CHAPTER II. PERSONS BY WHOM A SUIT MAY BE INSTITUTED. SECTION I. The Queen's Attorney-General. any All persons may sue in Equity. entitled to the assistance of a Court of Equity: Ir is a general rule, subject to very few exceptions, that there is no sort or condition of persons who may not sue in the Court of Chancery, and this rule extends from the highest person in the State to the most distressed pauper. The Queen herself has the same right which a subject has to The Queen institute proceedings in her own Courts for the assertion of right which she claims, either on behalf of herself or others; and the same principles which entitle a subject to the assistance of a Court of Equity to enable him to assert his legal rights, are equally applicable to the Sovereign. Thus a suit has been instituted on behalf of the Queen to have the benefit of a discovery, from persons charged to be aliens, of the place of their birth, in order to assist her in a commission to inquire into their lands, with the view of seizing them into her hands by inquisition.1 For the same reason, where an office cannot be found for the Crown without the aid of a Court of Equity, the Court will, at the suit of the Crown, interfere to restrain the commission of waste in the mean time.2 may sue in It has been said, that the Queen is not bound to assert her rights in any particular Court, but that she may sue in any of her any Court. Courts which she pleases, without reference to the question whether the subject-matter of her suit is such as comes within the peculiar jurisdiction of such Court. Thus she may have a quare impedit in the Queen's Bench, or she may elect to sue either in a Court of Common Law, or in a Court of Equity.5 Upon an accurate examination, however, of the cases that have given rise to these general assertions of the rights of the Crown, it appears that equitable grounds were alleged in each case for instituting the proceedings in Chancery. It seems, nevertheless, to be true, that the Queen may proceed, in questions relating to 1 Du Plessis v. Attorney-General, 1 Bro. P. C. ed. Toml. 415, 419. 2 Attorney-General v. Du Plessis, 2 Ves. $286. As to office found, see now 22 & 23 Vic. c. 21, § 25. & 11 Rep. 68 B; ib. 75 A; Plowden, 236, 240, 244. 4 11 Rep. 68 B. 5 The King v. Countess Dowager of Arundel, Hob. 109; Attorney-General v. Vernon, Vern. 277, 370; 2 Ch. R. 353; 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 75, pl. 1; 133, pl. 16; and see the cases cited 8 Beav. 283, and the Judgment, p. 287. CH. II. § 1. the property to which she is entitled in right of her Crown, either in a Court of Law or in a Court of Equity; and that where she has caused a Court of Equity to be informed that an intrusion has been committed on her land, although no matter of equitable jurisdiction has been stated, yet the information has been entertained but in such cases, if any question of law arises, the Court will put it in the course of trial by a Court of Law, and retain the information till the result of such trial is known.1 As a general rule, suits on behalf of the Crown are instituted in the Court which, by its constitution, is most properly adapted to the case, and the Court of Exchequer being the general Court for all business relating to the Queen's revenue or property, the practice has been to institute there all proceedings relating to the property of the Crown. By the 5 Vic. c. 5, § 1, however, it is enacted, "that on the 15th day of October, 1841, all the power, authority, and jurisdiction of her Majesty's Court of Exchequer at Westminster as a Court of Equity, and all the power, authority, and jurisdiction which shall have been conferred on or committed to the said Court of Exchequer by or under the special authority of any Act or Acts of Parliament (other than such power, authority, and jurisdiction as shall then be possessed by, or be incident to, the said Court of Exchequer as a Court of Law, or as shall then be possessed by the said Court of Exchequer as a Court of Revenue, and not heretofore exercised or exercisible by the same Court, sitting as a Court of Equity), shall be, by force of this Act, transferred and given to her Majesty's High Court of Chancery, to all intents and purposes, in as full and ample a manner as the same might have been exercised by the said Court of Exchequer, if this Act had not passed." The construction of the Act afterwards came before Lord Langdale M. R. in the case of The Attorney-General v. The Corporation of London, when his Lordship said he thought "the almost unavoidable construction of the Act made it so operate, as to leave to the Court of Exchequer every thing that was not exercised or exercisible by that Court as a Court of Equity, and to transfer to the Court of Chancery all that was exercised or exercisible by the Court of Exchequer as a Court of Equity." It appears, as the result of that case, that, in the opinion of Lord Langdale, in all matters affecting the rights, property, and revenue of the Crown, the Court of Exchequer, sitting on the Equity side, had, before the Act, a jurisdiction, notwithstanding the Crown might, in the particular 1 Attorney-General to the Prince of Wales v. Sir J. St. Aubyn, Wightw. 