power antagonistic to the spiritual power of the Revolution, and strong enough to damage it fatally. But, secondly, outside the frontier was arrayed the material power of feudal and monarchical Europe, and the armed assault upon the Revolution induced in men inexperienced in affairs a state of mind characterized by boundless apprehension and suspicion. It seemed that the government and the country, to present a determined front to the foe, should be purged of all traitors and halfhearted supporters. The foreign enemies of France are in chief measure responsible for the Terror, and the Terror removed the best minds of the nation from the conduct of the State to the scaffold, and, by the weariness of blood-shedding, prepared Paris to accept order and security upon any terms. Moreover, the formation of armies of defence, which achieved splendid victories, resulted in the rise in France of a military spirit, which prepared the way for the fatal 18th Brumaire, and the dictatorship of Napoleon.

Nothing is more easy than to assert that the French nation is not prepared for freedom, and is incapable of self-government. This is a statement which commends itself to the popular mouth by its convenient power of explaining many facts, and by the circumstance that it saves all trouble of inquiring into the particular events which led to the fall of the several governments of France during the present century. It is a statement which reflects not unpleasantly upon our own superior political judgment. But is it strange, or very culpable, that a nation having just found its true direction, and then through incalculable misfortune of circumstances having wholly lost it for many years, should fail to recover itself of a sudden? Was ever misfortune of a nation comparable to the inordinate success of Napoleon Bonaparte? The Empire fell, and was succeeded by the anti-revolution. Reaction in every direction led up to the event of July, 1830, a political movement as natural and necessary as the resistance of England to the arbitrary proceedings of James II. But even yet the true direction was not recovered. The so-called representative government of the new and popular monarchy ensured its own déchéance. The representation was upon so narrow a basis, that the opinions and wishes of the country were at times in direct opposition to those of the delegates. And it was the singular illluck of the new political body that its chief person, Louis Philippe, while laudably devoted to the preservation of peace, was so entirely convinced that peace could be preserved only by his own cleverness, that he transformed, with no tyrannical intentions, what had been not a popular, but a tolerable bourgeois government, into a government which was virtually personal. The Monarchy was succeeded by a Republic animated by noble feelings and ideas, but encountering at once a most difficult problem, to the solution of which the

times were unequal-how to realize in the political and social system the sentiment of fraternity, and how to embody it forthwith in institutions. Then (the Church again working death to the Revolution) appears the monstrous spectacle of a French Republic wantonly destroying a Republic of Rome, and supporting upon bayonets of revolutionaries the most decrepid and worthless monarchy of Europe. And then, Nemesis. The perjury and violence of Louis Bonaparte, the banishment of the genius and conscience of France, and the sterile splendour of the Second Empire.

Now, through the whole course of this history, what is truest, best, and most substantial in the French character and life-the purest élan, together with the noblest self-respect and self-restraintappears in the periods of Revolution. The failures of the first Revolution, of the Monarchy of 1830, of the Republic of '48, can be adequately and, indeed, easily explained by one who will take the trouble of investigating facts, without resorting to the theory that France is incapable of self-government. Such a blasphemy seems entirely parallel to the assertion of some writers that the Jewish people was incapable of being a faithful witness to the doctrine of the spirituality of religion, and the truth of monotheism. It is true they sighed for the flesh-pots of Egypt. It is true they danced around the golden calf; but were not the tables of their law broken at the sight? The conscience of the people was against their idolatry, not like that of other nations in its favour. And, in like manner, the conscience of France has been on the side of freedom. She has never been without a witness, either in the city or in the wilderness, for the primal truths of her political faith. At the worst hour of her idolatry there were seven thousand who had not bowed the knee unto Baal. That the spirit of the Revolution was not extinct even in Louis Napoleon's days of brilliant deceit and showy force—which was utter weakness-is proved by the homage paid to it by Napoleon himself. The charter of the Revolution was torn into fragments, and one fragment was preserved which had no meaning, save a bad one, apart from the rest. There was to be equality without liberty. There was to be the plebiscite, but a plebiscite held by a despot in favour of himself. One most rare act of political life was to take place, and men were to be made indifferent to all political life, including that very act, by the suppression of public speech, by the destruction of local assemblies, by the rule of prefects pulled by strings which led into the Imperial sitting-room, by a press alternately bribed and bullied, by the consciousness of universal espionage, by the showy illusions of Mexican victories, Hausmann boulevards, and féte-days made illustrious with rockets and Chinese lights.

And now is it hard to perceive the cause of the failure of France,

over and above all material causes, in her great duel with Prussia ? Why did everything collapse ? The answer is obvious-because France, although her conscience protested, had yet, partly through the evil of circumstances, partly through the evil of her own nature, been false to her idea. Writing in 1868, M. Prévost-Paradol declared that the public feeling could not be defined more acurately than by saying that it was the exact opposite of that of 1789. “As much as France was then inclined to generous illusions, so much does she now suspect and fear the most timorous experiments." The Empire was killing public spirit, and hope, and the sense of duty; and in the dearth of spiritual life an obsolete religion was recovering some of its ancient ascendency. Material interests had become supreme. The highest emotion which continued to have vital power throughout the nation was a feeling of honour. And one chief characteristic of the war of 1870-71 is that, leaving out of account certain believers of one kind or another (Garibaldians, Pontifical Zouaves, and others), who always fought as if fighting were for some inestimable disputed possession, the great mass of Frenchmen valued either a whole skin, or the intactness of that superficial mental cuticle, honour, as the only thing for which a human being need concern himself. Those who could not run away, who were surrounded by fortified walls, stood sufficiently long to enable their commander to issue a bulletin stating that they had deserved well of their country, and that their honour was saved, whereupon they would surrender with incomparable serenity. To beat the Prussians, to effect anything, was a secondary consideration to the preservation of this fiction of honour. Genuine honour could be saved only by genuine exertions. It was not thus the men of the first Revolution fought at Valmy and Jemappes.

