as the only means, of forcing England to sue for peace. If America declares

war against us, it cannot thereby * give more financial or military aid to our enemies than it has given them already; for it is sending them money and munitions without limit. The nation believes that the government is trying to spare England, in order to bring about a reconciliation with that country. The war cannot be ended until England is crushed. That can be accomplished only by the the U-boat. America wishes us to be defeated. All that is needed is one more Wilson note, and we will be forbidden to use our firearms at the front!'

Westarp's profound and statesmanlike confidence was not shaken by the figures which Helfferich presented, showing that a submarine campaign would ruin Germany, and by Capelle's admission that such a campaign would not prevent shipping troops and munitions across the Channel. Stresemann, who represented the Industrialist Party, backed up Westarp, although with some qualifications. England could not, in his opinion, be forced to its knees in six months; but it would suffer such frightful commercial losses and face such a gloomy future, that it would be ready' to discuss peace. The navy officers were all in favor of using the U-boat to the utmost. English ship owners were earning billions, while German shipowners were facing bankruptcy. Therefore he joined Westarp in asking whether we could get an acceptable peace without using submarines. The Chancellor ought to answer that question. Representative Gamp, the Free Conservative leader, joined these two, and was imprudent enough to ask: 'What is Hindenburg's opinion?', thus betraying the real wire-puller behind the scenes.

Bethmann tried to escape from a

situation in which he was torn between his convictions and his helplessness: 'I do not know the plans of the supreme army chiefs, and if I knew them I could not reveal them... Many gentlemen are asking me what Hindenburg thinks. We have submitted the question to him. He has told us that he can not let us know what he will recommend to the Kaiser. (We now know that Ludendorff was only waiting for the end of the Roumanian campaign in order that he might have troops enough to garrison the Holland and the Denmark frontiers.) I still consider a ruthless U-boat campaign a desperado policy, which I will not endorse either now or later. My standpoint is one of expediency. I am not opposed to using U-boats on principle.' MüllerMeiningen observed aside to Hanssen: 'You see, they're going to let the soldiers settle the question. No Chancellor will dare oppose it, if Hindenburg backs up the navy.' On the evening of October 1, Han

ssen

was in company with Haase, Bernstein, Kautsky and Breitscheid (leaders of the Socialist group which was opposing the war). All were agreed that Capelle was already opposing Bethmann. Haase had information of a bitter struggle behind the scenes between Capelle and Helfferich. Bernstein laid emphasis on England's tremendous resisting power, and its stern, inflexible determination to fight to the end. All the gentlemen present were agreed likewise that 'time is working for the enemy.' Breitscheid thought that Germany could not be defeated in the open field, while the others were inclined to lay stress on the point that it could not win a military victory in the open field. Kautsky declared that Germany might have obtained

an acceptable peace a year earlier had it granted Alsace-Lorraine a republican constitution and guaranteed full compensation to Belgium. All were of the opinion that this opportunity had been irrevocably lost.

During the session of the Appropriation Committee on October 5, which revealed with glaring distinctness the attitude of each party toward the question, von Jagow's embarrassment was made the matter of a joke (which cannot be reproduced in Engglish) by the Free-Thinker member Doormann: 'Herrn von Jagow nennt man jetzt ago weil er von Jott verlassen ist!' Erzberger argued against Westarp, who characterized a peace with Belgium as a sign of weakness. He said that Germany would be enormously strengthened were it to settle honorably its Belgian account. When we started our last submarine campaign the previous spring it did us immeasurable harm. However, he did not oppose using submarines as a matter of principle. (Ledebour protested violently against this statement.) The question was merely one of expediency, which the Chancellor had settled for the time being by his statement that he could not commit himself to a desperado policy. In reply to his question, 'How could we force America to make peace with us again?' von Jagow made the admission: 'I confess I don't know. We can only issue warnings.'

For the first time a voice was raised to assert the rights of the peoples' representatives to have a say in the question. Payer regretted that the matter was being handled behind locked doors. It was a national misfortune that the Chancellor's opponents were employing untruthful statistics, which public policy prevented the government from cor

recting. We should not entrust Hindenburg and Ludendorff with the decision of our fate. It was proper enough, though, to learn their views before making our own decision.

Scheidemann regarded further discussion unnecessary after Helfferich's statistics: 'A submarine war means not only war with America, but, as Helfferich has already told us, our own ruin. The German people do not want a submarine war; they want bread and peace. bread and peace. The suffering of the millions is so acute that we are living over a volcano. We should not forget this when taking counsel here. A deep cleft is opening through the German nation. The position of the government is not an easy one. The people must be held together. That is why the Chancellor's speeches are so ambiguous. No one dares to say frankly what he means. However, that itself is dangerous. We are likely to have a fall between two chairs. The Chancellor can not keep everyone contented all the time. He must make a decision. The German Empire cannot be handled like an East Prussian estate. The question is above all; How can we get an acceptable peace at the earliest possible date? I am no optimist. We cannot tolerate a situation where either of the combatants dictates peace to the other. All our efforts must centre upon a peace where there are neither victors nor vanquished.'

