cabinet minister-that "a most gallant standing army has been destroyed by what is not a standing army, but an armed nation." Great ignorance of the actual military organism of Prussia is displayed in this dictum; and ignorance only can likewise excuse those critics of our insufficient and inefficient national defences, who, in view of our altered position in Europe, have asserted that "the Prussian system must be adopted in this country." A few observations on that system will suffice to show how incompatible it would be with the free institutions of a country like England.

No doubt the military system of Prussia, as originally created by Scharnhorst and Clausewitz, well deserved the appellation "national army." It was well characterized by the latter when he said, “we have reason to hope that it will serve as a school for the military education of the people; and, at the same time, develop the national spirit." According to this system, the professional soldiers were the officers and non-commissioned officers of the regular army only, through which the whole nation, as it were—that is, the entire male population, after attaining twenty years of age-had rapidly to pass. The regular army might thus be compared to a vast school-the scholars the ever-changing rank and file, the teachers the permanent cadres. But the military education thus imparted did not become lost to the nation. The institution of the Prussian Landwehr, into which the private soldiers passed after their short service in the standing army, formed the most complete defensive force, the greatest in proportion to population (viz., fourteen per cent. of the males) which, with the exception of the Swiss militia, any country has yet provided. But it was the result of necessity-the complete breakdown of the old over-drilled, over pipe-clayed, aristocraticallyofficered "cabinet army" of the Hohenzollerns, when opposed to the innovating genius of Napoleon, that led the then King of Prussia to consent to such a national and democratic force as Scharnhorst had. called into life. Frederick William never loved this people's army; and when at Paris, after it was occupied by the allies, and in company of the Emperor Alexander, "the brave Silesian army about to be presented to him by York, he turned away his horse's head, with the curt remark, "Dirty fellows." Shortly before this, the cherished toys of royalty, the elegantly-equipped guards, had again formed part of the Prussian army, although until their arrival before Paris they had taken no part in the war. After the final fall of Napoleon many changes were introduced not in harmony with the enlightened and popular system of Scharnhorst. Gradually the standing army was increased out of all proportion to the requirements for garrisons, and for imparting military education to the nation. More regiments of guards, both infantry and cavalry, were established,

VOL. XVI.

was

and the officers of citizen blood (bürgerliche) who, during the war of independence, had been the more numerous-viz., three-fourths of the whole, were by degrees weeded out and pensioned, their places being supplied by members of the families of the impoverished nobility—the Junker-who especially enjoyed the favour of the King. In the end, the nobility came to form the majority of the corps of officers. According to the Prussian army-list for 1864, all officers holding the highest rank—viz., one field-marshal, one chief of the ordnance (Feldzeugmeister)-and twenty-seven generals of infantry and cavalry, are of noble blood. We give, in a tabular form, the proportion of officers not of noble birth in the other military grades.*

Remarkable in this list is the relative decrease of officers of citizen blood as the professional rank increases. Moreover, the officers not belonging to the nobility are chiefly found in the scientific corps, for which the Junker intellect shows itself less fitted than for service in the guards or garde du corps. In 1864 the Prussian guards comprised nine regiments of infantry (twenty-seven battalions) and nine of cavalry, their peace establishment being 21,660 men, and for war, 32,011.+ All the officers of the cavalry, and nineteen-twentieths of those of the infantry guards, are nobles. In the artillery guards, however, one-third of the officers are of citizen blood. The desire of the dynasty and governing classes to increase the standing army at the expense of the Landwehr has been further shown in the extension of the term of continuous service in the former from two years to three, and of that in the reserve from two to four, making altogether seven years' service in the regular army. Thus the Landwehr has become much reduced in numbers, and the education of the officers has not been so carefully attended to as the original scheme demanded. No wonder the Liberals in the Prussian House of Representatives have strenuously opposed the extension of regular service, and the great increase in the number of regiments; for no politician with true insight into the essence of constitutional government, can do *Kolb, "Handbuch der Vergleichenden Statistik," 1865, p. 182.

† According to the "Almanac de Gotha" for 1870, the superior officers in the army of Prussia and confederate minor states (not including Saxony and Hesse) have been greatly increased. In 1869 the peace establishment of the army is stated to be 319,476, and for war 977,262. The Prussian guards of every description numbered 26,312 men, on the peace establishment.

otherwise than regard a large standing army in time of peace, and officered, to boot, mainly—and exclusively in the highest charges— by privileged classes, as inimical to the development, if not to the actual existence, of liberty.

Another circumstance respecting compulsory service in Prussia requires to be mentioned, as it is not in harmony with democratic principles. It is the concession granted to young men of good social position to serve for one year only as privates in the Line, if they equip themselves. These Einjährige enjoy many privileges and advantages. Many of them subsequently become officers in the Landwehr.* Enough has been said to show that the Prussian military system comprises not merely a national army for securing independence, but likewise a vast standing-dynastic and cabinet-army, a fit instrument for aggression and conquest. When in 1866 the term of service in the standing army of Prussia was increased from two to three years, the Liberal party well knew that this increase was not demanded as necessary for military schooling, but for the sake of keeping young men sufficiently long in barracks, under professional cadres and aristocratic officers, to school them in devotion to their rulers. The clandestine emigration of Prussian subjects to America, to escape the onerous military service, has of late years been considerable.†

If it be desirable to look abroad for a system of national defence worthy of our imitation, it is to democratic Switzerland, and not to Prussia-in which aristocratic and bureaucratic influences so largely prevail-that we should direct our attention. In Switzerland there is no standing army; there are merely a permanent federal staff and permanent military educational institutions. An extract from a paper read at Berne in 1866, before the International Congress there assembled for the promotion of Social Progress, will convey a general idea of the Swiss militia system :

"Switzerland, with a population little more than two and a half millions, possesses a well-trained militia, numbering 200,000 effectives, and, according to the latest plan, it will soon be raised to 250,000. The Auszug (First Call) comprises 85,441 young men, who have attained their twentieth, or not completed their thirty-fourth year. The second call (Reserve) takes in the men from thirty-four to forty years old, and numbers 45,631. third call (Landwehr) is composed of men from forty to fifty years of age, and numbers 75,000. In addition to these, a Landsturm (levy en masse) is organized; it takes in all the veterans over fifty years of age capable of bearing arms, and the youths from eighteen to twenty. It is officially

The

* The admirable essay by Lieutenant-colonel Chesney, "The Military Growth of Prussia" ("The Military Resources of Prussia and France," Longmans and Co., 1870), gives full information respecting the one year's service men and the Prussian military system in general.

