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-The COURT said that the directors were equally bound by all the orders made in the action, although it was commenced at the instance of the official liquidator, and that the defendant was entitled to have the interrogatories answered by them. Rule refused.

GALSWORTHY (Assignee of a Bankrupt) v. Scorr.-Action to recover a banker's draft for 6504, which came on for trial at Leeds before Mellor, J., and the verdict was taken for the plaintiff with leave to the defendant to move to enter it for him.-Manisty, Q. C. now moved. The draft had been indorsed specially to the bankrupt, who passed it away until it came to the hands of the Yorkshire Banking Company, of which the defendant is one of the registered public officers. The defendant had unintentionally omitted to indorse the draft when he passed it away, and the question was whether the plaintiff, as assignee, for that cause was entitled to recover upon it for the benefit of the Rule nisi.

estate.

SOLOMON V. ADAIR.-H. T Cole moved to set aside an order of Bramwell, B. giving the defendant leave to appear and defend in an action under the Bills of Exchange Act. Rule refused. THOMAS V. BRITTON-Ejectment; tried at Bristol and the plaintiff nonsuited.-Pindar moved pursuant to leave to enter the verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that the assignment of an outstanding term by a dower trustee ought to be presumed: (Doe v. Sibarne, 7 T. R. 2; ngland v. Slade, 4 T. R. 682; Sugd. V. & P. 399.) Rule nisi. CAPPER. THE CAMBRIAN RAILWAY COMPANY.-Horatio

- Lloyd moved for a rule calling on the company to take up and give to Mr. Capper a copy of the award for compensation made pursuant to the 35th section of the Companies Consolidation Act. Rule nisi. FOBERT v. O'HARA.-Action for the keep of a racehorse; tried at York before Smith, J., and verdict for the plaintiff for 3471-Hayes, Serjt. moved for a new trial. Rule nisi.

JOHNSON THE LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.-Action for the loss of a horse that was killed whilst under the care of the defendants as carriers. At the trial at Chester before Cockburn, C. J., the verdict passed for the defendants.-Brandt moved for a new trial upon affidavits, Rule nisi.

YOUNG . LAMEIRD.-Philbrick moved to set aside a nonsuit which had been obtained in the absence of the plaintiff, and after the cause had been struck out as was alleged. Rule nisi.

MITCHENOR v. HAMILTON.-Action to recover on a contract for the sale of the goodwill and stock-in-trade of a tailor: verdict for the plaintiff for 2114-J. Brown, Q. C. moved to enter the verdict for the defendant, on the ground that there was no sufficient contract in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Rule nisi.

DAVIS v. TRIGG.-Bush Cooper moved to discharge the defendant out of the custody of the sheriff of Surrey, on the ground of his discharge under deed of arrangement with his creditors. At chambers Lush, J. refused to make an order, being of opinion that the deed was not a deed under the Bankruptcy Act, s. 192. Rule nisi.

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SMITH V. LANCASTER-Temple, Q. C. moved in this case, which was tried at Lancaster, when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, to set aside the verdict as against evidence, and for a new trial. Rule nisi.

HANDO . THE LONDON, CHATHAM, AND DOVER RAILWAY COMPANY-Powell, Q. C. moved in this case for rule to set aside the verdict for the defendants and to enter it for the plaintiff for 1507. Rule nisi. DOVER . TOUSE.-Robinson, Serjt. moved in this case, in which a verdict was returned for the defendant, for a rule to enter the verdict for the plaintiff, non obstante veredicto. Rule nisi. NORMILE . BRADY.-Ballantine, Serjt. moved in this case, in which the plaintiff was nonsuited, for a rule to enter a verdict for the plaintiff. Rule nisi.

WORTHINGTON v. THE RIMNEY RAILWAY COMPANY.Giffard, Q. C. moved in this case, which was tried at Cardiff, for a rule to set aside the nonsuit and enter a vedict for the plaintiff for 501. Rule nisi.

Re CHAS. W. CRONSHAY.-T. Atkinson moved, on behalf of the above gentleman, who is an articled clerk, that the time of his service may be dated from the execution of his articles, and that a copy may be enrolled in lieu of the original, such original having been accidentally lost.

Application granted.

HUMPHRIES V. EMANUEL-Huddleston, Q. C. moved in this case, which was tried at Gloucester, for a rule to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff and to enter a nonsuit, or for a new trial. Rule refused.

KIRK v. MANNING.-Daly moved for a rule in this case, which was an issue tried in the Whitechapel County Court, to set aside the verdict for the defendant on the ground of surprise. Rule nisi.

Ex parte THE OVERSEERS OF ST. PHILIP AND PRIORS.This was a motion calling upon the poor-law auditor to show cause why a certiorari should not issue to remove a certain surcharge. Rule nisi.

STEPNEY V. THE BURRYPORT RAILWAY COMPANY-Allen moved for a rule to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff and enter it for the defendant, or for a nonsuit. Rule nisi. WEBB C. RENNIE-Daly and Thomas showed cause herein against a rule for a new trial on the ground of the verdict being against the weight of evidence.-M. Chambers, Q C. and Foollett in support. Cur, ade, vult.

Tuesday, Nov 6.

WOOLFORD . WRIGHT.-Thesiger moved in this case, in which a verdict was returned for the plaintiff with 107. damages, to set aside the verdict and enter it for the defendant, or to enter a nonsuit. Rule nisi.

ROACH. INSOLE-Karslake, Q. C. moved in this case, which was tried at Bristol, when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff with 214, 1s. damages, for a new trial on the grounds of the verdict being against the weight of

evidence and for misdirection.

Cur. adv. vult.

LACKHAM V. BULLAR-Mellish, Q. C. moved in this case, which was tried at Liverpool, when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff with 4617. 15s. 5d. damages, for a

new trial ou the ground of surprise and the discovery of fresh evidence. Rule nisi. GRIMALDI AND WIFE . THE LONDON GENERAL OMNIBUS COMPANY.-Giffard, Q. C. moved to set aside the verdict for the plaintiff for 2507, and for a new trial on the ground of the verdict being against evidence. Rule nisi.

EMANUEL V. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.Clarke moved in this case, in which a verdict was returned for the plaintiff with 40s. damages, to set aside the verdict and to enter a nonsuit. Rule nii. COTTERELL V. LORD DUDLEY.-Wood moved for a rule to change the venue herein from Bristol to Middlesex.

Rule nisi

HARVEY V. YEARSLEY.-Stock, Q. C. moved in this case, which was tried at Dorchester, when a verdict was returned for the defendant, for a new trial on the ground of the verdict being against the weight of evidence.

Rule refused.

HAMMOND v. CATTERMOLE.-Keane, Q C. moved in this case, which was tried at Norwich, when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, for a rule to enter it for the defendant. Rule nisi.

CORE . THE MANCHESTER, SHEFFIELD, AND LINCOLNSHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY.-Keane, Q. C. moved in this case, in which a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, for a rule for a new trial or to reduce the damages

Rule nisi to reduce the damages. COOPER. EVANS-E. James, Q. C. moved in this case, which was tried at Liverpool, when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, for a rule to enter it for the defendant. Rule nisi MORGAN V. HEMMING.-II. T. Cole moved in this case, which was tried at Bristol, when a verdict was returned for the plaintiff for 251, damages, for a rule for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was agaiust the evidence. Cur. ade, vull.

STOER V. CASTRIQUE.-Daly moved in this case, in which a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, for a rule to enter a nonsuit Rule refused. APPLEBY. THOMPSON. - Kemplay moved in this case, which was tried at Leeds, when the plaintiff was nonsuited, for a rule to enter a verdict for 751. Rale nisi.

LESTRANGE v. ROLT.-Keane, Q. C. moved in this case, in which a verdict was returned for the plaintiff with 1s. damages, for a rule to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial on the ground of misdirection and the verdict being against evidence. Rule nisi.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Reported by W. GRAHAM and M W. MCKELLAR, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK.
MICHAELMAS TERM 1866.
Friday, Nov. 2.

CHAPMAN. SHEPHERD-This action was tried before Byles, J. at the sittings in London in last term, when a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, with leave to move to enter it for the defendant The plaintiff was a stockbroker in the country, and not a member of the Stock Exchange, and being instructed by the defendant to purchase shares in Overend, Gurney, and Co. (Limited), he instructed a member of the Stock Exchange to purchase them. They were carried over several settling days, when a petition was presented to wind-up the company, and the vendor insisted on the purchase being completed. The broker in London having been obliged by the rules of the Stock Exchange to pay the purchase-money, the plaintiff paid him and then brought this action to recover the amount from the defendant.-Griffits now moved for a rule to enter the verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the London stockbroker was the proper party to sue and that neither the plaintiff nor the London stockbroker had authority to pay the money after the petition to wind-up was presented. Rule nisi on the latter point only.

THE SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY (apps.) v. REEVES (resp.)-This was an appeal on a case stated by justices in petty sessions, raising a question as to the right of the respondent to take toll for waggons carrying goods supplied by a contractor to Her Majesty's troops at Aldershott. At the hearing no counsel appeared for the respondent, and counsel for the appellants having been heard, the Court gave judgment for the appellants.Keogh now applied to the court to allow the case to be re-entered on the ground that he had handed his brief to another counsel who had failed to attend.-The COURT stated that he could raise the question again, but they would not interfere to alter the judgment they had given. Leave refused.

NORTH. GILLING AND ANOTHER-This was an action for negligently keeping a ferocious dog; tried before Willes, J. at the last assizes at Hereford, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff for 101-Thesiger now moved to enter a nonsuit or a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that there was no evidence that the defendant knew that the dog was accustomed to bite mankind.-The COURT were of opinion that there was ample evidence.

Rule refused.

