tempts had been made to set me spying, Don't tell me any more of it. What is after her, and that I might have yielded to them, but for my own lofty sense of being a victorious veteran, and the way in which I was conquered by her extraordinary beauty.

and sometimes an officer behind them. If they should happen to come up the river, or go ashore upon business here, you need not I mean, you will quite understand that no harm whatever is intended to me, and therefore that you may - you see what I mean."

fowl for them. But she advised me on no account to have any talk with Nanette, or any servants of the household, whether male or female, not only because of the wicked reports and cruel slanders prevailing, but also that it might not be known how I was to act in her interest. And then having ordered me a good hot dinner in the butler's pantry, as often was done for poor people, she let me go once, and then called me back, and said, "Oh, nothing;" and then called me again, and said, looking steadily out of the window, "By "Quite so," she replied, looking bravely the by, I have quite forgotten to say that round, with as much of pride in her bright there is a boat belonging to a ship com- blue eyes as of colour on her soft fresh manded by a son of Sir Philip Bampfylde, | cheeks. So I made my best bow and dea white boat, with three oars on each side, parted.

"To be sure, to be sure, my lady. Of course, I may quit my duty so long as there is a man-of-war's boat in the river: even the boldest and worst of men would venture nothing against you then."

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A CHARACTERISTIC story of King Victor Emmanuel is related by M. d'Ideville, formerly French chargé d'affaires at Turin, in his diary now in course of publication in the Journal de Paris. The King, having received a letter from Napoleon III., in which the latter evoked certain promises he had made to him on a former occasion, was furious, and took the first opportunity of venting his anger on the Emperor's representative. At the next court ball he summoned Prince Latour d'Auvergne to his presence in a private room, and addressed him in these words. "After all, what is this Emperor of yours! the last comer among the European Sovereigns-an intruder and a parvenu. Let him remember what he is, and what I am I, the head of the first and oldest Royal dynasty that now reigns in Europe." Prince Latour listened to this outburst with as much calmness as he could command, and then observed, "Sire, you will permit me not to have heard a single word that you have spoken." The King said nothing and turned away. In the course of the evening, however, he came again to the Prince, and tapping him familiarly on the shoulder, whispered in his ear with a smile, "You need not report our conversation of to-day to Paris, cher prince. Besides, you told me yourself that you did not hear what I said.”

THE Russian Government has, after a long hesitation decided finally to dismantle the fortress of Riga on account of its strategically unfavourable situation, and to convert it into an open town. The fortifications have long been out of repair. The works were begun in 1650, and completed in 1708, standing several sieges while in progress. The Russians first besieged the city in 1656, the Saxon and Polish armies

tested the strength of the walls next in 1700, and the Russians followed a second and a third time in 1705 and 1709. The citadel capitulated on the 4th of July, 1710. During the last twenty or thirty years the place has been only nominally a fortress; some of the walls were removed in 1852, and now the city has, by an agreement with the Government, undertaken to complete the dismantlement within five years.

It seems that if German military men have their Kriegs-Spiel, French authors have what we may call their Romans-Spiel. A sale is announced as about to take place in Paris, of the puppets or marionettes which the late M. Ponson du Terrail, the well-known romance writer, made use of when employed in composing the voluminous feuilletons for which he was so celebrated. These puppets, which represent the various characters of the author's different novels, are small dolls about one foot high; their faces were carved expressly for M. du Terrail's use by M. Dollégus, a Swiss artist. These ma rionettes are divided into groups, each group bearing the name of the story in which the personages composing it played a part. For his great in length at least work of "Rocambole" the author had no fewer than 282 puppets. It should perhaps be mentioned that this last work fills nearly a score of closely printed voluines. M. Ponson du Terrail at one time contributed simultaneously five distinct novels to the feuilletons of five distinct journals in Paris; and it is not to be wondered at that he was driven to the use of mechanical contrivances in order to avoid confusing his plots. It is said that M. Paul Féval and M. Victorien Sardou employ the same plan. Pall Mall Gazette.

