V.C. W.] WILSON V. WHATELEY-REG. v. JUSTICES OF SOMERSETSHIRE. [Q. B. Held, that the Chancery Amendment Act, 15 & 16 Viet. c. 86, s. 52, providing for the abatement by death, marriage, or otherwise, was applicable to a special case as if it were a suit. Dart applied to the court for a direction to the registrar to draw up the usual order of revivor in this cause, and in which a special case had been settled, consequent on the death of the late Mr. Wilson, the fourth Member of Council in India. The registrars had doubted whether the 52nd section of the Chancery Amendment Act, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, applied to a special case. The effect of that section was, that "upon any suit in the court becoming abated by death, marriage, or otherwise, or defective by reason of some change or transmission of interest or liability, it should not be necessary to exhibit any bill of revivor or supplemental bill in order to obtain the usual order to revive such suit, or the usual or necessary decree or order to carry on the proceedings; but an order to the effect of the usual order to revive, or of the usual supplemental decree, may be obtained as of course upon an allegation of the abatement of such suit," &c. a The VICE-CHANCELLOR thought the Act applied to special case as well as to a suit, and directed the registrar to draw up the order accordingly. See also 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35, s. 32. Common Law Courts. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. HERTSLET, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. Thursday, Nov. 15. were or were not beyond the powers of those directors. | His opinion was that, in the absence of any clauses in their respective deeds of settlement empowering the directors to form an amalgamation, or to take upon themselves the debts and liabilities of another company, such a transaction was quite beyond the powers of the directors. In effecting policies, the main business of an office of this description, care was taken that there should be much supervision by the directors, and by a staff of properly qualified persons as to the eligibility and propriety of effecting insurances on the lives of the proposed insurers, and the shareholders naturally trusted to the judgment and discretion of their directors in effecting proper insurances. Could it have been imagined or contemplated by the shareholders that their directors were at one sweep to take to themselves the responsibilities of the whole mass of policies effected by another office, and of the propriety of which they could actually know nothing? Were they to be told that the directors had done all this, and subjected them to debts and liabilities to which they were by no means exposed by the provisions of their own deed of settlement? He had not heard and could not find a single clause in the deed of settlement of the Era Company enabling the directors to fix and cast upon the shareholders of the company the debts of another company, with which of course they could have no concern whatever-neither debts, nor the policies of another company could be assumed by the directors of the Era Company. With regard to the observations of the learned judges in the case which had been reported from the H. of L. (Ernest v. Nicholls), these must always be Reported by JOHN THOMPSON, T. W. SAUNDERS, and C. J. B. taken in connection with and in reference to the powers contained in the particular deed of settlement. Here it was admitted that no such powers were contained in the deed of the Era Company. With respect to the claim of Mr. Williams, who had paid a sum of 2007. and upwards on behalf of the Saxon Company, and for which he had subsequently taken proceedings to windup the affairs of that company, his case was by no means so strong as the claim now made on behalf of the Anchor Company. The Saxon Company were his debtors, and he could not compel the Era Company or its assets to satisfy that debt. The Anchor Company had been misled into giving up their security which they had held against the Saxon Company, and to take another which turned out to be wholly invalid against the Era Company, whom they had agreed to accept as their debtors instead of the Saxon Company. It was not necessary to enter into the question of estoppel which had been discussed; the directors had clearly undertook to do that which they were incompetent to do. The question reverted to that of whether one company could, without any special power, fasten their debts and liabilities upon another company, without any special powers conferred upon them for that purpose. If the directors had had powers to purchase the business of another company, then of course they would have been able to give a consideration for it; and if so, all difficulties as to the mode of carrying out such an arrangement and satisfying the creditors of the retiring company would be got over. But in the present case he could not see any consideration which was binding upon the shareholders. Whatever might be the remedy of the present claimants to recover the assets received by the Era Company, and making the amount applicable to these claims, with this question he had nothing to do. Both the claims therefore must be disallowed, as against the assets of the Era Company. No costs against the claimants. Friday, Nov. 16. One of the parties to a special case having died, the suit in which the case was entitled became abated: REG. v. JUSTICES OF SOMERSETSHIRE. Highway-Nonrepair-Justices-Order to indict5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, 88. 