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the captain to blame, first, for misrepresenting the weight of the stone which caused the damage; secondly, for allowing the unloading to take place at low water instead of high water; thirdly, for urging the continuance of proceedings after warning of the defect of the chain It was alleged on the part of the plaintiff that these three matters all belonged to the duty of the defendant, and if he allowed the captain to interfere without authority, the risk must be the defendant's. Rule nisi.

MOORE . BROWN.-Action tried at Guildhall before Byles, J. on 28th June. The plaintiff, a ship's carpenter, sued the defendant, a shipowner, for negligence in keeping out of repair, on board the ship on which the plaintiff was employed, a grating which gave way, and caused injury. to plaintiff. The jury found a verdict of 50%. for the plaintiff.-Watkin Williams moved, on leave reserved, to enter a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's complaint was that very want of repair which he was employed to remedy, and that he took this risk with his employment. Rule granted.

SMITH GREAT EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.-Ballantine, Serjt. moved, by leave, to set aside a verdict, and also for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to evidence. The plaintiff was bitten by a strange dog at a station of the defendants, through which was a public path; 501, had been the amount decided upon by the jury for the plaintiff, although there was no proof of the ownership of the dog. Rule nisi.

LORD V. MIDLAND RAILWAY COMPANY.-The plaintiff, a butcher at Settle, entered into a contract that defendants should carry meat for him daily to London, and that the defendants should recompense the plaintiff for all damage which might occur by non-delivery at the hour fixed. Notwithstanding this contract, the plaintiff had on several occasions signed consignment notes with the condition indorsed, to the effect that the company would not be responsible for any damage of such a kind. The first count alleged breaches of the special contract, the second negligence in not carrying with due and reasonable diligence. Upon the opening of the case at Liverpool, Lush, J. directed a nonsuit on the ground that the company were exempted from claim by their printed conditions signed by the plaintiff.-Jones, Q. C. now obtained a rule for a new trial.

YOUNG (Assignee) v. MATTHEWs. This was a question as to whether the property in some bricks had sufficiently passed to the purchaser to free them from the claim of the creditors of the bankrupt vendor. Action for trover, brought by the assignee against the defendant, to whom the purchaser had sold the bricks, was heard before Erle, C. J., at Guildhall, July 7.-Browne, Q. C. moved by leave reserved to set aside the verdict which had been found for the defendant, and argued that appropriation of the bricks had not been effected by the purchaser's agent. -The COURT, however, refused a rule.-(To be reported.) WHITEHEAD v. IzzoD.-A verdict had been taken in this case at Guildford, before Willes, J., for 2781. 17s. 6d, the price of twenty-five shares in Overend, Gurney, and Company (Limited). Plaintiff is a stockbroker in London, and defendant a merchant at Birmingham. The legality of the transaction between seller and agent had been raised by demurrer, and had also been reserved upon the trial-Pollock, Q. C. obtained a rule to set aside the verdict.

LOWESBY. PRICE.-M. Chambers, Q. C. moved to set aside the verdict for the defendant on the plea of fraud, on the ground that it was contrary to the evidence, and also on the ground of surprise upon affidavit. This case was also tried at Guildford, before Willes, J. It was an action by an insurer in the General Life and Fire Assurance company, of which the defendant was secretary and public officer. A fire broke out on the premises of the plaintiff on 23rd Feb. 1866, the insurance having been effected on 6th Sept. 1863, for 20007. The company's agent had invited plaintiff to send his claim, and after pressing the agent to make it out for him the plaintiff drew it up himself. It consisted of a sum for his stock-in-trade of hosiery, and also a sum for chronometers, the property of his brother at the time in his charge; the whole amounted to a little more than 2000. It was argued for the plaintiff that although the claim was made in ignorance for too large an amount, the evidence failed to prove fraudulent intention. The affidavit of the plaintiff alleged that six of his most important witnesses failed to appear at the trial. The Chief Baron in chambers had stayed execution upon security for costs. Rule refused.

BROWN v. BATEMAN. -Pearse (Abbott with him) asked for a rule upon leave reserved, to reduce a verdict of 557, to 107 A levy had been made upon some unfinished cottages in course of building by the execution-debtor. A clause of the agreement between the builder and landlord provided that all bricks, timber, and other things brought on the ground should be considered to belong to the premises, and should not be removed without the consent of the landlord. The action was brought against the Sheriff of Surrey for a false return of doors, tiles, &c., valued at 457. The value of the scaffold poles, 104, was not included in the leave to move. Rule nisi. CORPORATION

ACCIDENTAL AND MARINE INSURANCE (LIMITED) . DAVIS.-Byles, J. directed a verdict to be given for the plaintiffs at Bristol, 11th Aug., and allowed the defendant to move. The action was for calls, to which the defendant answered he was not a member, as, although he had applied for the shares, he had not signed the articles of association. He also declined to pay the calls, on the ground that an alleged material variance between the prospectus and the articles rendered the formation of the company void, and also on equitable grounds, that the statement in the prospectus that no further calls were contemplated was an exemption from the duty of payment-Folkard moved to set aside the verdict on these grounds, but the COURT refused the rule.

Monday, Nov. 5.

DUNNE v. JAMES AND WIFE. A motion was made by Temple, Q.C. to set aside the verdict in this case as being against evidence. The action was brought for trespass, and was heard before Martin, B., at Newcastle. The jury found a verdict for the defendants, and the learned judge expressed his opinion at the time that it was wrong. The question was, whether the defendants had concluded in 1862 the yearly tenancy by which they held a house and garden. It was proved that Mrs. James had told the collecting agent that they were unable to pay the rent, and had asked that the tenancy might be changed. This was agreed to, and they were allowed to continue as weekly tenants. They subsequently refused to pay rates, on

the ground that the yearly tenancy had terminated. The rent-book and receipts went to confirm the plaintiff's case. Rule nisi.

JAMES. GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.-This case was tried at Cardiff by Pigott, B., when a verdict of 2001. was taken for the plaintiff.- Giffard, Q. C. moved, upon leave reserved, to enter a nonsuit, or for a new trial, on the ground that verdict was against evidence. On the 9th Nov. last, about six o'clock in the morning, when it was very dark, the plaintiff crossed over the defendants' line by a public path, which was approached by a stile. A passing train with a light in front ran against the plaintiff and injured him. The alleged negligence of the company, upon which the verdict was found, depended on the facts that the tender was in front of the engine,

and that no whistle was sounded.

Rule nisi.

MEYERSTEIN v. BARBER.-Brett, Q. C. moved, upon leave reserved, to set aside a verdict of 20197. for the plaintiff, which had been obtained at the trial at Guildhall before Erle, C. J., and to enter a verdict for the defendant, or to alter the amount of damages. The declaration was in trover and for money had and received, and the question to be decided was whether plaintiff or defendant should suffer by the fraud of one Abraham, who had obtained possession of the three copies of a bill of lading, and upon the security of two of them received from the plaintiff bills of exchange to the amount of 30007., and upon the third got 20007. cash from the defendant. Abraham had taken on the business of the consignee of a cargo of cotton from India. The ship arrived in England on the 31st Jan., and the captain delivered the cotton in Abraham's name to the wharfinger. The two copies of the bill of lading were handed to the plaintiff at the beginning of March, but the plaintiff neglected to apply to the wharfinger to transfer the cotton to him. A few days after, as soon as Barber obtained possession of the third copy of the bill of lading, he got the cotton entered by the wharfinger in his name It was argued, on the part of the defendant, that, as a bill of lading is an emblem of a contract of carriage, an indorsement upon it can only transfer the property in goods before the end of the contract. Here the contract was concluded before the plaintiff received the bills of lading, and he never obtained that possession of the cotton which was necessary to complete the transfer. Rule for special case. ILFRACOMBE RAILWAY COMPANY v. DEVON AND SOMERSET RAILWAY COMPANY.-On the 8th Aug. a judgment was ob

tained against the defendants for 10,7501; writs of elegit were sent to each county in which they possessed land, but there was not sufficient to make up the sum.Brydge now applied on behalf of the plaintiffs for a rule to show cause why a writ of scire facias should not issue against Lord Poltimore for the amount of his shares not yet paid. Application was also made for similar rules against the other sixty-two shareholders.

Sixty-three rules nisi granted. FILMER . METCALF.-This case arose from an action Filmer v. Smith, concerning the signature of a contract, in which a rule nisi was granted and stood for argument. The at orney for the plaintiff, who is defendant in this case, declined to proceed without money from his client, and expended the last advances in drawing up counsel's briefs, which were delivered without fees, and conse

quently the rule was lost. This action was for negligence, and was tried at Guildhall after Trinity Term before Byles, J., when a verdict of 277, was given for the plaintiff. Leave was reserved to the defendant to move to enter a verdict for him, upon which this application was made by D. Seymour, Q, C. A new trial was also asked for on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence. Rule nisi.

COOK v. COOK.-This action of trespass was tried before Martin, B, at Liverpool at the last assizes, when the jury found a verdict for the defendant. Leave to move was granted by the judge. The plea upon which the question turned was that the land was not the land of the plaintiff, and it involved the construction of a will.-Jones, Q. C. obtained a Rule nisi.

Re THE MERCHANTS' COMPANY.-C. S. C. Bowen moved for a rule to show cause why the name of Captain Edward R. King should not be struck out of the list of shareholders of the Merchants' Company (Limited). Smith, J. had declined to entertain this application at chambers, and had referred the matter to the court. It was alleged in the affidavit that Capt. King had never applied for nor accepted any shares in writing, and one of the articles of association was to the effect that no person should be deemed to have accepted any share unless he had applied for or accepted it under writing by his hand.

