chance presented itself to the captains of the rear ships to choose the chord instead of the arc, throw over the formal movement, wear out of line, and head off the enemy. Nelson instantly seized this chance and determined the course of the battle, arresting the Spauish movement, and boarding the San Nicolas and San Josef. There was risk of being overwhelmed before support could arrive; there was the further risk which attached to an act undertaken without authority and in defiance of an ordered evolution; but Captain Mahan justly considers that in any case Nelson would have been upheld by an admiral "who had just fought twentyseven ships of the line with fifteen, because "a victory was essential to England at that moment."

To this signal success quickly followed a "sharp reverse" in the failure of the attack on Santa Cruz. This was essentially a task in which military forces ought to have been employed, as Nelson originally proposed, and the lesson is important. The loss of his right arm and the months of suffering which followed brought temporary despondency, which disappeared when at length the wound healed. On the 10th of April Nelson sailed in the Vanguard to join the fleet under St. Vincent, and to enter upon what Captain Mahan regards as the second period of his career. "Before him was now to open a field of possibilities hitherto unexampled in naval warfare; and for the appreciation of them was needed just those perceptions, intuitive in origin, yet resting firmly on well-ordered, rational processes which, on the intel lectual side, distinguished him above all other British seamen."

The political situation demanded the resumption of a naval offensive in the Mediterranean, where a great French expedition was known to be preparing. "If," wrote Lord Spencer to St. Vincent, “by our appearance in the Mediterranean, we can encourage Austria to come forward again, it is in the highest degree probable that the other powers will seize the opportunity of acting at the same time." The meas

ure was correctly conceived, and Nelson was the instrument selected by the Cabinet to carry it out.

With the greatest skill Captain Mahan retells the story of the famous chase from the 7th of June to the memorable 1st of August. We are made to share Nelson's anxieties and difficulties, to follow the workings of his mind, and to realize the inflexible steadiness of purpose which at length led him to the goal. Neither England nor Nelson himself at first recognized the tremendous importance of the battle of the Nile. French designs in Egypt and in the Far East were checkmated; Minorca fell; the fate of Malta was decided; and a new alliance, joined by Russia and Turkey, was arrayed against the forces of the Revolution. Meanwhile Nelson, severely wounded and suffering greatly, sailed for Naples to meet his fate and Lady Hamilton, who from this period till the hour of his death dominated his affections.

No biographer can ignore the influence which this woman henceforth exercised over the hero's private life. The later breach with his wife, and the intimacy which he publicly avowed, have rendered the discussion of this phase of his career inevitable. The name of Lady Hamilton must always be associated with that of Nelson.

It was, however, the manner and not the fact of his liaison that imposes upon the biographer the duty of transferring it to his pages. The lives of many other great men-lives grossly impure compared with that of Nelson's-escape this form of investigation. We do not, in their case, pause to inquire how far some woman's iafluence may have swayed their actions, or seek to frame theories of their moral deterioration. Captain Mahan appears to forget that the special circumstances which invested Nelson's human weakness with inevitable publicity constitute a strong plea against exaggeration of treatment. Nelson lived forty-seven years, into less than seven of which Lady Hamilton enters.

Yet throughout these two large volumes we are continually bidden to remember that a period of moral decline is impending, and the inwoven strain of reflections is somewhat irritating. Until Nelson sinned, we prefer to think of him as blameless. In the years dur ing which his whole nature is assumed to have been warped, his most splendid services to his country were rendered, his greatest victories won, and there is no valid evidence that the influence of Lady Hamilton drew him aside from his public duties. Captain Mahan does not follow Admiral Jurien de la Gravière in ascribing the execution of Carracciolo to that influence; but holds that Nelson, in not delaying it, showed that he was "saturated with the prevalent court feeling against the insurgents and the French." To us, living a hundred years after the reign of murder in France, it is not easy to realize the feelings with which Revolutionists were naturally regarded in 1798, and the crime for which Carracciolo was justly condemned would have aroused the strongest resentment of Nelson even if he had never known the sister of Marie Antoinette. Motives are usually complex, and it is not necessary to assume that his disobedience of the orders of Lord Keith was prompted by reluctance to leave Lady Hamilton. Nelson was not on good terms with his commander-inchief, whose judgment he distrusted, and whose instructions, addressed from a dull pupil to a master, he resented. Moreover, it is certain that before he had seen Lady Hamilton, as well as long after she had returned to England, he rightly or wrongly attached special importance to the security of the Two Sicilies. The disobedience cannot be condoned; but unquestionably it did not prejudice the interests of England, and the real moral is the unwisdom of subjecting genius to mediocrity in order to comply with the dictates of petty routine. Nelson was marked out for command in the Mediterranean in succession to St. Vincent, and in sending out Keith the government and the Admiralty

made a grave mistake, from which the national cause suffered. In the six months of temporary independence which followed Keith's departure for England, Nelson showed no sign whatever of diminished energy. His brief "administration of the station until Keith's return was characterized by the same zeal, sagacity, and politic tact that he had shown in earlier days." A second disappointment-the more bitterly felt since Keith, after having lost the French fleet, was sent back-and an Admiralty reprimand, which, though deserved, caused Nelson much pain, sufficiently explain his "testiness" at this time. Growing infatuation for Lady Hamilton there may have been; but if St. Vincent had remained, or if Nelson had succeeded to the command, it would have been unnoticed. When, after only four months in England, Nelson sailed for the Baltic, his fiery energy at once displayed itself, and we find no signs of an inordinate craving to linger by the side of Lady Hamilton. And when at last the brief peace came, Captain Mahan assures us that, "like Great Britain herself during this repose, he rested with his arms at his side, waiting for a call." There is no proof that his duty to his country and his king suffered from the one great passion, the one great weakness of his life.