From The Contemporary Review. ON HIBERNICISMS IN PHILOSOPHY.

BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL.

the denial-this is a kind of blunder in which our Irish friends have many successful rivals. Among these rivals none, as it seems to me, are more successful than philosophers, and especially metaphysi cians. To the illustration of this - I fear somewhat irreverent proposition — this paper will be devoted.

MISS EDGEWORTH, in her entertaining "Essay on Irish Bulls," observes that "it has never yet been decided what it is that constitutes a bull." It appears, however, from the context that the definition she Let me say, in the first place, that there means is not the definition of a bull, are sayings which at first sight may appear but the definition of that kind of bull to involve a bull, but which in reality do which is supposed to be especially Irish. not. For example, Sir John Herschel, in And in this contention I think she proves one of his popular lectures on science, tells that the confusions of thought and lan- us that "light, although the cause of viguage which constitute a bull can be pro- sion, is in itself invisible." This is no duced abundantly from the writings of mere paradox invented to attract attenEnglish poets, statesmen, and philoso- tion, and to fix it on the explanation which phers. I am happy to observe that no is to follow. It is, indeed, an apparent Scotch example has been produced by this paradox, but only because the literal facts ingenious and charming authoress. Never- are not commonly apprehended. Light is a theless, candour obliges me to confess that word which means several different things. quite lately I heard a Scotch young lady First, and perhaps primarily, it signifies the of my acquaintance (who, however, has sensation of vision. Secondly, it means some English blood) in answer to the the (once) unknown external cause of that question, "Do you remember Donald Fer- sensation. The first of these two meanguson?" make the following discriminat-ings is regarded by Locke (I think erroing reply: "No; I recollect his face, but I neously) as the proper meaning of the don't recollect him by name." Probably word. But the second is unquestionably this is pretty nearly a perfect specimen. the idea which is uppermost in the comHere is another which Miss Edgeworth mon understanding of the term. We talk tells us was particularly admired by Lord Orford: "I hate that woman," said a gentleman looking at one who had been his nurse; “I hate that woman, for she changed me at nurse." In the same essay we are told of an Irishman who accosted an acquaintance thus: "When first I saw you, I thought it was you; but now I see it's your brother;" and of a petition which was addressed to a lady in Ireland whom Miss Edgeworth knew, which began, "That your poor petitioner is now lying dead in a ditch."

Now, I am disposed to think that Miss Edgeworth has done injustice to her country, when she disputes whether there is anything peculiar in Irish bulls. There is a neatness, completeness, and perspicuity of confusion in an Irish bull which is inimitable and unapproachable, and which constitutes at once its humour and its innocence. The bulls of other nations are comparatively clumsy; the confusions of thought which they involve are as complete, without being as apparent - having all the absurdity of the Irish bull without its fun. But the essence of a bull-the contradiction in terms, the assertion of something which is nevertheless denied in the very terms of the assertion, or conversely, the denial of something which is nevertheless asserted in the very terms of

of the light coming to us from one direction or another—from one body or another meaning, of course, not our sensation of light (which cannot come to us from anywhere), but the agency, whatever it may be, which produces that sensation in us. But neither do these two meanings exhaust all that is now meant by light. In neither of these two meanings would there be any sense in saying that "light is in itself invisible." For if by light is meant the sensation, the saying wonld be nonsense; and if by light were meant the immediate cause of vision, or the precise agency which produces it, then the saying would be untrue. The thing which causes vision, or which, more correctly speaking, is the object of vision, is not only visible, but it is the only thing in the world which is visible. Light, in this sense, is the thing and the one only thing which the human eye is made to see. But there is a third meaning in which Sir J. Herschel's assertion is strictly true. We now know what light is "in itself" that is to say, we know the nature and constitution of it, not in terms of the sensation it gives to us, but in terms of a wholly different order of conception. First, we know that it is a motion; secondly, we know that it is a motion of a particular kind; and, thirdly, we know that it is that motion in a medi