Rule nisi granted, and proceedings stayed until the matter be disposed of. AITKEN. FLEMING.-This action was tried before the Under-Sheriff of Newington, and a verdict for the defendant was given by the jury.-Grantham now moved for a new trial upon the ground of surprise, as the traveller of the plaintiff was produced unexpectedly at the trial, and swore that he had agreed to give the defendant three months' credit. The action was brought for ale delivered to the amount of 162. 4s. Rule nisi. TIDSWELL. WHITWORTH.-Martin, B. directed a verdict of 2134. 35. 6d. to be taken for the plaintiff in this case at the trial at Manchester, and gave leave to the defendant to move the court to set it aside. The plaintiff is the landlord of a house in Grafton-street, Manchester, which he leased to the defendant in 1863. At that time the street had been opened and dedicated to the public, but not flagged nor sewered. Since the commencement of the lease the flagging and sewering have taken place, and under a provision of a local Act the corporation demanded the sum of 2131. 3s. 6d. from the owner. The plaintiff paid this sum, and then sued the defendant for the amount upon a covenant in the lease to defray all charges payable in respect of the premises.-Holker, for the defendant, argued that this was not a charge included in the

covenant.

Rule nisi.

KERNAN. WALTER AND GODFREY.-Beresford moved for a rule against the plaintiff to show cause why a judgment in this case should not be set aside, and a rule struck off, and why the plaintiff should not pay costs of the application. It seemed that the judgment had been obtained in 1860, and had stood over upon the suggestion of the court. A new attorney of the plaintiff has recently applied for the amount, contrary to a previous undertaking. Rule nisi. ARMYTAGE V. JESSOP.-Grantham moved for a rule to set

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aside a rule of Smith, J., directing costs of an execution paid under protest to be paid back to the defendant. Rule nisi.

MACKENZIE v. NAYLOR-A verdict was taken for the plaintiff before Cockburn, C. J., at Carnarvon.-H. Lloyd moved to set aside the verdict upon the ground that the contract upon which the plaintiff had employed one Brewer to work had been made before the partnership of Brewer and the defendant.

Rule nisi.

GRAHAM . ANDREWS.-Joyce moved for a rule of court under the statute, to show cause why a sheriff should not pay over to the plaintiff a sum of money lodged with him for that purpose. Rule nisi.

HOWARTH. SHEWARD.-This case was tried at the Middlesex sittings after Trinity Term before Erle, C. J., when the jury found a verdict of 1277 10s. for the plaintiff, and leave was given to move to enter a verdict for the defendant or a nonsuit.—Hawkins, Q C. now moved upon this leave, and also for a new trial on grounds of misdirection, rejection of evidence, and want of evidence. The action was upon a warranty of a horse, and the question turned upon how far a seller's agent not authorised to warrant may bind the seller. Here the seller and the agent were both horse dealers, and the COURT considered, on the principle enunciated in Brady v. Todd, that the warranty was good. Rule refused.

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LINGARD V. KIRKPATRICK. This was an action for negligently carrying a passenger against an omnibus proprietor. At the trial before the Recorder of Manchester, the damages were assessed by the jury at 10, and leave was granted by the judge to move for a nonsuit -Holker now asked for a rule on the ground that a master is responsible for a servant's negligence only when it is in the way of his business. Here the plaintiff was getting out of an omnibus before it stopped, and she asked the conductor to hold her hand; he did so, but was not able to prevent her from falling. Rule nisi.

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TYLER V. MEADOWS-This was an action for malicious

prosecution; tried before the Lord Chief Baron, at the last assizes at Ipswich, when a verdict was found for the defendant-Keane, Q.C. now moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. Rule refused.

WILKINSON T. ROEBUCK-In this case the plaintiff had filled an affidavit of debt under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, and had not recovered the full amount.-Temple, Q. C. now moved, under sect. 86 of that statute, for a rule to entitle defendant to costs. Rule nisi.

HILLMER. METCALFE-Tried before Byles, J. at the sittings in London after last term, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff for 271.-Pearse, for the plaintiff, now moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. -D. Seymour, Q C. having on a previous day obtained a rule to reduce the damages to a nominal amount, the COURT ordered this motion to stand over till after the consideration of that rule. Motion adjourned.

WHITE. FENN.-This was an action for the infringement of a patent: tried before Keating, J. at the sittings in Middlesex after Easter Term, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff.-Aston now moved to enter a nonsuit or a verdict for the defendant, pursuant to leave reserved. Rule nisi.

KELMER V. BAXDALE AND OTHERS.-This was an action to recover the value of goods supplied to the directors of an hotel company in process of formation. The defendants had ordered the goods for the company, which was formed after the goods were supplied. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff, D. Seymour, Q. C. now moved to enter the verdict for the defendants on the ground that they had not rendered themselves personally liable.

Rule nisi.

STUBBER V. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK.-Tried at the sittings in London after last term, when a verdict was found for the defendants. The trial was by proviso, and the plaintiff did not appear.-Gibbons now moved for a new trial or to enter a nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff had not received notice of trial. Rule nisi.

WOODYER. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.This was an action to recover damages for delay by the company in forwarding samples to a traveller. At the trial at the last assizes at Liverpool, Lush, J. directed the jury if they found a verdict for the plaintiff to award nominal damages. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff damages Is., and assessed the damages at 51, in the event of the plaintiff being entitled to substantial damages. - Littler now moved to increase the damages by that amount.

Rule nisi.

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WRIGHT AND OTHERS v. HICKLING AND ANOTHER-This was an action against Hickling and another as his surety on a promissory note. Hickling had borrowed 361, of a club to be repaid by monthly instalments, and he and his When 231. was paid off, surety had signed the note. Hickling borrowed a further sum, for which he and other sureties had signed another note. The instalments continued to be paid irregularly till 621. 9s. was paid, leaving 291. 1s. 6d. to be paid. Hickling and his sureties on the second note then became bankrupt, and this action was brought to recover the balance unpaid on the first note, when Hickling borrowed the second sum. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff,- Biron, for the surety, now moved for a new trial on the ground that the money had been paid by the principal, and the plaintiffs had given the principal time. Rule nisi.

LONDON AND WESTMINSTER LOAN COMPANY. NEWINS.This was an action of detinus; tried before Keating, J., at the sittings after last term, when a verdict was found for the plaintiffs for 131-Pearse now moved to enter the verdict for the defendant pursuant to leave reserved. Rule nisi.

BROUT. THE EAST LONDON WATERWORKS COMPANYH. Williams moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against evidence.-The COURT stated that they would consult Channell, B. who tried the cause. Stands over.

Re A MARRIED WOMAN.-Baylis moved for a rule directing the officer of the court for receiving and filing deeds of acknowledgment of married women, to file the deed produced, notwithstanding the lapse of time, the deed having been executed on the 12th Oct. 1855-The COURT being satisfied that the property had not been dealt with since, granted the rule. Rule absolute.

WILLIAMS V. THOMAS.-Philbrick moved for leave to take money out of court which had been paid in in lieu of bail, the bail having been now completed. Rule nisi.

HALL. THE CORPORATION OF BRISTOL-Tried before Blackburn, J. at Bristol, when a verdict was found for the defendants.-Coleridge, Q. C. now moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, and that the verdict was Rule nisi on the first ground. against evidence.

MYERS . THE LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY COMPANY.-Tried before Erle. C. J. at the sittings in London after last term, when a verdict was found for the defendant.-M. Chambers, Q. C. now moved for a new trial on an affidavit alleging facts which proved that a Rule nisi.

principal witness for the defendants had given false evi

dence.

TOOKE v. EVANS-This was an action of ejectment; tried before Channell, B. at the last assizes at Maidstone, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff.-J. Brown, Q. C. now moved to enter the verdict for the defendant, pursuant to leave reserved. Rule refused.

Wednesday, Nov. 7.

The 17th and 20th of this month were fixed for the hearing of appeals from revising barristers.

MORGAN F. NICHOLL.-This action of ejectment was heard before Shee, J., at Monmouth, when a verdict was given for the defendant.-Huddleston, Q. C. (with him H. James) now moved for a new trial on the ground of improper rejection of evidence. An action concerning the same points was tried in 1856 between the son of the present plaintiff, as plaintiff, and the father of the present defendant and the present defendant together, as defendants. It appeared that at the previous trial Morgan, the plaintiff in this action, was supposed to be dead, although only in hiding to escape punishment for the Chartist riots and to avoid domestic unhappiness. One of the witnesses at the first trial was dead before the second, and when a shorthand writer was called on behalf of the defendant to prove the contradiction contained in evidence of one of the witnesses, then before the court, the counsel for the plaintiff proposed to cross-examine the shorthand writer as to what the witness, since dead, had said at the previous trial. This was objected to, first, because the parties to the former action were not the same; secondly, because, if such evidence could be admissible, it ought to have been produced as evidence in chief.-The COURT agreed that the father, as plaintiff, could not be held to have the same interest as the son. Rule refused.

HARVEY V. LAWRENCE-This was an action by a builder for work done according to specification under a written contract: verdict for plaintiff at the trial, before Byles, J. at Exeter assizes. - Coleridge, Q. C. (with him Lopes) moved for a rule to set aside verdict because the judge refused to receive certain evidence, and also for a rule to show cause why verdict should not be reduced by 381. One of the clauses of the contract was to the effect that the work should be done according to the drawings, specifications, and directions, and to the satisfaction of the defendant or the architect. The work had been certified by the architect, and the judge therefore refused to receive evidence of the work not being in accordance with the specifications. The second ground of application was, that the verdict included a sum of money, 381, which ought to have been deducted for old lead. Rule nisi.

SCOTT v. LORD EBURY AND OTHERS. – Browne, Q. C. moved, with leave, to set aside a verdict of 5001. for the plaintiff, obtained at the Guildford assizes on the 16th Aug. last, before Willes, J. The question to be decided was, whether the railway company, of which the defendants were directors, had ratified the responsibility incurred by the defendants before the foundation of the company. Rule nisi.

