posed by the policy of Artaxerxes, in distributing sums of money amongst the several states; invincible in arms, and tơ the sword, but not to the gold and presents of the Persians; so remote were they in this respect from the character of the ancient Greeks their forefathers. To comprehend aright how much Sparta and Athens dif fered from what they had been in former times, we have only to compare the two treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the former by Cimon the Athenian* under Artaxerxes Longimanus above 60 years before, and the latter by Antalcides the Lacedæmonian under Artaxerxes Mnemon. In the first, Greece, victorious and triumphant, assures the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, gives the law to the Persians, imposes what conditions it pleases, and prescribes bounds and limits, by prohibiting them to approach nearer to the sea with their troops than the distance of three days march; or to appear with long vessels in any of the seas between the Cyanæan and Chalidonian islands, that is to say, from the Euxine to the coasts of Pamphilia. In the second, on the contrary, Persia, grown haughty and imperious, takes pleasure in humbling its conquerors, in depriving them, with the single stroke of a pen,, of their empire in Asia Minor, in compelling them to abandon basely all the Greeks established in those rich provinces, to subscribe to their own subjection, and to confine themselves, in their turn, within the narrow bounds of Greece. From whence can so strange an alteration arise? Are there not on both sides the same cities, the same people, the same forces, and the same interest? No doubt there are: but they are not the same men, or rather, they have no longer the same principles of policy. Let us recal those happy times of Greece, so glorious for Athens and Sparta, when Persia came pouring `like a deluge upon this little country with all the forces of the east. What was it that rendered the two cities invincible and superior to such numerous and formidable armies? Their union and good understanding. No dissension between the two states, no jealousy of command, no private view of interest; in fine, no other contests between them but of honour, glory, and the love of their country. To so laudable an union may be added an irreconcilable hatred for the Persians, which became a kind of nature in the Greeks, and was the most distinguishing character of that nation. It was a capital crime, and punished with death, only to mention peace, or propose any accommodation with them; and an Athenian mother was seen to throw the first stone at her son, who had dared to make such a motion, and to set others the example of stoning him. * Diod, I. xii. p. 74,75 Isoc. in Panegyr. p. 149 Book IX. This strict union of the two states, and declared abhorrence of the common enemy, were a long time the potent barriers of their security, rendered them invincible, and may be said to have been the source and principle of all the glorious successes which raised the reputation of Greece to so high a pitch. But by a misfortune common to the most flourishing states, those very successes became the cause of its ruin, and prepared the way for the disgraces it experienced in the sequel. * These two states, which might have carried their victorious arms into the heart of Persia, and have attacked in their turn the great king upon the throne itself; instead of forming in concert such an enterprise, which would at once have crowned them with glory, and laden them with riches, have the folly to leave their common enemy at repose, to embroil themselves with each other upon trivial points of honour, and interests of little importance, and to exhaust the forces ineffectually against themselves, which ought to have been employed solely against the barbarians, who could not have resisted them : for it is. remarkable, that the Persians never had any advantage over the Athenians or Lacedæmonians whilst they were united with each other, and that it was their own divisions only which supplied them with the means to conquer both alternately, and always the one by the other.. These divisions induced them to take such measures, as neither Sparta nor Athens would ever have otherwise been capable of. We see both the one and the other dishonour themselves by their mean and abject flatteries, not only of the king of Persia, but even of his satraps; pay their court to them,. earnestly solicit their favour, cringe to them, and even suffer their ill humour; and all this to obtain some aid of troops or money, forgetting that the Persians, haughty and insolent to such as seemed afraid of them, became timorous and little to those who had the courage to despise them. But in fine, what did they gain by all these mean condescensions? The treaty which gave occasion for these reflections, and will for-ever be the reproach of Sparta and Athens. SECTION VI.. WAR OF ARTAXERXES AGAINST EVAGORAS. WHAT I have said upon the facility with which the Greeks might have rendered themselves formidable to their enemies,. will be more evident if we consider, on one side, the diversity of people, and extent of country, which composed the vast empire of the Persians, and, on the other, the weakness of the government, incapable of animating so great a mass, and of Isoc. in Panegyr. p. 132-137, In Panath. p. 524, 525. supporting the weight of so much business and application. At the court every thing was determined by the intrigues of women, and the cabals of favourites, whose whole merit often consisted in flattering their prince, and soothing his passions.. It was upon their credit officers were chosen, and the first dig-nities disposed of; by their opinion the services of the generals of armies were judged, and their rewards decided. The sequel will show, that from the same source arose the insurrection of provinces, the distrust of the greatest part of the governors, the discontent and consequential revolt of the best officers, and the ill success of almost all the enterprises that were formed. Artaxerxes having got rid of the care and perplexity which the war with the Greeks had occasioned, applied himself to the terminating that of Cyprus, which had lasted several years, but had been carried on with little vigour, and turned the greatest part of his forces that way.. * Evagoras reigned at that time in Salamin, the capital city of the isle of Cyprus. He was descended from Teucer of Salamin, who at his return from Troy built this city, and gave it the name of his country. His descendants had reigned there from that time: but a stranger of Phoenicia, having dispos sessed the lawful king, had taken his place, and to maintain himself