94, 95. To give justices jurisdiction to make an order for the repair of a highway, or to indict the parish where the liability to repair is denied, two facts must erist -the road in question must be a highway, and it must be out of repair. Where the liability of a parish to repair a road has been denied, and an indictment preferred under sects. 94, 95 of the Highway Act, and a verdict of not guilty found in favour of the parish, the justices are not bound to direct a second indictment on a fresh information before them under sects. 94 95. Kinglake, Serjt. moved for a rule calling on certain justices of Somersetshire to show cause why they should not make an order for an indictment to be preferred against the inhabitants of East Coker for the nonrepair of a highway. It appeared that an information had been laid by John Bennett, pursuant to sect. 94 of the Highway Act, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, and that the surveyor of the parish attended the hearing and denied the liability of the parish to repair the road in question. It also appeared that the justices on a previous occasion had directed an indictment to be preferred under sect. 95 against East Coker for the nonrepair of the same road; and that at the trial one question raised was whether the road was a highway, and that the jury found a general verdict in favour of the parish. The justices on the present occasion refused to direct another indictmont to be preferred. It was now contended that it was compulsory on the justices to direct an indictment to be preferred (Reg v. Arnould, 8 El. & B. 550; that if the verdict for the parish was an answer to the indictment, it might be given in evidence upon the trial of the new indictment; that the statutory alteration in sects. 94 and 95 of the Highway Act was in substitution of the old mode of presentment of a highway when out of repair, which might have been resorted to many tines over. [BLACKBURN, J. referred to note in Reg. v. Heanor, 6 Q. B. 748, where it appeared that sect. 95 Q. B.] BLENKIRON v. GREAT CENTRAL GAS CONSUMERS COMPANY. only applies where the existence of the highway is) admitted.] COCKBURN, C.J.-It is discretionary with the court to grant this rule, and in the exercise of our discretion we do not think proper to do so. Our refusal to grant a rule does not exclude the applicant from resorting to the common law remedy by indictment. The jury having negatived the fact of the liability of this parish to repair the road by their verdict, there ought not to be a rule granted. The statute only intended an order | of justices to be made where the liability of the particular parish to repair came into issue, not where a jury had already determined that question. If that were not so, a parish might be perpetually harassed by fresh indictments on the same ground. [Q. B. house communicated to house adjoining-Allegation of defendant's liability. A declaration stated that plaintiff was possessed of certain premises; that defendants were employed in laying on gas to certain premises adjoining; and that they did their work so negligently that the gas escaped an dignited, and the premises adjoining plaintiff's were set on fire, and thereby the premises of plaintiff were set on fire and burnt: Held, on demurrer, that the declaration showed a good cause of action; that it was unnecessary to negative negligence in the owner of the adjoining house in putting out the fire before it communicated with plaintiff's premises; and that the plea of not guilty would put in issue the defendants' negligence. HILL, J.-Sects. 94 and 95 only apply to cases of admitted highways. To give the justices jurisdiction under those sections, there must be, first, a highway; and, secondly, it must be out of repair. The justices are to determine the facts, by sending a competent person to view the same and report thereon, or inspect it themselves. Having satisfied themselves of the facts, then, if the liability to repair is not disputed, they may order the surveyor to repair, but if it is disputed they are to order an indictment to be preferred. But unless these two facts exist they have no jurisdiction to ordering and laying on the said gas as aforesaid, and took so an indictment to be preferred. The declaration stated that plaintiff was possessed of, and carried on the trade or business of warehouseman in and upon, a certain messuage and premises, in the city of London, and was also possessed of divers goods therein; and the defendants were engaged and employed in laying on gas to a certain messuage and premises contiguous and adjoining to the said messuage and premises of the plaintiff; and the defendants, by their servants, so negligently, carelessly and improperly conducted themselves and acted in and about the supply BLACKBURN, J.