BARKER V. MACANDREW.-This was an action of char terers against shipowners, in which plaintiffs obtained a verdict for 7501, before Erle, C. J., at Guildhall, last summer.-Honyman, Q.C. (Coleridge, Q.C. with him) moved for a new trial on ground of misdirection, or to set aside signed before ship was launched, and she was injured verdict as against evidence. The charter-party was before she got to her loading berth.-The COURT held that injury took place before the voyage commenced. the Lord Chief Justice was right in directing that this

Rule refused

SMITH V. LITTLEDALE.-This case was tried at Chester, before Cockburn, C. J., who gave the plaintiff leave to move to set aside the verdict which was found for the defendant, and to enter for the plaintiff a verdict of 170 The plaintiff, the owner of a horse called "Jack," sued the stakeholder and one of the stewards of a steeplechase for not paying over stakes alleged by plaintiff to have been won by his horse. The conditions were that all horses allowed to win must be the property of gentlemen and have been bona fide hunted the season before, and

that decision of stewards should be final There was a
dispute as to the horse having been hunted fairly, which
was decided by the stewards in favour of the plaintiff
conditionally upon the plaintiff's proving his ownership.
The horse was subsequently held to be disqualified upon
another ground apart from ownership, and not considered
before the stewards' previous decision. The plaintiff
alleged that the stewards had no right to revoke their
judgments, but the COURT declined to maintain this
objection.
Rule refused.

DEFFELL . WHITE -This case was partly heard on
Friday, Nov. 2 It involved two questions on a bill of
sale. Judgment was given to-day in favour of the
plaintiff.
Rule absolute.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER.
Reported by H. LEIGH and E. LUMLEY, Esqrs., Barrister-at-
Law.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK.
MICHAELMAS TERM 1866.
Friday, Nov. 2.

The Judges who took their seats on the bench this term were Sir F. KELLY, C. B., BRAMWELL, CHANNELL, and PIGOTT, BB.

The undermentioned members of the Bar having during the vacation been appointed Queen's Counsel, appeared this morning in court, and were called by the Chief Baron and took their seats accordingly within the bar in the following order, viz - Maule, QC, of the Northern Circuit; Dickinson, Q. C., of the Chancery Bar; Sowler, QC., of the Northern Circuit; Prentice, Q. C., of the Home Circuit; T. Jones, Q. C., of the Northern Circuit; C. Pollock, Q. C., of the Home Circuit; Mundell, Q. C, of the Midland Circuit: Garth, Q. C., and Sir G Honyman, Q. C., of the Home Circuit; and Quain, Q. C., of the Northern Circuit.

H. James having been appointed to fill the place of postman in the room of C. Pollock, Q. C., and Thesiger having been appointed tubman in place of Sir G. Honyman, Q. C. were invited by the Chief Baron, and took their appointed places in the court accordingly.

JONES v. PAGE-This was an action tried before Shee, J. at the last summer assizes at Worcester, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff by consent, with 100% damages, with leave to move. The action was brought to recover damages from the defendant upon a contract, by which it was alleged defendant undertook to supply an omnibus to the plaintiff for the purpose of conveying a party of persons to the Warwick Races, whom the plaintiff had undertaken to convey there and back, and having applied to the defendant on the occasion, he was permitted himself to select an omnibus out of defendant's stock for the purpose. The journey to Warwick was safely performed, but on the return home journey, the inner part of one of the wheels of the 'bus gave way, causing the vehicle to upset, and many of the passengers were thereby seriously injured, and plaintiff was sued by them for damages.-H. James now moved accordingly for a rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside and a nonsuit entered. The ground on which the defendant relied was, that the defect in question was a latent one, and that defendant not being a coachmaker, had let the 'bus to the plaintiff in total ignorance of the fact of defective construction in the interior part of the wheel. There was no allegation of negligence in the declaration, and the question was, whether there was a warranty by implication that the bus was reasonably fit for the purpose. [KELLY, C. B.: What is the allegation in the declaration?] That the omnibus was at the time fit for being hired out. Here the plaintiff had as full an opportunity of inspecting the carriage as the defendant had. In similar cases of actions against railway companies it had been held that directors of the company are not liable for latent defects, and that it was necessary in a case of a latent defect in an axle to show neglect in the manufacture in order to create liability for an accident-By the COURT:

Rule to show cause.

not necessarily bear that meaning, and if they did, that
they were clearly not actionable.-KELLY, C. B.: We think,
looking at the summing-up of the learned judge, the ver-
dict, and the amount of damages, that defendant has
nothing to complain of, and that there ought to be no rule.
Rule refused.

NUTTALL v. BRACEWELL-This was an action by plaintiff
for the obstruction by defendant of the water flowing to
plaintiff's mill, which was tried at the last Leeds Spring
Assizes before a special jury, when a verdict was found
for plaintiff, and in which a rule to enter a nonsuit
or a verdict for defendant was argued in Trinity
Term last, by Manisty, Q. C. and Kemplay for the
plaintiff; and Overend, Q. C., Field, Q. C., and Rew for
defendant, when the Court took time to consider their
judgment, and subsequently in the same term Chan-
nell, B. announced that the judgment of the court was for
the plaintiff, but that the reasons for their judgment would
be given in Michaelmas Term.-Field, Q. C now prayed
on behalf of the defendant for the reasons accordingly,
whereupon the Court delivered written judgments seriatim
in favour of the plaintiff, and discharging the defendant's
rule, PIGOTT, B. reading the judgment of MARTIN, B., and
BRAMWELL and CHANNELL, BB. reading their own.

Rule discharged.

BETTSON V. GILPIN.-This was an action for a nuisance
arising to plaintiff from the smoke from the furnaces and
chimneys of defendant, an edge-tool manufacturer, which
was tried at Stafford before Keating J., when the jury
found a verdict for the defendant, accompanying their
finding with the recommendation that defendant should
raise his stack of chimneys.-Powell, Q. C., for plaintiff,
now moved for a rule to set aside that verdict and for a
new trial on the ground that it was against the weight of
evidence.
Rule to show cause.

Saturday, Nov. 3.

FOUNTAIN v. BATSALL.-H. James moved for a new trial.
Rule nisi.
Mellor, J. at Leeds, in which a verdict passed for the
TILLET. BROWNE.-This was an action tried before
plaintiff for 3331
move to enter a verdict for himself on the ground that
Leave was reserved to the defendant to
there was no evidence to go to the jury, and on a point
of law reserved. - Manisty, Q. C. now moved in pursuance
of the leave and also for a new trial on the ground that
the verdict was against the weight of evidence. The
plaintiff was the assignee of a bankrupt, and the action
was brought to recover the amount of certain payments
made by the bankrupt, which were alleged to be void
within the statute 13 of Elizabeth. The principal ques-
tion appeared to be whether a bank, in which bankrupt
held shares, and which had stopped payment, and was in
process of liquidation, could be considered as a creditor
of the bankrupt at the time of the payments in question,
no calls previously made being then due. Rule nisi.

EARL OF GLASGOW v. THE RAWCLIFFE STUD FARM COMPANY (LIMITED).—This was an action tried at Leeds before Mellor, J., in which a verdict passed for the plaintiff for one farthing damages.-Hayes, Serjt, now moved for a new trial on the ground of surprise and inadequacy of damages. It appeared that the defendants were a company whose business was to receive horses and mares for the purpose of breeding. A horse of the plaintiff's called Brother to Bird-on-the-Wing had been entrusted to the defendants' care, and while in their hands had become blind of one eye. No information of this fact had been given to the plaintiff, but on the return of the horses the injury was discovered. Some correspondence thereupon took place, in which the defendants' manager stated that the horse had probably given his eye a blow through his being cast in his box during the night, but that he never would allow his head to be touched afterwards: that it had never been perceived that his sight was any worse than when he came, and that the groom who had charge of him stated he could see as well as ever. No mention whatever was made of the horse having been treated by a veterinary surgeon for the injury. The plaintiff brought an action for negligence against the defendants, and relied on the fact that the horse had never been properly atHIRST V. SHEPPARD AND ANOTHER.-In this action, which tended to. The defendants produced evidence showing was tried before Bramwell, B. at the London sittings after that the services of a veterinary surgeon had been prolast term, a verdict was found for plaintiff for 3117. 58. on cured after the lapse of one day from the accident, and the count for money had and received, with leave to move proper treatment had been employed. It was contended on certain terms.-Manisty, Q.C., for defendants, now moved that the defendants, after the correspondence had taken accordingly to enter a nonsuit or a verdict for the place, had no right to spring this evidence upon the plaindefendants, or for a new trial. The plaintiff was a share-tiff, who was quite unprepared to expect it. The plaintiff broker, at Leamington, in Warwickshire, and the defend- had, however, no affidavits to show that he could produce ants were stock and share brokers in London, and the any evidence to put a different complexion on the matter action was brought to recover a sum of money remitted on a subsequent trial.-The COURT were of opinion that by plaintiff to the defendants to purchase certain shares of the mere fact of the plaintiff's being surprised was no a railway company called the East London Railway Com- reason for a new trial, unless it could be shown that there pany. The question turned on the construction of certain had been a manifest failure of justice, and that no such documents, amongst others a prospectus of the company, failure appeared here, and also that the verdict was not and the letters which passed between plaintiff and the de- an absurd one, because the jury might have thought, fendants. The plaintiff, by letter of the 18th Sept. 1865, though there was some slight negligence in not immedidirected defendants to purchase for the next account ately sending for a veterinary surgeon, yet that had not twenty East London shares "paid up" at 16, that being materially contributed to the ultimate injury done to the the then market price of the paid-up shares, and the ques- horse. The rule was therefore refused. tion was, what was the meaning of the expression "paidup "shares? [BRAMWELL, B.: I must say I thought it a very clear case, and I only reserved the point because I could not conceive how it was the defendants, who were stockbrokers, made the mistake they did. KELLY, C. B. : What was left to the jury?] Whether the terms of the order were such as to lead defendants to understand they were to buy what they did, and the jury found they did not buy what the plaintiff ordered He moved on the grounds-first, that there was no evidence to justify the finding; and secondly, that the verdict was against evidence.-KELLY, C. B.: Will you mention it again on Tuesday, when my brother Bramwell will have his notes of the trial in court? To be mentioned again. CARPENTER T. NORMAN.-An action for slander tried at Exeter before Byles, J., at the last summer assizes for Devonshire, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff with 18. damages, with leave to defendant to move. Coleridge, QC, for defendant, now moved accordingly for a rule to enter a verdict for defendant. It was a pothouse squabble. An election for the office of churchwarden was about to come off, and defendant, who had before been churchwarden, was again a candidate for the office. The words complained of were, "Carpenter shall not be elected churchwarden; he is a d--d rogue and I can prove it" It was urged by plaintiff's counsel at the trial that these words had reference to and conveyed an imputation on his honesty and character in the capacity of churchwarden. It was contended for defendant that they need

Rule refused.

