should bring conviction of the truth of the doctrine which it inculcates: the one seems to have reference to the moral, and the other to the intellectual faculties; conviction and belief to be the result of proper exercise of the latter, and not of the former. How, then, can it follow that we shall be brought to believe in the doctrine of the incarnation, atonement, resurrection, and ascension of Christ, as well as that of judgment to come, and of everlasting life, merely by practising those duties of piety to God and of charity to men which the Gospel precepts inculcate? How can the mind be brought to acknowledge the truth of these great mysteries, which are far above the comprehension of the loftiest intellect, by the practice of simple moral virtues which are in the reach of the meanest capacities?

that such

This is a question which does not admit of direct demonstration. It may not be prove easy to will be the necessary result; but it is not difficult to shew by analogy that such may be the probable, or, to substantiate by experience, that such is the general result. The confirmed Christian of course believes it to be the universal result, because it has been declared to be so by him who cannot lie. And if all the motives and actions of those disbelievers, whose conduct and lives have been cited as examples of goodness and morality being accompanied

with infidelity, be duly examined, it will be found that they have been deficient in the practice of one or more of those virtues which are essential towards performing the will of God. The first virtue which men are called upon to practise in order to become Christ's disciples, is humility. But this has no place in the catalogue of moral virtues exhibited by the heathen philosophers: it has rarely been seen among the qualities of modern infidelity. Mere prudence may, in many instances, be sufficient to restrain a man from falling into any of those excesses in which is sin; and pride, in itself a vice, may lead him to perform virtuous actions out of emulation towards others, or in order that he may make it appear to the world that the standard of belief which he has set up for himself may be as productive of good morals as that which is said to be requisite to do the will of God. Again, natural generosity of disposition, and kindness of heart, often lead a man to do actions which, considered independently of the motive which prompted them, may be placed upon an equality with those which originate in the express desire of doing God's will. If all these be duly applied to the analysis of the conduct and practice of the infidel professor of morality, they will discover defects in his character sufficient to shew, that while he is performing those virtues which the will of God would necessarily

lead him to practise, he nevertheless is only doing the will of man.

By these means the number of examples which have been brought forward, to shew that men may be unbelievers and still lead a virtuous and moral life, will be much reduced, while it will be found that in many cases their virtues are partial, and mingled with vices, and in others that they are practised from such motives as will not admit of their proceeding from the desire of doing the will of God. As to the few instances which may still seem to remain, it will be but legitimate reasoning to conclude that they also may be comprehended among the rest, although we may not have the means of examining them sufficiently to establish the fact; for it is notorious that immorality is almost universally connected with infidelity; that cases of infidels leading a life of exemplary morality are very rare; and that even of these, when properly tested, almost all can be proved to be of a spurious morality, widely differing from that which constitutes the doing the will of God.

At any rate this is enough to answer the objections of those who assert that to do the will of God is not sufficient to bring a man to believe the doctrines of Christianity, by alleging that examples are to be found of persons practising the virtues which the Gospel enjoins, without holding the

doctrines which it propounds: for surely these examples can only be brought forward as very rare exceptions to an extensive general rule; and we have good reasons to believe, that had we the means of properly testing them, they also would fall so far short of the true standard, as properly to be comprehended with the rest, and to be in reality no exceptions.

But on the other hand it is equally notorious that the persons of the most virtuous and holy lives are the firmest believers and the sincerest Christians; that all the moral graces and noble virtues which humanity is capable of are most fully developed in the life of the true Christian; that charity, liberality, gentleness, kindness, temperance, patience, forbearance, prudence, and all other virtues which adorn and ennoble the character of man, shine brightest and most constant in the lives of those who bear on their forehead the sign of the cross. And if these be questioned as to the means by which they are enabled to practise constantly such virtues, and the motive which induces them to do so, they have but one answer to give that it is their faith which supplies them with both; that it is their belief in the doctrines of the Gospel which enables them constantly to fulfil its precepts.

But should it be objected here that this is not the proposition which it is our purpose to establish, but

the converse of it; that belief producing the practice of virtue is a very different thing from virtue producing belief; we are ready to allow, that, if the matter be viewed partially, it appears to be so, and that a man may practise many virtues without being a believer in revealed religion at all. But in order that these may be considered as the will of God, it is necessary that they should be uniform and complete; that they should embrace all those good qualities which reason and philosophy teach us are the most proper and most becoming to rational beings, and at the same time conduce the most to their happiness; or at least, whenever weakness of resolution or strength of passions should interrupt their constant and uniform practice, they should be hallowed and sanctified by the desire to please the great Author of our existence, otherwise they can in no way be said to be the will of God. So that we must view the question generally, and not look to those who practise only some virtues, and these variably; but to those who practise, or at least endeavour to practise, every moral duty, and that not at intervals, but constantly. In this case, as on every other subject of knowledge or science, if we wish to learn the true principles upon which it is grounded, and the best method of employing them, we must apply for information to those who have made the greatest proficiency, and are generally