tally change its character. All relative experience, colonial and otherwise, proves that it would be impossible to resist the pressure to bring in partisans of the Government of the day, and it must be anticipated that the Irish Senate would soon consist of the nominees of one party if the scheme of the Home Rule Bill be not changed. If in answer to criticisms of the too probably lopsided character of the Irish House of Commons, we are told that the Irish Senate will redress the balance and maintain the equity of Irish legislation, we must reply that this safeguard is valid at best only for a season and would soon become quite untrustworthy. To get a real representation of Ireland, that is to say, to obtain security that Ireland should be governed by the resultant judgment of the best opinion of all classes, we must provide for the maintenance of the character of the Senate as first conceived, and for a better organization of the House of Commons also. Even with two years before us in which to fight over the Home Rule Bill and get it into better shape, I should not be sanguine of doing what is desired, had there not appeared in Ireland itself a most noteworthy and authoritative demand for the reconsideration of the scheme of Parliament contained in the Home Rule Bill. As we know, Irish Unionists almost unanimously refuse to consider the possibility of the establishment of Home Rule, and they will not criticize the provisions of Mr. Asquith's Bill with a view to their amendment; but despite this feeling a Proportional Representation Society has been formed in Dublin, with a branch in Belfast, enrolling members of all classes, opinions, and creeds, and they have put forward the scheme of a representative Parliament for Ireland, embodying the best guarantees that each Chamber shall be truly representative of Irish opinion. The scheme has

been communicated to members of the House of Commons, and steps have been taken to present it personally to the Prime Minister, indeed to all who can be expected to influence the course of legislation, with a view of obtaining, as far as possible, a discussion of its details. The interview with the Prime Minister will have happened before these pages see the light, and a report of the arguments laid before him would cover much of what I might otherwise have to say, but I may perhaps be permitted to press two or three points for consideration. In the first place, the true principle of a representative assembly is conceded in the Ministerial conception of an Irish Senate. It is no longer necessary to describe what we should aim at in the formation of a national representative chamber. Next, it may be fairly insisted, though I offer some apology for putting it forward, that the circumstances of Ireland make it peculiarly desirable that her future House of Commons should contain a full and accurate presentment of all the elements of Irish national life. Her past history, her government, her principles of administration, have developed a terrible disintegration of the community in classes and sections, separated, jealous, and hostile, if not irreconcilable one with another. It is conceded that what has come to be called the "Nationalists" is but a partial presentment of the nation. They may perhaps rightly claim to represent the majority of the people, but they do this to the exclusion of important and helpful, if not of vital elements of national life; and those who are most disposed to accept the Government's scheme without criticism and without change do so with the avowed hope and assurance that the new House of Commons will draw into it and make effective all those elements which are now wanting in the representation of the Nationalist Party. I

would like to take my stand for a moment on this assurance, and ask those who make it what are the grounds of their belief that it will be realized. If the old methods of obtaining representation are to be imported without modification into the election of the new House of Commons, why should we expect the result to be different in character? Elections by majorities, and by majorities only, have been tried all over the world with the same incompleteness, if not miscarriage of representation, with the same defects of character in the legislatures brought into being. Must we not expect the future Irish House of Commons to reproduce this unsatisfactory experience? And the way of escape is so simple and so easy, if we have a mind to take it into consideration. It is here that the action of the Proportional Representation Society of Ireland is so useful. They have taken the schedule of the Government Bill as a base of departure. They have adopted without change of boundary, the constituencies named therein, and by the simple process of uniting together those adjacent to one another, for the most part lying in the same city or county, and inheriting the same traditions of habit and association, they have formed larger constituencies entitled to return from three to eight members, and so affording the means of securing a measure of proportionate representation within each of them. The new constituencies are made by coupling together the constituencies already scheduled in the Bill. This is not all. The Government plan has to provide an election of a reduced number of members to represent Ireland in the Commons House at Westminster, and another schedule of the Bill defines the constituencies which must be brought into being for the election of these members. The Irish Society have adroitly seized upon this second schedule, and have shaped their

coupling of constituencies for electing members of the Irish House of Commons so as to conform in many cases with the constituencies the Government have proposed for the election of the Westminster contingent. The Irish Society have thus been wise in their generation. Their electoral map of Ireland is the Government map. The smaller constituencies which the Government have proposed for one purpose, have been united into larger constituencies such as the same Government propose for another purpose. There is a minimum of change, but it is a case of "the little more and how much it is," and it may be added, having regard to the contrast between the results achieved by this minimum of change, "the little less and what worlds away." Is it possible to make this change? As I have written, it must not be dismissed as impossible, even though it may not be accomplished at once. There is some time before ustime for education all round-time for Nationalist members to consent to what really will be a blessing and a privilege for Ireland, and for Unionists to submit to a revolution, hateful though inevitable, if coupled with a safeguard which, from its natural equity of principle, may be trusted to be permanent.