+ Kolb's "Handbuch der Vergleichenden Statistik,” p. 182.)

estimated at 150,000 men. The whole period of service in the three first categories, including camp-life, garrison duty, &c., averages per man six and a half days per annum. The yearly cost of this defensive army is only eight and a half million francs, and the entire military budget is but nine and a half million francs."

In comparing the Swiss militia with standing armies, it was further stated

"That the army of Belgium, on its peace establishment, 38,000 men, costs thirty-three millions of francs, and that the whole military budget of the little kingdom amounts to fifty-two million (a Belgian major present said the sum was eighty million) francs. By adopting the system of Switzerland, Belgium, with its population of nearly 5,000,000, could easily have an army of 400,000 well-trained militiamen, and yet spend only half the sum its small standing army costs. A standing army of only 3,000 men would swallow up the whole military budget of Switzerland. The standing armies of Europe number about 3,000,000 men, of whom 2,000,000 may be considered as effectives. To train the same number of men, according to the Swiss plan, would cause a saving of two and a half milliards of francs yearly. If the Swiss system were everywhere introduced, Europe would have 23,000,000 efficient soldiers, and Germany alone four and a half millions."

Since the report from which the above extracts are given was read, some changes in the Swiss militia service appear to have taken place.* The liability to service is now (a) in the Auszug from the twentieth to the thirtieth year, 3 per cent. of the entire population; (b) in the Reserve, from the thirtieth to the fortieth year, 1 per cent. of the population; in the Landwehr, from the fortieth to forty-fourth year, and this last-named branch of the service likewise includes all men capable of bearing arms who are not in the Auszug and Reserve. The artillery, too, appears to have been considerably increased. There are twenty-eight field batteries, two mountain batteries, four batteries of position (Positions-geschütze), six park companies, fourteen park-train companies, &c., with corresponding artillery reserves, giving a total 7,867 Auszug artillerymen, and 5,327 Reserve ditto. Engineers, sappers, pontonniers, &c., are in due proportion. On a sudden call to defend the country Switzerland is now capable of placing about 275,000 well-trained men in the prime of life under arms. So admirably is the system of decentralization in the Federal Republic combined with harmonious action, so rapidly are orders of the Federal Government conveyed, even into remote Alpine valleys, and executed, that three days only are required to mobilize the entire forces of the country. The chief points in the Swiss military system worthy of consideration are (1) the obligation of all physically and morally qualified men to serve, considered by all a privilege as well as a duty; (2) a numerous and thoroughly efficient federal staff; (3) the accumulation of all necessary stores and materials for war in various cantonal centres; (4) numerous

* "Almanac de Gotha," 1870.

federal military educational institutions, particularly for the scientific branches of the service; (5) the thorough military grounding of young men at their respective cantonal head-quarters when they attain twenty years of age-fifty-six days' training, &c., forms the usual first course for the infantry; (6) short yearly repetition drills and battalion exercises; (7) every two years large concentrations of troops of all arms in one or two suitable localities. The men are either in cantonments or under canvas for several weeks, and the last four days of mimic warfare, they bivouac on the ground they occupy at the conclusion of each day's manœuvres; (8) the drilling and tactical exercising of the pupils in all public and most of the private schools. Periodically there are large assemblies of these embryo soldiers, when they manœuvre under the command of experienced officers; (9) the great and general interest taken by the Swiss in rifle practice. It is their chief amusement on holidays and Sunday afternoons. There are likewise several yearly gatherings on a large scale for rifle shooting, and prizes of great value are open to competition at these popular fêtes; (10) lastly, it is emphatically to be noted, that with all this drilling, rifle shooting, and preparation to defend their country, the military spirit of the people is subordinate to their citizen spirit, and is as little dangerous to civil liberty as offensive to their neighbours.

Turning to our own country, what do we find by way of preparation to preserve our independence? I omit all mention of our first line of defence the sea-and of the question of our naval supremacy. More competent critics must speak on this head. On land, from all sides it is now acknowledged, we have a variety of military organisms without organic unity. The regular, reserve, and purely home forces are insufficient as to numbers; the latter inefficient as to schooling, without system, without centres of concentration for the formation into brigades, divisions, &c., for the accumulation of stores and munitions of war, and without the necessary staff, transport, and commissariat service for enabling large bodies of troops of all arms suddenly to take the field. To give a résumé and criticism of the numerous schemes latterly brought before the public for supplying our deficiencies and remedying our defects, would be a task beyond my powers. I venture only on offering a few observations and reflections, chiefly in reference to national defence, the result of much experience as a militia officer and of much reflection.

Requiring as we do, according to general opinion, a considerable standing army with a sufficient reserve, the Swiss system, in its entirety and oneness, is not applicable to this country. But there is much in it suitable for home forces, for a local militia. When, in 1852, the militia of the United Kingdom was called again into life, the law for raising this old constitutional force by ballot was