neither place them at the head, nor at the bottom of the scale; nor can we assert, as we sometimes may with respect to the corporeal frame, that an excess of a stimulant becomes a sedative. We see indeed instances of the latter effect in very violent emotions; and the death of lord Chatham is strikingly in point: yet, as there are probably sedatives in nature, wholly unrelated to stimulants, so there may be causes which influence the mental powers with equal want of connexion. It is certain that fear and grief, on the one hand, cannot be any way related to the pleasing undulations of the gentler affections, and that they have as little affinity with the powerful transports of fury on the opposite side of the scale. These affections, nevertheless, seem to extinguish the powers, as much as the more violent passions animate them, and will sometimes kill without producing any bodily affection; more often, however, by impairing digestion, and morbidly affecting the liver. This is what is called a broken heart; though we recollect an instance-we believe in Dr. Whytt's works-of a person dying from grief, where there was a laceration in one of the ventricles of this latter organ.

Dr. Cogan, in his first section, treats of affections, emotions, and passions, but not very clearly nor comprehensively. Appetites are also noticed, as distinguished from the former; but he adds, that of these they are frequently the occasion; and undoubtedly they must be so, as well as every other impression or cause of sensation.

Dr. Cogan next considers the arrangement of the passions, according to different authors, and objects to each. His own arrangement is drawn from the ruling principle of the human mind, and an inquiry how it is affected by different causes. He first examines the leading principle of our natures, and then inquires into its influence, and in what manner we become chiefly interested by it. Thus he begins with considering love and hatred, desire and aversion; and from these he deduces his classification.

◄ In this labyrinth, an attention to the following facts may perhaps furnish us with something of a clue.

Some of our passions and affections are inspired by circumstances which more immediately relate to ourselves, and to our own personal interests: that is, they belong to the principle of self-love: some of them belong to the social principle, and refer to our connexions with our own species, or to all animated natures.

In some of our passions and affections, the ideas of good are obviously predominant, in others the ideas of evil.

The passions and affections, which relate to self-love, and are ex cited by the idea of a good, may either refer to the good which is actually in our possession, and communicates various degrees of enjoyment, from simple gratification to ecstasies: or

The good we love may not be in our possession; but it may appear attainable, and become the object of our desire: or

Though it be not in our possession, circumstances may appear highly favourable to our attaining it, and it may thus inspire hope. The state in which evil is the predominant idea, referring to ourselves, may relate :

To the loss of that good which we possessed, or to disappointments respecting the good we desired, and hoped to obtain; inspiring sorrow, with its various modifications: or

We may be apprehensive concerning the loss of what we possess, concerning the approach of some positive evil, or concerning the ac complishment of our desires, which introduces the family of fear.

The cause of both sorrow and fear may be some agent, whose designed conduct, or even whose inadvertency, may threaten or produce injuries, and thus excite anger in various degrees.

The causes and excitements of our passions and affections respecting others, may also be arranged under the predominancy of good, or evil in our ideas.

Under the former head may benevolence be placed, which will indicate itself either by good wishes, or good opinions; each productive of a large diversity of affections and passions, according to contingent circumstances.

The predominance of evil in our ideas will shew itself in actual malevolence of disposition concerning another; or in a displacency and disapprobation of conduct.' P. 42.

But although these observations may suffice to justify the order proposed, yet it is acknowledged that they are not comprehensive enough to embrace every thing relative to the passions. There is à class of emotions, in which distinct ideas of good or evil are not present to the mind, and which in fact may with equal propriety enlist themselves under each division. They are vivid impressions, productive of effects which, strictly speaking, neither belong to the passions nor affections; and yet their presence frequently constitutes the difference between an affection and a passion.

This enigma will best be explained, by our attention to the manner in which our ideas of those influential and operative qualities, exciting passions and inspiring affections, are obtained.' P. 46

The last are called introductory emotions, and consist of 'surprise, wonder, and astonishment;' the two latter perhaps differing only in degree. The passions themselves are divided as they respect the selfish' or the social principle.' These create the classes. The orders are derived from the predominant idea, whether good or evil. The leading passions and affections point out the genera and the complicated nature of some of the passions, with other contingent circumstances furnish the species in this new ontological system.

To this arrangement we need make no great objection: it is better perhaps than any other, as derived from the leading prin

ciples of the human mind; but it is somewhat too complicated; and, as the objects are so few, arrangement is of less importance. Classification is only of use to facilitate the reference, or for the purpose of distinction. Neither, in this instance, is required. Were it necessary, however, we should rather derive it from the degree of affection, dividing originally the passions, as usual, into animating and depressing. We should place in the first rank that pleasing sensation which arises from objects of taste: admiration, love, veneration, joy, and ecstasy, would follow in order. Of the depressing passions, grief might occupy the first place. To this would succeed fear, anger, and revenge ; —the complicated passions forming the subdivisions.

In the subsequent sections of the first part, the different passions are very clearly and judiciously explained. We find little which can be the subject of animadversion; and nothing occurs, in so beaten a track, that can induce us to fill our pages with a quotation.

The second part is entitled Philosophical Observations and Inquiries, founded on the preceding Analysis. Of this, the first chapter is entitled Observations respecting the Laws of Excitement,' in which the author endeavours to show, that affections are augmented into passions by surprise,' but that affections alone are permanent. Passions are undoubtedly animated into increased violence by surprise; but, as Dr. Cogan himself has noticed and replied to one objection, we shall add another, viz. that passion is frequently excited by events antecedently suspected. Surprise will certainly increase the animation; but all violent exertions are transitory, and the affections only can be permanent. As what relates, however, to surprise is a very favourable specimen of Dr. Cogan's talents, we shall transcribe it.

