Philosophy of Logic
The papers presented in this volume examine topics of central interest in contemporary philosophy of logic. They include reflections on the nature of logic and its relevance for philosophy today, and explore in depth developments in informal logic and the relation of informal to symbolic logic, mathematical metatheory and the limiting metatheorems, modal logic, many-valued logic, relevance and paraconsistent logic, free logics, extensional v. intensional logics, the logic of fiction, epistemic logic, formal logical and semantic paradoxes, the concept of truth, the formal theory of entailment, objectual and substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers, infinity and domain constraints, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and Skolem paradox, vagueness, modal realism v. actualism, counterfactuals and the logic of causation, applications of logic and mathematics to the physical sciences, logically possible worlds and counterpart semantics, and the legacy of Hilbert’s program and logicism. The handbook is meant to be both a compendium of new work in symbolic logic and an authoritative resource for students and researchers, a book to be consulted for specific information about recent developments in logic and to be read with pleasure for its technical acumen and philosophical insights.
- Written by leading logicians and philosophers
- Comprehensive authoritative coverage of all major areas of contemporary research in symbolic logic
- Clear, in-depth expositions of technical detail
- Progressive organization from general considerations to informal to symbolic logic to nonclassical logics
- Presents current work in symbolic logic within a unified framework
- Accessible to students, engaging for experts and professionals
- Insightful philosophical discussions of all aspects of logic
- Useful bibliographies in every chapter
Mit mondanak mások - Írjon ismertetőt
Nem találtunk ismertetőket a szokott helyeken.
The Mathematics of Skolems Paradox
Objectual and Substitutional Interpretations of the Quantifiers
Paraconsistent Logics and Paraconsistency
Extensional vs Intensional Logic
Logically Possible Worlds and Counterpart Semantics for Modal Logic
Modal Realism and its Roots in Mathematical Realism
A Brief History of Truth
A Philosophical Sketch
Hilberts Program Then and Now
Logicism and its Contemporary Legacy
Classical Logics Coming of Age
Fictions and their Logic
Counterfactuals Causation and Preemption
Logic Mathematics and the Natural Sciences
Más kiadások - Összes megtekintése
algebraic analysis argument arithmetic axiomatic axioms Benthem Bernays bijection calculus Cambridge claim classical logic concept consistency consistency proof construction context countable deductive defined definition dialetheism dtrue Dummett entailment equivalent example expressions fact false finitary finite first-order logic formal formulas Frege function fuzzy given Gödel hence Hilbert Hintikka idea inference infinite infinity informal logic interpretation intuitive Kleene Kripke liar paradox liar sentence logicians Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem many-valued logic mathematics meaning modal modal logics natural numbers negation nontrivial notion objects ontological Oxford paracomplete paraconsistent paraconsistent logic philosophical postulates predicate principle problem proof propositions provable quantifiers question Quine reasoning recursive relation relevance logics rules Russell Russell’s semantics sense set theory Skolem’s Paradox statements structure symbols t-norm Tarski theorem theory of truth transfinite true truth degree truth value truthmaker University Press valid variables
248. oldal - The true," to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as "the right" is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.
246. oldal - Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
247. oldal - The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.
247. oldal - ... truth" as that to a belief in which belief would tend if it were to tend indefinitely toward absolute fixity), well and good: in that case, you are only talking about doubt and belief. But if by truth and falsity you mean something not definable in terms of doubt and belief in any way, then you are talking of entities of whose existence you can know nothing, and which Ockham's razor would clean shave off. Your problems would be greatly simplified if, instead of saying that you want to know the...
167. oldal - Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. Are they all 'amusing'?
268. oldal - A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the, one to which it " refers ") is of a type" with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions.10 Sfl.vTroubles arise from the use of the word " facts " for the histoficlituations, events, etc., and in general, for the world.
112. oldal - ... that thou art that which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God?
167. oldal - I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances'; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way, - And I shall say: 'games...
135. oldal - ... the fact that since Aristotle it has not had to retrace a single step, unless we choose to consider as improvements the removal of some unnecessary subtleties, or the clearer definition of its matter, both of which refer to the elegance rather than to the solidity of the science.
114. oldal - Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.