capacity being created by the necessity of the case alone, was also limited by that necessity." This principle is admitted by Mr. Leach, though he gives it a different, a dextrous, but, as we presume to think, not a just application. "The defect," he observes," is in the moral capacity of the King; in the will to do acts requiring personal interference. This will then is to be supplied; some representative of the royal will is to be appointed to act for the King, and in his name, in matters requiring his personal interference. This is the extent of the necessity; and that royal will once supplied in the person of the prince as regent, the defect is cured and the monarchy entire. The right created by necessity is limited by necessity, and here ends the right and duty of the two houses."

He also cites and argues upon the few precedents to be found in our history, and concludes his observations upon them with these words. 66 I presume to say that this right is not found in the common law of parliament; is supported by no authority; and is repelled by all such authority as there is upon the subject: and whatever objection may be made to the times and circumstances in which particular precedents occurred, yet the general conclusion is, that in no times, nor under any circumstances, have the two houses of parliament ever assumed the right now claimed."

Mr. Grenville, on the contrary, asserts, that "the principle of limiting the power of a regency, with a view to the future security of the sovereign, has been felt and acted upon in every case which has hitherto occurred, and is almost coeval with the constitution of the monarchy itself. The mode of restriction has, indeed, been usually different from that which is now proposed. The whole powers of the Crown have for the most part been called into action, though I believe it might be shewn that this has not always been the case; but they have not been given to any one subject."

It is, indeed, admitted by Mr. Leach, that in no instance have the two houses given to a sole regent the whole royal authority. The option must therefore be between a Regent limited in the extent of his authority, or controuled in the exercise of it. For, as has been observed by Mr. Grenville, "it cannot be a just conclusion to say, that because our ancestors committed the whole authority of a king into the hands of a regent, controuled and fettered by a fixed and permanent council, it is proper for us to delegate the same power to a single person, unrestrained by any similar check." We, however, concur entirely in the opinion, that it is far more agreeable to the true spirit of the British constitution, that "whatever degree of political authority is fit

under any given circumstances to be exercised for the purposes of executive government, should be exercised by a single person; and that wherever any just ground of danger is found to exist, it should be guarded against (if possible) by limiting the extent of the power so exercised, rather than by dividing amongst many what cannot with propriety be entrusted to one."

On the ground of expediency Mr. Leach asks, “To what end are dignities and prerogatives given to the crown?-Is it as a general proposition expedient, that whenever the personal exercise of the royal authority is for a time to be placed in other hands, some of its functions and prerogatives should be suspended? that in the hands of a Regent the public should lose the benefit of some means of good government, which in the hands of a king must be intended to be necessary for the public service?" These questions we would answer in the language of Mr. Grenville, " It is by no means a just conclusion, either from the theory or practice of the British constitution, or from any general principles of government, that the same powers which may be entrusted with propriety to the permanent authority of a king are equally fit to be committed to those hands which are to exercise the temporary and delegated functions of a Regent. The provisions which respect the prerogatives of the crown in this country are adapted to the ordinary course of an established government, and are calculated for a long continuance. But in the establishment of a regency the case is directly the reverse. We are to look, not to the general exigencies of government, but to those occasions which may probably arise during the period, for which the system so provided is intended to continue: and as for this reason there may frequently be much less ground to justify the grant of particular powers, so, on the other hand, there will almost always in such a case be infinitely more temptation to abuse them."

On the slight degree of importance which Mr. Leach appears to attach to the possible abuse by a regent of the prerogative of creating peers, we would remark, in the words of Mr. Grenville," that of all the powers of the crown this is the most liable to be abused under a delegated and temporary government; and it is also that, from the abuse of which the most injurious consequences would arise to the permanent interest of the sovereign."

For our own parts we have not a shadow of doubt of the right of parliament to restrain the temporary authority of the Regent in such manner as a due regard to the permanent authority of the sovereign may be thought to require; and we fairly acknowledge, that though we think it far preferable that the powers

of a regent should be limited by parliament, than that he should be liable to be controuled in the exercise of them by a council, we should deem the latter less exceptionable, (under such circumstances as those of the year 1789 and of the present time,) than the establishment of a regency in the hands of a single person, without any restriction or limitation whatever.

The question of the household is one of extreme delicacy, and doubtless one of no inconsiderable difficulty: but we cannot avoid thinking, that a somewhat exaggerated view has been taken of the splendour and dignity, as well as of the power and the patronage, which ought to belong to a regent during the period when the incapacity of the sovereign is considered as temporary, and likely to be of short duration. The same considerations which render it unfit that the care of the royal person should be given to a regent appear to make it also improper that he should possess the patronage of the household. Both should unquestionably be under the same superintendance and direction. But any proposition to reduce the King's establishment at such a moment would, surely, as Mr. Grenville observes, be repugnant to the feelings of a generous people, and " If we look to that happy period to which our wishes and our hopes are turned, what a picture must then present itself! Let us, if we can, imagine what must be his feelings in such a moment as that, when he is told that his parliament has availed itself with eagerness and avidity even of the shortest interval, to new model the offices attendant on his person, and by a miserable œconomy to degrade their sovereign from those circumstances of splendour which belong to the rank in which he was born, and to the station which he still occupies?"

