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free will he was not inclined to do, would in most cases obtain neither education nor manners; so it is much more unlikely that the savage, with all the confirmed babits of manhood and the traditional prejudices of race, should ever do more than copy a few of the least beneficial customs of civilization, without some stronger stimulus than precept, very imperfectly backed by example.
“If we are satisfied that we are right in assuming the government over a savage race and occupying their country, and if we further consider it our duty to do what we can to improve our rude subjects and raise them up towards our own level, we must not be too much afraid of the cry of
despotism' and slavery ;' but must use the authority we possess to induce them to do work they may not altogether like, but which we know to be an indispensable step in their moral and physical advancement. The Dutch have shown much good policy in the means by which they have done this. They have in most cases upheld and strengthened the authority of the native chiefs, to whom the people have been accustomed to render a voluntary obedience; and, by acting on the intelligence and self-interest of these chiefs, they have brought about changes in the manners and customs of the people which would have excited ill-feeling and perhaps revolt had they been directly enforced by foreigners.
. . No doubt the system here sketched seems open to serious objection. It iš to a certain extent despotic, and interferes with free labour, free trade, and free communication. The coffee has all to be sold to the Government at less than half the price the local merchant would give for it, and he consequently cries out loudly against 'monopoly' and 'oppression.'
He forgets, however, that the coffee plantations were established by the Government at great outlay of capital and skill, that it gives free education to the people, and that the monopoly is in lieu of taxation. He forgets that the product he wants to purchase and make a profit by is the creation of the Government, without whom the people would still be savages. He knows very well that free trade would, as its first result, lead to the importation of whole cargoes of arrack, which would be carried over the country and exchanged for coffee, that drunkenness and poverty would soon spread over the land, that the public coffee plantations would not be kept up, that the quality and quantity of the coffee would soon deteriorate, that traders and merchants would get rich, but that the people would relapse into poverty and barbarism. That such is invariably the result of free trade with any savage tribes who possess a valuable product, native or cultivated, is well known to those who have visited such people ; but we might even anticipate from general principles that evil results would follow. If there is one thing rather than another to which the grand law of continuity or development will apply, it is human progress. There are certain stages through which society must pass in its onward march from barbarism to civilization. Now one of these stages has always been some form or other of despotism, such as feudalism or servitude, or a despotic paternal government; and we have every reason to believe that it is not possible for humanity to leap over this transition epoch, and pass at once from pure savagery to free civilization. The Dutch system attempts to supply this missing link, and to bring the people on by gradual steps to that higher civilization, which we the English) try to force upon them at once. Our system has always failed. We demoralize and we extirpate, but we never really civilize. The Dutch
takes nature as a guide, and is, therefore, more deserving of success and more likely to succeed than ours." (Vol. i. pp. 397–402.)
In the island of Timor, under similar natural conditions, but, unhappily, under Portuguese rule, our author adduces a striking
contrast to the prosperity of Celebes—a decaying, wretched, barbarous, poverty-stricken race; and he proves conclusively that it is to the Dutch system, and to that alone, that the prosperity of Java and Celebes is due.
Even the spice monopoly, which has been more unsparingly denounced than any other part of the Dutch system, Mr. Wallace shows to have been planned with wise policy, in the interests of the natives themselves, concentrating the traffic in those spots only over which the Government have full control. The destruction of the trees elsewhere has actually improved the condition of the people; it has preserved them from demoralizing influences, and largely extended the fisheries, and the growth of rice, sago, and other valuable products. (See Vol. II. ch. xxi.)
Towards the end of the second volume (ch. xl.) Mr. Wallace indulges in some reflections, the self-evident truth of which is deeply humiliating to our higher civilization, and well worthy the attention of philanthropists and social reformers. There are points in which the very stage of civilization of South American savages and Oriental tribes reaches more nearly the ideal of social perfection than we have attained. There is less incentive to great crimes, and there is truer equality. Our moral advances have not been pari passu with our intellectual. Our material advancement, and our mastery over the forces of nature, have rapidly increased our population and accumulated our wealth. But the mental and moral status of the population has not developed in the same ratio, and the gulf between wealth and poverty has widened to gigantic dimensions. The wealth, knowledge, and culture of the few do not of themselves advance us towards the perfect social state. Our civilization at home and our colonization abroad have failed from the same cause—mainly from our neglect to train and develop more thoroughly the sympathetic feelings and moral faculties of our nature, and to allow them a larger share of influence in our social organization. Until they do, our colonial system must remain the opprobrium of Christianity, and the reproach of civilization. Is it too late even now to set about the construction of the ark which shall conserve the dwindling remnants of those aboriginal races, who have, unhappily for themselves, fallen under our rule? Just as that rule may be towards men who can meet on equal terms, may we not, now that we universally admit its practical failure, inquire whether there is nothing to learn from Batavia ? whether it were not better to admit the practical inequality of races, and to do violence to our cherished dogmas of “free trade" and “liberty,” than Béow dapulláttovres to exterminate the seed of a future army of labour, as we have extirpated the animals over whose crumbling relics the naturalist heaves a sigh?
