Another objection of Kleutgen’s is, that if generation through the parents is creation, then it must be production from nothing; and from this it will follow that the divine generation of the Logos by the Father is creation, and so the Son of God a creature, which is Arianism. This objection is easily removed. Hurnan generation not being an activity of the will but of essence, there is, so far, a perfect analogy between it and divine generation as it is taught by the dogma of the Church. But human generation has the character of what is created, and this is realized as an activity of the will; yet the creation is effected not by the human will, but by the divine. There is, then, a remarkable analogy between the dogmatic doctrine of the Church and the immanent development of humanity into nations and individuals, through the generative potency of the human race. Humanity thus developing itself, is the created image of the immanent divine life-principle; but this image being created the production of new persons by it is also a creation. So that human generation is not merely an image of the immanent divine life principle, but at the same time sa continuation of creation, and an image of the emanant divine activity, or primary act of creation.

This view of the origin of human souls which has raised such a violent opposition, appears to me to be in perfect harmony with Christian doctrine, and especially with the Mosaic record of creation. It accords also with the modern conception of nature. It may consist with the theological belief that the first human beings were created perfect at once, and that from them all men have descended. But it is also entirely in agreement with the hypothesis which is every day becoming more important in the region of science, that humanity has been developed progressively from a germ-existence, which had neither consciousness "nor will-in the same way as every man has been developed in his mother's womb. This first existence was of the most imperfect kind, but it came to maturity under the constant influence of natural conditions.

We shall only add a few remarks in conclusion. In our judgment Scholasticism was entirely right in receiving the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of being (forma substantialis.) It was right also in adding that the soul is the spirit or principle of the higher mental capacities and activities, and, at the same time, the true direct life-principle of the body. But this important, and, as we believe, correct definition of the soul and its capacities Scholasticism did not know how to improve or to make scientifically fruitful. It could make nothing by the talent committed to its keeping; it only wrapped it carefully in a napkin and buried it in the earth, that it might be safe. And every man who wishes to dig it out, or to inquire into its value, is oppressed and persecuted by the watchers

with all their might. Such, in the main, is the explanation of the “long combat” of Pius IX. against the labours of the German philosophers to use and improve this doctrine of the Scholastics.

This definition of the soul, as the principle of form which Aristotle manifestly had obtained from mere empirical observation of nature, was never established and developed either by induction or deduction. The formalism of the schools long stood in the way of its progress. It was hindered also by the belief that philosophy or knowledge of being, by means of the natural human powers, had reached its completion in Greek antiquity, which was regarded as a preparation for Christianity, and an ante-chamber of theology. Every independent inquiry was, therefore, regarded as useless or inadmissible. The philosophical views of antiquity as the fixed expression of what the human mind could do by itself, were brought into union with the dogmas, and thus the matter was concluded. On the one side the dogmas, and on the other the Aristotelian doctrine, were made to pass for scientific premisses and criteria. These were, in particular, the Christological dogmas concerning the nature of Christ, and the anthropological concerning will, freedom, sin, and divine grace, which were, and still are, regarded as the measure of what men are to believe and know. This proceeding is about as justifiable as if the doctrine of transubstantiation were to be received as the foundation for a definition of the essence of matter, or for scientific investigation into chemistry. The belief that the philosophy of antiquity, and especially that of Aristotle, was the measure of what the human mind could do, led men away from the study of nature, and of the soul itself, and confined them to the writings of the old philosophers. This was as unwise as if one were to study botany without botanizing, or astronomy without an observatory.

Psychology had yet another hindrance among the Schoolmen from the rude superstition which prevailed in regard to many phenomena of the mind. Mental excitements, creations of the imagination, and other things of a like kind, passed for announcements from supernatural beings, or as the work of devils, witches, and sorcerers. Scientific inquiry was thus set aside, and scarcely could any one venture to inquire into the natural causes of such phenomena without danger of falling under suspicion ; and so it happened that Scholasticism did nothing, by independent inquiry, for psychology. Superstition prevented it from looking with open eyes into the depths of the soul. The fear of setting forth new views in opposition to dogmas restrained it, and a false estimate of the philosophy of Aristotle made further inquiry superfluous. It omitted the examination of the essence of the soul as the principle of form in its relation to the rest of nature, and its importance for the nature development process.