BUTLER v. KNIGHT.-This was an action tried before Keating. J., at Stafford, in which a verdict passed for the plaintiff for 3981. 18s. 6d-Huddleston, Q. C. now moved, pursuant to leave reserved, to enter a nonsuit, or for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence and the damages were excessive. The action was against an attorney for agreeing to receive the sum of 100. in satisfaction of the sum of 3981 18s. 6d, the amount of a judgment recovered by the plaintiff in an action for breach of promise of marriage without the plaintiff's consent, and contrary to her direction. The principal questions were, whether there was authority to make the arrangement and whether the plaintiff's position was in any way altered by it for the worse when made.

Rule nisi.

ROOTH. THE NORTH-EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.This was an action tried at Derby before M Smith, J., in which a verdict passed for the plaintiff for 671.- Field, Q. C. now moved pursuant to leave to enter a nonsuit, or for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence. The action was for the loss of certain cows which had been delivered to the defendants for carriage from Boroughbridge to Chesterfield. The plaintiff had signed a note by which the defendants were to be exempt from all responsibility. The note also stated that the defendants would give free passes to persons travelling with the cattle in order to encourage the sending of competent persons to look after them. The plaintiff had

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TETLEY V. WANLESS-This was an action tried before

Lush, J. at Carlisle, in which there was a verdict for the
defendant.-Kemplay now moved, pursuant to leave, to
enter the verdict for the plaintiff for 981, 14s, 5d., and for

judgment non obstante veredicto. The action was for a
bankruptcy deed.
debt admitted to be due, and the only plea was one of a
The questions raised were, first,
whether the plea must be taken to be of a deed made
after action or before; secondly, whether evidence show-
ing that no tender of the composition had been made was
admissible under joinder of issue on the plea; and
thirdly, whether the deed was good.
Rule nisi.

TWEMLOW v. KAY.-This was an action of ejectment tried before Keating, J. at Stafford, in which a verdict passed for the defendant.-Griffits now moved, pursuant to leave reserved, to set aside the verdict and enter it for the plaintiff. The question was whether, under a lease notice, a notice to quit given on the 26th Sept. for the from year to year, stipulating for six calendar months' 25th March was good.-The COURT postponed their decision as to whether there should be a rule until they should have before them the instrument containing the stipulation.

Cur. adv. vull.

Re CORBET DAVIES.-Hughes moved for a rule calling on Corbet Davies, an attorney, to show cause why he should not pay over to Charles Timpson a sum of 131. Os. 8d., being moneys received by him as Timpson's attorney. It appeared that Timpson had recovered judgment for the amount against Davies, and the COURT were of opinion that his character had been thereby changed from that of remedy sought for was inapplicable. attorney into that of judgment-debtor, and therefore the Rule refu ed.

Monday, Nov. 5.

THOROLD . MOSES.-This was an action tried before Bramwell, B., at Guildhall, at the sittings after last Trinity Term, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff for 900% less a sum of 781 by way of deduction, being in effect a verdict for 8221. The Solicitor-General (Bovill, Q C.), for defendant, now moved for a rule for a new trial unless the plaintiff would consent to reduce the damages to 5007. Plaintiff was in the service of the defendant, an ivory and bristle merchant in London, in the year 1862, at a salary of 25s. per week, and had been in his service for many years previously. In that year defendant, with Messrs. Isaac Campbell and Co. and Messrs. Begbie and Co., made arrangements for running the American blockade; and it was proposed that plaintiff, an intelligent person, should go out to Nassau to look after the interests of the parties, and according to plaintiff's own evidence he was to receive from 2007 to 30OZ, He went to Nassau and remained there some nineteen months, when his engagement with the defendant ceased in Dec. 1863, and he made arrangements for entering the service of Messrs. Begbie and Co., who were to give him 500l. a-year. was in receipt from defendant of his salary of 25s. a-week during the whole of the nineteen months he was at Nassau, and had brought this action by which he claimed 10001. from defendant as remuneration for his services at Nassau at the rate of 5001. a-year. The defendant was willing to pay him 5007. Upon moving to stay execution at the close of the trial on the ground of excessive damages, Bramwell, B. said he could see no ground for the verdict -BRAMWELL, B.: I see I have a note here as follows: "This is 400l. too much according to the plaintiff's own evidence." Rule to show cause.

He

HARVEY V. METHERINGHAM.-An action of ejectment for three acres of land, tried at Lincoln, at the last summer assizes, before M. Smith, J., without a jury, when a verdict passed pro formâ for the plaintiff. The case turned on the construction of a will-Hayes, Serjt. moved for a rule to enter the verdict for defendant. The question was whether the three acres in question passed under a specific devise to the party from whom defendant had purchased it, or under the general residuary devise in the same will-if the former, then the defendant was entitled. The testator, George Harvey, by his will in Nov. 1829, devised as follows: "I give and devise to my dear mother, Elizabeth James, and her assigns, for and during the term of her natural life, one annuity or yearly rentcharge of 100%, charged upon and to be issued out of my estate, situate at Giggles Hearne, in Gedney, in the county of Lincoln, late Nicksons, Copelands, and Stevensons, and now in the occupation of" (naming three persons). Then the testator gave an annuity of 50%. a-year to a clerk, and after that he devised "the beforementioned property" (not giving any more specific description) to the individual from whom defendant purchased. It was objected at the trial, first, that it was not situate at Giggles Hearne; secondly, that it was not accurately described as "late Nicksons, &c;" thirdly, that it was not in the occupation of the tenants named. Objections one and three were found by the learned Judge in defendant's favour, and plaintiff was thus driven to rely on the second objection. It was also objected that there was no other land in Gedney to satisfy the residuary clause unless this land passed thereby, but it was found there was, and that point also was found in defendant's favour. Rule to show cause.

BATES. FOWKES.-An action for work and labour, tried before Mellor, J. at Derby summer assizes, when a verdict was found for plaintiff for 351, and execution stayed.-D. Seymour, Q. C. moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against evidence.

Rule nisi. SHAW -Maule, Q. C., for defendant, moved for a rule to set aside the award of the arbitrator in this case, which had been referred by judge's order. Rule nisi. PANTLER V. FRANCHEL-Garth, Q. C. moved for a rule to show cause why the bail-bond given to the sheriff of Middlesex herein should not be delivered up to be cancelled, and why plaintiff should not pay all costs, &c. The grounds on which he moved were, that the affidavit on which the order of the judge was made was insufficient on its face as regarded the statement of the debt. It was as follows: "The above-named defendant is well and truly indebted

in £

for money lent and goods sold and delivered." It was not stated that the money was lent or that the goods were sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant. This affidavit had been made so that it might be taken either way, and Pigott, B., not being satisfied, had stayed proceedings in order for this application to be made. There were numerous cases on the point. He would cite one: Taylor v. Forbes, 11 East, 315. He would ask for the rule, with stay of proceedings in the meantime. Rule nisi.

PELL V. THE NORTHAMPTON AND BANBURY JUNCTION RAILWAY COMPANY. - Mundell, Q. C. (with him Beasley and Markham) moved on behalf of the sheriff of Nottingham for an attachment against a person named Foster for obstructing the sheriff in his duty and forcibly removing from the custody of the said sheriff, in the persons of his officers, a locomotive railway engine which had been seized on the 26th Aug. last under a writ of fi. fa. issued against the defendants in the above-mentioned action. Various claims had been lodged and were discussed at chambers on the 5th Oct., but none at the moment by Foster. The officers had seized the engine and placed it on a siding, and on the 3rd Oct. it was moved, but returned on the parties being warned. It was then placed by the officers on the siding at Blisworth station, and a chain was placed through the wheels and locked. Foster then came with other men and broke the chain, and by means of an engine belonging to the London and NorthWestern Railway drove or drew off the engine in question. On 6th Oct, after he had seized the engine, Foster lodged a claim. He cited Cooper v. Asprey, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 355; 32 L. J. 249, Q. B.; 3 B. & S. 932, and referred to the Interpleader Act, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58. Rule to show cause.

-Mundell, Q. C. also made a similar application for an attachment against one Henry Crathee, the general manager of the defendants' line, for seizing and carrying away seventeen trucks from out of the custody of the said sheriff, who was in possession of them under a fi. fa.