in the usurpation, had filled the city with barbarians, and subjected the whole island to the king of Persia. Under this tyrant Evagoras was born, of whose education great care was taken. He was distinguished among the youth by the beauty of his aspect, the vigour of his body, and more by the modesty and innocence of his manners, which are the greatest ornaments of that age. As he advanced in years, the greatest virtues, valour, wisdom, and justice, were observed to brighten in him. He afterwards carried these virtues to so conspicuous a height as to give jealousy to those that governed; who perceived justly that so shining a merit could not continue in the obscurity of a private condition; but his modesty, probity and integrity, reassured them, and they reposed an entire confidence in him, to which he always answered by: an inviolable. fidelity, without ever meditating their expulsion from the throne by violence or treachery. A more justifiable means conducted him to it; divine providence, as Isocrates says, preparing the way for him.. One of the principal citizens murdered the person upon the throne, and had contrived to seize Evagoras, and to rid himself of him, * Isocrat. in Evag. p. 380. This Teucer was of Salamim, a little island near Athens, cele brated for the famous battle under Xerxes. Et qui ornat ætatem, pudor. Cic. in order to secure the crown to himself; but that prince escaping his pursuit, retired to Solos, a city of Cilicia. His banish-ment was so far from abating his courage, that it gave him new vigour. Attended only with 50 followers, determined like himself to conquer or die, he returned to Salamin, and expelled the usurper, though supported by the credit and protection of the king of Persia. Having re-established himself in Salamin, he soon rendered his little kingdom most flourishing, by his application to the relief of his subjects, and by pro-tecting them in all things; by governing them with justice and benevolence; by making them active and laborious; by inspiring them with a taste for the cultivation of lands, the breeding of cattle, commerce, and navigation. He formed them also for war, and made them excellent soldiers. * He was already very powerful, and had acquired great reputation, when Conon, the Athenian general, after his defeat at Egospotamos, took refuge with him ; not thinking it pos sible to find a safer asylum for himself, nor a more powerful support of his country. The resemblance of their manners and sentiments soon made them contract a strict amity with each other, which continued ever after, and proved equally advantageous to both. Conon was in great credit at the king of Persia's court, which he employed with that prince, by the means of Ctesias, the physician, to accommodate his differences with his host Evagoras, and happily effected it. Evagoras and Conon, with the great design of subverting, or at least of reducing, the great power of Sparta, which had rendered itself formidable to all Greece, concerted together the means for the attainment of that end. They were both citizens of Athens; the latter by birth, and the other by right of adoption, which his great services and zeal for that republic had deserved. The satraps of Asia saw with pain their country ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, and found themselves in great difficulties, from not being in a condition to make head against them. Evagoras remonstrated to them, that it was necessary to attack the enemy as well by sea as land; and he did not contribute little by his credit with the king of Persia, to Conon's being appointed general of his fleet. The celebrated victory over the Lacedæmonians at Cnidos was the consequence, and gave the mortal wound to that republic, The Athenians, in acknowledgment of the important ser vices Evagoras and Conon had rendered them with Artaxerxes, erected statues in honour of them. *A. ME: 3599. Ant. J. C. 405. Isocrat. in Evag. p. 393-395. †A. M. 3605. Ant. J. C. 392. A. M. 3606. Ant. J. C 398. Pausan. 1. i. p. 5. Evagoras, on his side, extending his conquests from city to city, endeavoured to make himself master of the whole island. The Cypriots had recourse to the king of Persia. That prince, alarmed by the rapid progress of Evagoras, of which he ap prehended the effects, and conscious of what importance it was to him to prevent an island's falling into the hands of an enemy so favourably situated for holding Asia Minor in awe, promised them an immediate and powerful support, without declaring openly, however, against Evagoras. Being employed elsewhere by more important affairs, he could not keep his word with them so soon as he expected, and had engaged. That war of Cyprus continued six years; and the success with which Evagoras supported it against the great king, ought to have banished from the Greeks all terror of the Persian name, and united them against the common enemy. It is true, the succours sent by Artaxerxes till then were little considerable, as they also were the two following years. During all that time, it was less a real war, than a preparation for war: but when he had disengaged himself from the Greeks, he applied to it vigorously, and attacked Evagoras with all his forces. The army by land, commanded by Orontes his son-in-law, consisted of 300,000 men, and the fleet of 300 galleys; of which Tiribasus, a Persian of the highest rank and greatest reputation, was admiral. Gaos his son-in-law commanded under him. Evagoras, on his side, assembled as many troops and ships as he could: but they were an handful in comparison with the formidable preparation of the Persians. He had a fleet of only 90 galleys, and his army scarce amounted to 20,000 men. As he had abundance of light vessels, he laid snares for those that carried the provisions of the enemy, of which he sunk a great number, took many, and prevented the rest from arriving; which occasioned a famine among the Persians, attended with violent seditions, which could only be ap peased by the coming of fresh convoys from Cilicia. Evagoras strengthened his fleet with 60 galleys, which he caused to be built, and 50 sent him by Achoris, king of Egypt, with all the money and corn he could have occasion for. Evagoras, with his land forces, attacked immediately a part of the enemy's army, which was separate from the rest, and entirely routed it. This first action was soon followed by another at sea, in which the Persians were worsted for some time, till, animated by the warm reproaches and remonstrances of their admiral, they resumed courage, and obtained a com Diod: I. xiv. p. 311. $ A. M. 3614. Ant. J. C. 396. A. M. 3618. Ant. J. C. 336. Isocrat. in Paneg. p. 135, 136, |