167, and the cases there cited; see also Attorney-General v. The Mayor of Plymouth, id. 134. 2 In Massachusetts, the Supreme JudiIcial Court has the general Equity jurisdic tion; but in certain specified cases Equity cases, have had a legal remedy, and that this jurisdiction has by CH. II. § 1. the Act been transferred to the Court of Chancery; and that, by virtue of that transfer, the Crown is now enabled, in matters of revenue dependent upon legal rights, to sue in the Court of Chancery, even though there would be no jurisdiction in similar cases between subject and subject. The decision in this case was affirmed by the House of Lords; but their lordships carefully avoided determining this question, as to which they expressed great doubt. In whatever way this question may be ultimately decided, it has been held by the Court of Exchequer that it still retains an equitable jurisdiction in matters of revenue. Where the Court of Chancery would have jurisdiction, as between subject and subject, it seems clear that the Crown may file an information in that Court for an account. The Attor or if no Attor ney-General, the Solicitoron behalf of the Crown in General sues In all cases where the rights of the Queen, or of those who partake of her prerogative, are the subject of the suit, the name ney-General, of the Queen is not made use of as the party complaining, but the matter of complaint is offered to the Court by way of information given by the proper officer. That officer, if the information is exhibited in any of the Superior Courts at Westminster, is the Attorney-General, or if the office of Attorney-General should happen to be vacant, the Solicitor-General.* the Superior Courts." tions where not immediately con the Crown is cerned: Besides the cases in which the immediate rights of the Crown of informaare concerned, the Queen's officers may, in some cases, institute proceedings on behalf of those who claim under the Crown, by grant or otherwise; or, more correctly speaking those who claim under the Crown may make use of the Queen's name, or of that of her proper officer, for the purpose of asserting their right against of Crown's a third party. Thus a chose in action may be assigned to the a chose in Queen, and may also be granted or assigned by her to another action; person; and, in the latter case, the grantee may either sue for it 1 1 H. L. Ca. 440. 2 Attorney-General v. Halling, 15 M. & W. 687, 700; Attorney-General v. Hallett, id. 97; 8 Beav. 288, n. but see Attorney-General v. Kingston, 6 Jur. 155, Eq. The procedure in suits by information in the Court of Exchequer relating to the revenues of the Crown is now regulated by The Crown Suits Act, 1865" (28 & 29 Vic. c. 104), and Reg. Gen. Exch. 14th March, 1866; L. R. 1 Ex. 389; 12 Jur. N. S. P. II. 182. 8 Attorney-General v. Edmunds, L. R. 6 Eq. 381, 392, V. C. G.; and see Attorney-General v. Corporation of London, 1 H. L. Cas. 440; see also the case of York Building Company. 4 Ld. Red. 7, 21, 22; Wilkes's case, 4 Burr. 2527; Story Eq. Pl. § 49; 1 Smith Ch. Pr. 99, 100. Rights purely public are to be enforced in the name of the State, or the officer in- While the office of Attorney-General was on behalf grantee of CH. II. § 1. in his own name, or in that of the Queen;1 but if he sues in his own name, he must make the Attorney-General a party to his suit. Thus, where A., having outlawed B., brought a bill against C., a trustee for B., with respect to an annuity, to subject this annuity to the plaintiff's debt; and the Court held, that forasmuch as by the outlawry all the defendant's interest, as well equitable as legal, was vested in the Crown, the plaintiff must not only get a grant thereof from the Crown, but must make the Attorney-General a party to the suit.2 on behalf of the Queen, as supreme head of the Church; as parens patriæ, for Informations may also be exhibited by the Attorney-General, or other proper officer, in support of the rights of those whose protection devolves upon the Crown as supreme, head of the Church. Thus, the Queen, as supreme head of the Church, is the proper guardian of the temporalities of the bishoprics; and an information may, therefore, be brought by the Attorney-General to stay waste committed by a bishop.3 In like manner, the Attorney-General may exhibit informations charities, &c. on behalf of individuals who are considered to be under the protection of the Crown as parens patriæ: such as the objects of general charities, idiots, and lunatics. Moreover, this privilege of the Attorney-General is not confined to suits on behalf of charities strictly so called, but has been held, in many instances, to extend to cases where funds have been made applicable to legal and general purposes. The rule in such cases appears to be, "that where property affected by a trust for public purposes, is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege of the public that the Crown should be entitled to intervene by its officer, for the purpose of asserting, on behalf of the public generally, that public interest and that public right which probably no individual could be found willing effectually to assert, even if the interest were such as to allow it."? 1 Dyer, 1 Pl. 7, 8; Keilw. 