Rule nisi. THE ADELPHI BANK (LIMITED) v. JOHNSON AND WIFEThis was an action tried before Lush, J. at Liverpool. It was an action on a promissory note for 43231. made and signed by the female defendant with five other persons in favour of the plaintiffs. There were three pleas. 1. Of fraud, that the defendant was induced to make and sign the promissory note by the fraud, covin, and misrepresentation of H. and C. Garniss, of which plaintiffs had notice. 2. A like plea of fraud of the plaintiffs. 3. An equitable plea that the note was signed as a surety for H. and C. Garniss, &c., and there was no other consideration, and was delivered to plaintiffs on express condition defendant should be liable only as such surety, and only until the guarantee of one Twentyman should be obtained by plaintiffs. On pleas 1 and 2 a verdict was found for the defendant, and on plea 3 for the plaintiffs.- Mellish, Q. C. (with him T. Jones, Q. C. and L. Temple) moved for a rule for a new trial on the ground there was no evidence to support the verdict, or if there was, that the verdict was against evidence. Rule to show cause. SANDERSON . THE MIDLAND RAILWAY COMPANY.-This was an action by the plaintiff, a collector and transmitter of small parcels in one packed parcel by railway, against defendants, to recover overcharges made upon him for the carriage of such packed parcels. It was tried at Nottingham before M. Smith, J., and a verdict was found for plaintiff for 1177. 10s. 6d, with leave to defendants to move. -Field, Q. C. now moved accordingly to enter the verdict for the defendants, or for a new trial The case involved

the same points as the case of Satton v. The Great Western Railway Company, in error, 13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 221; 35 L. J. 18, Ex.; 3 H. & C. 800; but there were some points which differed from that case. There were three iteins of charge as types of classes: No. 1, under date of 1st Jan. 1860; No. 2, 12th March 1862; and No. 3, 7th Jan. 1863, and different facts applied to each. Two lines of railway came to Nottingham, the Midland and the Great Northern. The London and North-Western Railway had no line of its own nearer Nottingham than at Rugby, but they appointed Pickford and Co. their agents at Nottingham to receive traffic for them. There were therefore three carriers from Nottingham to London, viz., 1, the Great Northern; 2, the Midland; and 3, Pickford's and the London and North-Western Railway via the Great Northern to Rugby, and thence by London and NorthWestern line to London. With regard to No. 1 item the plaintiff collected and packed "the smalls," and employed Pickford's to fetch and carry the packed parcel to the station at Nottingham directed "vid Rugby." They were charged in an account between "Sanderson and the London and North-Western Railway." Pickford's were the persons employed. [BRAMWELL, B. refers to Webber v. The Great Western Railway Company, 12 L. T_Rep. N. S. 498; affirmed in the Ex. Ch. in Trinity Term last.] Defendants were ignorant of the existence of plaintiff, and they could not sue him. [KELLY, C. B.: In any point of view you are entitled to No. 1.] As to No. 2, the account was between plaintiff and the Midland Railway Company. As to No. 3, the goods were delivered by the plaintiff himself. Pickford's were principals; they debited the plaintiff and paid the company, irrespectively of their being paid by plaintiff. As to No. 3, the inequality alleged here was between the charge to plaintiff and to warehousemen in Nottingham, as in Sutton v. The Great Western Railway, but here there was no evidence of defendant's knowledge, besides a difference as to the mode of consignment. (KELLY, C. B.: On this distinction you may have a rule as to item No. 3.] The rule was also granted as to the second item, Field, Q. C. undertaking not to argue it if he could not differ that charge also from Sutton v. The Great Western Railway Company. Rule nisi on all three points.

a rule as to item

L. J. 121, Ex.] He moved, on the ground that the evidence of the custom of Bombay was inadmissible, and that on the construction of the contract plaintiff was entitled. He also moved in a cross-action of Knoop v. Buckle. Cur, adv. vult.

HAKE v. GIBBONS.-Tried before Erle, C. J. at Norwich, and a verdict for defendant -O'Malley, Q. C., by leave, moved to enter a verdict for plaintiff for 1414, and also on misdirection. It was an action for collision. On 9th Jan. a gale was blowing, and plaintiff's smack, the Galatea, entered the outer harbour of Lowestoft, and anchored in a spot clear of the "fairway" leading into the inner harbour. The inner harbour was full of small vessels, and all passage into it was obstructed. Defendant's vessel, the Diana, a much larger one than plaintiff's, being partially disabled, made for the harbour, and in entering it she ran down and sunk the plaintiff's vessel. It was contended at the trial, that this being a harbour of refuge, defendant was entitled to take his vessel in there at all risks. It was stated by his counsel that it was impossible for her to get in without damaging some one or other of the small craft then crowding the hardour. It might be defendant was entitled lawfully to go in, but he must do so at his own risk, with regard to any damage he might thereby inflict on others. Any one might lawfully drive by night or day on either side of the road; but it was at his own risk in case of accident therefrom. [CHANNELL, B.: Is not every harbour in a sense a harbour of refuge? BRAMWELL, B.: Suppose the steersman in going in had determinedly put the helm so as to run in upon another vessel, saying to himself, “I must go in at all hazards, I cannot stay outside and be drowned;" would not that be trespass?] Rule nisi.

DAWBER AND WIFE V. THE LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY COMPANY.-Simon, Serjt. moved on part of defendants for a new trial or a reduation of damages in this action, for an injury to the female plaintiff, a passenger by the defendants' line, by reason of their negligence; tried at Liverpool before Lush, J., when plaintiffs obtained a verdict for 1507. She was a laundress, earning 188. a-week, and the injury to her ancle which she received incapacitated her from work, at the most, for some two or three months. It was an excessive amount -KELLY, C. B.: We will communicate with the learned judge.

Cur, adv, vult.

POTT V. THE CAMBRIAN RAILWAY COMPANY.-An action tried at Shrewsbury, before Keating, J, in which a verdict was found for plaintiff with damages by consent at 407J. O. Griffits now moved by leave to enter a verdict for defendants, on the ground that there was no evidence to support the declaration, and that the contract proved at the trial absolved the defendants from liability and disabled the plaintiff from suing for the negligence proved. Plaintiff was a cattle-dealer, and sent his agent to the station with some beasts for transit by rail, who there signed a printed form of contract on which the question turned. The fourth condition of that printed form was as follows: "The owner or driver of cattle shall be at liberty to ride free of charge in the waggon in which his stock are conveyed, but the company will not be liable for any accident he may sustain arising from any cause whatever." Plaintiff travelled in the truck with his beasts, and sustained an injury through a collision with another train. Rule to show cause.

KOSSOWSKI ". HALL-M. Lloyd moved for a rule to discharge defendant out of custody. Whilst in custody

under a ca, sa. defendant had executed a deed under sect. 192 of the B. A. 1861, which had been properly executed and registered under the Act. The question hinged on sects. 166, 192, and 198 of the statute: (Baerselman v. Langlands, 11 L. T. Rep. N. S. 348; 3 II. & C. 433; 34 L. J. 3, Ex-KELLY, C. B.: The Court should hear and decide any question arising out of the deed before ordering the defendant's release from custody. In case no question should be raised upon the deed the rule nisi now granted would be made absolute as a matter of course. Rule nisi.

CALLAGHAN r. RICHARDS-An action to recover the price of cotton; tried before the Judge of the Passage Court at Liverpool, when a verdict was found for plaintiff for 251. 12s. 10d-R. G. Williams now moved, on the ground that on the documents on which the case rested there was no sufficient memorandum of a binding contract.

Rule nisi.

THE MIDLAND WAGGON COMPANY . THE WARRANT FINANCE COMPANY (LIMITED). A. Wills moved for a rule for an attachment against the secretary of the defendants' company for contempt of a judge's order in failing to answer interrogatories. There had been no personal service of the order, but that was not necessary.

Rule to show cause.

ESTATE COMPANY (LIMITED) (Garnishees).-Diron moved THE EUROPEAN BANKING COMPANY r. Fox-THE GENERAL for a rule to set aside or to stay the proceedings against the garnishees. On the 24th May there was an order to the garnishees to pay, on which nothing was done. On 29th June the debtor was adjudicated bankrupt, and on 29th July execution was put in under the garnishee order: (Tilbury v. Brown, 3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 380; 30 L. J. 46, Q. B.) [CHANNELL, B. refers to Wood v. Dunn, in the Q. B.; 13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 403; 35 L. J. 11, Q. B., now standing for judgment in the Ex. Ch]

Rule nisi (at applicant's peril), alternatirely to set aside the execution, or that the sheriff withdraw. WOOD. PRESTWICH AND ANOTHER-In this action by the indorsee against the two makers of a promissory note

in which the plaintiff was nonsuited in the Salford Hundred Court of Record, Hance, for plaintiff, moved to set the nonsuit aside. The note was given originally to the then treasurer of a friendly society or money-club, and was indorsed to plaintiff, the previous treasurer of the club, which was not enrolled, and the ground of nonsuit was, that being an unenrolled society, and plaintiff and defendants being members of it, it was a case of partnership. He cited Bawden v. Howell, 3 M. & G. 638. There were eleven pleas on the record, but none to this particular point.