Captain Mahan is undoubtedly right in not investing the hero's frailty with a halo of romance; but he has perhaps tended towards the opposite extreme, and sought to depict a somewhat squalid amour. Nelson spent the greater part of his life at sea and knew little of women. He was capable of a devoted affection, which his wife at no time inspired. There were signs of incompatibility of temperament before another image engrossed his thoughts. That image was doubtless unworthy, but can scarcely have been so inadequate as it is represented in the spiteful reminiscences of Mrs. St. George. Emma Hart was what men had made her; but to deny all moral sense to the writer of the touching letters to Greville appears unjust.

Of

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her cleverness there is no question; her beauty is beyond dispute; that she was incapable of returning the deep affection she inspired is not certain. And Captain Mahan, in spite of his evidently opposite intention, conveys dim impression that the mistress was better able to understand the heroic side of Nelson's character than the blameless wife whose sad fate evokes our sympathy. "Such things are," as Nelson was wont to say in regard to the anomalies of life, and such things unhappily will be, so long as humanity retains its many imperfections. Nelson's great fault cannot ever be condoned; but the measure of that faultnot the publicity with which his headstrong will invested it-should supply the measure of the condemnation.

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The coalition formed after the battle of the Nile proved shortlived. Napoleon, whose escape from Egypt Nelson "sincerely regretted," landed in France in October, 1799, and Austria, struck down by repeated blows, made peace after Hohenlinden. Catharine the Second was dead, and the Czar Paul, easily cajoled by Napoleon, vived the armed neutrality to which Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia at once acceded. Great Britain stood alone. The new combination was, as the author points out, the work of Napoleon, who sought to employ the Northern navies to his advantage, and at the same time "to exclude Great Britain from her important commerce with the Continent, which was carried on mainly by the ports of Prussia or by those of North Germany." Again Nelson stands forth as the national champion. "We have now arrived at that period," he wrote, "what we have often heard of but must now executethat of fighting for our dear country." "I have only to say that the service of my country is the object nearest my heart." The astounding blunder of giving the chief command of the Baltic fleet to Sir Hyde Parker was, in the opinion of Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, due to a perception of "the propriety of placing under the control of some more temperate, docile,

...

and matured mind, that impetuous, daring, and brilliant courage whose caprices" the Admiralty "had learned to dread." Captain Mahan suggests, with greater probability, that the reason may be sought in Parker's possession of "the information acquired during the last preparation for a Russian war." The arrangement was one of which this country furnishes many examples; but in this case the national cause suffered no injury. Denmarknot Great Britain-paid heavily for the appointment of Sir Hyde Parker. "Nelson's understanding of the situation," states Captain Mahan, "was, in truth, acute, profound, and decisive. In the Northern combination . . . Paul was the trunk, Denmark and Sweden the branches. Could he get at the trunk and hew it down, the branches fall with it; but should time and strength first be spent in lopping off the branches, the trunk would remain, and my power must be weaker when its greatest strength is required.'' To strike straight at the Russian squadron at Revel-clearly the right policy-was a course which did not commend itself to Parker; and Nelson, perforce yielding to his titular superior, addressed himself to the subsidiary task of attacking the Danish fleet in the roads of Copenhagen. The plan which he proposed shows similarity to that executed at the Nile, but with an important difference. In the earlier case, a general idea was given to all the captains, to whom the details of the execution were left. In the late, the instructions were singularly careful and elaborate, aptly illustrating the completeness of Nelson's genius. The battle of the 2nd of April, 1801, was an exhibition of seamanship finely conceived, as well as of fighting power, and the share of the commander-inchief was practically limited to making a signal which might have wrecked the whole. Captain Mahan shows that Nelson, in applying his telescope to the blind eye, was not acting a little comedy, as has been represented. The frigates obeyed this "remarkable" signal, and Rear-Admiral Graves, "not

1

being able to distinguish the phant's conduct," repeated it, but happily did not haul down No. 16, signifying "Close action." As the author pointedly remarks, "The man who went into the Copenhagen fight with an eye upon withdrawing from action would have been beaten before he began."