The central scheme of the Home Parliament for Ireland being established, the next work is to determine the range of its Home Government. The phrase itself intimates the limitations below which it should not fall, and beyond which it should not pass. The Ministerial Bill is but slightly open to criticism as going too far; but I think there are serious objections to it that in some important respects it does not go far enough. It must indeed be remembered that Mr. Asquith and his colleagues work under a keen sense of the difficulties they have to overcome, difficulties which, for the present at least,

The

the Opposition will tend to magnify, but I am inclined to think that here, as elsewhere, courage might bring its own reward, and I always remember that time may assist us in evolving a proper valuation of difficulties. instance in which the Government's scheme seems to me to go too far is that of the transfer of the postal administration to the Irish Government, a transfer which, I apprehend, carries something more than administration. It would seem as if the Irish Legislature would be able to fix any rates of postage it pleased within the area of Ireland, and might enter into negotiations with the Postmaster-General touching the conduct and cost of postal intercourse between the two islands. It may well be that no difference in postal arrangements need be immediately contemplated, but if the Bill passes as it stands the Postmaster-General of the future would be hampered in taking any new departure by the necessity of obtaining the concurrence of the Irish Postmaster-General or of allowing some diversity of practice. If the Bill is to be regarded as something designed to fall in with quasi-federal arrangements we are led on to contemplate variations of administration in England, Scotland, and Ireland, not to say Wales. All this threatens an apparently gratuitous confusion. I am not aware that a separation of Post Offices has ever been an item in the programme of Home Rule. Uniformity of postal organization is as common a characteristic of federations as uniformity of coinage. It prevails in all our Dominions and in the United States, and the slight variations in detail found in Germany are of historical origin and involve no practical difficulty. Two reasons only occur to me for the proposed new departure. It may be said that the cost of postal adminstration in Ireland has been unnecessarily raised by the importation of English standards of

pay, and next (partly as a consequence) the expenditure on the Irish postal service exceeds its revenue. These considerations afford insufficient reason for the change, and so far as they involve any confession of failure of administration in the past that failure might surely be amended. I have already suggested that the Government Bill is open to more serious criticism for not going far enough. I do not understand why the administration of old age pensions should not be at once transferred to the Irish Government. The application of the Old Age Pension Act to Ireland was doubtless not sufficiently considered when it was passed, but this would appear to be a reason why the mind of the new Irish Government should be as speedily as possible directed to the subject, unless indeed Mr. Redmond is found pleading for delay in being burdened with this delicate duty. A larger question is that of the transfer of the police. Under the Bill the Dublin Metropolitan Police is, subject to certain reservations of personal interest, put under the control of the Irish Government, whilst the national or Royal Irish Constabulary remains for six years under the reserved control of the Imperial Government. The difference in treatment of the two forces, that of Dublin and of Ireland at large, is a curious inversion of our English practice, under which the Metropolitan Police is directly administered by the Home Office, and the provincial police subjected to borough and county authorities. But this difference need not detain us. The important question is, why should not the national police of Ireland be at once placed under the new Irish Government, subject, of course, like other services, to all necessary safeguards of individual privileges and rights? It would seem that those who are prepared to grant Home Rule at all--that is to say, to allow Irish laws and Irish administration to be

made and directed as the Government chosen by the people of Ireland shall think fit-should also be prepared to allow the Irish Government to wield the forces that are necessary to ensure obedience to the laws and respect for the administration. If we cannot go this length, we had better defer Home Rule until we are ready to make it a reality. I should expect Mr. Asquith and his colleagues to confess as much for themselves, and that they are afraid of the timidity of other people. Mr. Balfour, in his speech on Second Reading, directed all the strength of his dialectics to an exposure of the absurdities attendant upon the installation of a government without a police force to support it. But the answer to his otherwise unanswerable argument is not the abandonment of the Home Rule Bill, but the inclusion in it of a transfer of the Irish Constabulary. A little time occupied in looking the supposed difficulties of the situation in the face might show that they are not so terrible as they at first appear. There are doubtless portions of Ireland where the authority of the law seems always in danger of toppling to a fall.

