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long been unable to speak in their conscious moments, goes far to prove it. A large part, therefore, of thought which was once voluntarily acquired, lies secreted in the form of knowledge, of which much passes from our consciousness, though we have no warrant to say that it passes from the mind. This latent thought, or, as I should say, knowledge, is the stuff that dreams are made of. It is certain that nothing arises in the mind in sleep which has not entered it while waking. It may be wrought up into new and abnormal combinations, but the elements all lie within the circle of past thought and knowledge. For instance, none but a mathematician would be tormented by the nightmare of travelling to London on an asymptote.
3. That in our waking-hours the mind is replenished by a multitude of thoughts which are so far voluntary that we do not try to expel them; even while we are actually occupied only with those which are brought under our intention and attention by acts of the will.
4. That hence it follows beyond doubt that even if the brain could think, it does so in these instances, under the jurisdiction of a force distinct from itself.
5. That this force is not a function of the brain, but of an agent acting on the brain. This agent by efforts of will educates the brain, calls it from potentiality into act, uses it as an instrument of his intentions, creates by it intellectual systems and ideal worlds, according to his choice and discretion, and finally reduces the brain in matters of moral judgment and choice to subjection and obedience, thereby establishing a moral law and government over the whole body. To say that all this is done by the brain of itself to itself, is to ignore the countless phenomena which cover the whole field of our intellectual activity, and to leave without solution the development of the brain in self-educated man. I am afraid we should flog a boy who accused his brain of his false concords and false quantities. We punish the whole agent for idleness, which is flagrant injustice, if no agent but the brain exists. To say that the brain develops itself, is to deny what the consciousness of all mankind affirms, and on which the whole procedure of justice, from the school to the Penal Code, is founded.
If there be a fact of human consciousness, it is that we possess a will, and that the activity of that will follows indeed the first intuitive dictates of the intellect; but precedes the whole series and ramifications of intellectual acts, on which the processes of thought, the attainment of knowledge, and the morality of men depend. Further, thought and will are functions of an agent distinct from the material brain ; and the existence of an agent which we call “self”
or “I” is a fact of consciousness of the highest degree of certainty in human knowledge.
6. That this agent is neither intelligence nor will, but possesses both. It energizes in and through the brain in thought, and in union with thought by volition, as it also quickens the body with life. And yet life, intelligence, and will are all properties or faculties of a personal agent, who is in contact with matter, but is not material. And this personal agent the ancient world called “yuxń,” or “anima, and we call “ soul.”
Once more to repeat the axiom laid down in the beginning, “ the decision of mankind derived from consciousness of the existence of our living self or personality, whereby we think, will, and act, is practically worth more than all the arguments of all the logicians who have discussed the basis of our belief in it."
These facts of our consciousness are anterior to all logic. They form the premisses which are intuitively certain, and they acquire no intrinsic certainty from the syllogistic forms of reasoning which depend on them. To doubt the certainty of these internal facts is an irrational scepticism. It rejects the more certain upon the evidence of the less certain, and tries to rest the pyramid of human knowledge on its apex.
Such, then, is the old basis of metaphysical philosophy. It is founded on the intellectual system and tradition of mankind, and in its chief constructive principles, though often assailed, it has not been shaken. I know nothing in modern metaphysics nor in scientific reasoning to induce me to doubt the existence of the soul, or to attribute thought and volition to a material organism, except as a condition of its exercise in our present state.
I could as soon believe that the hand by automatic activity executed its almost inexhaustible variety of operations without the brain, as that the brain calculates the laws of comets or discusses metaphysics without an intellect distinct from matter. The cessation of thought and will with the cessation of life points away from matter to something beyond, that is, to something immaterial, or from the body to the soul. If it be said that the knife cannot detect it, it may be answered neither can the knife detect thought, or will, or life; and yet these exist by the acknowledgment of all; and are manifest by a threefold world of phenomena, vital, intellectual, volitional, altogether insoluble except on the old-world belief that in Man there is a Soul.
+H. E. M.
history, who fought in the battles of Woerth or Wissembourg, of Metz or Sedan, we cannot doubt that more than one or two strengthened themselves for their stern duty, not only with the thoughts common to our race— but with the very words of Tyrtæus :
τεθνάμεναι γάρ καλόν ενί προμάχοισι πεσόντα
άνδραγαθόν περί η πατρίδι μαρνάμενον.* And while thinking of these men, I have wished that I could hear from one of them how he-reading his Greek author in the light of actual life, and upon the very battle-field—would pronounce between the two renderings, each supported by high authority, ancient as well as modern, of the epitaph of Simonides on the Spartans who fell at Thermopylæ. The epitaph, according to Herodotus, who is followed by Suidas, was this :
"Ώ ξείν' αγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ότι τάδε
κείμεθα, τοις κείνων ρήμασι πειθόμενοι which I should translate
Go, tell the Spartans, friendly passer-by,
That we obeyed their orders, and here lie: supporting myself by the authority of Mr. Grote, who translates
* How fair his death wbo, in the foremost band,
Falls bravely fighting for his native land !
“in obedience to their orders," and by that of his great ancestor, Grotius, whom he so strikingly resembles in that sense of realityof history and literature being the records of actual life which marks the criticism of both, and who gives us
Nos hic esse sitos Spartæ dic, quæsumus, hospes,
Dum facimus prompto corde quod ipsa jubet.
Nos Lacedæmoniis refer hic, peregrine, jacentes,
At their bidding here we lie.-J. Riddell. But, on the other hand, the Athenian orator Lycurgus (B.C. 330), followed by Strabo (B.C. 30), and by Diodorus Siculus (B.C. 8), read the last two words of the epitaph meldójevol voulpois : and Cicero, evidently following this reading, translates—
Dic, hospes, Spartæ, nos te hic vidisse jacentes,
Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur: and from the moderns we have—
Wandrer sag' es in Sparta: Wir sind im Streite gefallen,
And Bishop Thirlwall says that the inscription on the monument of Leonidas and his Spartans “bade the passenger tell their countrymen that they had fallen in obedience to their laws." Thus we see that at least from the time of Lycurgus to our own day there have been not only two meanings—of which one great authority has preferred one and another another—but also two readings of the very passage to which such meaning is thus given. It will probably be admitted that the older text of Herodotus, which reads põuasi, is the better Greek, and the more likely to give the original word of
* This and the following versions, with the exception of that by Professor Wilson, are taken from Dr. Wellesley's Anthologia Polyglotta.
Simonides : but still it may be said, with Gaisford, that we must