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as to yield that result. Where, however, the disquietude of modern life. A genial piety natural constitution is not what we have taken takes root most readily, of course, in cheerful upon ourselves to call Horatian, it is possible natures; but in every soul, the necessary reto subdue its restlessness and make it happier sult of unbroken trust in " a faithful Creator," in action without a continual eye to results. is repose, simplicity, harmonious unity of Let it not be said that we introduce incongru- character. God is great! "The world is a aus ideas into this paper, when we add, that a beautiful world, after all," and the true "hapgenial piety is the medicine that best "minis-py valley" is the serene depth of a man's own ters to a mind diseased" with the Faust-like spirit.

From the Examiner, 19 Aug.
THE FIRST AND THE LAST.

seriously formed by the allied powers, than the peril which threatened the repose of the world is reduced, if not entirely dissipated. THE Speech from the Throne on the con- It could not escape such acute observers clusion of the session presents a most gratify-as Russian statesmen, that when England sent ing contrast to that with which it commenced, a fleet to the Baltic, wholly unprovided with in so far as the War is concerned. The Roy- vessels of light draught, and not carrying a al words are no longer faltering or ambiguous; single mortar, there was no immediate probut clear, distinct, and decisive. Instead of bability of any attack being made on either announcing military preparations, and a West- of the only two northern fortresses concernern alliance without any definite objects, her ing which Russia can feel any serious anxMajesty declares that "in cordial cooperation iety, Cronstadt and Sweaborg. And it was with the Emperor of the French, her efforts equally clear when the French and English will be directed to the effectual repression of troops stopped short at Gallipoli, that their that ambitious and aggressive spirit on the movement to the East was thus far a mere part of Russia which has compelled us to take demonstration, and that for some months at up arms in defence of an ally, and to secure least no fear need be entertained for the brightthe future tranquillity of Europe. This is est jewel of the Russian crown-Sebastopol. language not to be misunderstood. The But the same sagacity which led the Ruscountry at length knows that its Government sian Cabinet to conclude they might proseis in earnest. cute their schemes during the spring and summer with impunity, will now teach them that the time for diplomatic trifling on the part of the allies has passed away, and that autumn will see them proceed with much more effectual instruments.

Precisely in the same proportion that the declaration of her Majesty's advisers made during the session have increased in firmness, the pretensions put forward by the ministers of the Czar have abated from their original arrogance. Count Nesselrode no longer speaks of the Sultan as the vassal of the Czar; no longer treats with contempt the pretension of the maritime powers to interfere in the affairs of the East; and no longer declares that in their despite the material guarantee shall be retained, until the virtual sovereignty of the Emperor Nicholas over its Christian subjects has been acknowledged by the Porte. The last despatch of the Russian Chancellor is an apology for a detected and defeated policy, as confused, as equivocating, and as abject as ever proceeded from the pen of even a Prussian diplomatist.

Of course we do not overlook the part which the gallant Turkish army has played in inspiring the allied Governments with sufficient courage to form this resolution; and the graceful allusion in the Queen's Speech, pronounced with even more than usual emphasis and eloquence, to "the courage and perseverance manifested by the troops of the Sultan in their defence of Silistria, and the various military operations of the Danube"

accompanying the Cross of Grand Commander of the Bath which her Majesty has, we believe, just bestowed upon Omer Pasha -will doubtless incite those noble and patriotic men to still greater and more brilliant

What, then, is the lesson to be learnt from the momentous events which have occurred achievements. during the six months' interval which sepa- It is also a matter of congratulation that rates the two speeches? It is that the so-call- the Speech does not contain a syllable reed "policy of peace," the policy of yielding specting any alliance save that with France. to oppression, and endeavoring to conciliate It is no longer "in concurrence with other insolence, has been in fact the policy of Powers" that the great object of securing war; and that the determination to repress the future peace of Europe is to be pursued. ambition and resist aggression is no sooner The German potentates, even the stern and

resolute young Emperor from whom we were rienced during the session, that produced by told to expect so much, will now understand the closing Speech has certainly not been the that whilst France is with us, we care not who least. But it has been an agreeable one; and joins us, nor who may stand aloof. This con- we are convinced that those calm but ener viction may yet, if anything can, instil into getic words which we have quoted will go the German Courts something approaching to further towards securing a just and lasting manly and independent feeling. peace, than a bushel of German protocols, or à century of Vienna conferences.