Mr. John Redmond is assuredly quite well aware of the character of his brother's constituency, and there are corners in Cork and Kerry which may match West Connaught. The Irish Constabulary is, however, national in its organization, and has always proved singularly exempt from what may be called county influences, nor is there any chance of its becoming localized soon, if ever, and it might certainly be trusted to fulfil the policy of the central government in the maintenance of order. More doubt may be thrown by some on the steadiness of the central government itself in maintaining such a policy, but I believe any Irish administration that could be set up would be found more than ordinarily bent on this line of action. I sus

pect that its impulse would be to be authoritative. If, indeed, we could not rely upon it in this particular, we should find a difficulty in launching Home Rule at all. Having accepted Home Rule in principle, I would ensure its orderly evolution by giving the future government power, and the responsibility arising from power.

The questions most open to debate in connection with Home Rule are the determination of the financial relations between the Imperial and the Irish Parliament, and the measure of fiscal autonomy which may be allowed to the latter. Happy is the federation which has no financial relations between the federal and the local governments. This may be said to be the case in the United States, where the Federation defrays all its charges out of its own revenue, hitherto almost exclusively indirect, and each State meets its own expenditure by direct taxes of its own. In Canada, in Australia, in Germany, the financial relations between the central and particular governments are more or less complicated, and have been from time to time adjusted and readjusted, not without suspicion of corruptive pressure. The scheme of the Government Bill, when stripped of all transitory provisions, is to hand over to the Irish Government an annual sum sufficient to pay the estimated charges of the existing domestic services of Ireland and leave a surplus of £500,000, this surplus being diminished in subsequent years by a diminution of the annual sum, until it reaches £200,000. If any of the reserved services, for example Old Age Pensions or Police, were transferred to the Irish Government, the annual sum allotted would be augmented so as to meet this additional charge. The principle of the Bill is thus to give over to the Irish Government a sum supposed to be sufficient for it to pay its way with a disposable surplus, and the arrangement

would for the present, and for some time to come, involve charges on the Imperial Exchequer considerably above the revenue that under existing taxation can be said to be contributed to that Exchequer from Ireland. If in the process of time this deficiency disappeared a new arrangement would be made, to be devised by an arbitrating authority set up for the purpose. Meanwhile it is not impossible that the Irish Government, even with the assistance of the additional £500,000, would find it difficult to pay its way. Some existing services might possibly be more economically ordered, but new services would be called for, some of which would be inevitable; and what are the powers of the Irish Government apart from that of running into debt? It can add no new item to the customs tariff, and though it might increase existing rates of duty and enjoy some of the benefits of such increase, it is provided that the sum thus derived shall, whatever the rate of the increased duty, never exceed ten per cent. of the revenue raised in Ireland from the existing duty. It is plainly hoped and desired that customs duties shall not be tampered with at all. What other powers will the Irish Parliament possess? It can add to or diminish Excise Duties, and it may increase, but not by more than ten per cent., the Income Tax and Death Duties levied by the Imperial Parliament, and the gain or loss of revenue estimated as resulting from any exercise of these powers will be added to or deducted from the annual sum handed over to the Irish Government. There are minor powers which need not detain us. It may be doubted whether there will be any disposition in Ireland to multiply or increase Excise Duties, or to add to the Income Tax or Death Duties, and the net result probably intended is that the Irish Government should confine itself to the administration of its assigned in

come. This may be possible, but will certainly not satisfy the desire widely cherished among Irishmen. The last century has seen in Ireland, as in England, a gradual disappearance of numberless local industries which have been transferred and become concentrated in certain centres of cheap production, and it has been the aspiration of many Irishmen that an Irish Parliament should bring back these industries to the island. This would mean a Customs tariff against England, and it would seem that Tariff Reformers on this side St. George's Channel could scarcely withhold their sympathy from the project. The cry for fiscal autonomy may be kept under pending the inauguration of Home Rule, but it can scarcely disappear, and if the Irish Government found itself in any financial straits it would be vigorously revived. We cannot expect that a policy which has found such a disagreeable measure of support in Great Britain would not be pressed in Ireland also. In my article in 1886, when as yet there was no Tariff Reform Party among us, I anticipated this demand and urged that it should be met. was, as I have said, an opponent of Home Rule, but my argument was not advanced as a help towards wrecking the policy. I sincerely expressed the opinion that a denial of the tariff-power would be a vain and irritating prolongation of a struggle to which I was afraid there was only one issue, and I argued that the trade hindrances we should suffer would not be considerable. I proceeded indeed on the assumption, not now so certain, that our Customs Duties would remain few and the annoyance of an Irish tariff would be felt by an Irish importer in an Irish Custom house. But my conviction remains unchanged that fiscal autonomy should be the accompaniment of Home Rule, and my present acceptance of Home Rule is not defeated by this addition.

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