um having peculiar properties. Provision- it, and then to deny its conceivability, is a ally, and for want of a better, this medium bull. If the word or the phrase employed to has been called the "luminiferous ether." express it, is a word or a phrase representAnd it is of light in this sense that Sir J. ing an idea, then it is absurd to deny the Herschel speaks when he says that it is in- existence of that idea; and if the word or visible. It is now nearly seventy years phrase represents no idea, then it is equalsince Dr. Thomas Young startled and ly absurd to use it at all, and to make it amused the scientific world by announcing the subject of either affirmation or denial. his belief that this luminiferous ether "pervades the substance of all material bodies with little or no resistance, - as freely perhaps as the wind passes through a grove of trees." But when this ether is not agitated, it is invisible. Nay, more even when it is agitated, the movements of it are invisible, except when they come to us in a straight line, either directly from a luminous body, or indirectly by reflection from some other. In short, it may be sad that the luminiferous ether is like a vast ocean, which is never seen except where its waves break in surf. When these facts are apprehended, we see at once that Herschel's assertion of the invisibility of light, so far from being a bull that is, a confounding of ideas is a clearing up of our conceptions. If there is any apparent confusion in that assertion, it is not due to any confusion of ideas, but, on the contrary, it is due to a nicety of discrimination which the weakness of ordinary language fails to indicate.

In contrast with this, which illustrates one of the great aims and objects of philosophy, let us look at some of the many cases in which language is abused to cover contradictory propositions, or to cheat the mind into a semblance of ideas when there

are none.

To begin with-and to begin with a most distinguished country-man of my own, Sir William Hamilton-is not the very phrase," the Unconditioned," in itself a bull? "The" is the definite article, and applicable only to things or ideas capable of definition. But nothing is capable of definition which has no conditious. The negation of conditions is the negation of existence, as alone conceivable by man. "The Unconditioned" is, therefore, simply nonsense - that is to say, a word pretending to have a meaning, but having

But this case is carefully to be distinguished from another, with which it may easily be confounded. The necessities of language may compel us to place in momentary collocation, for the purpose of denial, two ideas which negative each other, and which thus make nonsense; the very object of the collocation being to show that such is the result. For example: "We cannot conceive any boundary to Space." Here, at first sight, it might appear as if we first speak of a conception, and then deny its conceivability. but this is not so. We have a distinct conception of a boundary, and a distinct conception of Space, and what we deny is that the idea of a boundary can be applied to the idea of Space, because the very conception of a boundary involves the conception of an outside as well as of an inside; and where there is an outside there must be space. Whatever, therefore, a boundary may be boundary of, it cannot be a boundary of Space.

Here, therefore, there is no confusion of thought in first describing an attempt ed combination of ideas, and then denying that this attempted combination can be made successfully - that is, with sense.

But what are we to say of the second of the three great metaphysical discoveries which Mr. Mill has just extolled as the great triumphs of Bishop Berkeley's philosophy, namely, the "non-existence of abstract ideas?"* It is not pretended that this phrase is in itself meaningless. It is not pretended that it involves an attempt to combine two ideas, the one of which excludes the other. On the contrary, the phrase is used over and over again, as having a definite meaning, which the mind can handle, examine, and analyze, by resolving it into the elements of which it is composed. But an idea cannot be proved to be non-existent by being In saying this I hope I am not commit- proved to be composite. For, just as the ting another blunder, which is very com- most solid and stable forms of matter in mon the blunder of denying the exist-physical nature are not elementary subence of some particular idea, which is stances, but combinations of them, so many nevertheless described and denoted by a of the most real and serviceable concepname. We read often nowadays of such tions of the mind are structures built out and such an idea being "unthinkable." If it be unthinkable, it had better also be considered as unspeakable. To speak of

none.