-The words of the statute do not say that when any person chooses to assert that a road is a highway, the justices are obliged to make the order in question, but only when there is a highway, and it is out of repair, they shall make an order as directed. Rule refused. little and such bad, insufficient and improper care and precaution to guard against accidents and injuries attending the same and to prevent the said gas from escaping and becoming ignited and exploding, and doing damage, and doing injury thereby, that by reason of the negligence, carelessness and improper conduct and default by their servants in that behalf, large quantities of the said gas became and were ignited and exploded, and the said messuage and premises con Ex parte RICHARD THOMPSON. Attorney-Costs-Charge upon property recovered-tiguous to and adjoining the plaintiff's became 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 28. An attorney, under the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 28, can only have a charge upon property recovered or preserved for his client in respect of the costs in the particular matter or suit, not for general costs. G. Francis applied on behalf of an attorney for a rale declaring him entitled to a charge upon property recovered for one D. Nicholson, in respect of a bill of costs incurred by him about other matters of business. It appeared that the attorney prepared and served notices for Mr. Nicholson upon the tenants of certain property, claiming the rents as mortgagee, and through his instrumentality Mr. Nicholson had been put into possession of the rents, and that he subsequently conducted the defence to an action for goods sold and delivered for Mr.Nicholson, and Mr. Nicholson became liable to him for 1134, the costs for such defence, and the attorney now wished to have a charge upon the rents so recovered for the costs of defence in that action under the recent statute, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 28, which enacts that in every case in which an attorney shall be employed to prosecute or defend any suit, matter, or proceeding, the court may declare such attorney entitled to a charge upon the property recovered or preserved, and upon such declaration such attorney shall have a charge upon and a right to payment out of the property for the taxed costs, charges and expenses of and in reference to such suit, matter, or proceeding, &c. and were set on fire and broke out into flames, and by fire and flames issuing and proceeding therefrom, the said messuage and premises of the plaintiff's were set on fire and burnt, damaged and injured, and divers of the said goods of the plaintiff's were set on fire and burnt, damaged and injured. Demurrer and joinder. Defendants' point. That the damage is not sufficiently connected with the negligence alleged to fix him with liability. Plaintiff's points.-That the cause of action is not too remote; that the count in the declaration shows that the injuries complained of were caused by the defendants' wrongful act. Lush, Q.C. (Malcolm and Keane with him) in support of the demurrer.-The declaration shows no cause of action; the damage alleged is too remote, and is unconnected with the alleged negligence of the defendants. It should be shown that the damage was the natural and inevitable consequence of the defendants' negligence; but it is quite consistent with the declaration that the damage was caused by the negligence of the owner of the adjoining house in not doing all in his power to put out the fire before it spread to the plaintiffs' premises. The declaration ought to have gone further; it ought to have alleged that there was no default in the owner of the premises in which the fire broke out, for a duty devolved upon him at common law, which duty was afterwards modified by stat. 6 Anne, c. 31, which, by sect. 6, enacts that no action shall be prosecuted against any person in whose house a fire accidentally begins. The plaintiff must show that the setting fire to his house was the consequence of defendants' negligence: he does not do so. It must be the natural and necessary consequence of the wrongful act of defendant; and if caused by the intermediate negligence of any third party, the defendant is not liable. The liability of parties in such cases is fully discussed in Holden v. The Liverpool New Gas ComGas company-Liability for negligence-Damage to pany, 3 C. B. 1. Here the plaintiff seeks consequen By the COURT.-The words "for the taxed costs of and in reference to such suit" are very plainly against this application, which is for a charge in respect of the attorney's general costs against his client. The section contemplates an order in a cause attaching the property in that cause for the particular costs of that Rule refused. cause. Friday, Nov. 16. BLENKIRON V. GREAT CENTRAL GAS CONSUMERS STURGEON v. SAME. Q. B.] COLLUMPTON v. BRIGHTHELMSTON, ex parte JOHN HOWSE. Saturday, Nov. 17. [Q. B. Ex parte WILLIAM THOMPSON. Habeas corpus-Warrant of commitment-Omitting to state whether imprisonment to be with or without hard labour. Where by a statute giving justices a power to commit summarily they are empowered to commit the offender to prison for a certain period, with or without hard labour, and in their warrant of commitment nothing is said about hard labour, it is to be taken that they did not mean to give hard labour, and the warrant is not objectionable for omitting to state whether the imprisonment is to be with or without hard labour. Upon supporting a rule, counsel will not be permitted to argue any points decided upon moving for the rule nisi. tial damages, necessarily, as he says, flowing from an act, but he does not negative the intermediate wrongful act of the person whose house first caught fire: the defect is in connecting the damage with the defendants. If the owner of the house which first caught fire was guilty of negligence in putting it out, defendants cannot be liable. [COCKBURN, C.J.