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One branch of the Northern Alliance having been lopped, Nelson, who had brought on an illness by rowing for six hours in an open boat to rejoin his flagship, was intensely anxious to fight the Russians. The assassination of the Czar Paul had, however, changed the situation, and when the fleet, under Nelson's command, sailed for Revel, the moment Sir Hyde Parker departed, Russia could no longer be regarded as a belligerent. The Baltic campaign had ended; "there was nothing left to do;" and considering how Nelson's life had been passed for eight years, the severe wounds he had received, and the suffering caused by the keen air of the north, the longing for rest which he evinced would surely have been natural, apart from the "unquenchable passion for Lady Hamilton." Landing in England on the 1st of July, he again hoisted his flag on the 26th in command of a "Particular Service Squadron," having previously drawn up what he called "a sea plan of defence for the City of London."

Whatever may have been the reality of Napoleon's preparations for invasion in 1805, those of 1801 were undoubtedly undertaken with the object of working upon the fears of the persons whom St. Vincent accurately described as "the old women of both sexes." While, therefore, Nelson threw himself with characteristic energy into the organization of a defensive flotilla, his opinion quickly changed as soon as he had obtained an insight into the situation. "Where is our invasion to come from? The time is gone," he wrote on the 12th of August.

From October, 1801, to May, 1803, Nelson lived with the Hamiltons at

1 Nelson's flagship.

As commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean he sailed in the Victory on the 20th of May, 1805. "Government," he had written, "cannot be more anxious for my departure than I am, if a war, to go." In this spirit Nelson entered upon the crowning period of his career -a period in which the wide experience of the past was to bear rich fruit, and the sterling qualities of the greatest of seamen were to shine forth in full splendor. Through the long and anxious cruising in the Mediterranean, the chase of Villeneuve to and from the West Indies, and the brief respite in England, down to the triumph at Trafalgar, Captain Mahan leads the reader in pages whose luminous analysis leaves nothing to be desired. The naval aspects of each phase of the great drama are grasped with a firm hand. Nelson's steady concentration of purpose upon the primary objectthe enemy's fleet-his determination to keep his own ships at sea, thus maintaining the officers and crews in fullest fighting efficiency, and the wise administration by which he won the love and

2 The influence of Sea Power on the Wars of the French Revolution and Empire.

confidence of his command supply lessons for all time. The causes of the victory of Trafalgar lie deeper than either strategy or tactics. They may be traced in the life of Nelson; they may be reproduced by following the example he has left.

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From beginning to end the Trafalgar campaign abounds in great lessons which are only now beginning to be understood. Assuming that the immense preparations on the French coast were seriously intended, Napoleon's correct perception of the risks was plainly shown. He might, as Captain Mahan intimates, be willing to sacrifice an army to accomplish the occupation of London. "What if the soldiers of the Grand Army never returned from England? There were still in France men enough," etc. He was not willing, however, to encounter the tremendous danger of being caught in passage or in landing by the British navy. His far-reaching plans were directed to the concentration of a superior force in the Channel, during a period which he variously estimated at six hours, fifteen days, and two months. He does not, however, pear to have realized that this concentration could not have been effected without hard fighting, which must inevitably have changed the whole situation. Nor did he understand that his harbor-trained ships were no match for their weather-beaten opponents. Provided that the British blockading squadrons would have quietly withdrawn into space when threatened by superior numbers, the over-elaborate scheme might have succeeded. But this is exactly what could not reasonably be expected. On the arrival of Villeneuve from the West Indies to relieve the blockaded ships, the blockaders would have moved up Channel, gathering strength, and being joined by the considerable free force which is usually left out of account. There would then have been a real "fleet in being"- -a fighting fleet numerically not far inferior to that which Napoleon vainly hoped to assemble, and in all other respects vastly superior. At

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best a victory could have been obtained only at immense sacrifice, which the French would have been crippled, while a fresh British squadron under Nelson must have been near at hand. Calder's action, incomplete as it was, showed clearly the moral ascendency which rendered it certain that the French would in any case be attacked, and Nelson's words to his captains have a special significance: "If we meet the enemy we shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather think twenty, sail of the line;"1 do not be surprised if I should not fall on them immediately-we won't part without a battle." The idea, frequently put forward, that England narrowly escaped invasion in 1805 has no foundation in reason or in fact.

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On the other hand, it is remarkable that neither the British government nor Nelson himself seems to have realized that, if Napoleon was really bent upon crossing the Channel, movement of the Toulon squadron must have been directly connected with the project. Nelson did not live long enough to understand how deeply the lesson of 1798 had been graven on the mind of his antagonist, who, with a great object in view, was not in the least likely to contemplate an eccentric operation of any magnitude. In any case, Nelson's conduct of the Trafalgar campaign was based throughout upon sound principles of naval war, and his success was amply deserved. Trafalgar did not, as is frequently asserted, save England from invasion; but the results were of vital importance. On the sea the aims Napoleon were finally shattered. Henceforth, abandoning all hope of direct invasion, he sought in vain to conquer the sea by the land. The Penlusular War, Moscow, Elba, Waterloo, and St. Helena marked the inexorable series of events which sprang from Nelson's last victory. To Great Britain Trafalgar implied the means of expansion, the firm foundation of the present Colonial Empire, and naval prestige which still endures. The com

1 Nelson had eleven sail of the line.

of