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themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.

He has abdicated government here, by declaring us out of his protection, and waging war against us.

He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burned our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.

He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of cruelty 10 and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation.

He has constrained our fellow-citizens, taken captive on the high seas, to bear arms against their country, to become the executioners of their friends and brethren, or to 15 fall themselves by their hands.

He has excited domestic insurrection among us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and 20 conditions.

In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A prince whose character is thus marked by every act which 25 may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

Nor have we been wanting in our attentions to our British brethren. We have warned them, from time to time, of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded 30 them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity; and we have conjured them, by the ties of our common kindred, to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and 35 correspondence. They, too, have been deaf to the voice of justice and consanguinity. We must, therefore, ac

quiesce in the necessity which denounces our separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends.

We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to 5 the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these united Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from 10 all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that, as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, 15 and do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do. And, for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.

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THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON. (JUNE 30, 1788).

O

THIS is one of those subjects, Mr. Chairman, on which objections very naturally arise and assume the most plausible shape. Its address is to the passions, and its impressions create a prejudice before cool examination has an opportunity for exertion. It is more easy for the human mind 25 to calculate the evils than the advantages of a measure, and vastly more natural to apprehend the danger than to see the necessity of giving powers to our rulers. Hence, I may justly expect that those who hear me will place less confidence in those arguments which oppose than in those which favor their prepossessions.

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After all our doubts, our suspicions and speculations on the subject of government, we must return at last to this important truth that when we have formed a constitution upon free principles, when we have given a proper 5 balance to the different branches of the administration, and fixed representation upon pure and equal principles, we may, with safety, furnish it with all the powers necessary to answer in the most ample manner the purposes of government. The great desiderata are a free representaIo tion and mutual checks. When these are obtained, all our apprehensions of the extent of powers are unjust and imaginary. What, then, is the structure of this Constitution? One branch of the legislature is to be elected by the people

by the same people who choose your State representa15 tives. Its members are to hold their office two years, and then return to their constituents. Here, Sir, the people govern; here they act by their immediate representatives. You have also a Senate, constituted by your State legislatures by men in whom you place the highest confidence 20 and forming another representative branch. Then again you have an executive magistrate, created by a form of election which merits universal admiration. In the form of this government, and in the mode of legislation, you find all the checks which the greatest politicians and the 25 best writers have ever conceived. What more can reasonable men desire? Is there any one branch in which the whole legislative and executive powers are lodged? No. The legislative authority is lodged in three distinct branches, properly balanced; the executive authority is 30 divided between two branches; and the judicial is still reserved for an independent body, who hold their offices during good behavior. This organization is so complex, so skilfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked measure should pass the great scrutiny 35 with success. Now what do gentlemen mean by coming forward and declaiming against this government? Why

do they say we ought to limit its powers, to disable it, and to destroy its capacity of blessing the people? Has philosophy suggested, has experience taught that such a government ought not to be trusted with everything necessary for the good of society? Sir, when you have 5 divided and nicely balanced the departments of government; when you have strongly connected the virtue of your rulers with their interest; when, in short, you have rendered your system as perfect as human forms can be, you must place confidence, you must give power.

ΤΟ

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We have heard a great deal of the sword and the purse; it is said our liberties are in danger if both are possessed by Congress. Let us see what is the true meaning of this maxim, which has been so much used and so little understood. It is that you shall not place these powers in either the legislative or executive singly; neither one nor the other shall have both, because this would destroy that division of powers on which political liberty is founded, and would furnish one body with all the means of tyranny. But where the purse is lodged in one branch, and the 20 sword in another, there can be no danger. All governments have possessed these powers; they would be monsters without them, and incapable of exertion. What is your State government? Does not your legislature command what money it pleases? Does not your execu- 25 tive execute the laws without restraint? These distinctions between the purse and the sword have no application to the system, but only to its separate branches. Sir, when we reason about the great interests of a great people, it is high time that we dismiss our prejudices and banish declamation.

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In order to induce us to consider the powers given by this constitution as dangerous, in order to render plausible any attempt to take away the life and spirit of the most important power in government, the gentleman com-35 plains that we shall not have a true and safe representation.

I asked him what a safe representation was, and he has given no satisfactory answer. The Assembly of New York has been mentioned as a proper standard; but if we apply this standard to the general government, our Congress 5 will become a mere mob, exposed to every irregular impulse, and subject to every breeze of faction. Can such a system afford security? Can you have confidence in such a body? The idea of taking the ratio of representation in a small society for the ratio of a great one is a fallacy 10 which ought to be exposed. It is impossible to ascertain to what point our representation will increase; it may vary from one to two, three, or four hundred; it depends upon the progress of population. Suppose it is to rest at two hundred; is not this number sufficient to secure it against 15 corruption? Human nature must be a much more weak and despicable thing than I apprehend it to be if two hundred of our fellow-citizens can be corrupted in two years. But suppose they are corrupted; can they in two years accomplish their designs? Can they form a combina20 tion, and even lay a foundation for a system of tyranny, in so short a period? It is far from my intention to wound the feelings of any gentleman; but I must, in this most interesting discussion, speak of things as they are, and hold up opinions in the light in which they ought to ap25 pear; and I maintain that all that has been said of corruption, of the purse and the sword, and of the danger of giving powers, is not supported by principle or fact; that it is mere verbiage and idle declamation. The true principle of government is this: make the system complete in 30 its structure, give a perfect proportion and balance to its parts, and the powers you give it will never affect your security. The question, then, of the division of powers between the general and state governments is a question of convenience; it becomes a prudential inquiry what 35 powers are proper to be reserved to the latter, and this immediately involves another inquiry into the proper