1853. The SHEFFIELD Gas Consumers' belief of his being a member of this partnership, and it may be very inequitable that one, who has allowed his name to be used, should not contribute with the other shareholders in paying liabilities incurred, by his perCompany mitting his name to be used. That is a totally different. (registered) equity from that of compelling a Defendant to execute HARRISON. a deed, and to become a partner in a concern unwillingly, and which partnership he may immediately put v. an end to. The last case cited by Mr. Daniel, Hutchinson v. The Surrey Gas Consumers' Company, seems to show, that this is no contract or agreement at all, and that it could not be enforced in a Court of Law, but I am satisfied that if there is any right, it is only to be enforced there. It is also to be observed, that although these joint stock companies have existed a great number of years, and cases of this description must have occurred frequently, yet I am not referred to, nor do I believe I could be referred to, any case in which such an attempt as the present has ever been made. This is, therefore, a purely speculative claim, and it must be dismissed with costs. NOTE. This claim was drawn on the authority of England v. Curling, 8 Beav. 129, which, however, was not cited in the argu ment. 1853. MACNAB v. WHITBREAD. July 5. A testator gave personal property to his all his real and DUNCAN UNCAN R. MACNAB gave and bequeathed all his freehold, leasehold and other personal property, whether in possession, remainder or expectancy, widow, her unto the Plaintiff, Charlotte Macnab, her heirs, execu- heirs, &c. " abtors, administrators and assigns, absolutely and for ever, for ever, in the solutely, and in the full assurance and confident hope that she would full assurance and confident bring up his children in the fear of God, and educate hope" that she and provide for them, the same as it would have been his intention, should it have pleased God to spare his life. The question was, whether the widow took the property absolutely, for her own benefit, or subject to precatory trust in favour of the testator's children? a Mr. R. Palmer and Mr. Heberden, for the widow. There is no trust for the children. The gift is to the widow, her heirs, &c. "absolutely," which is quite inconsistent with there being a trust for other persons. Again, the trust is too uncertain to be carried into execution, for how can it be ascertained what the intentions of the testator would have been if living? The object of the testator was, to place his widow in the same situation as himself, with an absolute power and control both over his property and children. They cited and commented at length on the following cases: would bring up, educate and provide for his children, as it would have been his in tention" if living. Held, that though the words " full assurance and confident hope" would create a precatory trust, yet the trusts were too obscure to carry into effect, and that the widow took absolutely. 1853. MACNAB v. cases: Abraham v. Alman ́a); Sale v. Moore (b); Curtis v. Rippon (c); Hoy v. Masters (d); Bardswell v. Bardswell (e); Pope v. Pope (f); Meredith v. Heneage (g); WHITBREAD. Benson v. Whittam (h); Knight v. Knight (i); Winch v. Brutton (k); Williams v. Williams (1); and see Webb v. Wools (m). Mr. W. D. Evans, for a trustee. There is a trust The whole gift is Mr. Godfrey, for the two children. in favour of the testator's children. subject to "the full assurance and confident hope" in their favour, and these words are quite sufficient, upon the authorities, to create a trust for them. Secondly, the trust can be ascertained by a reference as to what would be proper éducation and provision for them. Either the widow has a large discretionary power, or is entitled for life, with remainder to the children, with a power of selection to her. He cited Broad v. Bevan (n); Brown v. Casamajor (o); Raikes v. Ward (p); Briggs v. Penny (q); Woods v. Woods (r). Mr. Jackson, for an incumbrancer. The MASTER of the ROLLS. This is a very difficult and obscure will. It is almost impossible to decide such cases by others, but I have no (a) 1 Russ. 509. (k) 14 Sim. 379. 1853. MACNAB v. no doubt that the words "full assurance and confidence" are sufficient to create a trust. I am of opinion that the words that she will "educate and provide" for them, "in the same manner as it would have WHITBREAD. been my intention, should it have pleased God to spare my life," are too obscure to carry into effect. On the whole, I think, that I should best carry into effect the intention of the testator, by saying, that the widow took an absolute interest in the property, and I must make a declaration accordingly. CARTWRIGHT v. SHEPHEARD. THE July 7. The testator appointed A., B. and C. his executors and trustees, and devised and bequeathed to them his real and personal By his first codicil, after reciting his will, he revoked estate in trust. By a codicil, the appointment of Kinder as executor and trustee, and he desired that A., named in he devised and bequeathed his real and personal estate to Shepheard, Cartwright and Newport, upon the trusts declared by his will, and he appointed Newport one of his executors. By a second codicil, he expressed himself thus:-I desire Samuel Cartwright and William Kinder, named in his will as nominated D. made no alterdevise. Held, ation in the that A. still remained a trustee of the will. The testator appointed A., B. and C. to be trustees and executors. He revoked the appointment of C. as executor and trustee by his first codicil. By a second codicil he revoked the appointment of B. and C. as executors, but ratified his will except as altered thereby. Held, that the first codicil was not revoked, and that C. was not a trustee. 1853. CARTWRIGHT บ. SHEPHEARD. in my will as my executors, be no longer regarded as The question was, whether the Plaintiff Cartwright, though his appointment as executor had been revoked, was still a trustee of the will. Mr. Bevir, for the Plaintiff, argued, that the revocation was limited to the office of executor, and that the character of trustee remained. He cited Graham v. Graham (a). Mr. R. Palmer, Mr. Roupell and Mr. Renshaw, contrù, contended, that the Plaintiff was neither executor nor trustee; that the two characters were inseparably connected; and that the testator had, in a short way, expressed his intention of excluding him from both offices. Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Giffard, for other parties. The MASTER of the ROLLS. Your argument must go to this extent, that the second codicil revoked the devise to the Plaintiff. I am of opinion that there is no revocation of the devise of the real estate, and that Cartwright still remains a trustee. Mr. Welch, for Kinder, argued, that as the second codicil ratified and confirmed the will, except as it was altered (a) 16 Beav. 550. |