Rule to show cause. RICHARDSON. RIPPON.- Graham, for defendant, moved

BUCKLE. KNOOP.-This was an action on a charterparty; tried at Liverpool before Lush, J., when a verdict was found for defendant, with leave to plaintiff to move to enter it for him for 1401. 7s. 3d. E. James, Q. C. (with J. A. Russell) now moved accordingly. The charter-party provided that the plaintiff's vessel should proceed to Bombay and load a cargo, and therewith proceed to London or Liverpool as ordered, on signing bills of lading, and deliver at any dock the freighter might appoint, on being paid "75s. per ton of fifty cubic feet delivered cotton and wool;" and the question was, whether the quantity the plaintiff was entitled to be be paid freight for was the quantity shipped on board at Bombay or that delivered at Liverpool. The money was paid under protest. It was contradictory and inconsistent. It was an action of was contended that it meant the quantity measured on delivery at Liverpool. the port of discharge. [BRAMWELL, B. referred to Gibson v. Sturge, 10 Ex. 632; 24

to set aside the award in this action, in which a verdict was found for plaintiff at the Cambridge Assizes before Kelly, C. B, subject to a reference. He moved on the

grounds of misconduct of the arbitrator, and that the award ejectment by a landlord against his tenant, and the award directed that the verdict for plaintiff should stand, and that plaintiff should pay defendant 250%. The ground of

complaint was, that the arbitrator had stated that he would personally inspect the premises and the crops, whereby defendant was induced to abstain from calling witnesses; but, at the last moment, the arbitrator said he should did not view the premises and made his award, the defendant, by his counsel, protesting against the course adopted. [CHANNELL, B.: Had you no opportunity of calling wit nesses after the arbitrator had announced his change of purpose?] Defendant by counsel protested against the course pursued. [KELLY, C. B.: Have you an affidavit showing how defendant was prejudicǝd? He should have demanded an adjournment in order to enable him have the necessary witnesses examined] Again, the arbitrator had awarded 2501, which he had no power to award, and his doing so made the award contradictory. [BRAMWELL, B: You are not all bound to take the money.]-By the COURT Rale refused.

TAYLOR. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANYH. Matthews, for defendants, moved to set aside the verdict found for plaintiff on the third count in defiuue, and to enter a nonsuit in this case, which was, tried at Stafford, before Keating, J. The declaration contained thres counts, the third on which the present question turned being in detinue, and the plea thereto non detinet. The goods in question, thirteen casks of grease, belonging to the plaintiff had been in defendants' possession for many months, being held by them as a lien for a sum of money owing by plaintiff to defendants for tolls. In April plaintiff applied to Thompson, the station-master, for the casks, and was told by him that he must apply to Mr. Bills, the district manager. On the 24th April plaintiff's attorneys sent a cheque for the amount for which defendants held the casks to Maples and Co., defendants' London solicitors, the cash for which cheque, after passing through the ordinary course of town and country bankers, reached their hands on the 28th April. On the 2nd May, plaintif again applied to Thompson for his casks, who said he had no authority to deliver them. On the 10th May, Thompson having by that time heard from Bills, the district manager, that the money had been paid, wrote to plaintiff that he might have his casks, to which plaintiff's attorney replied that plaintiff would not now take them, but would hold the company responsible for the loss of a sale of them sustained by their detention. Thereupon plaintiff brought this action. It was contended that, under non detinet, defendants were entitled to the verdict-present detainer and not past detention being the gist of the action. Defendants had had a lien on these goods for many months, and their plea set up a justification. In order for plaintiff to rely on the small interval between payment of his cheque and Thompson's letter on the 10th May, plaintiff should have replied payment in the nature of a new assignment: (Gledstane v. Hewitt, 1 Cr. & Jer 563; 9 L. J, N. S, 145, Ex.; Clements v. Flight, 16 M. & W. 42; 16 L. J. N., S., 11 Ex.) Rule nisi on both points.

EMERY V. PINKER— O'Malley, Q. C., for defendant, moved in this action, tried at Norfolk before Erle, C. J, in which the jury found for plaintiff for 1421. 8s. 5d., for a new trial, on the ground of the verdict being against evidence. To consult the learned Judge.

PINDER . Coqui.-This action was tried before Bramwell, B., at Guildhall, at the sittings after Trinity Term, and a verdict was found for plaintiff for 7-Broten, Q. C. (with him W. G. Harrison), for defendant, now moved by leave to set that verdict aside. In answer to plaintiff's action & tripartite deed, under sect. 192 of the BA. 1861, between defendant, his trustees, and his creditors, was put in, to which various objections were taken. Under the Act assents may be given by a separate document, but it was objected that no deed or draft even was in existence when the assent was signed. It was proved, however, that the draft of the deed had been prepared by counsel contemporaneously with the draft form of assent, and the deed was engrossed, though not executed, which was sufficient under sect. 192. The form of the assent was: "I assent to the arrangement about to be made, &c.," in terms clearly referring to the deed. [BRAMWELL, B. That is in the nature of a promise, "I will consent when it is made."] A second objection was, that the requisite proportion of creditors in number and value had Banking Company had assented was objected to. not executed or assented, and the mode in which Barned's Оп the 17th April that bank stopped payment, and ceased to transact business thenceforward, and on the 8th May there was a winding-up order, and between those two dates the manager of the bank signed the assent, the bank being creditors of the defendant for 15,000Z [BRAM WELL, B.: The manager is no more than a bank clerk. What authority had he to do that act after the bank had ceased to carry on business?] The next objection ap plied to a debt of 80,000. The defendant was indebted in that amount to the London and Continental Bank. An arrangement was come to between that bank and the London and Mediterranean Bank, by which the debts and assets of the former were, without deed, assigned to the latter bank, and after that the former bank, the Continental, and not the Mediterran an Bank, signed the consent to defendant's deed for the debt of 80,000Z [KELLY, QB-Defendant is bound to show a clear and indis putable majority to the required extent of his creditors. BRAMWELL, B.: The assignment may be by parol, and a deed is not necessary. In equity, and in truth and substance, the Mediterranean Bank, and not the Continental Bank, were the defendant's creditors after the arrange ment had been come to between them] Rule refused.

Tuesday, Nov. 6.

HOLMES V. ROSE.-This was an action tried at Liverpool before Lush, J., in which the plaintiff had a verdict for 1601.-E. James, Q. C. now moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection and that the verdict was against evidence. The action was brought by the plaintiff as death through being run over by some trucks in defendants administratrix of her husband, to recover damages for his colliery. The declaration was based upon the 23 & 24 neglect, on the part of the defendants, to have places of Vict. c. 131, and the negligence complained of was the refuge at intervals of twenty yards, at the side of a certain inclined plane underground. It appeared to be customary for trucks descending this inclined plane to have a red light. The trucks through which the accident was caused had no such light, and there seemed to have been consi derable conflict of evidence whether the man killed and his companions had lights. Evidence was given to show that, if there had been anything to give warning of the approach of the trucks, the accident would not hava happened, as by a very simple machinery in use the men coming up might have communicated with those in charge

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PLATT V. PENNINGTON.-This was an action tried at Liverpool before Martin, B. for the price of 5000lbs. of twist, in which the plaintiff got a verdict for 1581. 1s.-E. James, Q. C. now moved, pursuant to leave, to enter the verdict for the defendant. Rule nisi.

WARBURTON . THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY ComPANY.—This was an action tried before Martin, B. at Manchester, in which the plaintiff, a servant of the London and North-Western Railway Company, got a verdict for 1501. It appeared that the plaintiff was employed at the Victoria Station at Manchester, which is jointly used by the defendants' company and the London and NorthWestern, and it was his duty to clean carriages after they had been shunted. While occupied in so doing he was - crushed between the train of carriages he was cleaning and another train of empty carriages of the Great Western shunting on to the same siding. The evidence showed that the accident arose through the neglect of the driver of the Great Western train. It was also shown that the servants of the Great Western, while engaged in the station, were bound to obey the rules and directions of the officers of the London and North-Western.-Brett, =Q. C. now moved for a new trial, on the ground that the learned judge ought to have directed a verdict for the defendants on the ground that the servants of the Great Western and North-Western were fellow-servants for the purposes of the rule of law that prevents recovery of damages for the negligence of fellow-servants, or at any rate it ought to have been left to the jury to say whether they were so or not. Cur. adv vult.

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BLACKETT v. BATES-This was an action tried before Martin, B. at Newcastle, in which a verdict passed for the defendant.-E. James, Q.C. now moved pursuant to leave reserved to enter the verdict for the plaintiff, damages to be referred. The action was for nonperformance of an award which directed the execution and delivery of a lease. The defendant pleaded the tender of a lease in accordance with the direction of the award, and also that plaintiff would not accept the lease. The award directed that within twenty-one days after delivery of the award the defendant should execute and deliver to the plaintiff a lease in the form contained in the schedule to the award, and that the plaintiff should execute and deliver a counterpart. When the lease was tendered on the last day to the plaintiff he was asked to sign the counterpart, which he refused to do without a previous examination of it by his solicitor. He was in consequence not allowed to take away the lease, and thereupon brought an action. The learned Judge being of opinion that the true construction of the award was, that the execution and delivery of the lease and counterpart were concurrent acts, directed a verdict for the defendant. It was now contended that they were independent and distinct; but the COURT were of the same opinion as the learned judge, and refused the rule.

Rule refused. POWELL v. CHANCE-SAVAGE T. THE SAME.-Huddleston, Q. C. applied for a certiorari to remove certain actions depending in the County Court of Warwickshire to the assizes. The actions were for nuisances caused by the defendant's alkali works, and were of great importance to the defendant, who had spent large sums upon his works to prevent any nuisance arising therefrom, and the questions involved were of a highly scientifle character.-The COURT, after some consideration, granted the rule, stating they felt great difficulty, being pressed on the one side by the intention of the Legislature to give a cheap legal remedy to persons of small means, and on the other by the great importance of this question to the defendant, and intimating that it was probable some terms as to costs might be imposed on the defendant.

Rule nisi.

MINNS . PRESTON. -E James, QC. moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight

of evidence.

Rule nisi.

CODDINGTON. PALEOLOGO.-This was an action tried before Martin, B. at Manchester, when a verdict passed for the plaintiff.-Temple, Q. C. now moved pursuant to leave to enter it for defendants. The question was whether, under a contract for delivery of cotton goods containing

tried at the last assizes for the county of Devon, before Byles, J., when a verdict passed for the plaintiff.-Kinglake, Serjt. now moved for a new trial on the ground of

misdirection.

Rule nisi.