-Suppose A. strike B., and B. falls against C. and knocks him down, is not A. liable to C.? HILL, J.-You cannot qualify your own wrong.] There is no allegation connecting the damage directly with the defendants, or any wrongful act which a plea of not guilty would put in issue: (Vicars v. Wilcox, 8 East, 1; 2 Smith L. C. 423.) [COCKBURN, C. J.-Have you any authority for saying that if a fire breaks out at No. 1 by the gross carelessness of the owner, and it afterwards communicates with No. 2 and destroys it, that the owner of No. 2 would have no action against This was a rule for a habeas corpus, to bring up the owner of No. 1 for negligence?] By the common William Thompson, now a prisoner in Preston gaol,. law, as already stated, every one was liable. He re- Lancashire, upon a summary conviction for an aggraferred to Year Book, H., 33 Hen. 6, fol. 1, pl. 3. vated assault upon a female, under the 16 & 17 Vict. [BLACKBURN, J.-Suppose A. wounded B., but by c. 30, s. 1. The only ground upon which the rule the negligence of the surgeon, B. died, would not A. nisi was granted was that the warrant did not state be liable, although the surgeon had intervened?] whether or not the prisoner was to have hard labour: That would be an aggravation of the original injury. (see Ex parte William Thompson, 3 L. T. Rep. N.S. 294.) It was the duty of the owner of the house in which the By the above statute it is enacted, "When any person fire originated to use every means to put it out. shall be charged before two justices of the peace [COCKBURN, C. J.-Suppose they had introduced in with an assault upon any female whatever the declaration these words, "and such fire could not either upon the complaint of the party aggrieved or otherbe extinguished before it had consumed the plaintiff's wise, it shall be lawful for the said justices . . . . if premises?"] That might have met the objection. [COCK- the assault is of such an aggravated nature that it canBURN, C. J.-I am quite ready, at present, Mr. Hawkins, not in their or his opinion be sufficiently punished to hold this declaration good; but we do not want to under the provisions of the statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, to put you to a nice point of law. Could not the decla- proceed to hear and determine in a summary way, and ration be so amended as to meet the objection? if they shall find the same to be proved, to convict the Hawkins, Q.C. intimated that he did not think any person accused; and every offender so convicted shall amendment necessary; that he was instructed that be imprisoned in the common gaol or house of correcthe evidence would support the declaration as it stood.]tion, with or without hard labour, for a period not Defendants say that if the fire arose originally from exceeding six calendar months," &c. their negligence, yet if it could have been prevented Kay now showed cause, and contended that the warcommunicating to plaintiff's premises by an intervening rant was perfectly good, for, as it said nothing about person, they are not responsible. Defendants' neg-hard labour, no hard labour could be imposed, and that ligence, if any, was a breach of a contract with the occupier of the first house, for which a third person cannot sue; at most it was not a misfeasance, but a nonfeasance. [HILL, J.—It is a dangerous act done negligently.] Hawkins, Q.C. (H. Giffard with him) was not called on. if hard labour were not intended to be given, it was not necessary to negative it in the warrant. He also referred to the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, the form in schedule I 3, which is applicable to a conviction when the punishment is to be imprisonment, having the words "and there to be kept to hard labour" in brackets, to be inserted only where hard labour forms a part of the judgment. COCKBURN, C.J.-It is unnecessary to decide at present the point of law which has been raised, Overend, Q.C. (Wheeler with him) was called upon, but I may say that I entertain a strong opinion that a and he argued that the warrant was bad for uncerperson against whom an action is brought for an injury tainty in not stating whether the defendant was to be which flowed naturally from his wrongful act cannot be imprisoned with hard labour or not. [HILL, J.-By heard to say that, but for the intervention of another saying nothing about hard labour, the justices have adparty, the wrongful act might have been prevented. judicated that he is not to have hard labour.] The The meaning of the declaration is, that the injury was gaoler looks to his warrant, and he does not know what the consequence of the negligence of the defendants. to do. [COCKBURN, C.J.