Philosophy of LogicElsevier, 2006. nov. 29. - 1218 oldal The papers presented in this volume examine topics of central interest in contemporary philosophy of logic. They include reflections on the nature of logic and its relevance for philosophy today, and explore in depth developments in informal logic and the relation of informal to symbolic logic, mathematical metatheory and the limiting metatheorems, modal logic, many-valued logic, relevance and paraconsistent logic, free logics, extensional v. intensional logics, the logic of fiction, epistemic logic, formal logical and semantic paradoxes, the concept of truth, the formal theory of entailment, objectual and substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers, infinity and domain constraints, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and Skolem paradox, vagueness, modal realism v. actualism, counterfactuals and the logic of causation, applications of logic and mathematics to the physical sciences, logically possible worlds and counterpart semantics, and the legacy of Hilbert’s program and logicism. The handbook is meant to be both a compendium of new work in symbolic logic and an authoritative resource for students and researchers, a book to be consulted for specific information about recent developments in logic and to be read with pleasure for its technical acumen and philosophical insights. - Written by leading logicians and philosophers - Comprehensive authoritative coverage of all major areas of contemporary research in symbolic logic - Clear, in-depth expositions of technical detail - Progressive organization from general considerations to informal to symbolic logic to nonclassical logics - Presents current work in symbolic logic within a unified framework - Accessible to students, engaging for experts and professionals - Insightful philosophical discussions of all aspects of logic - Useful bibliographies in every chapter |
Részletek a könyvből
1 - 5 találat összesen 64 találatból.
22. oldal
... variables are individuals (particulars) and higher-order logic, in which they can be entities of a higher logical type, such as sets, properties and relations. It is this first-order logic that is generally considered as the core area ...
... variables are individuals (particulars) and higher-order logic, in which they can be entities of a higher logical type, such as sets, properties and relations. It is this first-order logic that is generally considered as the core area ...
23. oldal
... variables). Indeed, the entire first-order logic is equivalent with a quantifier-free system where all variables are universal and in which the job of existential quantifiers is done by function constants. 12 THE MEANING OF QUANTIFIERS ...
... variables). Indeed, the entire first-order logic is equivalent with a quantifier-free system where all variables are universal and in which the job of existential quantifiers is done by function constants. 12 THE MEANING OF QUANTIFIERS ...
24. oldal
... variable y depends on the variable x, in the sense of concrete factual dependence. This function of quantifiers is ... variables. Hence the received first-order logic is not fully representative of the function of logical constants ...
... variable y depends on the variable x, in the sense of concrete factual dependence. This function of quantifiers is ... variables. Hence the received first-order logic is not fully representative of the function of logical constants ...
29. oldal
... variables of the appropriate type. The important development in the history of mathematics of the idea of an arbitrary function is in effect the development of the standard interpretation of function variables. Applied to functions from ...
... variables of the appropriate type. The important development in the history of mathematics of the idea of an arbitrary function is in effect the development of the standard interpretation of function variables. Applied to functions from ...
81. oldal
... variable assignment s, providing an auxiliary denotation for variable parts of the expression, which may change in the process of evaluation. Logicians look at this scheme from various angles. Given a formula φ, one can study its models ...
... variable assignment s, providing an auxiliary denotation for variable parts of the expression, which may change in the process of evaluation. Logicians look at this scheme from various angles. Given a formula φ, one can study its models ...
Tartalomjegyzék
1 | |
13 | |
41 | |
65 | |
101 | |
131 | |
Vagueness and the Logic of Ordinary Language | 155 |
Logic and Semantic Analysis | 173 |
The Mathematics of Skolems Paradox | 615 |
Objectual and Substitutional Interpretations of the Quantifiers | 649 |
ManyValued Logics | 675 |
Relevance Logics | 723 |
Paraconsistent Logics and Paraconsistency | 791 |
Extensional vs Intensional Logic | 913 |
Logically Possible Worlds and Counterpart Semantics for Modal Logic | 943 |
Modal Realism and its Roots in Mathematical Realism | 997 |
Justificatory Irrelevance of Formal Semantics | 205 |
A Brief History of Truth | 227 |
A Philosophical Sketch | 325 |
Hilberts Program Then and Now | 411 |
Logicism and its Contemporary Legacy | 449 |
Classical Logics Coming of Age | 497 |
Infinity | 523 |
LoumlwenheimSkolem Theorems | 587 |
Free Logics | 1023 |
Fictions and their Logic | 1061 |
Counterfactuals Causation and Preemption | 1127 |
Logic Mathematics and the Natural Sciences | 1145 |
Default Reasoning | 1163 |
Index | 1173 |
Más kiadások - Összes megtekintése
Gyakori szavak és kifejezések
algebraic analysis argument arithmetic axiomatic axioms Benthem Bernays bijection calculus Cambridge claim classical logic concept consistency consistency proof construction context countable deductive defined definition dialetheism dtrue Dummett entailment equivalent example expressions fact false finitary finite first-order logic formal formulas Frege function fuzzy given Gödel hence Hilbert Hintikka idea inference infinite infinity informal logic interpretation intuitive Kleene Kripke liar paradox liar sentence logicians Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem many-valued logic mathematics meaning modal modal logics natural numbers negation nontrivial notion objects ontological Oxford paracomplete paraconsistent paraconsistent logic philosophical postulates predicate principle problem proof propositions provable quantifiers question Quine reasoning recursive relation relevance logics rules Russell Russell’s semantics sense set theory Skolem’s Paradox statements structure symbols t-norm Tarski theorem theory of truth transfinite true truth degree truth value truthmaker University Press valid variables
Népszerű szakaszok
248. oldal - The true," to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as "the right" is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.
246. oldal - Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
247. oldal - The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.
247. oldal - ... truth" as that to a belief in which belief would tend if it were to tend indefinitely toward absolute fixity), well and good: in that case, you are only talking about doubt and belief. But if by truth and falsity you mean something not definable in terms of doubt and belief in any way, then you are talking of entities of whose existence you can know nothing, and which Ockham's razor would clean shave off. Your problems would be greatly simplified if, instead of saying that you want to know the...
167. oldal - Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. Are they all 'amusing'?
268. oldal - A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the, one to which it " refers ") is of a type" with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions.10 Sfl.vTroubles arise from the use of the word " facts " for the histoficlituations, events, etc., and in general, for the world.
112. oldal - ... that thou art that which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God?
167. oldal - I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances'; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way, - And I shall say: 'games...
114. oldal - Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.