fore the condition broken. A purchaser may call for the title deeds and need not be deceived unless he will." So Lord Kenyon says, in Gordon v. East India Company (a), “The case of real property is in a different situation; no purchaser is satisfied with the mere possession of an estate; before he purchases he calls for the title deeds, and examines whether or not the possessor is entitled to the estate; but the possession of personal property is generally the title on which the world relies." The Court will not extend the statute of James, because it is productive of many hardships, and though it might have been useful when the operations of trade were few and simple, the case is very different now, when apparent possession does not confer the credit which it used to do. Secondly, the jury have not found the reputed ownership to be in the bankrupt, and, unless they do so, the Defendants in error can have no right to recover: it was said by Eyre C. J., in Lingham v. Biggs, "It was well observed by Mr. Justice Buller, in Walker v. Burnell, that questions on the 21 Jac. have much more of fact than of law in them." It It may be admitted, that, if the jury find a fact or facts to which no other fact is opposed, the Court may be left to draw an inference; but here the jury find conflicting evidences of ownership, and omit to strike the balance between them. If a ship were let for years, as in Frazer v. Marsh (b), the jury would be bound to decide in whom was the reputed ownership at the time of the bankruptcy, and they are equally bound to do so in the present case. In Muller v. Moss (c), Lord Ellenborough says, Reputed ownership is a fact which ought to have been found." (a) 7 T. R. 234. I 3 (c) 1 M. & S. 335. Tindal, 1820. MONKHOUSE V. HAY. 1820. MONKHOUSE v. HAY. Tindal, for the Defendants in error. - As to the second point, in all the cases on this subject, there has been a mixture of fact and law, and it has been left to the Court to decide, whether, under the facts, the reputed ownership was in the bankrupt. If the jury find the reputed ownership to be in him, no question can be left for the Court; therefore, taking the special verdict as it now stands, there is enough to entitle the Defendants in error to recover. As to the first and main point, this case falls within the statute of James, unless the ship register acts operate as a repeal of that statute as far as ships are concerned. But the ship registry acts relate to objects entirely different from the objects of the statute of James. The object of the registry acts being to exclude the competition of foreign shipping, that of the statute of James to prevent false credit. Then, the possession and management of the ship continued by the bankrupt so long after the transfer, is a sufficient reason for calling this a case of reputed ownership. It is contrary to daily experience, that parties who supply a ship with necessaries, should have recourse to the documentary title; the person who puts himself forward as apparent owner, is the person charged, and liable upon evidence that he has acted in such a capacity. It would be a great inconvenience, therefore, if the reputed owner should not be responsible to such claimants. As to chattel interests in land, they are, clearly, not within the purview of the statute. The register acts do not affect titles, passing by operation of law, as, to executors or administrators, in case of death, or to assignees generally in case of bankruptcy. In these cases a title may be transmitted without any of the forms required by statute; there is no reason, therefore, why it may not be so transmitted in a particular case falling within the operation of the statute of James; and there never was one which came more completely within the spirit Parke, in reply. Robinson v. M'Donnel and Hay v. Fairbairn (e) are now to be rer nsidered by the Court, and the other authorities do no come up to the point of the present case. The clause the deed which enables the bankrupt to retain the sip, does not and cannot (a) 2 Ves. sen. 272. he register. If the ship had ad become bankrupt, that usive on the true owner, and om the case of a lessee. (d) Selw. N. P. 1142. 1820. MONKHOUSE v. HAY. DALLAS C. J. The general question, here, is, whether the ship Dolphin was in the possession, order, and disposition of the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy, with the consent and permission of the true owner and proprietor; and two objections have been urged against the claim of the Defendants in error to this ship; one, that the reputed ownership should have been found by the jury, that it has not been found, nor have facts been found on which the Court could infer any such reputed ownership; the other, that the possession of the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy could not constitute a reputed ownership under the statute of James, inasmuch as by the register acts no one can be reputed owner but he who is registered as such. Upon the effect of possession by the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy, with respect to reputed ownership, the facts are such (here his Lordship stated the facts of the case) that it is impossible to conceive a stronger case of apparent ownership, continuing up to the time of the bankruptcy: but, independently of this, and as far as the conduct of the assignees could affect it, the property, here, would pass to them; for, at the period when the commission was sued out, the ship was on a voyage; and in every case of a transfer of a ship at sea, the assignee must do, not that which is impossible, (namely, possess himself of the ship at sea,) but what he can do, that is, assert his title at the earliest period when he can make it available by taking possession. This the Defendants in error did on the ship's return, and as soon as they were enabled to do so under the commission; and the question, therefore, comes to this, whether the register acts operate as a repeal of the statute of James? Now those acts were made with a view to very different objects. The register acts relate only only to transactions between vendor and vendee; to cases of real ownership. The statute of James was passed to prevent tradesmen from being injured by false credit derived from apparent or reputed ownership: the case of apparent ownership is, by the very term, opposed to that of real ownership, and therefore cannot fall within the purview of the registry acts. The vessel, in the present case, is left in the possession of the bankrupt with the consent of the true owner and proprietor, and I agree with Lord Ellenborough, that "these statutes do not affect titles passing by operation of law, as, to executors or administrators in case of death, or, to assignees generally in case of bankruptcy. In these cases a title may be transmitted without any of the forms required by the statute; and if a title may be transmitted without these forms in cases of bankruptcy generally, we see no reason why it may not be so done in a particular case, falling within the scope and operation of the statute of James." (a) That is the true ground on which these cases are distinguishable; we are not now considering the case as between vendor and vendee, but as between an assignee by operation of law, and an owner who has permitted the bankrupt to retain the vessel in his order and disposition. As to the other point, I will only say that sufficient facts appear on this record to refer to the Court the question of apparent ownership; and it appears to us that the conclusion to be drawn is, that the bankrupt was in possession with the consent of the true owner and proprietor. A reputed ownership in goods is established by the fact of the bankrupt's having the order and disposition of them with the consent of the true Here, the bankrupt had such order and dis owner. (a) Cited in Hay v. Fairbairn, 2 B. & A. 196. 1820. MONKHOUSE V. HAY. VOL. II. K position, |