-By the forms in Jervis's If it should turn out that it arose by reason of some-Act, where there is to be hard labour, it must be stated. thing which ought to have been done by the owners of The justices have omitted to say anything about hard the house in which the fire broke out, the injury will not be one for which the defendants are responsible. If that should be proved at the trial at Nisi Prius the judge will dispose of it; but, taking the proposition to be correct, I am of opinion that it will be available to the defendants as a defence on this record. labour, and therefore it must be taken that they did not Rule discharged with costs. COLLUMPTON (appellants) v. BRIGHTHELMSTON (re- The expenses of maintaining a pauper after the time Q. B.] COLLUMPTON v. BrightHELMSTON, ex parte JOHN HOWSE. time of making the order of removal it is duly suspended. Where, therefore, an order of removal was made, and at the expiration of the time for appealing (no notice having been given) the pauper was retained in the relieving parish in consequence of her then pregnancy, and after delivery she was removed, and the expenses of her maintenance demanded: 319 [Q. B. to the assistant overseer of the said parish of Brightbut was not then paid, and had not since been paid. helmston, for the maintenance of the said paupers, pended by the said parish of Brighthelmston for the That the said sum of 107. 128. 3d. had been exmaintenance of the said Elizabeth Hill and her said child James Hill and her said infant from the time the copy of the said order of removal and the notice of Held, that these expenses could not be recovered: chargeability and grounds of removal were sent to the Held, also, that sect. 11 of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, the said Elizabeth Hill and infant being removed under overseers of Collumpton aforesaid to the time of applies to an order of justices made for the pay-the said order; and that the sum of 31. 128. 3d. was ment of such expenses, and that an application for expended more than six years before the said informathem must be made within six calendar months of tion was laid. the time when demanded. This was a case stated by justices under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. It stated as follows: 1 It was objected by the attorney for the defendants, First, that the information ought to have been laid 107. 12s. 3d. being demanded as required by the 11 & within six months from the time of the said sum of 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, and that this was not a proceeding excepted from the operation of that Act by the 35th section thereof. pended, and notice of such suspension sent to the overSecondly, that the order ought to have been susseers of Collumpton. At a petty sessions of her Majesty's justices of the peace for the borough of Brighton, in the county of Sussex, held at the town-hall, Brighton, in and for the said borough, on the 15th Dec. 1859, before us, William Alger, Esq., Arthur Bigge, Esq., and William Mellet Hollis, Esq., an information was, on the 5th Dec. 1859, laid before the undersigned, Arthur Bigge, by Samuel Thorncroft, assistant overseer of the poor of the parish of Brighthelinston, in the borough years before the said information was laid were irreThirdly, that the moneys expended more than six aforesaid, charging that the churchwardens and over-coverable by reason of the Statute of Limitations. seers of the poor of the parish of Collumpton, in the county of Devon, and Henry Hill, assistant overseer order for the payment of the 10%. 12s. 3d. and the We decided against the defendant, and made an of the poor of the same parish, being the parish to costs incurred before us; and the grounds of our deciwhich one Elizabeth Hill and her illegitimate child sion were that we considered this proceeding was by James Hill, poor persons, had been adjudged to belong, the 35th section of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, excepted had refused, and still did refuse, to pay to the direc- from the operation of that statute; that the said Elizators and guardians and the assistant overseer of the beth Hill was not, at the time of making the said poor of the parish of Brighthelmston aforesaid, the order, unable to travel from any cause other than her suin of ten pounds, twelve shillings and threepence, pregnancy, which did not afford legal grounds for the being the cost and expenses of the relief and main-suspension of the said order; and that the Statute of tenance of such poor persons, under an order of two justices of the peace for the county of Sussex, dated the 6th Oct. 1853, for the removal of the said Elizabeth Hill and her said child from the said parish of Brighthelmston to the said parish of Collumpton, from the time of notice of such order and of the said poor persons having become chargeable to the said parish of Collumpton. The facts of the case proved before us were as follows: That on the 6th Oct. 1853 an order for the removal of Elizabeth Hill and her illegitimate child James Hill from the said parish of Brighthelmston to the said parish of Collumpton was