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And if this had been well confidered, men would not, by being too intent upon God's fovereignty, with neglect of his other perfections, have spoken thofe hard things about predeftination: for the fovereignty of God doth by no means fet him above the eternal laws of goodness, and truth, and righteouf. nefs. And if this were confidered, men would not, by poring upon the juftice and feverity of God, be fo fwallowed up in despair: for God is not fo fevere, but he is merciful to the penitent, and hath left a retreat for the returning finner. If this were well confidered, it would check the prefumption of thofe who encourage themselves in fin, by fancying to themselves a God all of mercy and goodness; and because fentence against an evil work is not speedily executed, therefore their heart is fully fet in them to do evil: For it is not goodness and mercy finally to bear with and forgive obstinate offenders, but want of prudence and good government.

Thirdly, Among different opinions concerning God (as there always have been and will be in the world) choose those which are farthest from extremity; because truth as well as virtue ufually lies between the extremes. And here I will inftance in that controverfy, which has much difquieted the church almoft in all ages, concerning the decrees of God; about which there are two extremes, the one, that God peremptorily decrees the final condition of every particular person, that is, their everlasting happinefs or mifery, without any regard or confideration of the good or bad actions of men. The other, that God decrees nothing concerning any particular perfon, but only in general, that men found under fuch and fuch qualifications fhall be happy or miserable, and puts it into their own power to qualify themfelves. Now he that is doubtful in this matter, as every man must be that understands the difficulties on both fides, had beft take up in the middle opinion, that God decrees the final condition of particular perfons with refpect to certain qualifications, which speaking abfolutely, are not in every man's power, but yet under the influence of God's grace,

which is never wanting to the fincere endeavours of men, may be faid to be in our power, in the fame fenfe as St. Paul fays, I am able to do all things through Chrift ftrengthening me: For befides that this in all probability is the truth, there will be this advantage in it, that he that ftands in the middle, is like to be more moderate towards the diffenters on both fides, than either of them will be to one another: because the middle is not fo far from either extreme, as the extremes are from one another: At the worst, he stands fairest for an impartial enquiry after truth, and when he has fatisfied himself where the truth lies, he may more filently pafs over to it, without any great imputation of inconftancy; which cannot but be remarkable in him who paffeth from one extreme to an

other.

Fourthly and lastly, Entertain no opinion concerning God, that doth evidently contradict the pratice of religion and a good life, though never fo fpecious and fubtile arguments may be used to perfuade it. Truth is most eafily feen and difcerned in those reasonings and opinions which tend to practice; because the abfurdity and inconvenience of them is fooneft difcovered: whereas we cannot fo certainly find out the truth or falfhood of those opinions which fpeculative men devife in their ftudies, without any confideration whether they ferve any real purpose of life or not. Men indeed are very apt to form thofe notions, which are most remote from common fenfe and ufe; becaufe more pains and wit are required to make them plaufible: but there needs no other argument to make a wife man despise them than that they are unprofitable, and fignify nothing to our practice, and to make men truly better.

This is univerfally true in all kind of knowledge, but moft confiderable in the knowledge of God and religion; because that knowledge is of the greatest confideration. We need not fcruple to admit fome things not fo evident to natural reafon, if we be fatisfied of the truth of them from an higher and VOL. VI. Z

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more cogent reafon : As that God has revealed it, and faid it; this general reafon may perfuade us of a thing that is above and beyond natural reafon: But we may not admit any thing for a divine revelation, which evidently contradicts and weakens the practice of an holy life; because this is the main end of all divine revelation; and we know God, only in order to the fervice and imitation of him.