Of all the disappointments we have expe

THE GUN-BOAT QUESTION.

The danger of a shot under water is small indeed, water deadening or diverting shot to a degree which ought to be very intelligible on Endeavor to strike a smart little reflection. blow in the water, and you will learn to value the resistance of the fluid, and to comprehend how much the momentum of a round shot must be diminished in passing even point A boy blank through a few feet of water. who makes ducks and drakes with a stone may thence have a notion of the effect of wa upon a slanting shot.

ter

stowage of the machinery without exposing it THERE seems to be still some misunder-to shot; and to use wood where iron would be standing of the gun boat question. Lord unsafe. And this was done by building from Clanricarde has truly stated that the services the floor (keel there is none) to the line of in the Baltic requires vessels of a heavy arflotation with iron, and finishing upwards, the mament, and drawing about five feet water. top sides and bulwarks, with wood. The gun-boats built by the Admiralty are no doubt all that is desirable in armament, but they draw between eleven and twelve feet. Why is this? We know that vessels of the a same scantling, power, and equal capabilities in every respect, can be built with a draught of five feet; and what possible motive can the Admiralty have for preferring the longer-legged craft, which must be utterly useless in the shoal waters of the Baltic ? A prejudice stands in the way of the most perfect combination of heavy armament and light draught. An error in one extreme has been avoided, and haps as often happens in such cases, an error in the opposite extreme has been adopted. When Lord Ellenborough was at the head of the Admiralty, it was determided to build whole fleet of iron steam vessels; no less than thirty, if we are not mistaken. After all was settled, and many of the vessels were on the stocks, if not actually built, the question was raised, what would be the effect of shot upon them. The experiment was tried, and the re-man contrivance for locomotion, whether in sult proved that for purposes of war they The fact that the Prussian Government has might as well have been made of glass. Iron was then condemned, and without sufficient purchased the vessels to which we have re discrimination between the uses for which it is ferred, the Nix and Salamander, for gun-boats, superior to wood, and of those in which it is proves that in the opinion of that Govern unfitting for war. But private builders have ment at least, iron, so far as it enters into made this distinction; and as we have before their build, is not unfitted for war. stated, Messrs. Russell & Co. have furnished

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We do not go so far as to contend that a shot might not by possibility take unlucky effect upon an iron hull under water, but it is so very unlikely a chance as not to countervail the certain advantages of such a struc ture; and if the bare possibility of an un lucky shot were a decisive objection, the steam machinery even encased in wood would be condemned for purposes of war. Some risks must always be compounded for in every hu

peace or war.

The Czar too has profited by the model, and the Pruth, which for a time so importantly aided the operation of his armies on the Da nube, was on the plan of the Nix and Salamander, but on a smaller scale.

the Prussian Government with gun-boats, the very model of what is wanted for our service in the Baltic and the Euxine, combining a powerful armament with a draught of only five feet. How was this done? Not by building of wood wholly, for a smaller draught than eleven or twelve feet cannot be had with wooden vessels of the scale required; nor by building of iron wholly, it having been proved double the desirable draught; and every inch that iron splinters under shot, so as to render above six feet tells as a serious disadvantage, it unfit for vessels of war. But it was possi- or an absolute inefficiency.-Examiner, 19 ble to use iron, where it would serve to dimi- Aug.

No doubt the gun-boats built by the Admiralty are the best for the purpose that can be built of wood, but that material necessitates a draught of eleven or twelve feet, more than

nish draught, and to conduce to the snuggest

ty; not of being baffled by our adversary, but of letting him off too easy; not of conducting the war ill, but of throwing away all the advantages of victory by too great a desire for peace, and too great magnanimity towards a fallen foe. Therefore we confess we feel no inconsiderable alarm when we observe with what alacrity every one begins to consider the terms on which the war may be concluded, on the first avowed discomfiture and professed rotirement of the enemy. Let us reflect for a moment or two whether this alacrity is not somewhat dangerous and premature.