duly made by two of her Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county of Sussex. That on the 14th Oct. 1853 a copy of the said order of removal with notice of chargeability and grounds of removal was duly sent by post by the directors and guardians of the poor of the said parish of Brighthelmston to the overseers of the said parish of Collumpton. Limitations was no bar to the recovery of the money expended more than six years previously to the said information being laid as directed by the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 84. in case any poor person shall from henceforth be brought By the 35 Geo. 3, c. 101, s. 2, it is enacted, "That before any justice or justices of the peace for the puris inhabiting or sojourning by virtue of any order of pose of being removed from the place where he or she tices that such poor person is unable to travel by removal, and it shall appear to the said justice or jusreason of sickness or other infirmity, or that it would be dangerous for him or her so to do, the justice or justices making such order of removal are hereby required and authorised to suspend the execution of executed without danger to any person who is the subthe same until they are satisfied that it may safely be ject thereof, which suspension shall be indorsed on the said order of removal and signed by such justice or justices." By sect. 84 of the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, it is That the said Elizabeth Hill was at the time of the whose settlement shall be in question at the time of enacted, "That the parish to which any poor person said order being made maintained in the workhouse of granting relief, shall be admitted or finally adjudged to the said parish of Brighthelmston; that she was preg-belong, shall be chargeable with and liable to pay the hant at that time, and was delivered at the said work-cost and expense of the relief and maintenance of such house on the 3rd Jan. 1854; that by reason of such poor person, and such cost and expense may be recovered pregnancy and delivery, and the delicate state of her against such parish in the like manner as any penalties health consequent thereupon, she could not be removed under the said order till the 9th March 1854; vided always, that no charges or expenses of relief or or forfeitures are by this Act recoverable. that during all that time she continued an inmate of maintenance shall be recoverable under a suspended the workhouse of the said parish of Brighthelmston, order of removal, unless notice of such order of removal, and that during such time her said child James Hill with a copy of the same, and of the examination on within ten days of such order being made to the overwhich such order was made, shall have been given seers of the poor of the parish to whom such order is died That on the said 9th March 1854 the said order Hill and the infant to which she had given birth after directed." as executed by the delivery of the said Elizabeth the making of the said order, with a duplicate of the Pro By the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, it is enacted, eaid order and a statement of charges for maintenance, "That in all cases where no time is already or shall hereafter be specially limited for making any such complaint or laying any such information in the Act or Acts of Parliament relating to each particular case, such complaint shall be made and such information shall be laid within six calendar months from the time when the matter of such complaint or information respectively arose." By sect. 35 of the same Act it is enacted, "That nothing in this Act shall extend or be construed to extend to any warrant or order for the removal of any poor person who is or shall become chargeable to any parish, township, or place," &c. Tomlinson, for the appellants, contended that the order was bad: first, because there was no suspension of the order of removal under the 35 Geo. 3, c. 101, s. 2, as there should have been to have rendered the appellants liable to the cost of maintenance; secondly, that the respondents were out of time in applying to justices for the order for payment, more than six years having elapsed since the demand of payment by them of the appellants. G. Denman, for the respondents, argued first, that no order of suspension could have been made at the time the order of removal was made, as the woman was not unable to travel by reason of sickness or other infirmity, pregnancy not being such a sickness or infirmity (Reg. v. Kendal, 28 L. J. 163, M. C.), and that as the suspension could not have been made at the time of the making of the order of removal, it could not have been made afterwards (Reg. v. Llanellchid, 29 L. J. 102, M. C.; 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 84); secondly, that the 11th section of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, does not apply, the 35th section of the same Act exempting from its operation all warrants or orders for the removal of any poor person: (Reg. v. Chedgrave, 20 L J. 23, M. C.; Reg. v. Chedgrave, 12 Q.B. 206.) COCKBURN, C. J.