It did not inquire concerning the roots of human nature in their relation to the whole of nature, and particularly to that which lives. But little also was done to establish this principle of form by inquiring further into the characteristics of the mental and historical life of humanity, and so recognising the connection between nature-life and soul-life. For psychology, in a narrower sense, Scholasticism has not known how to make fruitful this knowledge of the human soul as the essence form and life-principle of human nature. It has not shown how it is thereby the simple ground and principle of all the different psychical potencies and activities, and how the entire physical life, lower as well as higher, may be derived from it; and so an actual scientific psychology obtained. Scholasticism rather leaves an unreconciled dualism between the activities of the higher and the lower souls. To overcome this dualism, and to obtain a unity of a psychological ground principle, modern psychological science must regard as its problem. Different efforts have already been made to solve this problem. In these efforts we shall persevere, claiming, in spite of ecclesiastical persecutions and censures, the right which belongs to science; refusing to renounce free inquiry, or to be spellbound by the fixed opinions of a past age.


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[TH HE visit of our friends was nearly concluded ; and they were to

return to London in a day or two. Mr. Milverton and I were in the study, expecting them to join us, in order to have a final discussion upon some of the many points which had been raised in the course of these conversations. I was deploring to him how little we had done of all that we intended to do; and was reminding him, for instance, of the careful preparation I had made, under his direction, of the various books which he thought should be read by any man who was to be considered a cultivated man in English literature. “Never mind, Alick," he said. “Culture must, for the present, take care of itself. What little we have managed to say about war, will be talked of by Ellesmere and Sir Arthur at London dinnertables, and will not be altogether lost. I an, moreover, if we can get an opportunity to-day, to sum up, as shortly as may be, a few of the conclusions I have come to about war.”

At this moment Sir John Ellesmere and Sir Arthur entered the room.]

Ellesmere. Sir Arthur and I, Milverton, have been having a dispute, which has almost degenerated into a quarrel, about the nature of Love. I believe that I have invented an aphorism about

Love, which closely borders upon perfection. But Sir Arthur persists in not seeing the merit of it.

I say, that the person you love most, is the person with whom you can stay longest without being bored. Of course I know that there are different kinds of love; but this one great maxim will apply to all. Sir Arthur talks of “unity of soul,” and “community of sentiment," and all the fine things that Sir Arthur naturally would talk of; but, to use an emphatic expression, they are mostly“ bosh." Don't accuse me of being rude to Sir Arthur: he has been very rude to me, and has told me I know nothing about the subject I pretend to understand.

Unity of soul! I have a very high opinion of Sir John Ellesmere as a companion, but I don't want another of the sort to live

He would bore me terribly. Then, as to “community of sentiment,” I commune in sentiment very much with Clarkson, Wilberforce, and Co., about slavery and the slave-trade. I should not, however, have wished to have lived much with them. They would have bored me to extinction.

But listen. [Sir John, in his careless way, had left the study-door open, and we could hear what Mrs. Milverton and Mr. Mauleverer were talking about on the landing]

Maulererer. There should be a soupçon of garlic in it.
Mrs. Milverton. But my husband does not like garlic, Mr. Maule-

with me.


Mauleverer. He must be made to like it. Besides, he will know nothing whatever about it, if you are discreet in its use. You women overdo everything. It requires the delicacy of a man-cook to apply telling flavours.

“ Thin, but not too thin; thick, but not too thick," as Mr. Woodhouse says of his gruel, in Miss Austin's “Emma." If that wise old gentleman had given us his thoughts about pepper, and garlic, and other condiments, there would have been the same element of wisdom in them.

Mrs. Milverton. But we must go; they will be waiting for us in the study.

Ellesmere. Now, there is community of sentiment; but, after all, I do not think they would have lived happily together. She would not have been content to look up at our stout friend with the mute admiration with which she regards her husband during his dullest discourse. But here they come.


We were talking, Mrs. Milverton, about love. It is of no good recounting to you what I have said, because it is a subject of which

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