READ V. THE MANCHESTER AND SHEFFIELD RAILWAY COMPANY.-This was an action tried before Mellor, J. at Leeds, when a verdict passed for plaintiff for 217. 168Manisty, QC. now moved for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence, and that there was no evidence to go to the jury. Rule nisi.

THOMAS V. HUCKWELL.-This was an action brought by a

man whose wife had been injured through the defective state of a trap-door on premises of which the defendant was landlord The plaintiff was nonsuited, and Coleridge, QC. now moved to set aside the nonsuit, and enter a verdict for plaintiff for 207. damages agreed on by the parties. The defendant had leased for twenty-one years to one Ellis, who had sublet, and the premises were then in the occupation of a tenant from year to year. Ellis being indebted to the defendant had deposited his lease with the defendant, together with a memorandum by which the defendant was to receive the rents until recouped. The trap-door had been made by Ellis.-The COURT were of opinion that the defendant not having erected the nuisance, and the tenancy still subsisting, the defendant could not be made liable. Rule refused.

The LORD CHIEF BARON called attention to the fact that

special cases, and demurrer books were often delivered without any points for argument, or with points of so vange a character as not to afford any real information as to the matter to be argued, and requested that this might

not be so for the future.

LAW SOCIETIES.

ARTICLED

CLERKS' SOCIETY. [Specially reported for this Journal.] The third inauguration meeting of this society was held in King's College Great Hall on Wednesday evening last, Mr. Coleridge, Q.C., M.P., in the chair.

The names of several new and honorary members having been announced,

He is the truest gentleman as well as the best attorney, who thinks no detail too small and no labour too great which may enable him to become practically master of the profession which he has adopted as his calling in life. With regard, therefore, to your purely professional education I have little or nothing to say. I assume, of course, that you have done your best to make yourselves masters of our few-I wish there were more for the sake of

jurisprudence-great text writers; that you have tried to present clearly to your minds the outlines and principles at least of law and equity, the principles of real property, of conveyancing as applied to real property, of assurance, of contracts, of easements, of the poor law, and of the criminal law. But what I want to insist upon to you tonight is, that it is of the greatest importance to yourselves and to society at large, that should you be more than mere lawyers, more even than wellintentioned and honourable practitioners. I assume that you will, or that you will try to, be all this; but you ought, in my opinion, to be a great deal more. It is important for yourselves, because it very seldom happens that a man without wide and general cultivation can attain the first place in a liberal profession; or if he does attain the first place by force of mind, by audacity, or by methods even less creditable, many examples, I think, sufficiently show us that he too often discredits an eminence to which he may have attained, but for which everybody except himself considers he is totally unfit. I do not mean to say that cultivation will do alone. I know perfectly well that cultivation will not do alone, but I do say that it makes success greater, that it gilds as it were the laurel of the conqueror, and that it pours some precious drops of consolation into the cup which many of the defeated have to drain. (Applause.) I cannot adequately express the strength of my feelings on this matter. Most of us I fear at some period of our life have wasted time, but we have not wasted one hour that has been spent in really wide The CHAIRMAN proceeded to deliver the inaugural thorough cultivation of the mind. Those hours, address. He said:-Gentlemen, I thank you very depend upon it, have been best spent which have been much for the kind and cordial reception which it spent in becoming familiar with, and in the study of, has been your pleasure to accord to me, but I cannot the works of great men of our own and of other say that it at all diminishes the reluctance with countries-hours that have been spent with Homer, which I appear before you in this chair to-night. and with Aristotle, with Cicero, Virgil, with Dante, It is not, I assure you, that I am afraid of the over with Montaigne, with Shakespeare, with Milton, with turbulence of your debate. I am not afraid but that Wordsworth, and with Bishop Butler. There we I may have capacity sufficient to sit in this chair to may learn, or at least we ought to learn, that there listen to the exciting speeches that I have no doubt are things better than professional success, things will be delivered, and formally to put the question much worse than professional failure; and that to you at the conclusion of the discussion. But I there are other and higher objects in life than to win understand that you have a desite that I should verdicts or to reverse decrees. From them we may address a few observations to you' upon points arrive, or we ought to arrive, at sound and sober connected with the conduct of our common Pro- judgments about ourselves and other people, at the fession with regard to which I may be enabled to knowledge what poor creatures most of us are side give any advice, and it is only the simple truth to by side with the great giants of our race, who from say that I approach this part of my duty with very time to time it has pleased God to vouchsafe to come great reluctance, for my professional life has been amongst us. And thus we may learn, or we ought to led so very much by chance from day to day, with learn, to avoid that vulgar vanity, that tiresome so very little of preconceived plan or settled object egotism and self-display which is so commonly, and about it; my experience has been so little reflected I am afraid so justly, charged by men of the world upon upon or brought into anything like order, and my men of our profession. It is not, perhaps, unnatural success-moderate and partial as it has been-was that so it should be. A great and successful lawyer so unexpected, and it is still so entirely unintelli- knowing nothing outside his profession, knowing gible to myself. that I really have no results his profession excellently well, matching himself of my own experience to lay before you, and no against men who, professionally, are greatly inferior precepts which I can give you as the outcoming of to himself, and having succeeded by means of his my personal recollection. Yet I know that if I profession in obtaining great worldly wealth or speak upon these subjects at all it will be supposed rank, is naturally and perhaps excusably, but often in spite of any protest that I may make that I am absurdly and ridiculously, vain. Now, bring such a speaking from myself, and that I am laying before man into the presence of a really great and noble you something in the way of personal example. I genius; make him, if you can, feel the grandeur and assure you it is not so, and with this simple and the beauty of such a mind. Show him the vast fields of thought and knowledge entirely new to as best I can, that part of my duty this evening, himself, which the works of such a man open to him, which I sincerely wish I could avoid discharging and he will begin to suspect that he is perhaps, after altogether. With regard to your professional educa- all, not quite so great and quite so fine a being as tion I can tell you nothing, because I do not profess he has been accustomed to think. And he is to understand the subject. I did not, as is the case humbled-which is good for himself; and silenced, with many barristers, pass any portion of time in which is good for others. (Laughter and applause.) an attorney's office as part of my preparation for the And, gentlemen, the qualities which you thus derive bar, and therefore, except so far as common sense you will look for and you will value in other men; and experience, and now some little familiarity and it is of the greatest importance to the Bar and with briefs, may be supposed to give it me, I have through the Bar to the country, that you should no practical experience of the working details of an arrive at those principles of judgment and that you attorney's office. And, indeed, I suppose, that to should act upon them. "The interests of the Bar," most sensible men advice about purely professional said a wise and high-minded friend of mine, a education may be comprised in the simple and obvi- country gentleman, "are really the interests of everyous precept: "Make yourselves fully masters of body who ever may have occasion to employ the your work; never suppose that you are above Bar." That is, they are the interests of almost your work; never suppose that your work is below every subject of the Queen, and the higher, and the you, or that you condescend to do it as a matter of purer, and the more elevated you can make the grace, which is certain to end in slovenliness and in character of the Bar, the better not only for our laziness." Gentlemen, whatever is worth doing at common Profession, but the better for the great all is worth doing well, and as an attorney's work, country of which we have the privilege of being beyond the work of almost every other man, is im- citizens. But, gentlemen, we of the Bar look to portant not only to himself, but to other people, a and are created by you, the attorneys, and in sense of solemn responsibility ought to come in aid proportion as you value justness of thought, largeof a sense of self-respect, and you ought to be anxiousness of view, refinement of mind, and elevation to do your duty thoroughly, not merely because it of character, so will you seek out and do honour is the calling in life which you have selected, but from to and promote those men in the other branch a sense of duty to your clients. This is sufficiently of the Profession who are distinguished by those obvious to every reflecting man. The poor pretender great characteristics. It is a very great mistake to to gentility who affects to depreciate and look down suppose that such men make bad practical advoupon the profession he has to live by, can excite- cates. In my opinion they make the best and most and ought to excite-in every manly mind no powerful advocates of all. But I will not rest the sentiment but that of disdainful pity. (Applause.) argument I am addressing to you upon any considera

the following words, "delivering on April 17th, complete short, but earnest disclaimer, I proceed to discharge,

8th May," the defendants had a right to rescind because no delivery was made on the 17th April Rule nisi. JOHNSON . KERSHAW.-This was an action tried at Liverpool before Martin, B., in which the plaintiff had a verdiet for 14431. 3s. 6d. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as agent for the purchase of 100 bales of cotton of a certain quality. Six out of the bales which the plaintiff purchased were not according to the order; and the question was whether the order was indivisible or not. T. Jones, Q. C. now moved pursuant to leave to enter the

verdict for the defendant.

Rule nisi.

GROVE v. RITCHIE. This was an action of ejectment; tried before Martin, B., at the sittings after Trinity Term in Middlesex, in which a verdict passed by consent for the defendant.-C. Pollock, Q. C. now moved pursuant to leave

to enter the verdict for the plaintiff. The principal questions were, whether a counterpart lease signed by lessee only was a lease in writing within sect. 8 of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, and also whether there was any evidence to go to the jury of the existence of a lease signed by the lessor.

Rule nisi.

Cooper v. DurnfORD.-Rochfort Clarke moved pursuant to leave to enter a verdict for the plaintiff. Rule refused. MORRIS v. HUNTER.-This was an action tried before Willes, J., at Guildford, in which the verdict was for the plaintiff.-Montagu Chambers, Q. C. now moved pursuant to leave to enter a nonsuit or a verdict for the defendant. The action was to recover money paid by the plaintiff, a stockbroker, for the purchase of shares in the Agra and Masterman's Bank for the defendant. The defendant had refused to pay when applied to for the money before the settlement-day, and between that time and the time of his giving the order the bank had stopped and a petition for winding-up had been presented, the name of the former owner of the shares still remaining on the register. DREW E. LAXTED.—This was an action of trespass;

Rule nisi.

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