-As regards the first question, I am of opinion that the case does not fall within the operation of sect. 84 of the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76. It is clear that as regards the expense of maintaining the pauper during the twenty-one days after notice of chargeability, the parish of settlement would be bound to reimburse the removing parish. This is provided for by the 84th section of the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76. But the statute says nothing as to the expenses of maintenance after the settlement is admitted. Cases may easily occur where supervening sickness might arise after the order of removal is made, but before it is executed, so as to render it dangerous or cruel to execute the order, and this cannot be avoided by a suspension then of the order, which must according to the decisions be made at the same time as the order of removal itself. Unfortunately this is a casus omissus in the statute, and there is no power given to recover the subsequent expenses of maintaining the pauper through sickness after the settlement is decided and the order of removal made and not executed; and it is to be hoped that some member of the Legislature now present will take some steps to remove this very serious defect in the statute. With regard to the point as to the limitation of time, I think that, under the 84th section of the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, the removing parish can recover from the parish of settlement the expenses of maintaining the pauper between the service of the notice of chargeability and the expiration of the twenty-one days or longer during which the question of settlement remains undecided. The removing parish may apply for an order for payment of this amount, but the prosecution of such an order must be commenced within six months after the expenses are ascertained and demanded. It is no doubt true that the 35th section of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, exempts all warrants or orders for the removal of poor persons from the operation of the statute, but such an order for payment is not a warrant or order of removal, though it is certainly a consequence of an order of re [9. B. This court refused to grant a criminal information, at the instance of a private individual, against the proprietor of a newspaper for inserting articles in his paper tending to incite and encourage persons to volunteer to serve in Garibaldi's army. Bovill, Q.C. (Couch with him), on behalf of George Crawshay, moved for a rule, calling on John Baxter Langley, the proprietor and publisher of the Daily Chronicle and Newcastle Advertiser, and also of a weekly paper published in the same place, to show cause why a criminal information should not be filed against him. It appeared that Mr. Crawshay had formerly been mayor of Gateshead, and the present application was made in consequence of certain articles which had appeared in Mr. Langley's newspapers, as it was now alleged, inciting and encouraging persons in England to enlist in the army of General Garibaldi, and the publication of which articles it was now contended amounted to a misdemeanor. [COCKBURN, C.J.-Is this a case in which it is competent for a private person to come forward and ask for the interposition of the court? Have you any precedent, Mr. Bovill, for such an application? If this is an offence, it is an offence against the State, and it is for the AttorneyGeneral to interfere; but I never heard of a private person making such an application. BLACKBURN, J. I certainly never heard of a private individual applying thus in a matter in which he had no private and personal interest. HILL, J.-Cannot you indiet? COCKBURN, C.J.-You ask us to sanction a private individual taking up a public question which the Attorney-General has not thought right to interfere in.} This charge was brought before the justices at Newcastle, and they decided not to entertain it, but said the prosecutor had his remedy in the Q. B. I now apply to this court as the highest court of criminal jurisdiction. [BLACKBURN, J.-Assuming Mr. Langley had been guilty of a misdemeanor, and assuming that the justices did wrong in refusing to interfere, is that any reason why we should do so? So far as my memory goes, nothing has ever been done approaching to such a step.] As this is a matter relating to the public, all persons are more or less interested in it. [COCKBURN, C.J.-If anything, it is an offence against the State, and the proper officer to prosecute is the Attorney-General, and if he does not do so it is not for a private individual to come forward.] I may then assume that, even if I were to succeed in making out s case, the court would decline to interfere. [COCKBURN, C.J.-It is such a case, I think, as a private persen should not interfere in, and by so doing supersede the authority of the Attorney-General. We must leave you to the ordinary remedy which the law gives you. Crawshay may, if he please, bring the matter under the notice of her Majesty's law officers, who will decide whether they think it necessary to interfere; all we say is, that we do not grant a criminal information at the instance of a private individual, but he must be left to prefer his bill of indictment, or to such other proceedings as he may be advised. HILL and BLACKBURN, JJ. concurred. Rule refused. Mr. |