From The Economist, 19 Aug. THREATENED NEGOTIATIONS.

THE first campaign is scarcely more than half over, and already Russia has been baffled, defeated and repelled. She has been obliged to exchange the attitude of aggression for that of self-defence. From being resolved to appropriate neighbor's territory, she is reduced to tremble for her own. In the winter her fleet was busy destroying the Turkish navy and massacring the Turkish sailors at Sinope: in summer she finds all her ships locked up in their own harbors-confined to bed in short. In March she menaced, or was supposed to menace Constantinople in August she is called upon to defend Sebastopol. In spring she was crossing the Danube: in autumn she is recrossing the Pruth. She has been baffled in nearly every enterprise, and beaten in nearly every engagement. She has lost all that she had gained, except some of the fortresses in the Dobrutscha; and those are about to be wrested from her.

Russia has evacuated the Principalities and retired behind the Pruth. Is it so very certain that this is really a retrogressive movement, or one that can be held to indicate either any actual relinquishment of her aggressions, or any deference towards the allies, or any disposition to make peace? What has led to it, and what is to be gained by it? In the first place, this evacuation has not been ordered till it became an indispensable measure of safety. The allies were advancing, the The tone of the Czar has changed nearly as Ottomans were everywhere victorious, the much as his fortunes. The insolent language of Russians were everywhere baffled, the Aus the Autocrat, who was resolved to have his way trians held all the passes of the Carpathians, in defiance of all Europe, and who was astonish- and could at any moment have taken the Imed at the unreasonableness of those who perial troops at a fearful disadvantage. As blamed him and the audacity of those who soon as the attitude of Austria became unmis presumed to thwart him, has been moderated takably hostile, the Russian positions in Walinto the complaining phrases-not yet quite lachia and Moldavia became obviously untenapologetic or deferential-of a man who would able. The forces of the Czar not only could fain make out that he had been misunderstood no longer remain there, but were peremptorily and ill-used. The last despatch of Count Nes-wanted elsewhere.

selrode, so ably answered by M. Drouyn de For it was not on the Sereth that they could Lhuys, is in marked contrast to some former meet their advancing foes. Between Austria memorable documents from the same pen. on the west, Omer Pasha and his AngloThe evacuation of the Principalities has been French auxiliaries on the south, and the allied officially announced, with an indication that it fleet which might have assailed their rear, the. has taken place in compliance with the preju- invaders would have had no chance of escapedices-strange and incomprehensible as it is A retirement from the Principalities duly anhinted they are of the Emperor of Austria. nounced, might yet suspend the actual comf It is clear that the Czar has been worsted, and mencement of hostilities by Austria; and in that he admits it; and it is believed that he is not-if Austria must be met or assailed-her inclined to come to terms. Already writers accessible point was clearly not the Transyland diplomatists are discussing what these vanian but the Gallician frontier. The eva terms should be. This is the crisis of affairs cuation which has been the object of so much that we have always looked forward to with congratulation, therefore, was probably dethe greatest anxiety. The dangers of hostili-signed to effect two objects, both most importies seem about to be exchanged for the far tant to Muscovite designs-the liberation of more serious dangers of negotiation. Our one large force, which could be detached to readers will remember that, although we have take Austria at advantage on a preferable never dreaded the arms of Russia, we point, and the sending of another to succor have always expressed the greatest fear of Odessa and the Crimea, which were indubitaher diplomacy. We know the characteristic bly about to be assailed by the allies. This weakness of the British nation-aggravated as evacuation, then, is not a political concession, it now is by our settled love of peace, and by but simply a necessary and judicious strategic the deep sense of responsibility which weighs operation. on rulers who, after forty years of peace have had again to deal with war. We know that our real danger is not in being beaten in a

campaign, but of being overreached in a trea-it as liberating her from her engagements to

In one sense, however, it was undoubtedly designed to have a political effect. It liberates Prussia-at least Prussia will choose to accept