-

The Fortnightly Review, November 1, 1871, "Berkeley's Life and Writings."

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of the rudimentary elements of thought. indefinite number of individual objects, The Irishman who complained that he had and with these properties it is associated been changed at nurse is clear-headed, in a peculiarly close and intimate manner." compared with the philosopher who takes Well, to say that a word is "a mark" for up an abstract idea, examines it, describes an idea, is equivalent I suppose to saying it, and then denies its existence. And the that it means the idea. It appears then, absurdity of this blunder is made, if possi- that these general names mean, or “conble, more apparent, by the obvious impos- note," or are "a mark for," the properties, sibility of conducting the argument against or some of the properties, which are comthe existence of abstract ideas, without mon to many individuals. But what are perpetually making use of them in the properties? and especially what are comvery terms of the argument itself. Ab- mon properties? Is not this essentially an stract ideas are employed to give witness abstract idea? Mr. Mill indeed asserts against themselves. They are summoned that every "class name " calls up the idea into the witness-box, examined, and urged (image) of some individual as well as the to confess, like the poor Irishman, that special properties which it "marks." But they lie dead in a ditch." Mr. Mill pro- he admits that in this idea the common fesses to explain the psychological ma- properties of the class are made "artifichinery by which general names do their cially prominent;" and that all others may work without the help of general ideas," be unattended to, and thus "thrown into which seems to me very like explaining the shade." And so, the whole argument how mere words, which are denied their comes, after all, to be not a denial of the appropriate meaning, " do the work" of existence of abstract ideas, but an account ideas which are denied their appropriate of their origin and a definition of their name. How there could be any "help" in meaning. Of course, it may be perfectly general ideas, if they don't exist, I can't good sense to argue that the vulgar unconceive. And how general names can do derstanding of a word is an erroneous any "work" in the operations of mind if one, and to put a better defined one in its they don't indicate general ideas, seems stead. But even in this point of view, equally hard to understand. And how Mr. Mill's definition seems to cast no new "general ideas" can be thus spoken of, light whatever on the common understandand argued about at all, if no such con- ing of the term, which is in close accordceptions can be formed, is the greatest ance with the etymological meaning of wonder of all. For here we have got "abstract." The idea of properties which general names which do not mean general are drawn forth from a group of others, ideas, but nevertheless do the same more or less completely separated from them, "work;" and we have got general ideas and brought into such mental prominence which would be very "helpful" if they as that all others are out of focus-cast existed, but then they don't. The only into the shade and practically out of mind solution of this puzzle would be, that the - this seems pretty much what everywhole discussion is one like some others body understands by an abstract idea. which Mr. Mill himself has elsewhere To analyze an idea and to trace its comsuccessfully exposed a logomachy-in ponent parts is a legitimate operation. which words are used without any mean- But to conceive it, describe it, define it, ing whatever, and solemn affirmations and and then affirm it to be non-existent, is denials are made all about nothing at all. very like a bull. But Mr. Mill seeing the (at least) apparent puzzie, offers a solution which deprives us even of this escape. He says, "the solution of this, as of so many difficulties, lies in the connotation of general names," and he lays especial stress on the point, that these "general names" are "not (like a proper name) mere words devoid of meaning." "General names," then, are not mere words without any signification. They have a meaning, and yet they do not mean general ideas. What then do they mean?

Mr. Mill's explanation is that a general name "is a mark for the properties or some of the properties which belong to an

There is another very similar process of metaphysical analysis which also passes readily into like confusions, and that is the process by which we trace the means through which particular ideas are arrived at. A brilliant example of the legitimate application of this process is the reasoning by which Bishop Berkeley has proved that the eye does not directly see that which we call distance, and that distance is an idea arrived at by the experience of other sensations, interpreting those of sight. The great opponent of the bishop, on this point, is the brush-turkey, which certainly sees distance the moment it is hatched, and without any experience at all. But