If these sentiments were just twenty years ago, are they less so at this time? Have the events of that interval taught us that it is decent or wise to place our Sovereign in the shade? or can they have weakened his claims upon the respect, affection, and gratitude of his people?

We now take our leave of this most interesting subject. The substance of the argument is, we are fully aware, exhausted by the comprehensive and powerful speech to which our attention has been particularly directed. Should we however succeed in conveying to, or confirming in any minds the feelings and opinions with which our own are deeply impressed, our wishes will be gratified and our expectations surpassed. But if we should even be so fortunate as to excite a stronger and more general sense than was before entertained of the importance of the subject itself, and induce those who may notice this article, and who were before unacquainted with the speech of Mr. Greu

ville, to read, reflect upon, and digest it, we shall have contributed to the diffusion of sound constitutional principles, and shall have accomplished our object and attained our reward.

ART. IV. Voyage de Decouvertes aux Terres Australes, executé par ordre de sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, sur les Corvettes le Geographe, le Naturaliste, et la Goëlette le Casuarina, pendant les Années 1800, 1801, 1802, 1803, et 1804. Publié Decrét Imperial sous le Ministère de M. de Champagny, et redigé par M. F. Péron, Naturaliste, &c. &c. Tome I. Paris, 1807.

par

IN June 1800, several months before Mr. Pitt resigned the situation of prime minister to Mr. Addington, and when Lord Spencer was at the head of the Admiralty, passports were granted at the request of the French government to "le Geographe❞ of 30 guns, and "le Naturaliste," two strong gabarres (a large kind of transport) which that government had appointed for a voyage of discovery to the coasts of Australia. The nature of these passports was to place Captains Baudin and Hamelin, the two commanders, with their vessels and crews, in safety from all hostile attack, and to entitle them to a favourable reception and necessary accommodation at any of the British establishments where they might have occasion to put in. This permission has been much found fault with, and our* good natured minister has been not a little ridiculed for omitting to inquire further into Captain Baudin's (the commodore's) instructions before the general passports were granted.

Now, to say nothing of the absurdity of supposing, that any inquiry on the part of the Admiralty would have induced the French to disclose such instructions as might interfere with the indulgence they requested; we confess our opinion to be, that Mr. Pitt and Lord Spencer, (although we never heard that they were ministers remarkable for good nature towards the French,)

See Quarterly Review, No. 7. p. 42. where a strange mistake is made in supposing that Mr. Addington was minister in June, 1800. We beg pardon for noticing this mistake so pointedly, which we certainly should not have done, were it not that we are a little shocked at the use that is attempted to be made of it. It must, however, be observed, that the mistake is briefly noticed in the following number under the head errata, where it is stated, that the word (after) was intended to be written (before) as it stands in the first line of this article. The review, therefore, had it in contemplation to charge Mr. Pitt and Lord Spencer with all the blame and the good nature imputed to the act in question.

acted on this occasion with that liberality and due regard to the interests of science which are becoming in the government of a great and enlightened nation. And we have good reason to believe that they so acted, (not without inquiry as is alleged) but upon a due consideration of the French commodore's instructions, which were submitted to them, such as they are detailed in the work before us, and such as the French commanders in fact adhered to, as strictly as the nature of the chances to which they were exposed would admit. We will presently state the grounds of this opinion. In the mean time it may be observed, that if the French government has made a villanous use of this liberality, or an ungrateful return for it, there may be good cause for refusing a similar indulgence in future. But we think the following reasons conclusive as to the claim they had upon us for compliance in the present instance; and we feel peculiar pleasure in laying the detail before our readers.

Compared with the conduct of the present French government towards Captain Flinders, which we shall afterwards expose, it exhibits a striking contrast of the public honour and humanity of the old and regular government of France, (and even of the small portion of those virtues which yet remained in the national councils under the corrupting influence of the Convention,) with the studied dereliction of principle, and absolute disregard of all the duties of honour, justice, and humanity, in which the modern dynasty affects to glory. (See Buonaparte's reasoning with the Spanish deputies at Bayonne.)

In the year 1779, upon the breaking out of the war between France and England, we are informed by the Marquis de Condorcet, that the liberal and enlightened mind of M. Turgot perceived how honourable it would be for the French nation, that the vessel of Captain Cook, then about to return to Europe from his third voyage, should be treated with respect at sea. "He composed a memorial, in which he proves that honour, reason, and even interest, dictated this act of respect for humanity; and it was in consequence of this memorial, the author of which was unknown during his life, that the following circular letter was written by M. Sartine, secretary of the marine in France, and sent to all commanders of French ships." The rescript was dated on the 19th of March, 1779, and ran thus.— "Captain Cook, who sailed from Plymouth in July, 1776, on board the Resolution, in company with the Discovery, Captain Clerke, in order to make researches on the coasts, islands, and seas of Japan and California, being on the point of returning to Europe, and such discoveries being of general utility to all nations; it is the king's pleasure that Captain Cook shall be treated