suspended, and a wrong principle, filling the ranks from the lowest stratum of society only by payment of bounty, was introduced and has since been maintained. During the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny, many militia regiments were embodied for garrison duty; but as these regiments were frequently "worked" to draw their men into the regular army, they were suddenly liable to be much reduced in numbers, demoralized, and rendered of little use for home defence, had the need for their services arisen. A certain improvement in the mode of gaining militiamen for the line has latterly been adopted in the "Militia Reserve Act" (1867), and it is said there are now upwards of 21,000 militiamen engaged to serve in the army "in the event of war." As the militia of the United Kingdom (exclusive of Ireland) is limited to 100,000 men, and as "one-fourth part of the respective quotas of the private militiamen for the time being fixed by law" may be enlisted to serve in the army, the number already thus enlisted—supposing all militia regiments to have their standard strength approximates to the fixed maximum. But 25,000 men, by no means representing the stamina of the country, form a very inadequate reserve for the regular army; and, moreover, if on an emergency that number of instructed men were to be suddenly abstracted from our home forces, they would become inopportunely weakened. At the same time as the Militia Reserve Act, was passed likewise an Army Reserve Force Act. According to the provisions of the latter, 20,000 men (Class I.) "who are serving or have served in Her Majesty's regular forces," may be enrolled and held as a reserve force, and 30,000 out-pensioners, &c., may be held liable to permanent service in the United Kingdom. Class I. only can therefore be considered as a real army reserve, and it is important to note in respect to it that the act is said to be a complete failure. As above all things we require simplicity and unity of system, it may be as well that it is so. The principle of connecting a militia with a standing army, and of thoroughly appealing to and utilizing local attachments and associations for filling the ranks of both, is sound, but such professional forces, on economical and political grounds, must be kept within proper limits. We therefore require two categories of militia, the one to be called the active, or mobile, connected with the line; the other to be a local militia, for home defence only. With regard to the first, it would be well to associate as far as possible line regiments bearing county denominations with county militia battalions, and the Royal Artillery with militia artillery; and instead of merely engaging militiamen as now, to serve a portion of their time, when at war, in the army, young men should at once be enlisted for both branches of the service, whether the country be at war or at peace. The longest term of one enlistment for the army is now twelve years. Fully half of these years could be devoted to militia duties only. Youths whose constitutions are not sufficiently matured for foreign service could begin their military duties in the militia, and pass on into their corresponding line regiments. After five or six years' continuous service in the army, they could complete the term of their engagements in the militia of their native counties. The same principle could apply to enlistments for shorter periods than twelve years. A connection such as intimated, and interchange of men, between an active militia and the line, would preserve the esprit de corps of the former, even when greatly weakened by the exigences of war. It may be objected to a scheme like this, that as recruits for the army are chiefly obtained from the poorest class of society, from a so-called floating population, many of them, unless their army service were long and continuous, would have no means of supporting themselves. But such an objection applies to the militia as at present raised, almost entirely from the poorest classes, whose services are only periodically remunerated. Besides, it should be optional for young men to make the army a profession, with a prospect of promotion fully open to merit, and of good pensions for long service. Moreover, the life of a soldier should not only, as now, include some intellectual schooling, but moral training and teaching of practical things (handicrafts and spade industry), so as to enable men, on leaving the army, to become useful members of society. But far more than this is requisite to make a joint army and militia service attractive to young men of superior character to those who now enlist. We require a thorough army reform and the abolition of the purchase system. These questions have lately been so ably treated by Mr. G. O. Trevelyan in his address to the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, that I content myself with referring to it, and endorsing all that he has said. Not only would an active militia of the character indicated enable men whose constitutions had become impaired by foreign service-though still efficient for home duties to be transferred to their militia battalions, but officers likewise could profit by similar arrangements. The amount of pay for soldiers in the army, and in a militia, used as a reserve force, requires to be graduated according to the duration and character of service. At present the bounty given on enlisting is too much, and often demoralizing; the pay too little. Men once rendered thoroughly efficient, when required only for home service, need merely occasional repetition exercises and ball practice, so as not to interfere with civilian occupations. As regards officering a militia such as indicated, it should be taken out of the hands of the lord lieutenants. Aspirants for commissions in the army, and supernumerary officers, could, whilst waiting their turn, be temporarily appointed to serve in the militia, the first as subalterns-called cadets, or otherwise. These suggestions, however, are based on the hope that the purchase system will soon be abolished. Restricting myself to these few suggestions-in mere outlinerespecting the standing army, and an active militia serving to some extent as its feeder and reserve, as well as available at all times for garrison duty, I come to the question of a local militia, based on the obligation of all to defend their country. Entirely upholding the principle, that in a free country there shall be no compulsion, in time of peace, to lead the life of a soldier, yet in the present phase of European history there can be no security for our independence unless our feeling of patriotism and duty is sufficiently powerful to induce us, by a rational and inexpensive system, to be prepared to repel an invasion. This principle has been to some extent acknowledged by all members of volunteer corps. But the volunteer system does not include the working classes— the most numerous. It is confined to the middle classes, and our English love of respectability is shown in the appointing and promoting of volunteer officers by lord lieutenants. Many years ago, on two occasions, I called attention in the Spectator to the value of the vox populi principle in officering volunteer corps, recommending that the men should elect those comrades in whom