Schiffer backed up the Chancellor. We ought not to try a desperado policy. But a situation may develop which leaves us no choice. Strese

mann made one of his characteristic about-faces: 'A submarine campaign would shorten the war. If the Chancellor opposes it, he must show some other way to get peace!' The Conservative Roesicke blurted out with

Arrogant and brutal blindness: 'We've he power in our hands and are not sing it. The moment we destroy the onnection of the neutral countries with England we force them to deal with us. The Saloniki army is lost, if we cut it off rom its overseas supplies. We can produce a profound effect in Egypt. The harvest situation makes this a avorable time. England must import ighty-five percent of the food it conumes. We are not so dependent y any means on foreign sources. If we cut off England's imports its people will have a panic. I have no use whatever for Scheidemann's standpoint. We want no submission, but victory. No one of us underestimates the seriousness of the situation. America does not endanger us if it takes part in the war.' And concluding with an absolute self-contradiction he wound up: 'We are suffering frightfully from lack of forage, artificial fertilizers and labor. We lack springs, machine parts, metal, wool, cotton, jute, binding twine, leather, bagging, and many other things. Trade is paralyzed. We have no automobiles and no bicycles. Can anybody foresee how long we can hold out? catastrophe comes on apace. must have an end. But how?'

The

We

Groeber now began to argue for Parliamentary abdication: 'I consider it absolutely necessary that Hindenburg gives us his opinion. If Hindenburg rejects a submarine compaign, things must stay as they are now. If he approves such a campaign, the Chancellor surely will not oppose him. All must bow to Hindenburg's decision.' And then he continued with glaring inconsistency: "The Chancellor is responsible. The Reichstag is also responsible, because it furnishes the money. But if Hindenburg demands a submarine campaign neither the

Chancellor nor the Reichstag can refuse it. (Interruptions: Sure! Sure!)' He then formulated the following grotesquely contradictory programme as that of his party: '1, The Chancellor is responsible and must decide; 2, Hindenburg's decision is a mandatory decision for the Chancellor; 3, If Hindenburg endorses a submarine campaign the Chancellor must not oppose it. Thereupon UnderSecretary Lewald hastened off to telephone this message. Helffreich and Wahnschaffe had an excited consultation with Zimmermann. The navy officers were jubilant, feeling certain that they had won.

But the Conservatives were far from satisfied even with this committee success. Westarp roared out: 'You've not intimidated us with your threats. If you begin to attack the Chancellor in full session we will be on the benches. How are we to get a good peace? We will not get it by following Scheidemann's counsel and giving up what we've won. We cannot evacuate Belgium without absolutely unquestionable guaranties. I do not think that we shall make any separate peace. England is still mistress of the sea. We must crush England. Without that we shall not get a satisfactory peace. We have no choice. We may perhaps win a strategic victory here and there, but we cannot win the victory now on the land alone.'

Noske again calls attention to the frightful distress prevailing among the people: 'We do not oppose U-boat warfare on principle. We will fight with any means in our power England's efforts to starve us. We understand that the life of the German nation is at stake. Therefore for us it is only a question of expediency. We clearly see the advantages. But

we fear that we shall soon find America, Holland, Denmark, and other nations, in the ranks of our enemies, and that this will only make matters worse. Groeber wishes to leave the decision to Hindenburg. That is the most remarkable proposal I ever heard. With all respect to Hindenburg, the Chancellor is the responsible official. The Belgian question is the principal obstacle to peace.'

Ledebour also replied to Groeber, saying that he had never known such an abdication of private judgment as the latter proposed. The Chancellor and Helfferich should say, rather: We stand or fall with our convictions. The Chancellor ought to offer our enemies peace on a bas's of the status quo and self-determination for the Eastern nationalities.

One of Westarp's supporters outdid his leader by not only insisting upon a submarine campaign as ultima ratio, but by frankly endorsing a desperado policy. He would insist on the ruthless use of submarines, even should the higher army command, contrary to all expectation, advise against this. The man who thus went to the limit in championing the reckless bravado programme of his party, was Mr. Kreth. He argued: 'We cannot crush Russia by force of arms. We have underestimated the strength of France. England is becoming stronger with every day that passes. We must relinquish hope of capturing the Suez Canal. We cannot get at India. We might fight a war of exhaustion which would end by wearing out our enemies. Someone has asked: "How can we get peace again with America?" I ask: "How can we ever get peace if America remains neutral as it is today?" The next harvest will ruin us. I have an idea that the Foreign Office already expects an unfavorable peace.

The

only thing that can save us in this crisis is the ruthless use of our submarines. The moment could not be more favorable. So we must strike at once. People talk of the danger of a desperado policy. We Old Prussians have no fear of a desperado policy. Prussia would never have become great without desperado policies. It is often necessary to take daring risks. We need not fear America. We can accomplish nothing by kindness. We must show our teeth. We have perfect confidence in Hindenburg; but we fear he will be worked upon in every way possible before he gives his opinion. Therefore, we reserve the right to insist on our own policy.'

This committee wrangle went on all through the 9th and 10th of October. There was a bitter fight to get the submarine policy debated in the full Reichstag. Session after session was adjourned. The Chancellor interfered personally on two occasions, and vetoed a memorandum which the committee had drafted for the public. When the National Liberals finally went over to the side which opposed debating the question in open Reichstag, the Conservatives had to relinquish that idea. Bassermann thus reported to the Reichstag on October 11th.

Meantime, the Higher Army Command had decided in favor of a submarine campaign, although men supposed to be well-informed still denied this. We know of that decision from the fact-as Haase reported on October 13-that three army corps were already stationed in SchleswigHolstein along the Danish frontier. Further reports confirmed this fact. Moreover, 3,000 military prisoners were set to work repairing and strengthening the fortresses along the Danish border. On December 23,