Yet that France was not lost beyond recovery the war has also made clear. The irrepressible joy in Paris upon September 4th, which most English observers regarded as the conclusive evidence of French frivolity and childishness, proved what the plebiscite had already proved that the heart of Paris was sound, that she, the harlot of cities, was forgiven and accepted because she loved much. That day of childish frivolity gave to those who could interpret it aright an assurance that Paris was not without faith nor without hope, and foretold the coming days of noble order, fortitude, and patient self-sacrifice by which, indeed, the true honour of France has been saved and exalted. What form of government the country may now abide by it is not easy, as these lines are written, to conjecture. Perhaps a monarchy, founded upon popular election and a liberal representative system. Perhaps, again, a republic, with a princepresident. One thing is certain, the future would work for the

republic. "If it could endure ten years, its stability would seem to be indefinitely assured; while, at the end of the same time, any possible dynasty would be almost certainly drawing near to its fall. The first years would be most full of peril for the republic, subsequent years for monarchy." * If complete separation could be effected between Church and State; and if the nation could agree to postpone the political problems suggested by socialism until a happier season, one might have good hopes of the future of France under any popular form of government.

And what of the future of Germany? It is to be observed that, while the French idea is a universal one, a world-idea, the German is essentially a national idea. No people turns to Germany for any help or any light of love, as the faces of the nations have looked to France, lit by her coming or the hope of it. Germany had once her world-idea, in the days of her great revolution, which more fortunately called itself the Reformation. Her Mirabeau, her Danton was Martin Luther. But since then (and her last great thinker, Hegel, has acknowledged the fact) she has had no word of the first importance for the children of men. An admirable doctor or professor she has been, but no prophet or poet. The idea of Germany has been a national one. What has been the mode by which she proceeded to realize her idea? Here Prussia has been the agent; and, though the idea of unity has been a German idea, the mode in which it has been realized has been peculiarly Prussian. German unity has been attained by the securing of Prussian supremacy; and Prussia has secured her supremacy by a method of procedure which is described by her able English champion, Mr. W. R. Greg, in accurate language: "She has steadily enriched herself and extended her boundaries at the cost of every neighbouring state, usually by war and foray, sometimes by diplomacy and intrigue; always choosing her moment with a sagacity unchecked by shame or pity, and clinging to her conquests or her spoil with the tenacity of a bull-dog. . . . She has pursued her aim with that patient, unswerving, cold, vigilant consistency which, in the end, tires out or wears through every obstacle. She has despoiled enemies and allies without partiality or predilection." It is the method of the ancien régime. "In the same manner," as M. Quinet has said, "were formed the great monarchies of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by conquest, by the sale of peoples, by the trafficking of princes, in which the will of the people counted as nothing." Prussia strives to throw back the world three centuries. She has done all that in her lies to earn the just hatred of Europe by introducing a new reign of force, more intelligent, more carefully

* M. Emile de Laveleye—“The Future of France," Fortnightly Review, Dec., 1870. + Contemporary Review, Dec., 1870, p. 143.

calculated than the brute force which obeyed the older monarchies, but essentially the same, and by violently endeavouring to overwhelm an industrial era with the military spirit, so that we shall behold all Europe converted into an armed camp, and our seas will swarm with hideous, prowling ships of war. But Prussia was compelled to all this in self-defence? Such was certainly not the opinion of Prussia herself. The people of Prussia were clear in their conviction that two years of active military service converted an untrained citizen into a sufficient agent of defence. The royal drill-sergeant and the patron of blood and iron saw that three years' service would convert him into a more efficient instrument of attack, and they defied the nation, and conquered it. How sound were their calculations events have proved, and the axiom that nothing succeeds like success has been once more verified. Germany has conquered; Germany stands supreme; but, under the sway of Prussia, she stands alone-cut off from the love and reverence of all nations. What, then, of Germany in the years to come?

One of two things. The idea of German unity has during the last six months been transforming itself, by a very natural process, into that of German supremacy. The desire to be strong and so respected, quickly passes on to the desire to be strong and so obeyed. Germany is becoming false to her idea. Count Bismarck is reported to have announced the important fact that the Latin races have accomplished their work, and that the day for the Teutonic races has begun to dawn. A portentous dawn indeed. He has declared that the true capital of Austria is not Vienna but Pesth. Idealists of pan-Teutonism-Professor Treitschke among others-demand yet further conquests and aggressions; and the idealists of one year, in these our days, often are the realists of the year which follows. We know the tone in which England is spoken of by the servile press of Germany. There is no logic by which the demands upon France attributed at present to German statesmen, and openly expressed by the German people, can be justified, which will not warrant further aggression north, south, and west. Here, then, is one possibility for Germany-a further carrying out of her career of high-handed crime, until Europe rises against the general spoiler, and a coalition of powers be formed strong enough to bind the violent hands.

Or, on the contrary, Germany will sit down in peace, and begin to consider her position. Can it be doubted, the object once attained for which the supremacy of Prussia was tolerated, that Prussian supremacy will not be viewed by the great German people with unmingled satisfaction? What inevitably lies before the nation is the troubled water of a transition period from personal government to a constitutional system. Whether Bismarck stand or fall,