H. B. TRISTRAM.
IN the number
of this Review
for December last year, there appeared a well-written article explaining and vindicating the psychological principle of Scholasticism, " that man is one complete being, made up of body and soul in the sense that the intellectual soul is by itself the true and immediate form of body.” This principle is announced as the official doctrine of the Catholic Church, which, in the course of centuries, has been declared and confirmed as such, and which has been maintained in our day by Pope Pius IX. in his “long combat with German professordom.” This warfare is not to be denied. It has been waged with great zeal by Pius IX. in his own writings, as well as by means of the Congregation of the Index and his Jesuits. But this has been done not so much against materialism and its advocates—their bold and successful advances go for nothing with the Pope—as against two Catholic theological and philosophical authors who have, in the most direct manner, combated materialism, but who certainly have also, in some points, opposed the Scholastic psychology. These two authors were Anthony Günther, a secular priest in Vienna, and the writer of the present article. We shall try to set forth what “the long combat” of Pius IX. with the German philosophers was all about, and what course it took.
The Scholastic psychology, as everybody knows, is Aristotelian, only with some modifications in the interest of church dogmas. Aristotle
ascribes a soul to plants, whose function, however, consists only in nourishment. In beasts there is also a perceptive, and, we may say, moving soul. But in man there is the higher thinking principle, the reason (volls). Aristotle does not further examine or determine whence come these different kinds of souls, and in what relations they stand to each other. He does not determine if they are related as different stages of development and degrees of potency, or if they are merely put together, as it were, by an empirical classification. This only in regard to his principles is determined—that the next lower steps are related to the higher, as matter to form. Thus the material elements stand as matter, over against the souls of plants as form. But the plant again with its soul, is matter in relation to the soul of beasts. The mind (voîs), on the other hand, has nothing to do with bodily functions, and comes into men “from without” (Fúpatev), whilst the vegetative and perceptive soul, even in man, takes its origin through generation.
This psychological ground-principle of Aristotle the Scholastics also received, but they tried at the same time to remove its obscurity and indefiniteness, to modify it so as to suit ecclesiastical dogmas. Aristotle admitted the nourishing or vegetative, and the perceptive or animal soul to exist in man, to work with, or rather in subjection to, the reasonable soul. But Scholasticism explained the reasonable soul as the principle of the higher mental activity of men, at the same time as the form and the life-principle of the body, and also as the principle which has to exercise the nourishing and perceptive functions in the body. The Aristotelian principle that the spirit (vows) came “from without” (Púpatev) into man, whilst the nourishing and perceptive soul arises through generation, was somewhat changed by the Scholastics. They said that the higher soul of man was created immediately by God, at the origin of each individual, and was united to the material formations that came from the parents. Such were the Scholastic improvements of the ground-principle of Aristotle. It was these improvements which have been opposed in Germany both by Günther and myself, though in very different ways.
Günther opposed the Scholastic position that the immortal soul is created immediately by God with each individual man, that it is directly or immediately the life-principle of the body, and that in man there is not required a particular lower nourishing and perceptive soul. He rather held fast by the Aristotelian view that the reasonable soul remains independent of the life of the body, and so far, in a measure, he approaches the abrupt dualism of Descartes. He wished, in fact, to maintain only two parts in human nature,—to hold fast dualism as the Scholastics did. But these two parts were not matter, and soul as the form or life-principle (forma substantialis), but body
and soul in the sense that man consists of a living body (unity of matter and life-principle, or nature-soul), and a spirit which is indeed a necessary condition of life, but not the principle of corporeal life and the lower physico-psychical functions. It is not, as with the Scholastics, the real forma substantialis.
Besides this "dualism,” Günther had some other peculiar views, as, for instance, his idea of the creation of the world as the “contraposition” of Deity, and his finding a scientific foundation for the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in the analogy of human selfconsciousness. He set forth his doctrines in several works, especially his “ Introduction to Speculative Theology,” published in 1828, his “Euristheus and Heracles,” published in 1843, and later in his periodical, Lydia, which was carried on for several years. Günther found a large number of disciples, many of whom held chairs of theology and philosophy, though he never himself had any professorship. He exercised an immense influence, especially among the Catholic clergy of Germany. But he had also determined and zealous adversaries. These were chiefly the advocates of the old Scholasticism, the pupils of the Jesuits in Germany, and the Jesuits themselves. The doctrine chiefly combated was the “dualism.” But, besides this, the Jesuits were dissatisfied that Günther put a higher estimate on reason and science, in opposition to authority, than was allowed at Rome. This doctrine concerning the parts of human nature, Günther and his disciples regarded as “dualism,” because, in their conception it consisted only of a living body and a soul. But by the Jesuits it was designated a trichotomy, which, as all agreed, had already been rejected by the Church, and was therefore treated not only as contrary to the general doctrines of the Church Fathers and Scholastics, or as a bold innovation, but as something approaching heresy. Yea, it was even pronounced heretical, because at the General Council of Vienne, in 1311, the Scholastic dualism was declared by authority to be the doctrine of the Church. And, moreover, the dogmas concerning the person of Christ were based on the supposition of this dualism. Günther's works were denounced at Rome to the Congregation of the Index, and brought to trial. Their fate was already decided. Those to whom the Congregation refer for information, and whom they consult on these questions, are men who have received an exclusively theological education, and are entirely devoted to all that is specially Scholastic. Moreover, in recent times the decisions of the Congregation have rested chiefly in the hands of the Jesuits. Two of Günther's most distinguished followers travelled expressly to Rome to act as mediators, and to give what explanations might be required of obscure passages in his works. These judges of German books, with very few exceptions, could not understand German. The