they could place full confidence, subject, of course, to their giving proofs on examination of military knowledge and capacity. With all due admiration of the patriotic spirit which called the volunteer movement into life, yet I confess that it interferes somewhat with my ideal of home defence for this country-a comprehensive and harmonious system analogous to some extent to that of Switzerland. Still in the early part of this century an "old militia," a "local militia,” and volunteer corps coexisted in England, and it is possible now to have similar organisms, and bring them into the necessary connection. If a local militia, based on the duty of all to protect their country, were once established, in course of time, possibly, the volunteers might give up their exclusiveness, and unite in a general national militia. Our Liberals have admired the Prussian Landwehr and its success in war, chiefly because men of various social grades and avocations stand in its ranks, shoulder to shoulder. Scharnhorst's system of national defence has not only, as he anticipated, developed a national spirit—perhaps to a dangerous degree—but military discipline and a habit of obedience have contributed likewise to strengthen the moral character of the people. Respecting a local militia, I now offer for consideration the following outline of suggestions: 1. Every physically and morally qualified young man, from his twentieth to his thirtieth year, should be bound, if required, to serve. 2. Young men preparing for certain professions (church, &c., as may be settled by law), those belonging to the army, navy, active (reserve) militia, and volunteer corps, of well tested efficiency, to be exempt. 3. The number of men, on attaining their twentieth year of age, to be actually called upon for enrolment and training, to be fixed by Parliament every year. 4. As it should be considered the duty of all to be prepared to defend their country, no purchase of substitutes should be permitted. Neither is the principle of the ballot sound. The number required every year should be raised by some local machinery based on popular election. 5. Either some popular county board, or the suffrages of militiamen actually serving, should nominate for the appointment of officers. There should be strict examinations before commissions are granted (by the Crown or otherwise); the same should be required before promotion, which should be by seniority (up to sixty years of age) and merit. 6. Officers of the local militia should have no mess establishments. Work, not luxury and amusement, should be their motto. 7. The present depôts of militia regiments should likewise serve for storing the arms, clothing, and accoutrements of the local militia. 8. The permanent staff of the present militia should be employed for drilling and instructing young men of the local force when first called upon. 9. Their grounding in the first year should be complete; either in one, or-as is sometimes the case in Switzerland-in two periods of the same year. 10. The posts of noncommissioned officers should be open to merit. 11. With the exception of an adjutant, sergeant-major, and quartermaster-sergeant on the permanent staff, all officers, non-commissioned officers, and men should receive pay for their days of actual service only. The arms, clothing, and accoutrements of the latter to be provided by Government. Mounted officers should have a yearly forage allow12. After the first year's grounding, local militiamen should only be called upon for short yearly repetition drills and battalion exercises. But a few days previous to the assembling of battalions, the non-commissioned officers should be called together for preparation. 13. Frequent opportunities for rifle practice should be afforded to local militiamen. A minimum of efficiency should be required, and rewards for proficiency accorded. 14. District and paid staff appointments should be open to meritorious officers of local militia. ance. The system of organizing the military forces of a country into brigades, divisions, corps d'armée on a geographical principle, and of concentrating in different local centres artillery, munitions of war, 'means of transport, &c., so as to enable each corps at all times to know its place, and be prepared at short notice to take the field—as is the case in Prussia and Switzerland-is so sound that it deserves to be imitated to a considerable extent in this country. In the military districts into which England is divided,* all troops having their head-quarters in the same-whether permanently, as local forces, or temporarily, as those of the regular army-should be periodically concentrated for some weeks in suitable localities (partly in cantonments, partly under canvas) for manœuvres on a large scale. Every year, in one or two districts, such concentrations should take place, so that in each district, every fifth year (or oftener) all the local forces in it should have some experience of mimic warfare. On such a system every local militiaman and volunteer could at least, once in the period of his service, have some preparation for campaigning. Neither the Prussians nor the Swiss approve of camps of instruction—in which the command of General Routine is too prominent a feature; but autumnal concentrations of troops of all arms, for the purpose mentioned, are considered of vital importance. There are many parts of this country-as the South Downs, Salisbury Plain, Dartmoor, Exmoor, Cannock Chase, the north-country moors, &c.—where the troops belonging to the military districts in which such open places are situated could easily be manoeuvred; and even more enclosed countries could be advantageously used in autumn, the money necessary to indemnify farmers for damage to hedges and green crops would be well spent for the purpose of military education. The over-centralization of the artillery forces of this country would be fraught with danger if ever an enemy should effect a landing in parts of our coast very distant from Woolwich and other centres of our ordnance. To the causes of the military disasters in France, must be reckoned the over centralization, requiring long preparation for a campaign. A most important point for national defence requires to be mentioned. As the best preparation for local militiamen, drilling and military exercises should be practised in every school in the kingdom. When all would be called upon to serve, it would be with us, as in Switzerland, the aim of young men of superior education and means to qualify themselves for becoming officers. I have made no mention hitherto of the requirement of light cavalry for national defence, nor of our actual yeomanry cavalry. The latter is at present, I believe, a very inefficient force, and requires reorganization. The voluntary system may be sound for such light cavalry forces as are requisite for home defence; and as it would be too much to demand of local militiamen that they should fit themselves for artillery service, the amount of artillery in the active militia should be greatly increased, duly instructed, and provided with field batteries. Neither have I made any mention of Ireland. It is to * It is questionable whether the present military districts are strategically sound. Some are evidently too small, some too large. |