1. Something no doubt will be gained by exchanging the exclusive protectorate which Russia has heretofore exercised over the semiindependent provinces of Turkey in Europe, for a collective protectorate of all the great Powers. But the practical evils arising from the anomalous position of those territories will only have been mitigated, not by any means

Austria. She had promised to aid that Power lend their mutual co-operation, in order to obin enforcing the evacuation in case Russia tain from the initiative of the Ottoman Goveither annexed those provinces or pushed its ernment the consecration and observance of conquests to the south, and to stand by her the religious privileges of the various Christian and defend her against internal and external communities, and turn the generous intentions foes in case she incurred danger or hostility manifested by His Majesty the Sultan to the while furthering German interests. But now account of their various co-religionists, so that Russia has retired-has done in fact what that there shall not result therefrom any inPrussia wished the latter may plausibly fringement of the dignity and independence enough allege that whatever consequences of his crown. may ensue from any hostile steps on the part of Francis Joseph against the Czar, Austria will have voluntarily brought upon herself; and that she can therefore no longer claim the assistance of Prussia to guard her from them. The Court of Berlin is therefore perfectly free to desert Austria in any dangers she may incur by siding with the Western Powers, and to pursue its own projects of rivalry and am- removed, but by this change. Russia, if one of bition, with any help which Russia can be- the protecting Powers, will become or continue stow. The evacuation of the Principalities by as before, the chief protecting Power. She is the Czar may thus convert Prussia from a he- close at hand; she has already a party in sitating neutral and a possible foe into an those provinces (in Servia a large and poweravowed if not an active ally; and has doubt-ful one); she will still retain all her instru less been expected by Nicholas to operate ments and subtle machinery of intrigue; she powerfully in paralyzing his new enemy. Thus alone, having an interest in mischief will be the same retrograde movement across the perpetually getting up grounds of complaint Pruth enables Russia to menace Austria on and interference; she, as before, will be ceasetwo sides, to pacify and neutralize Prussia, and lessly busy in fomenting disturbances, and to march fifty thousand men to the succor of charging the Porte with violation of the privi his endangered seaports. leges of the Principalities when that Government attempts to put them down; she, on the plea of " co-religion" and of kindred will have pretexts for remonstrances and claims, when the other Powers see nothing to complain of. Thus the virtual and active protectorate will be exercised by her nearly as much as now; and if she can persuade any one of

It seems, therefore, by no means certain that the Czar has any real desire of suing for or accepting a reasonable and satisfactory peace. But even if he has, let us look at the terms which the French Minister for Foreign Affairs declares that the common interests of Europe require. First. That the protectorate hitherto exer- the co-operating Powers to join her (as she cised by the Imperial Court of Russia over will possibly be able to do when coolnes the Principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and or hostility prevails among them), she may Servia, shall cease, and that the privileges easily override the opposition of the others, granted by the Sultans to these dependant and even if she does not, the very differences provinces of their empire, shall, in virtue of will again make the Eastern Question a peran arrangement with the Sublime Porte, be manent apple of discord to the rest of Europe. placed under the collective guarantee of the Knowing, as we do, what these provinces have Powers. always been to Russia-the means, namely, of Second. That the navigation of the Danube, keeping the Porte in perpetual hot water and as far as to its outfall into the Black Sea, shall of furthering her designs on Constantinople— be delivered from all restriction, and sub- is it wise, is it at all a satisfactory arrangement mitted to the operation of the principles con- by which to terminate a troublesome and cost secrated by the acts of the Congress of Vi-ly war, to leave to that restless and encroaching Power any pretext for again interfering in their concerns?

enna.

Third. That the treaty of July 13, 1841, shall be revised in concert by the high contracting Powers in the interest of European equilibrium, and in the sense of a limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea.