Let us then look upon all knowledge that contradicts practice, as vain and falfe, because it deftroys its end. There are many things that feem probable enough in fpeculation, which yet we most pertinaciously deny, becaufe they are not practicable; and there are many things which feem doubtful in fpeculation, and would admit of great difpute, which yet because they are found true in practice and experience, are to be taken for certain and unqueftionable. The après aóyos, the idle reafoning of the Stoicks, was a thing contemned by the wifer Philofophers, as a vain and ufeless fubtilty. Zeno pretends to demonftrate there is no motion; and what is the confequence of this fpeculation, but that men muft ftand till? But fo long as a man finds he can walk, all the fophiftry in the world will not perfuade him that motion is impoffible. In like manner, they that would perfuade us that men can do nothing, nor contribute any more to their own fanctification than ftocks or ftones, and upon fcripture-metaphors mifunderstood, (as our being dead in trefpaffes and fins, and created to good works) graft notions, which are impoffible and abfurd in practice, do not confider that the natural confequence of this is, that men must do nothing at all in religion, never think of God, nor pray to him, nor read his word, nor go to church, but fit ftill and be wholly paffive to the operations of God's grace. But however this may feem plaufible, and men may think they add much to the glory of God's grace, while they deny any power in the creature; yet every confiderate man will presently apprehend, that this is by no means to be admitted, because

it contradicts practice, and makes all the commands and exhortations of God's word vain and to-no purpose, becaufe it deftroys religion, and difcourages the endeavours of men; makes them floth ful and careless of working out their own falvation, than which nothing can fet a man farther from God's grace and affistance, and more immediately difpofe him for ruin: And upon fome fuch falfe reafoning as this, the flothful Servant in the parable hid his talent in a napkin, and buried it in the earth; but when he was called to account, his excufe was not admitted, but he was cast into utter darkness. The two other particulars, namely, how far we are to imitate the divine perfections, and particularly what thofe divine qualities are, which our Saviour doth here more efpecially propound to our imitation, and likewife to clear the true meaning of this precept, and to fhew that the duty here enjoined, Be ye perfect, as your Father which is in heaven is perfect, is not impoffible to us: Both these I fhall refer to another opportunity.

SERM ON CXXXI.

Concerning our imitation of the divine perfections.

MAT T H. V. 48.

Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.

I

The fecond fermon on this text.

N thefe words we have, firft, The abfolute perfection of the divine] nature fuppofed, not only in thofe before-mentioned, of goodness, and mercy, and patience; but in all other excellencies whatfoever.

Secondly, The perfection of God is propounded as a pattern for our imitation.

In the handling of thefe two particulars, I propounded to proceed in this method:

I. To fhew how we are to conceive of the divine perfection.

II. To lay down fome rules, by which we may rectify and govern our opinions concerning the attributes and perfections of God.

III. To fhew how far we are to imitate the perfections of God, and particularly what thofe divine qualities are which our Saviour doth here more efpecially propound to our imitation.

IV. To clear the true meaning of this precept; and to fhew that the duty here intended by our Saviour, is not impoffible to us: and then to draw fome ufeful inferences from the whole.

The two first I have already spoken to. I now proceed to the third particular, which is, To fhew how far we are to imitate the perfections of God, and particularly what thofe divine qualities are which our Saviour doth here more efpecially propound to our imitation. For though thefe words do fuppofe the abfolute perfection of the divine nature, yet because there are feveral perfections of God, which are incommunicable, and a creature, as fuch, is utterly incapable of them, these cannot be fuppofed to be intended for a pattern to us. As the neceffity and independency of the divine nature, and the self-sufficiency of it to his own happinefs; to be the original caufe of all things; and confequently fu preme Lord and Governor; the immenfity and eternity of his being; thefe and perhaps feveral other perfections, are incommunicable to a creature; and it would be an unfufferable pride, and a kind of high treafon against the divine Majefty, and a fottifh ignorance of the neceffary bounds and li mits of our own ftate, as we are creatures, to think to refemble God in thefe excellencies, of which the condition of a creature is utterly incapable. This was the fin of Lucifer; an ambition to ftep into the throne of God, and to be like the Moft High.

So

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