Thus, for example, in joy the pleasing part of the impression owes its origin to the possession or undoubted expectancy of some desirable good. This in its lowest influence produces some degree of change in the corporeal frame. It is a sensation, and must be felt somewhere. The vividness of the impression occasioned by the impetus of surprise renders this sensation more vivid, diffuses its effects ever the whole system, and occasions a delectable and ungovernable flow of spirits, which becomes conspicuous to every spectator. But as novelty is the exciting cause of surprise, in proportion as the novelty of the good subsides, surprise gradually diminishes, and leavés the mind under the influence of an affection, more proportionate to the real value of the object.

• Thus we may suppose the passion of anger to consist of that disagreeable sensation which a sense of injury will always occasion, quickened by surprise into an ungovernable emotion. The reluctance with which we part with any thing contributing to our benefit or enjoyment, will be quickened by surprise into the agonies of sorrow; which is also able to convert painful apprehensions into the excess of fear.

Nor does the acknowledged fact, that our passions are sometimes excited by deliberate contemplation, militate against this opinion. This can only take place in affairs of high importance; and in such cases the more deliberate survey consists in examining and reflecting upon every circumstance relative to the nature of the exciting cause; which necessarily produces a variety of new and unexpected combinations, each of which will be attended with a proportionate degree of surprise; and although there will not be in any one circumstance that quantum of novelty that so powerfully strikes the mind in cases which are sudden and totally unexpected, yet the combined influence of the aggregate number of novelties may finally produce the most extravagant passions. Thus may the mind calculate the variety of benefits accruing from some prosperous event, until it be transported with joy; enumerate the evils of privation until it becomes frantic with sorrow; dwell upon the number and magnitude of provocations which aggravate an injury, until resentment shall be converted into rage; and by ruminating upon the extent of danger, it may be driven into despair. P. 1821

The observations on the relation of the passions and affections are very ingenious: those on the seat of the passions are not equally important. Their seat is evidently in the brain; and the question must at last be referred to the materialists and immaterialists. Dr. Cogan's remarks reach only the systems of other authors, and do not even remotely relate to this disputed question.

The diversity of our affections is influenced by many diffe rent causes, which are enumerated with great propriety and accuracy of discrimination. These are the influence of experience; the difference of sex and temperament; our progress from infancy to more advanced periods; national customs; the force of habit; the principle of self-love; the influence of education and novelty; the power of fashion; the love of singularity; popular prejudices; associated ideas; the manner in which information is conveyed; imitative tones and representations; rhetoric, oratory, and eloquence; the drama; and predisposing

causes.

₹

The influence of the different passions on the human body is the next subject of inquiry; and our author here presents us with the substance of his thesis, published at Leyden in 1767, when, as he observes, it was his professed object to theorise, chiefly in opposition to the system of Boerhaave. It contains principally the more obvious medical changes on the human body, in consequence of the different passions.

The second section of this part relates to the influence of the passions on thoughts and language, on character and happiness. Its first chapter comprehends the influence of imagination, as produced by exciting the passions, and contains some beautiful as well as just remarks. It is apparently designed to illustrate the language of the passions and affections, in opposition to that of reason.

The other two chapters, though not more original, are accurate and elegant.

On the whole, this publication, though it contain little novelty or depth of research, is judicious and interesting. It shows Dr. Cogan to be deeply acquainted with the human mind, and to have been an attentive observer of its influence on the different functions of the body. The mode in which this influence is exerted, or the great questions of materiality and immateriality, we have already observed, are not examined in the present work.

ART. XI.-Analytical Essays towards promoting the Chemical Knowledge of Mineral Substances. By Martin Henry Klaproth, Professor of Chemistry, &c. Translated from the German. 8vo. 1os. 6d. Boards. Cadell and Davies.

1801.

THE name of Klaproth occurs frequently in our journal; and he can never be mentioned without respect by any scientific chemical inquirer. We have lately seen, in M. Hauy's very excellent treatise on mineralogy, Klaproth and Vauquelin exclusively quoted, as authorities of the first rank. These essays are, of course, highly valuable; but what chiefly renders them so, will make them less interesting to the general reader. Chemical analysis, though a labour of great importance, can never become entertaining; and a minute account of the proportions of different ingredients is of all other subjects the least pleasing, except to the eager chemist.

The volume before us contains both the first and the second part of M. Klaproth's collection; and the essays in the latter are almost wholly new. Some of those in the former have been already published in different journals: they first appeared at Berlin in 1795 in their present form; and were succeeded by his second volume in 1797.

• With respect to those, who may possess patience and inclination sufficient to undertake a repetition of my experiments, I have described every particular management, as circumstantially as could bè done, consistently with keeping within due bounds that prolixity which is hardly ever separable from the narrative of chemical processes. Those who are familiar with this subject, will perceive my endeavours to reduce the analysis of mineral bodies to methods which are simple in themselves, and lead to results that may be depended on. Among others, I flatter myself with having traced out a way of analysing gems, which seems to deserve being followed by skil ful chemists.

• A circumstance, seemingly indifferent, often produces in chemical experiments, as in other investigations, unexpected consequences; which may be proved by comparing my former with my later analyCRIT. REV. Vol. 35. June, 1802.

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