2. The freedom of the navigation of the Danube from all restrictions, and the removal of those obstructions by which the calculated carelessness of Russia has caused its waters to be choked, we have always pointed out as one of the most important of the objects to be se cured, when the terms of peace came under

Fourth. That no Power shall claim the right to exercise any official protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte, to whatever rite they may belong, but that France, Aus- consideration. But if we recal to mind that tria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia shall these objects have already, and long since,

been insisted on in the most formal manner, | liberation. It may be handed over to Turkey and guaranteed by the most solemn treaties, or it may be simply dismantled-or it may and promised by Russia once and again under be made an independent" harbor of refuge," her hand and seal, we really do not see what di- under the protection of all the European maplomatists can persuade themselves is gained ritime Powers. As long as it remains the splenby compelling that dishonest Power to renew did port and fortress which it now is, in the treaties she has always disregarded, promises hands of Russia (Lord John Russell was quite which she has always broken, and professions correct in saying) Constantinople is permaso empty as to have become almost insults. nently menaced, and commerce can scarcely As Lord Lyndhurst so plainly urged, Russia be secure or free. has shown that no engagements can bind her. 4. The distinct denial of the claim of RusWhy, then, enter into fresh engagements? sia to interfere on behalf of the Greek-ChrisYou insist on the free and unobstructed navi- tian subjects of the Porte will be a most valugation of the Danube:-secure it, therefore, able object gained; and if the other Powers in the only manner in which experience has simply obtain from the Sultan the concession shown that it can be secured, viz., by restor- of perfect freedon from all interference, perseing to Turkey all its mouths and all the for- cution, or oppression on religious grounds to all tresses which guard them and which command his non-Mussulman subjects, we believe all willthe course of the river. Take back from Rus- have been done that can be done;-and more sia the Delta she obtained by the treaty of than is done in Austria, Russia, Spain or Italy. Adrianople, and let Ismail and Galatz be dis- Oppression of the Rayahs there no doubt is, mantled or transferred. We do not believe and will continue to be; but it will be only that any other arrangement can be secure, or that which the Government is powerless to ought to be conceded. prevent, and which time and an improved sys

3. "The revision of the treaties of 1841 "tem of administration can alone entirely put -if by this be meant the opening of the down. Hitherto it is certain that the chief opBlack Sea to the navies of all nations-will be pressors of the Turkish Christians have been a signal triumph and a most important practi- Russian agents and the priests of the Greek cal advantage to commercial enterprise; but, Church. if merely a parchment treaty and unaccompa- In conclusion: We shall be as thankful as nied by "material guarantees "-("I thank any one for the restoration of peace on a perthee, Jew, for teaching me that word!"-it manent and solid basis. Our only object in can scarcely be considered safe or efficient. the preceding remarks has been to warn our The navigation of the Euxine is proverbially countrymen against acceding to terms which, difficult and perilous; Sebastopol is the only however plausible, are yet proverbially fallasecure and ample harbor whether for mer- cious; and which will leave the embers of chant ships or men-of war; whoever possesses discord still slumbering and ready to burst out that harbor, fortified as it is, will always be whenever circumstances shall render it the inmistress of the sea which it commands; the terest of the great aggressor again to fan them only real condition or security, therefore, for into a flame. Do not let us cobble or slur the free navigation of the waters in question over our work. Do not let us have to do it must be found in wresting that important pos- over again, at some future and less convenient session from the Czar, and disposing of it in period. Do not let us have spent ten millions some other way, to be decided on mature de-for a hollow and unreal victory.

From The Spectator, 19 Aug.
AMERICAN IMMENSITIES.

mission to the enemy with a treacherous abandonment of each ally in turn, and new advance of hostility. But if it is so in Europe, the character of periodical literature in America imparts to the news there a much greater appearance of capricious change. The latest

THE action of great States does not change and fluctuate with every week, although in the reports which reach us from week to week it may seem to do so; as, in a flickering light, intelligence would give the idea that America a brilliant object seems itself to share the tre- is in a sudden state of universal ebullition mor of the light in which it is viewed. Trust that the annexation-fever has an acute access, to the reports of the day, and the really stead-which threatens every conterminous State. fast action of our Government in regard to Rus- Not only is little Mosquitia doomed to bomsia and Turkey would be converted into one bardment and oppression at the hands of the of incessant change, alternating a craven sub- American navy, by order of Gen. Pierce,

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