169; 5 Bac. Ab. tit. Prerog. F. 3; Miles v. Williams, 1 P. Wms. 249, 252; Earl of Stafford v. Buckley, 2 Ves. S. 170, 181. 2 Balch v. Wastall, 1 P. Wms. 445; Hayward v. Fry, id. 446; see also Rex v. Fowler, Bunb. 38. 8 Knight v. Mosely, Amb. 176; Wither v. D. & C. of Winchester, 3 Mer. 421, 427; Jefferson v. Bishop of Durham, 1 Bos. & Pull. 129, 131. 4 See Attorney-General v. Clergy Society, 8 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 190; Wright v. Trustees of Meth. Epis. Church, 1 Hoff. Ch. R. 202; 2 Kent (11th ed.) 285-288, 4 id. 507. 5 See Norcom v. Rogers, 1°C. E. Green (N. J.), 484. 6 Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Swanst. 265; Attorney-General v. Corporation of Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220, 227; Evan v. Corporation of Avon, 29 Beav. 144; 6 Jur. N. S. 1361; Attorney-General v. Corpora tion of Lichfield, 11 Beav. 120; AttorneyGeneral v. Corporation of Norwich, 16 Sim. 225, 229; Attorney-General v. Guardians of Southampton, 17 Sim. 7, 18; Attorney-General v. Eastlake, 11 Hare, 205; 17 Jur. 801; Attorney-General v. Mayor of Wigan, Kay, 268; 5 De G. M. & G. 52; 18 Jur. 299: Attorney-General v. West Hartlpool Improvement Commissioners, W. N. (1870) 107; 18 W. R. 685, V. C. G.; L. R. 10 Eq. 152. 7 Per Sir J. L. Knight Bruce, V. C. in Attorney-General v. Compton, 1 Y. & C. C. 417, 427. In Massachusetts under Genl. Sts. c. 14, § 20, the Attorney-General is required to enforce the due application of funds given or appropriated to public charities within the State, and prevent breaches of trust in the administration thereof. The power of the AttorneyGeneral or public prosecutor to institute a proceeding for the enforcement of a public charity, is a common-law power, Suits on behalf of idiots and lunatics are usually instituted by CH. II. § 1. the committees of their estates; but sometimes, where there has been no committee, or where the interest of the committee was on behalf of idiots and likely to clash with that of the persons whose estates were under lunatics; his care, informations have been exhibited on their behalf by the Attorney-General, as the officer of the Crown. Where informations have been filed on behalf of persons found lunatic, but who have had no committee appointed, the Court will proceed to give directions for the care of the property of the lunatic, and for proper proceedings to obtain the appointment of a committee.2 Persons incapable of acting for themselves, though not coming under the description of idiots or lunatics, have been permitted to sue by their next friend, without the intervention of the AttorneyGeneral.3 unless to avoid his own acts; It seems that when an information is filed on behalf of a lunatic, lunatic must he must be named as a party to the suit, and that merely naming be a party, him as a relator will not be sufficient; a distinction, however, appears to be taken between cases where the object of the suit is to avoid some transaction of the lunatic, on the ground of his incapacity, and those in which it is merely to affirm a contract entered into by him for his benefit, or to assert some claim on his behalf. In the former case it was held, that the lunatic ought not to be named as plaintiff, because no man can be heard to stultify himself; if he is named, however, it will be no ground for demurrer. The reason for making a lunatic a party in proceedings of this nature appears to be, that as no person can be bound by a decree in a suit to which he, or those under whom he derives title, are not parties, and as a luuatic may recover his understanding, the decree will not have the effect of binding him unless he is a party to the suit; and upon the same principle it is held, that where a suit is instituted on behalf of the lunatic by his committee, the committee must be named as a co-plaintiff, in order that the right which the committee acquires in the lunatic's estate, by virtue of the grant from the Crown, may be barred. The incident to the office. Parker v. May, 5 Cush. 336, 338, per Shaw C. J. See Wright v. The Trustees of the Meth. Epis. Church, 1 Hoff. Ch. R. 202; 2 Kent (11th ed.), 285– 288 notes. 1 Attorney-General v. Parkhurst, 1 Cha. Ca. 112; Attorney-General v. Woolrich, id. 153; Attorney-General v. Tyler, 1 Dick. 378: 2 Eden, 230; Norcom v. Rogers, 1 C. E. Green (N. J.), 484. If the plaintiff appear upon the face of the bill to be a lunatic, and no next friend or committee is named in the bill, the objection may be raised by demurrer or by motion to take the bill from the files. Norcom v. Rogers, 1 C. E. Green (N. J.), 484. 2 Attorney-General v. Howe, Ld. Red. 30, n. (m). 3 Liney v. Wetherley, Ld. Red. 30, n. (n); Light v. Light, 25 Beav. 248; West v. Davis, Rolls, 1863, W. No. 83, and see post, Chap. III. § 7, Idiots and Lunatics (Plaintiffs). 4 Attorney-General v. Tyler, 1 Dick. 378; Ridler v. Ridler, Eq. Ca. Ab. 279. See Story Eq. Pl. § 64; Gorham v. Gorham, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 24. 5 Attorney-General v. Parkhurst, 1 Cha. Ca. 112; Attorney-General v. Woodrich, 1 Cha. Ca. 153. 6 Ridler v. Ridler, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 279 pl. 5; and see Tothill, 130. 7 Norcom v. Rogers, 1 C. E. Green (N. |