can never be fuppofed, that Nature and Reason, in all their Glory, can be able to know the Will of God fo well as he himfelf knows it: And therefore, should God ever make a Declaration of his Will, that Declaration must, according to the Nature and Neceffity of the Thing, be a more perfect Rule for Religion, than Reason and Nature can poffibly furnish us with. Had we the Wisdom and Reafon of Cherubims and Seraphims to direct us in the Worship and Service of our Maker, nevertheless it would be our highest Wisdom, as it is theirs, to fubmit to his Laws, that is, to the Declarations of his Will.

Secondly; From hence it appears, how extremely wrong it is to compare Natural Religion and Revelation together, in order to inquire which is preferable; for 'tis neither more nor less than inquiring, whether we know God's Will better than he himself knows it. Falfe Revelations are no Revelations; and therefore to prefer Natural Religion before fuch pretended Revelations, is only to reject a Forgery: But to fuppofe that there is, or may be, a true Revelation, and yet to say that Natural Religion is a better Guide, is to say that we are wifer than God, and know better how to please him without

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without his Directions than with them. Upon this State of the Cafe then, a Revelation must be entirely rejected as a Forgery, or entirely submitted to; and the only Debate between Natural Religion and Revelation must be, whether we really have a Revelation, or no; and not whether Revelation or Nature be, in the Nature of Things, the best and fureft Foundation of Religion: Which Dispute but ill becomes our Condition, and is a vain Attempt to exalt ourselves and our own Reason above every Thing that is called God.

Since then Revelation, confidered as fuch, must needs be the fureft Guide in Religion, every reasonable Man is bound to confider the Pretenfions of Revelation, when offered to him; for no Man can justify himself in relying merely on Natural Religion, till he has fatisfied himself that no better Directions are to be had. For, fince 'tis the Bufinefs of Religion to please God, is it not a very natural and a very reasonable Inquiry to make, whether God has any-where declared what will please him? at least, 'tis reasonable when we are called to this Inquiry, by having a Revelation tendered to us, supported by fuch Evidence, which, though it may be

eafily rejected without Reason, yet to Reafon will ever approve itself.

But the Inquiry into the Evidence for any particular Revelation is excluded by those who argue against all Revelation a priori, as being inconfiftent with the Wisdom of God. What they fay amounts to this; That God, having given us Reafon, has bound us to obey the Dictates of Reason, and tied himself down to judge us by that Rule, and that only: To fuppofe otherwise, they imagine, would be to maintain that God gave us an imperfect Rule at first, and which wanted to be mended; a Thing, they imagine, inconfiftent with his Wifdom: And, the Rule of Reafon being fufficient, all Revelation, they judge, must be useless and impertinent, and confequently can never derive itself from God. But, as it is too apparent to be denied, that Reafon and Natural Religion never did in any Age univerfally, prevail; to help out the Argument, it is farther fuppofed, that whatever happens in the World is agreeable to the original Defign of God, and confequently, that those who have least of Reason and Natural Religion, are in the State for which God defigned them; and, if fo, 'tis abfurd to fuppofe a Revelation should be

given, to take Men out of that State in which God originally defigned to place them.

This is the Sum of the Argument against Revelation a priori: To confider it particularly will take more Time than can be allowed: But in brief we may observe,

1. That to argue from the Perfection of human Reason, that we are discharged from receiving any new Laws from God, is inconfiftent with as clear a Principle of Reason as any whatever, and which neceffarily arises from the Relation between God and Man; which is, That the Creature is bound to obey the Creator, in which Way foever his Will is made known to him: And this furely is true with respect to the highest Order of Beings, as well as to the loweft; for this Plea, now made for human Reason, would be presumptuous in the Mouth of an Angel, and inconfiftent with the Subjection he owes to God.

2. As to the Perfection of human Reason, it cannot be, nor, I fuppofe, will it be maintained, that human Reason is abfolutely perfect; and therefore the Meaning must be, that Reason is relatively perfect, confidered as the Rule of our Obedience. But this is true only upon Suppofition that Reason is the only Rule of our Obedience; for, if

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there be any other Rule befides, mere Reason cannot be the perfect Rule of our Obedience: And therefore this Argument is really begging the Thing in question; for it supposes there is no other Rule but Reason, which is the Thing not to be fuppofed, but to be proved. As much may be faid for every Law, as is faid in this Cafe for human Reafon: Every Law, being the only Law in the Cafe, is a perfect Rule for the Subject's Obedience, because the Subject is bound to no more than the Law requires: But, if the Law be amended and enlarged by the fame Authority that made it, it is no longer a perfect Rule of Obedience; but, to make it such, it must be taken jointly with the Corrections and Enlargements made by the proper Authority.

3. Hence it follows, that to alter or add to a Law once confidered as a perfect Rule of Obedience, when an Alteration of Circumstances requires it, is neither useless nor impertinent, but oftentimes the Effect of Wisdom and Neceffity.

4. To fay that Revelation is unneceffary, because Reason is a perfect Rule, and at the fame time to affirm that thofe who have but an imperfect Ufe of Reafon have no Need of Revelation, is a manifeft Contradiction: To fay farther, that those who are

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